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Tyler Paytas and Nicholas R. Baima
Commentators such as Terence Irwin and Christopher Shields claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic 2 cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.
From Demosthenes to Diogenes Laertios
In 360/359 BC, Kotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians, was killed by two brothers of Ainos. Confusion, however, soon arose around their identity. The aim of this article is to reconstruct and analyze the various traditions that spread in Antiquity about their identification. Demosthenes was the first to call the murderers Python and Herakleides of Ainos. His version of the facts was later followed by Philodemos, Plutarchos, and Philostratos. Aristoteles, however, called them Πύρρων (or Πάρρων) and Herakleides of Ainos. Diokles of Magnesia, probably following the same tradition as Aristoteles, confused Pyrrhon of Ainos with Pyrrhon of Elis. Similarly, Demetrios of Magnesia confused Herakleides of Ainos with Herakleides Pontikos. Finally, the figures of Kotys, Herakleides, and Python were perhaps reused by the author of the spurious Letters of Chion of Herakleia and recontextualized as symbols of the conflict between philosophy and tyranny.
In recent decades the view that the disputed central books of Aristotle’s ethics are an integral part of the Eudemian rather than of the Nicomachean Ethics has gained ground for both historical and systematic reasons. This article contests that view, arguing not only that the Nicomachean Ethics represented Aristotle’s central text throughout antiquity, but that the discussion in the common books of such crucial concepts as justice, practical and theoretical reason, self-control and lack of self-control, are more compatible with the undisputed books of the Nicomachean Ethics than with those of the Eudemian Ethics.
Felix J. Meister
This article aims to address the problems posed by Sappho’s difficult fr. 114 V. It first revises the assumption that both lines need to display the same metrical profile and concludes that this assumption is unreliable. Then it offers a reconstruction of the fragment that is not restricted by the alleged need for metrical homogeneity.
Cicero and Cassius on a Point of Philosophical Translation
A Lexical and Semantic Survey
The ancient theoretical debate on language and its purposes has long concerned scholarship, but only in recent years a growing attention has been directed to ancient concepts and instances of nonsense in both communication and artistic-literary expression, as the recent monograph by Stephen Kidd attests. This paper engages in an analysis of the phrase οὐδὲν λέγειν/nihil dicere, used to express the nonsense of a statement. An overview of the occurrences of οὐδὲν λέγειν is followed by a survey of what can be considered the ‘reception’ or calque of the Greek idiom in Latin, namely nihil dicere. The concentration of the occurrences, both in Greek and Latin, in the same two genres, i.e. comedy and philosophical dialogue, suggests that the phrase was borrowed from the colloquial vocabulary of the spoken language. The authority of Aristophanes and Plato seems to have eased the assimilation of the locution by authors such as Plautus, Terence and Cicero. The rarity of the phrase outside these authors and their genres supports the thought that, in literature, οὐδὲν λέγειν/nihil dicere were typical of the lexical repertoires of dramatic ἀγών and dialectics.