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This book proposes to investigate the arts from the inside, namely to consider, first and foremost, what artists do to create their works in order to proceed fruitfully in the direction of their evaluation and explanation. To this end, it develops a philosophical inquiry that examines the ground zero of the arts, their common foundations, namely the rules for artistic creation, the processes that involve artists in their activities, the forms that they can or cannot achieve. This proposal and its outline for a rule-based ontology of the arts addresses four themes: the relationship between human nature and artistic practices, the features of art-making, the conception of artworks as structures, and the social nature of the arts.

Abstract

This book proposes to investigate the arts from the inside, namely to consider, first and foremost, what artists do to create their works in order to proceed fruitfully in the direction of their evaluation and explanation. To this end, it develops a philosophical inquiry that examines the ground zero of the arts, their common foundations, namely the rules for artistic creation, the processes that involve artists in their activities, the forms that they can or cannot achieve. This proposal and its outline for a rule-based ontology of the arts addresses four themes: the relationship between human nature and artistic practices, the features of art-making, the conception of artworks as structures, and the social nature of the arts.

In: The Ground Zero of the Arts: Rules, Processes, Forms
Author: Fiona MacMillan
This work sets out to consider the fate of creativity and forms of cultural production as they fall into and between the regimes of cultural heritage law and intellectual property law. It examines and challenges the dualisms that ground both regimes, exposing their (unsurprising) reflection of occidental ways of seeing the world. The work reflects on the problem of regulating creativity and cultural production according to Western thought systems in a world that is not only Western. At the same time, it accepts that the challenge in taking on the dualisms that hold together the existing legal regimes regulating creativity and cultural production lies in a critically nuanced approach to the geo-political distinction between the West and the rest. Like many of the distinctions considered in this book, this is one that holds and does not hold.
Author: Fiona Macmillan

Abstract

This work sets out to consider the fate of creativity and forms of cultural production as they fall into and between the regimes of cultural heritage law and intellectual property law. It examines and challenges the dualisms that ground both regimes, exposing their (unsurprising) reflection of occidental ways of seeing the world. The work reflects on the problem of regulating creativity and cultural production according to Western thought systems in a world that is not only Western. At the same time, it accepts that the challenge in taking on the dualisms that hold together the existing legal regimes regulating creativity and cultural production lies in a critically nuanced approach to the geo-political distinction between the West and the rest. Like many of the distinctions considered in this book, this is one that holds and does not hold.

In: Western Dualism and the Regulation of Cultural Production
Author: Alessandro Arbo
What do we mean when we talk about the identity of a musical work and what does such an identity involve? What in fact are the properties that make it something worth protecting and preserving? These issues are not only of legal relevance; they are central to a philosophical discipline that has seen considerable advances over the last few decades: musical ontology. Taking into account its main theoretical models, this essay argues that an understanding of the ontological status of musical works should acknowledge the irreducible ambivalence of music as an “art of the trace” and as a “performative art.” It advocates a theory of the musical work as a “social object” and, more specifically, as a sound artefact that functions aesthetically and which is based on a trace informed by a normative value. Such a normativity is further explored in relation to three primary ways of conceiving and fixing the trace: orality, notation and phonography.
Author: Alessandro Arbo

Abstract

The cases of copyright infringement that occasionally crop up in the world of music raise many interesting questions: what do we mean when we talk about the identity of a musical work and what does such an identity involve? What in fact are the properties that make it something worth protecting and preserving? These issues are not only of legal relevance, they are central to a philosophical discipline that has seen considerable advances over the last few decades: musical ontology. Taking into account its main theoretical models, this essay argues that an understanding of the ontological status of musical works should acknowledge the irreducible ambivalence of music as an “art of the trace” and as a “performative art.” It advocates a theory of the musical work as a “social object” and, more specifically, as a sound artefact that functions aesthetically and which is based on a trace informed by a normative value. Such a normativity is further explored in relation to three primary ways of conceiving and fixing the trace: orality, notation and phonography.

In: The Normativity of Musical Works: A Philosophical Inquiry
In the present work, a legal philosopher (Angela Condello) and a literaray scholar (Tiziano Toracca) develop the idea that a comparison between law and literature must be framed starting from the modes in which law and literature function. In this sense, they read law and literature as arts of compromising characterized by an analogous and yet, at the same time, profoundly different structure. Both, in fact, mediate conflicts between norms and transgressions, and more precisely between a principle of normativity (repression), on the one hand; and a principle of counternormativity (repressed), on the other hand. Through a progression in three steps, aimed at clarifying some peculiarities of law (1) and literature (2), by referring to examples of their interaction (3), the authors finally sketch some relevant hypotheses on why a placement across these two arts of compromising suggests some theoretical itineraries on their threshold.

Abstract

The present publication stems from the idea that a comparison between law and literature must be framed starting from the modes in which law and literature function. In this sense, we read law and literature as arts of compromising characterised by an analogous and yet, at the same time, profoundly different structure. Both, in fact, mediate conflicts between norms and transgressions, and more precisely between a principle of normativity (repression) on the one hand, and a principle of counternormativity (repressed) on the other hand. Through a progression in three steps, aimed at clarifying some peculiarities of law (1) and literature (2), and by referring to examples of their interaction (3), some hypotheses are sketched on why a placement across these two arts of compromising suggests some theoretical itineraries on their threshold.

In: A Theory of Law and Literature
Author: Gianmaria Ajani
The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an “autonomous author” urges the law to rethink authorship, originality, creativity. AI-generated artworks are in search of an author because current copyright laws offer as a solution only public domain or fragile regulatory mechanisms. During the 20th century visual artists have been posing persistent challenges to the law world: Conceptual Art favoured legal mechanisms alternative to copyright law. The case of AI-art is, however, different: for the first time the artworld is discovering the prospective of an art without human authors. Rather than preserving the status quo in the law world, policy makers should consider a reformative conception of AI in copyright law and take inspiration from innovative theories in the field of robot law, where new frames for a legal personhood of artificial agents are proposed. This would have a spill-over effect also on copyright regulations.
Author: Gianmaria Ajani

Abstract

The advent of Artificial Intelligence as an “autonomous author” in the various modes of Arts urges the law to rethink the traditional concepts of authorship, originality, and creativity. AI-generated artworks are in search of an author, so to speak, because current copyright laws only offer the solution of the public domain or fragile regulatory mechanisms. Several adjustments have globally led copyright laws to cover new forms of authorship as well as new sorts of works. Yet, the romantic idea of a lone individual as the master of creativeness still influences theoretical elaborations and normative choices. Throughout the 20th century, visual artists have been posing persistent challenges to the law: conceptual art and dematerialization have favored legal mechanisms alternative to copyright law. The case of AIart is, however, different: for the first time, the art world is discovering the perspective of an art without human authors. Rather than preserving the status quo in the legal world, policy makers should consider a reformative conception of AI in copyright law and take inspiration from innovative theories in the field of robot law, where new frames for a legal personhood of artificial agents are proposed. This would also have a spill-over effect on copyright regulations.

In: Contemporary Artificial Art and the Law