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Action, Identification and Experience
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
Action, Identification and Experience
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
The monograph offers an in-depth, source-oriented presentation and analysis of the complex discussions that took place between ca. 1230 and 1350 on the differentiation and expansion of the structural concept of scientific knowledge and certainty in lifeworld-contingent areas of investigation. It makes transparent a development in the course of which a graduated, multidimensional conception of knowledge and certainty emerges. In the process, the masters gain pioneering insights into the philosophy of science. Starting from the key data provided by Aristotle, the scholastic scholars' productive, far-reaching further thinking leads to a deeper understanding of the nature and reliability of scientifically acquired knowledge. These intellectual endeavours were significantly challenged by the increasing knowledge of the spectrum of the transmitted Aristotelian and Arabic sciences. They also received significant impulses from epistemological reflection in theology.
The monograph offers an in-depth, source-oriented presentation and analysis of the complex discussions that took place between ca. 1230 and 1350 on the differentiation and expansion of the structural concept of scientific knowledge and certainty in lifeworld-contingent areas of investigation. It makes transparent a development in the course of which a graduated, multidimensional conception of knowledge and certainty emerges. In the process, the masters gain pioneering insights into the philosophy of science. Starting from the key data provided by Aristotle, the scholastic scholars' productive, far-reaching further thinking leads to a deeper understanding of the nature and reliability of scientifically acquired knowledge. These intellectual endeavours were significantly challenged by the increasing knowledge of the spectrum of the transmitted Aristotelian and Arabic sciences. They also received significant impulses from epistemological reflection in theology.
A New Theory of Constructive Reasoning
This book develops a modern evolutionary anthropological theory of the cognitive conditions for explanatory descriptions of the world.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
A New Theory of Constructive Reasoning
This book develops a modern evolutionary anthropological theory of the cognitive conditions for explanatory descriptions of the world.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
Belief, Knowledge, Ontology, Reception
Volume Editor:
Diego Zucca
What is knowledge? This fundamental question is treated with unprecedented depth by Plato in his Theaetetus, where it opens the path to many puzzles and issues we are still coping with in our days: what is the nature of perception, belief, justification, truth? Which objects can be properly known? How are we to account for cognitive mistakes? How can the mind be "in touch" with the world? This book provides fresh, rigorous and original explorations of the main themes of the dialogue by well-established scholars who work on Plato and Platonism, especially on Plato's theory of knowledge.
Belief, Knowledge, Ontology, Reception
Volume Editor:
Diego Zucca
What is knowledge? This fundamental question is treated with unprecedented depth by Plato in his Theaetetus, where it opens the path to many puzzles and issues we are still coping with in our days: what is the nature of perception, belief, justification, truth? Which objects can be properly known? How are we to account for cognitive mistakes? How can the mind be "in touch" with the world? This book provides fresh, rigorous and original explorations of the main themes of the dialogue by well-established scholars who work on Plato and Platonism, especially on Plato's theory of knowledge.
From the perspective of philosophical contrastive pragmatics, this study investigates our multiple selves as manifested in how we use language. Based on analyses of original and translation texts of Japanese and English literary works, the Japanese self is proposed as being fundamentally empty and yet richly populated with multiple subjective aspects, characters, and characteristics. Incorporating the concept of emptiness drawn from Japanese philosophical traditions and postmodernism primarily developed in the West, selves evidenced in grammar, style, and variation are investigated applying interpretive resources of linguistic subjectivity, character, and character-speak. Expressive gaps found in source and target texts across two languages lead us toward different ontological views, and guide us to engage in the rethinking of the concept of self.
From the perspective of philosophical contrastive pragmatics, this study investigates our multiple selves as manifested in how we use language. Based on analyses of original and translation texts of Japanese and English literary works, the Japanese self is proposed as being fundamentally empty and yet richly populated with multiple subjective aspects, characters, and characteristics. Incorporating the concept of emptiness drawn from Japanese philosophical traditions and postmodernism primarily developed in the West, selves evidenced in grammar, style, and variation are investigated applying interpretive resources of linguistic subjectivity, character, and character-speak. Expressive gaps found in source and target texts across two languages lead us toward different ontological views, and guide us to engage in the rethinking of the concept of self.
The ‘Eye’
The volume explores the body part ‘eye’ as a source domain in conceptualization and a vehicle of embodied cognition. It includes in-depth case studies of languages situated in different cultural contexts in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania. It also provides insights into cross-linguistic comparison of conceptualization patterns and semantic extension of the term ‘eye’ on various target domains. The contributions in the volume present a range of cultural models associated with the visual organ which take into account socio-cultural factors and language usage practices. The book offers new material and novel analyses within the subject of polysemy of body part terms. It also adds to studies on metaphor, metonymy and cultural conceptualizations within a cognitive linguistic paradigm.
The ‘Eye’
The volume explores the body part ‘eye’ as a source domain in conceptualization and a vehicle of embodied cognition. It includes in-depth case studies of languages situated in different cultural contexts in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania. It also provides insights into cross-linguistic comparison of conceptualization patterns and semantic extension of the term ‘eye’ on various target domains. The contributions in the volume present a range of cultural models associated with the visual organ which take into account socio-cultural factors and language usage practices. The book offers new material and novel analyses within the subject of polysemy of body part terms. It also adds to studies on metaphor, metonymy and cultural conceptualizations within a cognitive linguistic paradigm.
Merab Mamardashvili (1930-1990) is a legend of Russian and Russian-Soviet philosophy. His work sought to cultivate an “awakening to thought,” to help his interlocuters distinguish between truth and falsity. This book serves as an in-depth investigation into the life and work of one of the most prominent philosophers of Russian and Russian-Soviet history, collecting his ideas here in one book. Diana Gasparyan explains the philosophical foundations of his ideas, as they relate to the broader traditions of philosophy of consciousness, phenomenology, existentialism, transcendental philosophy, and Continental philosophy. However, his ideas also lead much further - deep into philosophy itself, its cultural origins, and to the basis and roots of all human thought.
Merab Mamardashvili (1930-1990) is a legend of Russian and Russian-Soviet philosophy. His work sought to cultivate an “awakening to thought,” to help his interlocuters distinguish between truth and falsity. This book serves as an in-depth investigation into the life and work of one of the most prominent philosophers of Russian and Russian-Soviet history, collecting his ideas here in one book. Diana Gasparyan explains the philosophical foundations of his ideas, as they relate to the broader traditions of philosophy of consciousness, phenomenology, existentialism, transcendental philosophy, and Continental philosophy. However, his ideas also lead much further - deep into philosophy itself, its cultural origins, and to the basis and roots of all human thought.
Entwurf eines wissenschaftlich fundierten Welt- und Menschenbilds
Blick ins Buch
Viele glauben, dass sie eine Seele besitzen, die den Tod des Körpers überleben kann. Und viele glauben, dass es außer den Dingen unserer Erfahrungswelt auch noch Wesen und Kräfte gibt, die einer transzendenten Welt angehören. Die Wissenschaften zeigen uns heute ein anderes Bild.
Alles um uns herum besteht aus Atomen. Überall gelten dieselben Naturgesetze. Es kann heute als ausgemacht gelten, dass alle Lebensphänomene physikalisch-chemisch erklärt werden können. Nichts spricht dafür, dass wir eine immaterielle Seele besitzen. Und es gibt keinerlei Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass es eine transzendente Welt gibt. Müssen wir deshalb unser Menschenbild ändern? Nein. Auch wenn wir keine Seele besitzen, bleiben wir doch Wesen, die wahrnehmen, Schmerz und Freude empfinden, nachdenken, entscheiden und handeln – manchmal sogar frei und verantwortlich. Und auch wenn es keine transzendente Welt gibt, können wir aufgrund moralischer Normen handeln, die für alle gelten.
Viele glauben, dass sie eine Seele besitzen, die den Tod des Körpers überleben kann. Und viele glauben, dass es außer den Dingen unserer Erfahrungswelt auch noch Wesen und Kräfte gibt, die einer transzendenten Welt angehören. Die Wissenschaften zeigen uns heute ein anderes Bild.
Alles um uns herum besteht aus Atomen. Überall gelten dieselben Naturgesetze. Es kann heute als ausgemacht gelten, dass alle Lebensphänomene physikalisch-chemisch erklärt werden können. Nichts spricht dafür, dass wir eine immaterielle Seele besitzen. Und es gibt keinerlei Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass es eine transzendente Welt gibt. Müssen wir deshalb unser Menschenbild ändern? Nein. Auch wenn wir keine Seele besitzen, bleiben wir doch Wesen, die wahrnehmen, Schmerz und Freude empfinden, nachdenken, entscheiden und handeln – manchmal sogar frei und verantwortlich. Und auch wenn es keine transzendente Welt gibt, können wir aufgrund moralischer Normen handeln, die für alle gelten.
Entwurf eines wissenschaftlich fundierten Welt- und Menschenbilds
Blick ins Buch
Viele glauben, dass sie eine Seele besitzen, die den Tod des Körpers überleben kann. Und viele glauben, dass es außer den Dingen unserer Erfahrungswelt auch noch Wesen und Kräfte gibt, die einer transzendenten Welt angehören. Die Wissenschaften zeigen uns heute ein anderes Bild.
Alles um uns herum besteht aus Atomen. Überall gelten dieselben Naturgesetze. Es kann heute als ausgemacht gelten, dass alle Lebensphänomene physikalisch-chemisch erklärt werden können. Nichts spricht dafür, dass wir eine immaterielle Seele besitzen. Und es gibt keinerlei Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass es eine transzendente Welt gibt. Müssen wir deshalb unser Menschenbild ändern? Nein. Auch wenn wir keine Seele besitzen, bleiben wir doch Wesen, die wahrnehmen, Schmerz und Freude empfinden, nachdenken, entscheiden und handeln – manchmal sogar frei und verantwortlich. Und auch wenn es keine transzendente Welt gibt, können wir aufgrund moralischer Normen handeln, die für alle gelten.
Viele glauben, dass sie eine Seele besitzen, die den Tod des Körpers überleben kann. Und viele glauben, dass es außer den Dingen unserer Erfahrungswelt auch noch Wesen und Kräfte gibt, die einer transzendenten Welt angehören. Die Wissenschaften zeigen uns heute ein anderes Bild.
Alles um uns herum besteht aus Atomen. Überall gelten dieselben Naturgesetze. Es kann heute als ausgemacht gelten, dass alle Lebensphänomene physikalisch-chemisch erklärt werden können. Nichts spricht dafür, dass wir eine immaterielle Seele besitzen. Und es gibt keinerlei Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass es eine transzendente Welt gibt. Müssen wir deshalb unser Menschenbild ändern? Nein. Auch wenn wir keine Seele besitzen, bleiben wir doch Wesen, die wahrnehmen, Schmerz und Freude empfinden, nachdenken, entscheiden und handeln – manchmal sogar frei und verantwortlich. Und auch wenn es keine transzendente Welt gibt, können wir aufgrund moralischer Normen handeln, die für alle gelten.
This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
Selbstbewusstsein, Leiblichkeit und Persistenz
Manche meinen, unsere Existenz hänge an Erinnerung und Persönlichkeit. Andere glauben, wir seien unsere Biologie. Tatsächlich sind wir körperliches Selbstbewusstsein, das durch all das unbestimmt ist. Wir haben nicht Bewusstsein, wie wir Hände oder eine Leber besitzen. Denn unsere Fähigkeit, über uns selbst zu reden, kommt zu einem gewissen Preis: Sie legt uns darauf fest, dass wir Selbstbewusstsein sind und nicht nur solches haben. Aber dieses Bewusstsein ist unbestimmt von all dem, was uns wichtig ist. Unsere Existenz besteht nicht in unserer Erinnerung oder Persönlichkeit. Doch über uns selbst zu sprechen, legt uns auf noch mehr fest: Wir können keine reinen Denker sein. Notwendig befinden wir uns körperlich in Raum und Zeit. Diese Körperlichkeit können wir aber nicht vollständig verstehen, wenn wir sie ausschließlich anhand empirischer Wissenschaft erklären wollen.
Selbstbewusstsein, Leiblichkeit und Persistenz
Manche meinen, unsere Existenz hänge an Erinnerung und Persönlichkeit. Ande