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Abstract
The relationships among the EU, the AU, and their respective member states evolved in an increasingly turbulent global context. Cooperation in areas including trade and investment continued and even deepened through new international agreements, yet diplomatically the relationships went through difficult times. Views on Ukraine and Gaza often diverged significantly. The ongoing destabilisation in the Sahel region, coupled with diminishing European – especially French – influence and engagement, further underscored these differences. The consequence was that high-level dialogue at the AU–EU level was more or less paused during 2023, but the adoption of new Africa strategies by several European countries indicated both a willingness and a potential to deepen relations.
Abstract
Following last year’s hotly contested election, and the rather narrow re-election of President João Lourenço, this year was by contrast politically relatively uneventful, though it saw the first ever opposition motion to dismiss a sitting president – a process still open by the end of the year. The country’s foreign politics saw a more proactive role in regional peace efforts and, notably, a rapprochement with the United States. The economic situation was dire, especially after the government phased out fuel subsidies, which triggered widespread but swiftly repressed citizen protests. Generally, the human rights situation and press freedom deteriorated, while a book featuring the alleged ‘confessions’ of the late ex-president José Eduardo dos Santos made minor waves.
Abstract
As an election year in Benin, 2023 was also marked by initiatives at the highest level of government to strengthen security, against a backdrop of intervention by armed groups in the north of the country. The enhancement of bilateral and multilateral cooperation enabled the acquisition of equipment and the synergy of efforts in the fight against terrorism. Despite the economic gloom decried by the population, Benin’s economic situation was quite satisfactory and stable, according to the analysis of certain international institutions.
Abstract
The tension between President Mokgweetsi Masisi and the former president, Ian Khama, intensified, with reports of possible mediation without success. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS) continued to attract disapproval for its deceitful character. The independence of the judiciary and other critical public institutions such as the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) remained public issues, and reports of corruption and maladministration continued. Opposition cooperation talks were in motion, yet divisions and internal wrangling were apparent. Despite Khama’s efforts to disparage Masisi’s regime, the country sustained positive foreign relations. Socioeconomic developments were dominated by a new ten-year sales agreement between the government and De Beers, and mining licences for Debswana (a partnership between the Botswana government and De Beers) were extended for 25 years from 2029 to 2054, following intense negotiations – a critical development considering the role of diamonds in the country’s economy. However, the economy remained vulnerable to external shocks, and the country continued to be afflicted by socioeconomic challenges.
Abstract
After seizing power in 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré consolidated control over his military junta by suppressing dissent and building ties with other juntas in the region. As Traoré focused on internal critics and opposition to his power grab, a growing militant Islamist insurgency besieged dozens of localities, cutting populations of displaced people off from essential humanitarian aid. Some 1 m school children had no school to attend as a quarter of the country’s schools were shuttered due to rampant insecurity. A formal alliance with neighbouring juntas in Mali and Niger appeared to do little to address the worsening security situation, as millions in the region faced the highest levels of food insecurity in the last ten years.
Abstract
Burundi experienced significant socio-political events in 2023, both domestically and regionally, marking a dynamic year for the country. The Burundian courts sentenced General Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, former prime minister and strongman of the presidential party, to life imprisonment. His trial marked a clear split between the pro-Nkurunziza and pro-Ndayishimiye factions. The activities of the Congrès National pour la Liberté (CNL), the main opposition party, were suspended by the authorities, making it increasingly difficult for its members to express their opinions and organise freely. The year also coincided with Burundi’s presidency of the EAC, which enabled President Évariste Ndayishimiye to position himself at the regional level, cutting short the option of diplomatic isolation that his predecessor had opted for. Despite this glimmer of diplomatic hope, the economic situation was alarming due to the opaque ways in which public affairs were managed, the trial-and-error approach, and the global economic situation. Several cases of fuel shortages and basic needs affected daily life. The human rights situation did not improve, and human rights defenders were not spared.
Abstract
In April, Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva was for the fourth consecutive time elected leader of the Movimento para a Democracia (MpD), albeit with a slightly smaller percentage of votes and a lower turnout of voting party members than before. On several occasions, President José Maria Neves publicly disagreed with his government’s decisions. The tourism sector suffered a set-back when, in October, a Chinese investor cancelled a $250 m casino project in Praia for which the concession contract had been signed in 2015. Nevertheless, the number of foreign visitors further increased, while the number of air passenger arrivals reached a new annual record.
Abstract
Political tensions appeared to be on the rise following the sordid murder of the director of a private radio station, in which agents and officials of a counter-espionage service were implicated. Given President Paul Biya’s age (90 years), the presidential election scheduled for 2025 fuelled political ambitions and rivalries within the ruling party, but also within the opposition, which lost one of its veterans, Ni John Fru Ndi, who succumbed to illness. Under pressure from the IMF, the government was compelled to reduce fuel price subsidies; this had a negative impact on inflation and put considerable strain on private households. While President Biya appeared eager to strengthen ties with Russia, his administration became embroiled in a diplomatic row with the Canadian government over the negotiations to end the war in the country’s two Anglophone regions, where armed groups and the regular army continued to clash with each other and commit atrocities against the civilian population.
Abstract
The year 2023 was another one of continued armed violence in half of the countries of the sub-region, with all of the consequences of this in terms of internal displacement and flight to neighbouring countries. Family rule was the established pattern of domestic politics in Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo, Cameroon, and Gabon – in this last case at least until the military coup in August. The impact of this event on at least one sub-regional organisation was evident as Ali Bongo Odimba had been the current chair of CEEAC. The regional integration process did not progress substantially, and last year’s announcements that a merger of CEMAC and CEEAC would be accelerated were not followed by concrete action. Economically, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic were (at last) largely under control, but the countries of the sub-region fared quite differently in terms of growth and inflation rates.
Abstract
President Faustin-Archange Touadéra managed to get a firm long-term grip on power by pushing for a new constitution revoking presidential term limits, which was adopted by referendum. The opaque and executive-heavy process was contested by the opposition, but to no avail. The peace process saw some superficial progress, not least because a number of rebel movements split, with some factions accepting dissolution. However, the ever more widespread use of explosive devices meant that civilian populations, particularly in the north-west, could not live in peace. The economic situation remained dire, with the IMF intervening to help a government that did little by itself. Turmoil in neighbouring countries (Chad and Sudan) somewhat altered the familiar regional picture, making CAR look less vulnerable in comparison and even allowing Touadéra to be designated facilitator in Gabon’s post-coup crisis, though he could not point to a major improvement in his own country.