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Abstract
How do power-sharing governing coalitions work in the context of politicized identities and external pressures? And how do they emerge, develop, and disintegrate when governing parties share power in the context of colliding agendas? Working on the premise that coalition governments may be messy constellations of power, rather than rational avenues for deliberation, this article explores the politics of coalitions in the Middle East as a case of adversarial power-sharing, or what we frame as ‘forced marriages.’ We focus on Yemen and Lebanon, two polities that have developed power-sharing arrangements in conflict-laden environments, albeit under different circumstances and logics of state-building. We argue that while both countries are different on a wide range of variables, they have broader lessons to convey on the ways coalition governments perform and the policy consequences they yield. Throughout both countries’ political history, coalition governance patterns have led to political fragmentation and policy gridlock. However, the puzzle is that notwithstanding antagonistic policy agendas and despite popular disaffection with ruling arrangements, coalition governments have kept re-emerging. This requires an incisive look into the relational and complex dynamics that sustain their logic.
Abstract
While existing research on coalition government formation and durability has significantly enhanced our understanding of coalition processes, it remains heavily focused on (1) the experiences of established democracies in Europe and on (2) the various roles of domestic institutions and actors. In this article, we examine the interplay of external interference and domestic actors to explain the success and failure of coalition government formation in the context of fragile democracies. We ask: How does external interference impact government coalition formation? Drawing on Domestic Opposition Theory (dot), we explore two cases of coalition government efforts in the Middle East: post-elections in Iraq in 2018 and in Palestine in 2006. Findings show that, in the case of Palestine, external interference – financial boycott of Hamas-led government and support for Fatah against Hamas – played a key role in the eventual failure of the governing coalition. In Iraq’s case, widespread public domestic opposition to continued external influence, particularly from Iranian-backed interests, played a defining role in coalition formation processes.
Abstract
The article analyzes multiparty coalition governments under authoritarian tutelage in Morocco and Algeria. While in Morocco multiparty coalition governments are just a means for the King to dress their windows, in Algeria they represent a new arena of power bargaining. In both cases, portfolio allocation follows the Gamson’s law but cases of advantage for the formateur are also given. Nonetheless, the parties included in multiparty coalition governments are almost always regime-controlled ones, as is the case in Algeria, or encounter reserved domains constitutionally defined, as is the case in Morocco. Moreover, in both cases the democratic potential intrinsic to multiparty coalition governments is defused by preventing grassroots parties to access top-weighted ministerial portfolios and by envisaging a relevant role for non-party ministries. This renders cabinet positions hardly contestable and adds up to the durability of multiparty coalition governments while making them barely apt at channeling grassroots demands for political change.
Abstract
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has moved in recent decades from being the exception to the rule among Arab states. Not only has it spread, but contests about adjudication of constitutional disputes have become much more prominent and political reform efforts have sometimes included a great emphasis on establishing or strengthening constitutional courts. In Jordan, longstanding calls for a constitutional court were finally met in 2011 and the Jordanian Constitutional Court began operating the following year. This article traces the background to establishing the court and analyzes its structure. It then assesses the Jordanian Constitutional Court in operation, first by examining its short history and then by analyzing why its emergence as a judicial actor has been slow and uneven and how this might be changed.