This article has a threefold aim. First, to create a typology of Balkan migration crises. Second, to reflect on how migration is theorized in a crisis situation by analyzing the competing conceptual clusters and proposing new ones. Third, to measure the ratio between the region’s crisis and anti-crisis potential in the field of migration in regard both to agency and policies. The article is structured in four parts. The first part reconstructs the conceptual history of “crisis” and its affirmation as the hegemonic discourse of contemporary times. The second part introduces temporality as a theoretical zoom that illuminates a different migration profile depending on whether we are observing it in a short-term, mid-term, or long-term perspective. The third part presents a new typology of Balkan migration crises based on different criteria. It structures Balkan migration crises into two clusters: real and constructed. The article seeks to answer the question of why, given the abundance of real refugee and migration crises, new ones are constructed. The fourth part goes beyond the crisis and analyzes the migration and development nexus as a major policy innovation. The conclusion offers a comparative analysis of the diverse Balkan migration crises.
Migration studies are usually concerned with involuntary or underprivileged migrants living in highly developed societies. In contrast, this article focuses on emigration from affluent to less developed countries, using the example of EU lifestyle women transmigrants living in Belgrade. Serbia is a Western Balkan EU candidate country with a high youth emigration rate. The aim of this study is to question whether EU migrants can be development actors in a Western Balkan country. The bulk of the ethnographic research was conducted in 2018 by way of a series of interviews. The findings show that by using their “transcultural capital” in Serbia, the interviewees have the development potential to act as agents of “Europeanisation from below” and avoid the negative public perception of Europeanisation as a tool of Western domination in the region. However, in order to fulfil their development roles, affluent migrants first need to be recognised in Serbian migration management policies and supported by the local authorities.
This article examines a migration pattern which has been overshadowed by the ‘security turn’ dominating European discourses: depopulation. Across Europe, emigration is responsible for significant demographic transformations, especially in rural and remote areas. Depopulation leads to the reduction of services provided to citizens, further diminishing the attractiveness of these territories. Against this background, migration can counterbalance depopulation as part of a strategy for rural regeneration. This article analyses the case of Riace, an Italian town that has been hosting people seeking asylum and refugees for decades, and compares it to the Serbian town of Sjenica, where increasing numbers of non-EU migrants are settling after the ‘closure’ of the Western Balkans route. Our empirical findings indicate that there is both an opportunity and a political will to implement a similar model to that of Riace in Sjenica and in the southwest Sandžak region.
Anti-establishment parties with either a left-wing or a right-wing ideological slant have been entering contemporary European Democracies with sizeable vote shares. During the Great Recession, the Greek party system could be perceived as a relevant case-study for the formation and breakthrough of anti-establishment parties. Given the fact that two deeply ideologically diverging anti-establishment parties, the Coalition of the Radical Left – Social Unionist Front (syriza) and the populist radical right-wing Independent Greeks (anel), came to power, forming a coalition government from early 2015 to January 2019, the primary goal of this article is to enquire into ‘supply-side’ parameters, exploring potential associations along a range of programmatic stances and policy dimensions that effectuated the syriza-anel alliance. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey datasets from 2012 to 2017, our findings confirm beyond the expected programmatic differences the existence of a converging policymaking basis between syriza and anel which goes beyond the ‘pro-Memorandum vs. anti-Memorandum’ divide.
Studies have identified variables that influence ngo objectives, organizational structures and activities, often related to the broader socio-economic context. Among the most important are the availability of funding and the density of networks. Both factors affect ngo s by driving them either to adjust priorities and widen or limit their operations and/or to become more or less extrovert. This article aims to assess whether, how and to what extent the recent refugee crisis has impacted the Greek ngo ecosystem in terms of scope of activities, professionalization, organizational structures and transnational networking. Available funding, mostly from European institutions, has suddenly and spectacularly increased while International ngo s (ingo s) established operations to Greece – some cooperating with local partners. Likewise, several Greek ngo s (gngo s) embarked on a process of significant operational expansion, mostly ‘in the field’ and as part of an ‘emergency response’. Also, a series of grassroots organizations have been created – mainly at the local level. Based on a series of interviews with executives of the most recognizable gngo s, funders and policymakers and a survey based on questionnaires, the authors argue that the impact was both positive and negative and varied extensively depending on the size and type of organization under focus.