This volume explores the extent to which frameworks of tradional neutrality might remain useful in modern contexts of peace and war, notwithstanding the technical prohibition of war in the Charter of the United Nations. Traditional neutrality constituted a system through which non-belligerent states could remain at peace with warring states, and thereby avoid attack and continue peacetime trading relations. The essays here collected deal with the rules of neutrality as they had developed and operated generally by the outbreak of World War 1, those variations in and alternatives to traditional neutrality which arose in the aftermath of World War 1, and particular aspects of the legacy of neutrality which continue to survive in the post-1945 era. It is argued that the operable rules of traditional neutrality foundered in the face of industrialized warfare, but that the retreat from the 'logic' of neutrality in the modern era has been premature.
In March 2000, the United Nations Secretary-General convened an international panel to conduct a major study on United Nations Peace Operations. Chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister and current Under-Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Panel was tasked to conduct a wide-ranging study and analysis over lessons learned from past operations such as those in Rwanda and Somalia, as well as current missions in Kosovo, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Panel looked at how peacekeeping missions could achieve greater efficiency and success in attaining the key objectives of maintaining peace and promoting reconciliation and reconstruction. It also reviewed the context within which peacekeeping missions took place, the resources and limitations of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) specifically, and the modality, efficacy, and extent of assistance rendered by the `international community' within the framework of peacekeeping and peace-building in general.
The fifth in a series of conferences organised on lessons learnt from peacekeeping operations was held under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of Singapore and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Throughout two intense days in Singapore, in April 2001, an eminent group of academics, government officials, representatives of international organisations, representatives from ongoing UN Missions, and military scholars gathered behind closed doors to reflect upon the recommendations of the Brahimi Report and the obstacles to reform of peacekeeping.
This volume contains all the papers presented at that event. It also includes the
Co-Chairs' Summary and Recommendations. The Report is a summary of the many animated debates that took place during the conference. Recommendations of the Co-Chairs have been drawn from the broad range of opinions and insights from the conference. The findings and reactions of the participants to the Brahimi Report should give policy-makers, researchers, and international affairs analysts a candid review and critique of past experiences that is essential to the comprehension of the failures of current peacekeeping and requirements for future success.
The entry into force in 1997 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) symbolizes the coming of age of the law of arms control as a separate area of international law. It is not only the first treaty whereby a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, viz. chemical weapons, is completely banned, but it also puts into place a comprehensive compliance control system. For this purpose a specialized international organisation has been created with as its sole purpose the supervision of the commitments under this arms control treaty: the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based in The Hague. Supervision under this Convention is an example of compliance management, which is cooperative rather than adversarial in character, in spite of the elaborate and intrusive inspection regime concerning not only the military component but also the civilian chemical industries worldwide. Thereby not only States Parties' military security concerns are taken care of, but also the concerns of the chemical industries with regard to the protection of confidential business information.
In general, this volume aims to provide a better understanding of some of the special characteristics of arms control law. One part of this volume highlights the unique characteristics of the compliance control model by providing a detailed analysis of the CWC, the OPCW and of the specific supervisory functions. The obligations of the signatories to the CWC are discussed in the other part. Although an important topic of general international law, clarity as to the obligations of Signatory States appears to be of special importance in the case of arms control treaties, for, given their security interests, it is crucial for States that at a minimum a
status quo between all the signatories is maintained. The main contributions are complemented by shorter comments on various aspects of the topics dealt with. The articles are all written by specialists in the field - academic and practitioners- making this book a valuable source for academics, diplomats, (international) civil servants, and practitioners involved in the work of the OPCW, arms control (law) or general international law.
A total of 84 documents are reproduced here including arms control agreements, regional peace and security agreements, and forces reduction agreements, as well as 34 instruments controlling particular weapons. In addition, explanatory charts help the researcher to locate instruments according to specific criteria such as penal characteristics, applicability (war and peace), and extent of ratification.
Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.