Kant’s conception of freedom is of special importance in the history of philosophy. It not only brings together older traditions but has great influence on later theories of freedom. The edited volume analyzes Kant’s theory, referring to the concepts of will, choice, autonomy, and reason. It consists of four parts: Kant’s theory in its historical context; Kant’s own conception as developed in his various philosophical works; central conceptions of freedom in German Idealism after Kant (including Reinhold, Schiller, Maimon, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer); the systematic relevance of Kant’s conception of freedom with regard to recent debates in analytic philosophy (agent causality, compatibilism and incompatibilism).
Freedom is one of the main issues of modern philosophy and Kant’s philosophy of freedom a major source for comprehending it. Whereas in contemporary debates Kant’s concept of practical freedom is addressed frequently, the cosmological foundation of it is much less discussed and even mostly taken for granted. In
Metaphysics of Freedom?, by contrast, Kant’s concept of cosmological freedom is scrutinized both in a historical and a systematic perspective. As a result, a deeper and broader understanding of Kant’s conception of freedom, its presuppositions, and problems emerges.
Grounds of Pragmatic Realism argues that Hegel’s philosophy from the 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit through his last Berlin lectures on philosophical psychology demonstates how Kant’s critique of rational judgment across his Critical corpus can be disentangled from Kant’s failed Transcendental Idealism and developed into a cogent, pragmatic realism, within which the social and historical aspects of rational inquiry and justification are shown to justify realism about the objects of empirical knowledge. Hegel’s demonstration reveals how deeply contemporary epistemology remains beholden to pre-Critical options, none of which are adequate to the natural sciences, nor to commonsense. Hegel recognised and justified (independently) Kant’s semantics of singular
cognitive reference to particulars within space and time. Hegel’s analysis of mutual recognition develops Kant’s insights into the self-critical and inter-subjective aspects of rational judgment and justification, to show that none of us can be properly rational judges, nor can we properly justify our judgments rationally, without constructive self-criticism and without acknowledging and benefitting from constructive critical assessment by others.