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Amira Schiff


This article examines the factors that contributed to the failure of the last major effort, which was carried out by US Secretary of State John Kerry, to facilitate a Final Status Agreement to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The analysis is based on an understanding that every effort to resolve this intractable conflict, even if unsuccessful, is worthy of examination, which can yield interesting observations and insights that may inform future attempts to find a solution. As President Trump’s administration makes intensive efforts to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and the US Middle East negotiation delegation shuttles intensively between the parties and between major regional actors to explore the possibility of renewing official negotiations, this seems like an opportune time to review the major factors that affected the outcome of the previous peace talks.

I. William Zartman


This issue contains an examination of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with an effort to break through the deadlock strategically. It analyzes the past record of failure and addresses the basic problem of asymmetry. Despite the solutions that have been advanced for all the specific issues, it is the forward-looking matter of trust that is the impediment to productive negotiations. The declaration of a Palestinian state and its recognition by the international community are now the basic elements necessary to break the asymmetry of the parties. A second element – allegedly favored by the Trump administration – is to reduce a symmetry by enlarging the playing field to include surrounding states, as proposed in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.


Midori Okabe

However normative it might be, the inclusive power of European Union (EU) is not effective to Asian countries (including asean as a region) with regard to migration governance. The EU attempts to be a mandatory actor of global institutions yet it seems only successful on condition that the EU and Asian countries reach agreements to cooperate. Although the asean-eu meeting (asem) could have been used for the very opportunity, it serves as a forum on information sharing at best. The bilateral scheme is the possible alternative and the EU would need a negotiation-based power instead of attracting non-EU countries to join in the EU as it does to EU candidate and other neighboring countries. Since the EU Enlargement is not a viable bargaining chip to Asia, the EU needs different items of agenda to make the package-deal useful. As a result, the EU resembles more of a single actor on the arena of negotiation where the inclusive power is least salient


Edited by Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog, Marion Panizzon and Dora Kostakopoulou


Paula García Andrade

The design and implementation of the external dimension of the EU migration policy requires a high degree of coordination among the different levels and actors involved in its development. The current division of external competences in this field calls for the participation of both the Union and its Member States in the setting of cooperation with third countries in the field of migration, leading to potential overlaps as it is particularly noticeable, for instance, in the negotiation of readmission agreements or the adoption of mobility partnerships. The involvement of various EU institutions in the design and execution of this external dimension also creates major challenges for inter-institutional coordination within the EU, such as those identified in the relationships between the Commission, the eeas, the Council and the European Parliament. The same is true with regard to the different Directorates-General and working structures within the Commission or the Council. The legal answer to the current flaws of coordination which may be perceived in the development of the EU external action on migration lies in the “duty of cooperation” which has been inferred by the ecj from the loyal cooperation principle enshrined in art. 4.3 and 13.2 teu. This contribution attempts to extract from the Court’s case law the scope and content of the precise obligations arising from this duty and, after identifying those instances in which a lack of coordination and cooperation can be perceived at the different levels of action in the external dimension of migration, to suggest ways of ensuring its respect with the aim of securing the unity of the international representation of the EU and the consistency and effectiveness of its external action.