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Introduction, Translation, and Commentary
Author:
In the treatise On the Change of Names (part of his magnum opus, the Allegorical Commentary), Philo of Alexandria brings his figurative exegesis of the Abraham cycle to its fruition. Taking a cue from Platonist interpreters of Homer’s Odyssey, Philo reads Moses’s story of Abraham as an account of the soul’s progress and perfection. Responding to contemporary critics, who mocked Genesis 17 as uninspired, Philo finds instead a hidden philosophical reflection on the ineffability of the transcendent God, the transformation of souls which recognize their mortal nothingness, the possibility of human faith enabled by peerless faithfulness of God, and the fruit of moral perfection: joy divine, prefigured in the birth of Isaac.
Introduction, Translation, and Commentary
Author:
In the treatise On the Change of Names (part of his magnum opus, the Allegorical Commentary), Philo of Alexandria brings his figurative exegesis of the Abraham cycle to its fruition. Taking a cue from Platonist interpreters of Homer’s Odyssey, Philo reads Moses’s story of Abraham as an account of the soul’s progress and perfection. Responding to contemporary critics, who mocked Genesis 17 as uninspired, Philo finds instead a hidden philosophical reflection on the ineffability of the transcendent God, the transformation of souls which recognize their mortal nothingness, the possibility of human faith enabled by peerless faithfulness of God, and the fruit of moral perfection: joy divine, prefigured in the birth of Isaac.
This book represents the first monograph (miscellany) entirely devoted to Crantor of Soli (app. 335–275 BCE), an outstanding figure of the Old Academy. He was in particular famous for his On Grief, an exemplary work of consolation literature, and for his being the first commentator of Plato’s Timaeus. Unlike his darling Arcesilaus of Pitane, who initiated the Sceptical turn, Crantor seems to have stuck firm to the Academic teachings of Polemon and Plato. The contributions collected in this book aim to convey a complete picture of Crantor by discussing various aspects of his philosophy and biography.
This book represents the first monograph (miscellany) entirely devoted to Crantor of Soli (app. 335–275 BCE), an outstanding figure of the Old Academy. He was in particular famous for his On Grief, an exemplary work of consolation literature, and for his being the first commentator of Plato’s Timaeus. Unlike his darling Arcesilaus of Pitane, who initiated the Sceptical turn, Crantor seems to have stuck firm to the Academic teachings of Polemon and Plato. The contributions collected in this book aim to convey a complete picture of Crantor by discussing various aspects of his philosophy and biography.
A wealth of political literature has survived from Greek antiquity, from political theory by Plato and Aristotle to the variety of prose and verse texts that more broadly demonstrate political thinking. However, despite the extent of this legacy, it can be surprisingly hard to say how ancient Greek political thought makes its influence felt, or whether this influence has been sustained across the centuries. This volume includes a range of disciplinary responses to issues surrounding the legacy of Greek political thought, exploring the ways in which political thinking has evolved from antiquity to the present day.
A wealth of political literature has survived from Greek antiquity, from political theory by Plato and Aristotle to the variety of prose and verse texts that more broadly demonstrate political thinking. However, despite the extent of this legacy, it can be surprisingly hard to say how ancient Greek political thought makes its influence felt, or whether this influence has been sustained across the centuries. This volume includes a range of disciplinary responses to issues surrounding the legacy of Greek political thought, exploring the ways in which political thinking has evolved from antiquity to the present day.
Volume Editor:
This volume of fourteen essays explores the biology of Aristotle and the Early Peripatos (Theophrastus and the Physical Problems) in its various dimensions—how the study of the soul contributes to the foundation of the science of perishable life, what is the program of this science and its main explanatory strategies, whether it be the explanation of natural generation or the relationship of the animal to its surroundings. But the authors also explore what might be, to Aristotle, the unity of life, not only that of animals and plants, but also that of celestial bodies and the Prime Mover.
Series:
Philosophia Antiqua, Volume: 171
Volume Editor:
This volume of fourteen essays explores the biology of Aristotle and the Early Peripatos (Theophrastus and the Physical Problems) in its various dimensions—how the study of the soul contributes to the foundation of the science of perishable life, what is the program of this science and its main explanatory strategies, whether it be the explanation of natural generation or the relationship of the animal to its surroundings. But the authors also explore what might be, to Aristotle, the unity of life, not only that of animals and plants, but also that of celestial bodies and the Prime Mover.
Author:
‘Let me give you a simple example of what I mean, and you will see the rest for yourself.’ This is how Plato usually introduces mathematical examples to illustrate important philosophical puzzles. The research presented in this book offers a systematic analysis of these examples and demonstrates their crucial psychagogical function. Providing a toolkit of paradoxical objects that challenge the soul and summon thought, mathematical examples do not convey demonstrative rigor or exact calculations, but instead induce psychic states of aporia and wonder. The gaze of Plato’s mathematicians is directed both downwards and upwards: precisely for this reason mathematics have the power to awaken the soul and to lead it towards the Forms.
«Prendi un piccolo esempio, e saprai tutto quello che voglio dire». Così Platone introduce esempi matematici volti a illustrare snodi filosofici particolarmente problematici. Questo studio fornisce un’analisi sistematica di tali esempi e ne mostra la cruciale funzione psicagogica. Come un toolkit di oggetti paradossali che confondono l’anima e mettono in moto il pensiero, le matematiche degli esempi non veicolano rigore dimostrativo e calcoli esatti, ma inducono stati psichici di aporia e meraviglia. Proprio in virtù del loro sguardo biforcuto, rivolto non solo verso l’alto ma anche verso il basso, le matematiche hanno il potere di risvegliare l’anima e di trainarla verso le Idee.
«Prendi un piccolo esempio, e saprai tutto quello che voglio dire». Così Platone introduce esempi matematici volti a illustrare snodi filosofici particolarmente problematici. Questo studio fornisce un’analisi sistematica di tali esempi e ne mostra la cruciale funzione psicagogica. Come un toolkit di oggetti paradossali che confondono l’anima e mettono in moto il pensiero, le matematiche degli esempi non veicolano rigore dimostrativo e calcoli esatti, ma inducono stati psichici di aporia e meraviglia. Proprio in virtù del loro sguardo biforcuto, rivolto non solo verso l’alto ma anche verso il basso, le matematiche hanno il potere di risvegliare l’anima e di trainarla verso le Idee.
Author:
‘Let me give you a simple example of what I mean, and you will see the rest for yourself.’ This is how Plato usually introduces mathematical examples to illustrate important philosophical puzzles. The research presented in this book offers a systematic analysis of these examples and demonstrates their crucial psychagogical function. Providing a toolkit of paradoxical objects that challenge the soul and summon thought, mathematical examples do not convey demonstrative rigor or exact calculations, but instead induce psychic states of aporia and wonder. The gaze of Plato’s mathematicians is directed both downwards and upwards: precisely for this reason mathematics have the power to awaken the soul and to lead it towards the Forms.
«Prendi un piccolo esempio, e saprai tutto quello che voglio dire». Così Platone introduce esempi matematici volti a illustrare snodi filosofici particolarmente problematici. Questo studio fornisce un’analisi sistematica di tali esempi e ne mostra la cruciale funzione psicagogica. Come un toolkit di oggetti paradossali che confondono l’anima e mettono in moto il pensiero, le matematiche degli esempi non veicolano rigore dimostrativo e calcoli esatti, ma inducono stati psichici di aporia e meraviglia. Proprio in virtù del loro sguardo biforcuto, rivolto non solo verso l’alto ma anche verso il basso, le matematiche hanno il potere di risvegliare l’anima e di trainarla verso le Idee.
«Prendi un piccolo esempio, e saprai tutto quello che voglio dire». Così Platone introduce esempi matematici volti a illustrare snodi filosofici particolarmente problematici. Questo studio fornisce un’analisi sistematica di tali esempi e ne mostra la cruciale funzione psicagogica. Come un toolkit di oggetti paradossali che confondono l’anima e mettono in moto il pensiero, le matematiche degli esempi non veicolano rigore dimostrativo e calcoli esatti, ma inducono stati psichici di aporia e meraviglia. Proprio in virtù del loro sguardo biforcuto, rivolto non solo verso l’alto ma anche verso il basso, le matematiche hanno il potere di risvegliare l’anima e di trainarla verso le Idee.
Volume XXXVIII (2023)
This volume, the 38th year of published proceedings, contains four papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2023. Topics: Theophrastus’s interpretation of De Anima III 5 defended against the traditional readings; a new interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmology, aiming to deflect Aristotle’s criticism; analysis of the role of Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic, arguing that he is responsible for the turn to politics in the dialogue; explication of Metaphysics book Epsilon, in which Aristotle argues for the necessity of a first philosophy beyond physics. The commentators subject each paper to critical review, and they support, challenge, or reject what they find.
Volume XXXVIII (2023)
This volume, the 38th year of published proceedings, contains four papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2023. Topics: Theophrastus’s interpretation of De Anima III 5 defended against the traditional readings; a new interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmology, aiming to deflect Aristotle’s criticism; analysis of the role of Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic, arguing that he is responsible for the turn to politics in the dialogue; explication of Metaphysics book Epsilon, in which Aristotle argues for the necessity of a first philosophy beyond physics. The commentators subject each paper to critical review, and they support, challenge, or reject what they find.
In:
Méthexis
Author:
Abstract
How can events in part of the Stoic cosmos be contingent, when all events are necessary? Why does Chrysippus hold that the impossible may flow from the possible, or that while it is possible Dion die, ‘this person be dead’ is impossible. This article constructs a naïve model of Stoic modality in which truth evaluations are grounded in spatial location and motion. This is shown to provide a best fit for the Stoic doctrine, generating the six events which Chrysippus groups into the four Stoic modal categories, and explaining why the Stoics espoused doctrines attacked as contradictory by their opponents.
In:
Méthexis
Author:
Abstract
This article explores, from an epistemic perspective, the scope of some key notions of the Stoic theory of action at the moment of a rational agent’s deliberation. It is argued that deliberation consists primarily in a critical examination of impulsive presentations (φαντασίαι ὁρμητικαί) and that indifferent objects (ἀδιάφορα), as carriers of a kind of selective value (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική), rather than a reason to act constitute a reason to believe (Klein, 2015). Finally, it is concluded that virtue, contrary to what has sometimes been interpreted, is not part of the deliberative process as one among other considerations about the indifferent because the moral value of virtue is incommensurable with the natural value of the indifferent. However, virtue enters decisively into deliberation insofar as the practical end of the rational agent is to reason perfectly (εὐλογιστεῖν) in full consonance with the demands of destiny.
In:
Méthexis