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What is money? What is capital? The Spectre of Capital tackles such fundamental questions at a deep philosophical level. It argues that the modern world is ruled by a ‘spectre’, the spectre of capital. This insight is rooted in an original combination of the ideas of Marx and Hegel. It presents the most sophisticated argument to date for ‘the homology thesis’, namely that the order of Hegel’s logical categories, and that of the social forms addressed by Marx’s Capital, share the same architectonic. The systematic-dialectical presentation shows how capital becomes a self-sustaining power.
Platons Antwort an Protagoras im ‘Theaitetos’ und im ‘Protagoras’
Protagoras beansprucht, die Jugend erziehen zu können. Warum nicht? Wenn «Mensch Maß aller Dinge» ist, kann jeder jeden ‘besser’ machen… Für Plato geht das nicht auf. Insofern Pädagogik Menschen dazu bringen will, ‘bessere’ Wesen zu werden, verlangt sie nach Plato ein gesundes Verständnis von ‘Sein’ überhaupt. Diese Studie untersucht die ontologischen Implikationen des Homo mensura-Satzes, Protagoras’ Prämisse, im ‘Theaitetos’ – einem Dialog, der selten ontologisch gelesen wird. Wenn der protagoräische Prämisse den pädagogischen Anspruch nicht trägt, dürfte der ‘Protagoras’ gar nicht eigentlich von den erzieherischen Fragen handeln, die diskutiert werden. Es könnte sich herausstellen, dass er einen ‘verborgenen’ Diskurs enthält…

Protagoras claims to be able to educate the young. If «Man is Measure of Everything», anybody can make everybody ‘better’… To Plato, this doesn't add up. Insofar as pedagogy aims at making humans become better beings, to Plato it supposes a sound conception of ‘being’ per se. This study explores the ontological implications of homo mensura, Protagoras’ premiss, in the ‘Theaetetus’ – a dialogue which is rarely read ontologically. If the Protagorean premiss doesn't support the pedagogical claim, the ‘Protagoras’ might not even be about the educational questions under discussion, but turn out to contain a ‘hidden’ discourse…
Volume Editors: Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki
The volume contains works showing the comprehensive contribution of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, to the European analytical movement.
The readers of the volume will learn, among other things, how the theoretically fertile distinction between act and product introduced by Twardowski turned out to be.
Furthermore, this volume illustrates the importance of Twardowski’s defense of alethic absolutism.
Finally, readers will learn about the conceptual tools developed by Twardowski, enabling the explanation of the phenomenon of still lingering prejudices, as well as Twardowski’s conception of rationality, and about his attitude towards formal and informal logic, as well as logical education.
An undoubted novelty of the volume is that it provides a kind of parametrization of Twardowski’s continuously increasing position in global philosophy by referring to the complete bibliography of works by and on Twardowski in European languages (other than his native language) up until 2020.
In: Das Maß des Menschen
In: Das Maß des Menschen
In: Das Maß des Menschen
In: Das Maß des Menschen
In: Das Maß des Menschen
In: Das Maß des Menschen
Author: Jan Woleński

Abstract

According to Twardowski, truth is if it is independent of temporal coordinates. This understanding was one of the main arguments against truth-relativism. Kotarbiński rejected this view as far the issue concerns sentences about the future, but he did not elaborated this idea from a logical point of view. Leśniewski offered an argument that truth is eternal if and only if it is sempiternal; Twardowski shared this opinion. Łukasiewicz rejected sempiternality but retained eternality. His main novelty consisted in applying three-valued logic to explain how it is possible that truth is not sempiternal. Łukasiewicz also pointed out that bivalence together with the principle of causality implies radical determinism. Kotarbiński accepted Leśniewski’s criticism and he defended Twardowski’s view in Elementy. Tarski did not explicitly addressed to the problem of absoluteness or temporality of truth. On the other hand, Kokoszyńska proposed an interpretation of the semantic theory of truth as absolute. It is possible to justify absoluteness of truth in semantics cum the principle of bivalence and show that bivalence does not imply determinism.

In: At the Sources of the Twentieth-Century Analytical Movement