Using novel quantitative data from the Millennial Trends Survey administered online in March 2019 with over 2,500 respondents between the ages of 18 and 35 in both Canada and the U.S., we examine in detail inherited (non)religion as well as intergenerational conversion and disaffiliation among young adult birth cohorts. Key results include approximately two thirds of Millennials in our sample belonging to the same (non)religious tradition of at least one of their parents. Among the remaining one third who did have a different religious (non)affiliation than their parents at the time of the survey, intergenerational disaffiliation was the most common change present: especially in Canada, but also in the U.S. Intergenerational retention of nonreligion among families where both parents are nonreligious are especially high among Millennials in both countries, a characteristic of this generation’s much more secular social milieu.
Since Pope John Paul II’s stock-taking of twentieth century martyrs, the Catholic Church has significantly increased the beatification and canonization of martyrs. Not only have the numbers of martyrs increased but the definition of martyrdom has expanded. Using a comprehensive new data set on Catholic martyrs (1588 to 2020), we argue that the Vatican’s recent emphasis on martyrs is a strategic response to competition with Protestants, specifically Evangelicals. Martyrs, unlike regular saints (confessors), tend to be predominantly male and died in parts of the world where the Catholic Church was actively involved in evangelization or had a significant presence. Martyrdom often associates with violent events, such as the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and the French Revolution, and with mass persecutions, such as in the English Reformation or in cases of repression of missionaries, as in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and China.
This study examines women’s attitudes toward the own use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) by their religious affiliation in Germany. The social relevance of ART is increasing in Western countries due to overall low birth rates, a high rate of childlessness, and a gap between the desired and the actual numbers of children. Previous literature has been scarce, however, on attitudes toward ART, and religious diversity has not been included in studies on ART. Our analysis is based on data collected in a pilot study in 2014 and 2015. The sample includes 944 women aged 18 to 50 living in Germany. The results show that Muslim women were significantly more likely than Christian women to say they would consider using ART; having no religious affiliation was associated with the least open attitude toward ART usage.
The following tables represent the results of analysis of data on religion for all of the countries of the world which appear in the World Religion Database (Johnson and Grim 2008). These data are collected at the national level from a number of sources including censuses, surveys, polls, religious communities, scholars, and others.
We analyze cohort fertility by religion and education in Latin America from periods previous to the general decline in period fertility in 1950s. We reconstruct cohort fertility and parity progression ratios of women born in 1930–1970 in a number of countries in the region, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. Our main aim is to understand the past developments of cohort fertility in the course of fertility transition in Latin America and to assess the role of religious affiliation, as well as to understand these developments controlling for a number of socioeconomic characteristics. We also seek to grasp if religion becomes more or less important with rising school levels and human capital over time.
In most European countries more religious people have more children than the secular and are less likely to remain childless. However, in some ex-communist states this association is subdued or even inverted. This study investigates not only fertility and partnering outcomes, but also differences in the level of desire for a child. Four contrasting countries are compared: Austria, Switzerland, Bulgaria and Georgia. We found the more religious had higher expectations that a child would bring joy into their life than the non-religious. The religious ‘nones’ tend to be very worried about the financial impact of a(nother) child and negative effect on their sex life; these concerns are much less prevalent among active Christians. In Georgia, where highly educated young people are more religious than the old, differentials by religiosity are small. History and context cause the impact of personal religiosity on fertility behavior and attitudes to be potentially divergent.
This article offers analysis of religious affiliation for 18 categories of religion for the globe and six continents: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Northern America, and Oceania. Estimates of religious affilia¬tion are made for four dates, 1970, 2000, 2018, and projections for 2030. Annual average growth rates are provided for two 30-year periods, 1970–2000 and 2000–2030. These global and continen¬tal tables are aggregated from country data in the World Religion Database.
In this paper we focus on the top 10% of income earners, and within those at the individuals with more than 1 and 50 million in assets worldwide and their religion. This is a group of people with an inherent global outlook on their activities and social lives, who often share more interests in common with people along the same scale of wealth than with many of their fellow country-people at lower levels of income. The perception of political power gained by wealthy individuals punctually observed, has been found by research to be buttressed by the more active political participation by people in the upper ranges of income distribution and increased inequality is found to increase unequal political outcomes.
The social behaviour of this group of people at the top of the global income scale drives social policy, as these citizens tend to be better educated, connected, travelled and economically and politically active than the parts of the population that are worse off.
Religion, or the lack thereof, is a global social marker that influences behaviour on many levels, often at subconscious levels shared by whole societies, such as the perception of fairness and retribution, redistribution of resources and the wider relationship of society to economic resources.
Contemplated from a global perspective, religion as a shared cultural trait across nations may be a powerful unifier of interests and driver of political and economic action to tackle global problems such as climate change, environmental degradation, global poverty alleviation and other type of global externalities. Understanding the religious make-up of the group of people most active in shaping economic and cultural decisions globally should help in finding platforms for global cooperation.