Pacifism is the view that necessarily, the nonconsensual physical harming of pro tanto rights-bearers is all-things-considered morally impermissible. Critics of pacifism frequently point to common moral intuitions about self-defenders and other-defenders as evidence that pacifism is false and that self- and other-defense are often morally justified. I call this the Justification View and defend its rival, the Excuse View. According to the latter, a robust view of moral excuse adequately explains the common moral intuitions invoked against pacifism and is compatible with pacifism. The paper proceeds in five steps. First, I identify ten intuitive data points that require explanation. Second, I introduce the justification/excuse distinction. Third, I demonstrate the Excuse View’s equal explanatory power with respect to the intuitive data. Fourth, I defend the Fair Use Principle: When evaluating the plausibility of rival theories J and E, the use of datum d’s full intuitive force against E and for J is epistemically permissible only if (i) d is better explained by J than E and (ii) no intuitive components of d are equally well-explained by E. Finally, I conclude that the conjunction of pacifism and the Excuse View renders the intuitive defense of the Justification View largely moot, and that this is a substantial victory for pacifism.
This article examines whether Taiwan’s current legal landscape regarding the protection of migrant fishers satisfies both the requirements set by the CPTPP and other relevant international labor standards, including the International Labour Organization conventions and the forced labor indicators. Specifically, this article conducts a content analysis and in-depth interviews to identify how legal protections granted to migrant fishers are deficient and how Taiwan can improve them. By focusing on the labor chapter and relevant provisions of the CPTPP, this article demonstrates how accession into the CPTPP will provide a more effective collaborating mechanism that will facilitate multilateral cooperation between Taiwan and other members. The cooperation will jointly address the forced labor issues on distant water fishing vessels. This article aims to envisage legal and policy recommendations to facilitate Taiwan’s accession into the CPTPP and polish Taiwan’s regulatory framework that protects migrant fishers.
This special report aims to examine the development of norm-setting mechanisms regarding connectivity in the latest Indo-Pacific policies and strategies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). Linking the States together within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond is essential for the development and prosperity of the region. The geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, where the interests and the focus are diverse among key players, may make promoting connectivity difficult. Yet, international norm-setting for efficient, transparent, fair infrastructure investment is essential. The developed States and regional bodies, including the US and the EU, are trying to lead the way. The norm-setting efforts are, at least partially, in response to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This special report explores the latest progress regarding the extent to which the high standards are reflected in these practices.
In the field of international criminal law, it is often claimed that a norm of corporate accountability for international crimes is expanding, yet commercial actors who profit from atrocity do so with impunity. The Myanmar situation exemplifies the potential for greater corporate accountability, highlighted by the findings of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on the role of economic actors in alleged Tatmadaw crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations. These under-acknowledged allegations of serious corporate complicity present an opportunity for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate. Doing so would challenge the accountability carve-out for corporate accountability that currently exists in the enforcement practice of international criminal law. If prosecutions for atrocity crimes in Myanmar focus solely on senior military and political figures, this will be a matter of policy rather than legal mandate, disavowing the heritage of international criminal justice after Nuremberg, where industrialists were charged for the complicity of their business activities in international crimes. We analyze the existing allegations of corporate complicity in Myanmar, describe the (expanding?) accountability norm, and evaluate jurisdictional possibilities. We argue that Myanmar presents a testing ground for international criminal justice: rise to the challenge and apply international rules of individual complicity to commercial activity (normative expansion), or maintain the status quo (enforcement carve-out).
In June 2020, Singapore, Chile and New Zealand signed the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA), which expanded the scope of the international agreements covering digital trade, including more detailed provisions on digital trade facilitation, and treatment of digital products and other recent trends. In addition, Australia and Singapore signed the Digital Economy Agreement (ASDEA) in August 2020, which largely implemented the DEPA provisions.
The DEPA and the ASDEA provisions are based on the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with provisions covering new areas. In addition, the drafting of the DEPA and ASDEA show some degree of flexibility by providing “principles” rather than fixed “rules” in new issues. Moreover, other countries are applying to the DEPA membership, and using the DEPA language in their own digital trade agreements. In this regard, the experience of DEPA and the ASDEA may provide helpful points to consider for future digital trade agreements including the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.