Browse results
The standard notion of the rule of law values individualism, equality, rights, and courts, which hardly fit the makeup of the Middle East. Securing stability and protecting religious freedom in the region requires compromising on the rule of law; the consociational model of constitutionalism would have better chances of achieving them.
The standard notion of the rule of law values individualism, equality, rights, and courts, which hardly fit the makeup of the Middle East. Securing stability and protecting religious freedom in the region requires compromising on the rule of law; the consociational model of constitutionalism would have better chances of achieving them.
Abstract
Religious Freedom without the Rule of Law: The Constitutional Odysseys of Afghanistan, Egypt, and Iraq and the Fate of the Middle East compares the domestic and international efforts to instill the values and practices of the rule of law in the Middle East in the early twenty-first century with their disappointing performances in terms of safety, political volatility, human rights violations, and, especially, religious freedom. It zooms in on Afghanistan, Egypt, and Iraq to argue that international interventions and local struggles underestimated the ethno-religious mosaic of these countries and their ideological cleavages. The rule of law could not reasonably replace local rights and promote religious freedom as many hoped. The notions of individualism, equality, rights, and courts, which are among the strongest philosophical underpinnings of the rule of law, are explored and contrasted with the political and constitutional culture of the Middle East. The work concludes that securing stability and protecting religious freedom in the region requires compromising on the rule of law and that the consociational model of constitutionalism would probably have better chances of achieving them.
Abstract
The present study is an analysis of a treatise (risāla) by the 18th-century Mālikī al-Tāwudī in which he discusses a doctrinal detail regarding bayʿ al-thunyā, a common stratagem to circumvent the prohibition of interest. I use al-Tāwudī’s text as a lens to reconstruct the hermeneutical perspective of a Muslim jurist of the late premodern era. In the first section, I show that al-Tāwudī’s legal reasoning is strongly informed by the legacy of Mālikī discourse on bayʿ al-thunya, which is one of constant disagreement over the acceptability of the institution. In the course of this conflict, various doctrinal compromises were negotiated, only to be challenged again by the invention of new stratagems or by rigorist backlashes. Al-Tāwudī’s treatise must be understood as part of this doctrinal tug of war.
In the second section, I analyze al-Tāwudī’s epistemological premises. I show that his legal reasoning is strictly exegetical, except that the object of this exegesis is not Qurʾān and Sunna, as proposed in classical uṣūl al-fiqh, but the school’s literary corpus. This corpus, in turn, is hierarchically structured. It consists of many layers of texts, accumulated over centuries and tightly interwoven by intertextual references, with certain texts enjoying a particularly authoritative status. Against this background, reasoning becomes a game of artful referencing. Successful argumentation requires claiming a maximum of authority within the school tradition in support of one’s position.