The influence of Kant’s understanding of morality is too strong to be ignored. Hegel, however, fundamentally criticized Kant for offering merely a ‘formal’ model of normativity that cannot sufficiently comprehend human action as free. Instead, Hegel argues in his doctrine of ethical life (
Sittlichkeit) that the embeddedness of the acting subject must be taken into account when identifying normativity. Yet the issue of normativity in Kant and Hegel remains contested even today, not least due to the misunderstandings of their conceptions of the topic. The present volume explores developments within recent scholarship which enable a better understanding of the concept of normativity in the thought of Kant and Hegel.
Kant’s conception of freedom is of special importance in the history of philosophy. It not only brings together older traditions but has great influence on later theories of freedom. The edited volume analyzes Kant’s theory, referring to the concepts of will, choice, autonomy, and reason. It consists of four parts: Kant’s theory in its historical context; Kant’s own conception as developed in his various philosophical works; central conceptions of freedom in German Idealism after Kant (including Reinhold, Schiller, Maimon, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer); the systematic relevance of Kant’s conception of freedom with regard to recent debates in analytic philosophy (agent causality, compatibilism and incompatibilism).