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In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
In: Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures
Selbstbewusstsein, Leiblichkeit und Persistenz
Author: Markus Herrmann
Manche meinen, unsere Existenz hänge an Erinnerung und Persönlichkeit. Andere glauben, wir seien unsere Biologie. Tatsächlich sind wir körperliches Selbstbewusstsein, das durch all das unbestimmt ist.
Wir haben nicht Bewusstsein, wie wir Hände oder eine Leber besitzen. Denn unsere Fähigkeit, über uns selbst zu reden, kommt zu einem gewissen Preis: Sie legt uns darauf fest, dass wir Selbstbewusstsein sind und nicht nur solches haben. Aber dieses Bewusstsein ist unbestimmt von all dem, was uns wichtig ist. Unsere Existenz besteht nicht in unserer Erinnerung oder Persönlichkeit. Doch über uns selbst zu sprechen, legt uns auf noch mehr fest: Wir können keine reinen Denker sein. Notwendig befinden wir uns körperlich in Raum und Zeit. Diese Körperlichkeit können wir aber nicht vollständig verstehen, wenn wir sie ausschließlich anhand empirischer Wissenschaft erklären wollen.
Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977–2107. In memory of Rudolf Haller
Volume Editors: Mauro Antonelli and Thomas Binder
This volume, originating from the centennial Second International Conference Graz 1977–2017 on Franz Brentano’s philosophy, collects eighteen essays written by nineteen distinguished specialists covering the main areas of Brentano’s philosophy: his epistemology, ontology, ethics, and logic, and his contributions to psychology and philosophy of mind. Its goal is to explore the significance and impact of Brentano’s thought, to promote a deepening of the ongoing renaissance of interest in Brentano, and to advance the project of understanding Brentano’s actual philosophical positions and correcting entrenched misunderstandings.
Author: Andrew Oberg
The question of the self, of what the self is (or even if there is a self), has been one that has grown alongside humanity – has haunted humanity – throughout our history. Blurred: Selves Made and Selves Making guides the reader down these dark corridors, shining light on the specters of theories past and unveiling a new self-view to hover afresh, beckoning to roadways beyond.

In this remarkably interdisciplinary study, philosophy of mind joins with contemporary neuroscience and cutting-edge psychology to lay bare the how of identity formation, judgment, and behavior generation. Drawing on thinkers from both the Continental and Analytic traditions, consciousness is explored and a uniquely realist self-concept presented that, if adopted, offers a life lived otherwise.
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness brings Buddhist voices to the study of consciousness. This book explores a variety of different Buddhist approaches to consciousness that developed out of the Buddhist theory of non-self. Topics taken up in these investigations include: how we are able to cognize our own cognitions; whether all conscious states involve conceptualization; whether distinct forms of cognition can operate simultaneously in a single mental stream; whether non-existent entities can serve as intentional objects; and does consciousness have an intrinsic nature, or can it only be characterized functionally? These questions have all featured in recent debates in consciousness studies. The answers that Buddhist philosophers developed to such questions are worth examining just because they may represent novel approaches to questions about consciousness.
Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures is concerned with a crucial aspect of Brentano's philosophy as it was developed in his logic lectures from c. 1870 to c. 1885. The first part of the volume is an analysis of his theory of concept and judgment. The second part consists of materials, including a German edition and English translation of notes that a student took from a lecture course that Brentano gave. A short book by this student on Brentano is also translated in the materials.

The access to Brentano's philosophy is enhanced by this volume not only with regard to his logic as a theory of deductive inference, but also to his descriptive psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.
In: Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
Author: Shinya Moriyama

Abstract

The problem of other minds has been discussed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, three arguments by Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Ratnakīrti having received the most attention from modern scholars. However, there is another significant resource for considering the problem, viz Dharmapāla’s distinct analyses of a bodhisattva’s and of a buddha’s cognitions of other minds. Through examining his commentary on the Viṃśikā called Cheng wei shi bao sheng lun 成唯識寶生論 and the Cheng wei shi lun 成唯識論 together with the Wei shi ershi lun shuji 唯識二十論述記 by Kuiji (窺基, 632–682), I argue first for the specificity of Dharmapāla’s basic tenet that accepts other minds and negates external objects, pointing out how it differs from Dharmakīrti’s and Ratnakīrti’s arguments on the same topic. Based on this analysis, especi,ally focusing on Dharmapāla’s argument concerning a buddha’s cognition of another’s mind, I also propose to read Dharmapāla’s argument as a variant of the so-called transparency thesis, which claims that one’s mental states are transparent not only to oneself but also to the Buddha, or more correctly, one’s mind is more transparent to the Buddha than to oneself.

In: Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
In: Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
In: Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness