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In: Philosophie des Abschieds
In: Philosophie des Abschieds
In: The Spectre of Capital: Idea and Reality
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Abstract

According to Twardowski, truth is if it is independent of temporal coordinates. This understanding was one of the main arguments against truth-relativism. Kotarbiński rejected this view as far the issue concerns sentences about the future, but he did not elaborated this idea from a logical point of view. Leśniewski offered an argument that truth is eternal if and only if it is sempiternal; Twardowski shared this opinion. Łukasiewicz rejected sempiternality but retained eternality. His main novelty consisted in applying three-valued logic to explain how it is possible that truth is not sempiternal. Łukasiewicz also pointed out that bivalence together with the principle of causality implies radical determinism. Kotarbiński accepted Leśniewski’s criticism and he defended Twardowski’s view in Elementy. Tarski did not explicitly addressed to the problem of absoluteness or temporality of truth. On the other hand, Kokoszyńska proposed an interpretation of the semantic theory of truth as absolute. It is possible to justify absoluteness of truth in semantics cum the principle of bivalence and show that bivalence does not imply determinism.

In: At the Sources of the Twentieth-Century Analytical Movement
In: Entanglements and Weavings: Diffractive Approaches to Gender and Love
In: The Real of Reality: The Realist Turn in Contemporary Film Theory
In: A Cosmological Reformulation of Anselm’s Proof That God Exists
In: A Cosmological Reformulation of Anselm’s Proof That God Exists
In: A Cosmological Reformulation of Anselm’s Proof That God Exists
Author:
Dans le Sophiste de Platon, un mystérieux étranger venu d’Élée entreprend de définir méthodiquement le rival le plus farouche du philosophe, le sophiste. Sa définition est cependant interrompue par une tentative de réfuter l’ontologie de Parménide. La signification propre de cette réfutation et sa relation exacte avec la chasse au sophiste demeurent très controversées dans la littérature secondaire. Ce livre propose un commentaire suivi du dialogue montrant comment la distinction, souvent négligée, entre dialectique et apparences permet de trancher dans les controverses suscitées par le Sophiste, tout en restaurant l’unité et l’originalité profondes de la pensée de Platon.

In Plato’s Sophist, a mysterious Eleatic Stranger, the main character of the dialogue, undertakes a systematic definition of the philosopher’s fiercest rival, the sophist. His hunt for a definition of the sophist, however, is interrupted by an attempt to refute the ontology of Parmenides. The philosophical significance of this refutation and its exact relationship to the sought-after definition remains a matter of great scholarly dispute. This book, by means of a running commentary on the dialogue, argues that the oft-neglected distinction between dialectic and appearances is not only the key to solving this and other exegetical conundrums, but also reveals the unity and originality of Plato’s argument in the Sophist.