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Uno Kōzō’s Theory of ‘Pure Capitalism’ in Light of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy
Value without Fetish presents the first in-depth English-language study of the influential Japanese economist Uno Kōzō‘s (1897-1977) theory of ‘pure capitalism’ in the light of the method and object of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy. A close analysis of the theories of value, production and reproduction, and crisis in Uno’s central texts from the 1930s to the 1970s reveals his departure from Marx’s central insights about the fetish character of the capitalist mode of production – a departure that Lange shows can be traced back to the failed epistemology of value developed in Uno’s earliest writings. By disavowing the complex relation between value and fetish that structures Marx’s critique, Uno adopts the paradigms of neoclassical theories to present an apology rather than a critique of capitalism.
Anxiety, Modern Society, and the Critical Method interrogates the historical intersections of political economy, technology, and anxiety. By analyzing and building upon the tools developed by critical theorists to diagnose the symptoms of modern life—such as alienation, anomie, the Protestant ethic, and repression—Joel Michael Crombez convincingly argues for a revitalization of critical social science to better confront the anxiety of life in modern societies.

With anxiety typically falling under the purview of psychology and its biomedical approach to treatment, here anxiety is demonstrated to have origins in the totalizing logics of modern society. As such, Crombez provides an interdisciplinary roadmap to diagnose and treat anxiety—which he calls critical socioanalysis—that accounts for the psychosocial complexity of its production.
In this volume, the philosophical writings of Stephen Turner on social science and the social are examined critically in essays by major scholars in philosophy and sociology from all over Europe and the United States. The topics covered include his intellectual trajectory and issues over the concepts of practices, the belief-desire model of action explanation, normativity, and collectivities. These issues form the core of the philosophy of social science and are central to the history of the social sciences. In addition, there are substantive discussions of the relation of cognitive science to economics and Weber, of ethnography, and of the legacy of Talcott Parsons. The volume includes Turner’s response to these essays, which also presents a synthesis and retrospective overview.

With contributions by Christopher Adair-Toteff, Alban Bouvier, David Henderson, John Holmwood, Terence Horgan, Peter Olen, Mark Risjord, Paul Roth, Theodore R. Schatzki, Karsten Stueber, Sam Whimster, Rafał Wierzchosławski and Julie Zahle; as well as Stephen Turner himself.
Author: Sam Whimster

Abstract

When economic models—here marginalist models of the Austrian school: Menger, Hayek, Lachmann and rational expectations—are superimposed on the standard theory of mind, a computing engine, we are able to distinguish between an evolutionary constant (goal-directed rationality) and additional rationality claims which on examination turn out to be loosely justified and extend to the ideological. Conversely, we can ask what parts of rationality explanations are exogenous to the mind and belong to the realm of culture and civilization. With the financialization of economic life, computing machines perform a large part of economic decision-making with the effect of hijacking the cognitive core of rationality and separating it from its civilizational surroundings. Economics as a discipline needs to reflect on the directions in which they drive their theories of rationality and whether these are compatible with human flourishing.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social
Author: Alban Bouvier

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of the relevance of research programs focused on the role of argumentation and rhetoric in the emergence, transformation and disappearance of collective beliefs, an issue that has been recently tackled by Dan Sperber. Several alternative models based on methodologically individualist assumptions are briefly investigated from Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto to James Coleman, Raymond Boudon, and Jon Elster. But I also argue that recent holistic models, such as Margaret Gilbert’s, inspired by an original re-reading of Emile Durkheim, provide fruitful conceptual tools compatible with methodological individualism.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social
In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social
Author: Julie Zahle

Abstract

Interpretivism is commonly associated with the employment of qualitative methods. In philosophical discussions of interpretivism, however, the way in which qualitative research is conducted and may serve as basis for the advancement of interpretations is almost never considered. In this paper, I explore how the philosophical discussions may benefit from taking into account the way qualitative researchers go about their business. From this perspective, I examine Taylor’s influential defense of interpretivism and two objections to it, the argument from lack of brute data and the argument from underdetermination. I argue that, by bringing into view how qualitative research proceeds, it may be shown that Taylor’s position should be amended, that the argument from brute data should be dismissed, and that the argument from underdetermination has a much smaller scope than assumed by its proponents.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social
Author: Stephen Turner

Abstract

In this reply to the commentary in the volume, some intellectual, historical, and biographical context is provided for the writings discussed. This includes a brief account of the trajectory from Sociological Explanation as Translation, and a discussion of the general problem of the substrate of social explanation and the status of social theories as ideal-typical constructions with a problematic relation to this substrate. On this basis, the themes of practices, normativity, and the problem of the meaning of reasons explanations are reconsidered. An outline of a view of norms based on the notion of Jellinek of the normative power of the real is given and related to Russian developmental psychology. This extends and gives a psychological base to the pragmatic account of norms and practical normativity that runs through these texts. The chapter concludes with a discussion of social science, including the problems of the status of economic theory, the objectivity of field work and the problem of underdetermination, and the political significance of Parsons.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social

Abstract

In Cognitive Science and the Social: A Primer (), Stephen Turner provides a head-spinning catalog of difficulties confronting those working within a wide range of disciplines. The difficulties arise from the ways in which what is emerging from thinking about what is really going on at the level of underlying cognitive (or cognitive-ish) processes seems not to mesh with much that has been supposed in a standard (dominant and venerable) framework for work in the social sciences (or with much that has gone on in standard cognitive science). The picture Turner provides is, admittedly, murky—as the recent work Turner surveys is diverse and developing, having cross-cutting currents. In this paper, we focus on a narrow range of work in the social sciences—work on social norms. This would seem a fitting focus, as it deploys intentional psychology in ways that Turner argues are crucially problematic: invoking shared rules and expectations within communities. We take to heart some of the trends in cognitive science to which Turner rightly calls attention. We argue that, properly understood, many important themes in work such as Bicchieri’s (and Guala’s, and Pettit’s) can be recast in ways that are not problematic in light of emerging cognitive science. When it comes to understanding social norms, we likely will not get what one might have traditionally wanted, but we will get what we need—social norms.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social
Author: Paul A. Roth

Abstract

Stephen Turner, scholar that he is of the history of the social sciences, deeply appreciates how the history of social science stands littered with failed theories, ones that aspired to formulate a science of the social. But why? A key insight guiding his work from early to late has been a keen appreciation of a need to clarify what such a science is a science of. That is, Turner almost alone among the leading social theorists of the last several decades understood that resolving prospects for a science of the social required first achieving clarity regarding the constituent elements of any such explanation. His guiding question is: Just what is it for something to be both social and yet sufficiently thing-like so there can be something for some science to explain? In tracking how his concerns refocus and evolve in the several decades that span the time from his first book to his most recent with respect to the question of what makes explananda social, one achieves a synoptic view of how debate regarding the idea of a social science reshapes as it moves into the twenty-first century.

In: Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social