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Contributors include: Silvia Apollonio, Stefan Bauer, Eraldo Bellini, Chiara Catalano, Maarten Delbeke, Maria Pia Donato, Federica Favino, Irene Fosi, Sven K. Knebel, Alessandro Metlica, Anselm Ramelow, Pietro Giulio Riga, and Jon R. Snyder
Contributors include: Silvia Apollonio, Stefan Bauer, Eraldo Bellini, Chiara Catalano, Maarten Delbeke, Maria Pia Donato, Federica Favino, Irene Fosi, Sven K. Knebel, Alessandro Metlica, Anselm Ramelow, Pietro Giulio Riga, and Jon R. Snyder
Contributors to this volume: Jacopo Agnesina, Nicholas Cronk, Mélanie Éphrème, Enrico Galvagni, Jonathan Israel, Alan Charles Kors, Mladen Kozul, Brunello Lotti, Emilio Mazza, Gianluca Mori, Iryna Mykhailova, Gianni Paganini, Paolo Quintili, Alain Sandrier, Ruggero Sciuto, Maria Susana Seguin, and Gerhardt Stenger.
Contributors to this volume: Jacopo Agnesina, Nicholas Cronk, Mélanie Éphrème, Enrico Galvagni, Jonathan Israel, Alan Charles Kors, Mladen Kozul, Brunello Lotti, Emilio Mazza, Gianluca Mori, Iryna Mykhailova, Gianni Paganini, Paolo Quintili, Alain Sandrier, Ruggero Sciuto, Maria Susana Seguin, and Gerhardt Stenger.
Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.
Abstract
In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.
Abstract
This chapter examines the various ways in which d’Holbach engaged with Voltaire’s texts. It argues that the baron’s practice of often quoting and paraphrasing passages from the Patriarche’s works as well as his attempts at imitating Voltaire’s unmistakeable style can be interpreted as part and parcel of a carefully devised strategy, simultaneously aiming to conceal his authorship of his texts, attract public interest to his works, increase the diffusion of his ideas, and win Voltaire himself over to the cause of atheism and determinism. By emphasising the importance of the Voltairean subtext to d’Holbach’s works, this chapter also aims to reflect on the advantages that different (and perhaps opposing) strands within Enlightenment thought could derive from mutual interaction and dialogue.
Abstract
It is a common opinion that for d’Holbach order and disorder are concepts relative to subjective human evaluations, though order may be regarded as objective if we think of nature as the necessary system of causes and effects. A more accurate reading of the Système de la nature brings to light also the objective side of disorder, when it is conceived as the change of a preceding state of things, since both the preceding state and its change follow from the absolute order of nature. Even human prejudices about order and disorder are objectively grounded as they depend on the relation between the natural course of events and the equally natural drive of each individual to survive and to enjoy pleasant sensations. The subjective notions of order and disorder become sources of error only when they are employed by human imagination to describe the whole universe, thereby concealing the true necessary order of nature which is grasped by reason. A reconstruction of these concepts is provided in this essay, together with an examination of d’Holbach’s arguments against natural theology and an analysis of the interplay of necessity, energy and infinity in d’Holbach’s view of natural order. Finally, d’Holbach’s skepticism is discussed, as he recognized that the inner constitution of bodies, being imperceptible, is unknown, and therefore many causes of motions remain unknown too. This epistemic limit, coupled with the adoption of Leibniz’s principles of indiscernibles, appears incompatible with the strong metaphysical determinism asserted by d’Holbach merely on the assumption that every action of each body must proceed from its essence, according to the axiom ex nihilo nihil. Despite the inconsistencies of d’Holbach’s determinism, the Système de la nature deserves to be appreciated in the history of western thought because it represented the first materialistic and atheistic system, opposed to the ‘ancien régime’ of theological metaphysics which had hitherto dominated the philosophical tradition.