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Abstract
This article discusses the veneration of Metropolitan Petr of Kyiv and all Rus’ in 14th–16th century Moscow. It focuses on the shifting roles attributed to his tomb in the Dormition Cathedral, from locally developed veneration, to a source of ecclesiastical legitimacy. In the first section, I trace the cult’s development from the earliest hagiographical writings to posthumous miracles included in chronicle writing and artistic representations of Petr’s activity as an icon painter. The second section examines a possible attempt at ritual building for local appointments of metropolitans, after 1448, revolving around Petr’s tomb. I argue that Petr’s saintly image was purposely shaped over two centuries from a wonderworking saint to also a military protector of the city and a prototype of the legitimate metropolitan of all Rus’. Although his tomb did not receive a permanent place in enthronement ceremonies, in the 16th century it became synonymous with the seat of the metropolitan, and played a major role in the subsequent veneration of a correct line of ecclesiastical successors buried in its proximity.
Abstract
After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, a new historical phase began for the whole of Europe, marked by a sharp escalation of international conflict and the imminent outbreak of World War II. For Soviet citizens, these events were particularly traumatic because they also meant a sudden turn toward peace with Germany. The news of the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression pact was received by Soviet citizens with mixed feelings. Many of them did not understand why yesterday’s Enemy No. 1 was suddenly turned into Ally No. 1, and what to expect from this partnership. In searching for the rationale for this agreement, the Soviet people were inclined to take a positive view of the pact, and then a negative one. A detailed analysis of the transformation of the public mood makes it possible to identify the internal problems of Soviet society, which manifested themselves expressively in the first weeks of World War II. This study also draws attention to the problem of Soviet people’s trust in official sources of information; to the impact of war scares of the interwar period on Soviet society; and to the influence of the ideas of the world proletarian revolution on the perception of the events of late August and early September 1939. The study is based on the accounts of the predominantly Russian population of the Soviet Union and presents the perspective of this ethnic group.
Abstract
While historians of homosexuality in the post-Stalin era have mainly focused on developments such as discussions about the decriminalization of homosexuality and the establishment of sexology, our understanding of conservative perspectives on homosexuality remains limited. This article introduces and analyses a previously classified medical doctoral thesis (habilitation) on homosexuality prepared and defended in the 1970s. This is currently the only accessible in-depth scholarly investigation of male homosexuality in this period. The article seeks to contribute to the thriving field of the history of homosexuality under late socialism by shedding some light on the rationale for continuing to criminalize consensual homosexual activity, from the perspective of a contemporary forensic expert. Secondly, the thesis, which was based on the criminal files of those convicted of consensual homosexuality in Leningrad (1961–1968) – a total of 107 men were convicted – provides additional data on the previously rather obscure realm of interaction between homosexuals and law enforcement agencies.
Abstract
The present article aims to propose a theoretical framework capable of elucidating the intriguing resilience of the ideas shaping the attitudes of Russian ruling circles and intellectuals toward Ukraine. Offering a perspective that incorporates the latest findings on Russia’s “empire-nation dilemma” into the explanatory model, it delves into the historical context in which the Russian political and intellectual elite’s worldview and self-narratives were shaped – the period spanning from the 1830s to 1917. It reveals the intricate link between their sense of ontological (in-)security in relation to the West and the belief that assimilating Ukraine was pivotal for bolstering external power and ensuring internal stability within the Russian state.
Abstract
Since launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, Russian authorities have provided several narratives to justify their aggressive actions and war crimes. According to the first, their war is only a response to the actions of the “Nazis”; therefore, the current war is a continuation of the Great Patriotic War in which Russia defeated Hitler. The second asserts the superiority of Russian culture over Ukrainian and explains the attack on Ukraine by the desire to protect the Russian language and culture on Ukrainian territory. Both of these narratives can be categorized as ressentiment, a term coined by Nietzsche that refers to a feeling of hostility towards an individual who is deemed responsible for one’s failures or hardships. This reaction involves glorifying an idealized past and vehemently opposing anything associated with the freedom and cultural values of another. Russophone anti-war poetry written after February 24th, both in Russia and abroad, deconstructs these propaganda narratives and offers its own narrative strategy for talking about Russian history, which I term the poetics of “de-ressentiment.” This essay analyzes anti-war poems by Russian-speaking poets and identifies the principles and tasks of de-ressentiment in the context of Russia’s catastrophic policies. The paper explores how Russian-language anti-war poetry tries to find the right language to discuss the most traumatic topics in Russian history and proposes a total revision of Russian history and culture. This de-ressentiment revision should break free modern Russia’s destructive focus on its past that deprives it of any future.
Abstract
The rethinking and decolonization of Russian history has become a significant challenge for historians. This process should cover primarily the history of the Russian empire. The study of different regions of the Russian empire is one of the possible approaches because the empire was heterogeneous. The history of imperial institutions would thus move to the sidelines, while the history of regions, cities, different social, ethnic and religious groups, as well as the interaction within and between them should become the primary focus of historians. This approach would foster a shift from a Moscow-centric view.
Abstract
With Russia’s escalation in Ukraine, many long-standing positions and relationships have become much more complicated. Many nations in the Global South have elected to remain neutral to avoid damaging their long-standing relations with Russia, which they rely on for political or economic stability. The Russian government has instrumentalized this history of Russian and Soviet support for anti-imperialism to buoy its own relations with the Global South. This support has its roots in the Comintern period when the Communist International promoted anti-imperialism, anti-racism, and self-determination of nations. These efforts, in turn, helped develop the image of the Soviet Union as an anti-imperial bulwark, while also providing an alternate path in which many nations in the Global South found inspiration following the Second World War. This thought piece reconsiders the history of the Comintern to ask fresh questions about its role in anti-imperial and anti-racist movements. In doing so, it calls for a greater attention to the limitations of the Soviet regime during the interwar period, and a reconsideration of the imperial actions of the Soviet Union as relates to this history. It also explores how the history of the Comintern and the complicated history of Soviet support for global decolonization in the interwar period remains relevant to contextualizing present-day reactions to Russian aggression in Ukraine and why, despite the correctives of the post-Cold War period, historians now need to ensure further complexities in this history are not overlooked in the instrumentalization of this history promoted by Russia following February 2022.
Abstract
Dostoevsky’s nationalism has long been a sensitive and controversial topic in Western scholarship. At the core of the controversy is the problem of explaining the stark contrast between Dostoevsky’s philosophical message of universal love and the explicitly xenophobic, chauvinistic and war-glorifying statements found in many of his journalistic articles. Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has reignited the old controversy in ways that have brought to light the profound political implications involved in interpreting Russian history in a post-2022 context. Many Ukrainian intellectuals and public figures have come to question not only the appropriateness of Dostoevsky’s title as a “great humanist” but also the conventions of Dostoevsky’s reception in Western scholarship, which serve to maintain this image of the writer in the public mind, despite many of his unpalatable ideas. These sentiments are echoed by (as yet) a small group of Russianists in the West who argue for the need to reconsider Dostoevsky from a more critical, decolonizing perspective. This essay offers a historiographic review of the theme of Dostoevsky’s nationalism in Western and Russian scholarship over the past two decades. It also highlights the way in which Dostoevsky’s nationalist ideas have been used by Russian propagandists in popular media since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.