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Universal Reform, Studies in Intellectual History 1550-1700 (URSIH) volumes 1 and 2 were published by Routledge under ISBNs 9781472469168 and 9781472435842. Starting with the present volume 3, the URSIH series is published by Brill.
Abstract
At Phaedo 74b–c an important argument is given for the non–identity of perceptible equals and equality. The argument is usually understood as an application of Leibniz’s Law in which the predicate appears unequal is affirmed of perceptible equals but not equality. But this reading requires explaining why the plural locution the equals themselves is initially used for equality, and why the additional predicate appears as inequality is denied of it. In this paper, an account of the equality premise is given which allows for an initial grasp of equality as a plurality (suitably expressed by a plural locution), and introduces a generic predicate for appearance, appears its opposite (rightly denied of equality). The former ensures that the question of non–identity is not begged, while the latter secures a role for every element in the premise. So understood, the argument is both more robust and carefully formulated than is usually thought.
Abstract
In Kantian philosophy, the term “condition of possibility” is central, but carries the following ambiguity. According to one reading, “condition of possibility” merely means “necessary condition”. However, it is demonstrated that a deeper interpretation of the term “possibility” proves to be more fruitful. This reading allows us to reconstruct an important background assumption of Kant: Every condition of the possibility of experience holds necessarily, provided that experience is possible. Or more generally: All conditions of the possibility hold necessarily as long as the conditioned is actually possible.
This conclusion is understood through the axiomatic system S5. Therefore I argue by referencing the schematism chapter that Kant’s notion of modal terms can be formalized through S5.