8.1 “The Council Must Have Been Confused”: The Spanish Court and the Politics of the Second Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada

As mentioned above, José Patiño first began to consider the possibility of re- establishing the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1734. Unfortunately, very little is known about the early stages of the process. According to Sergio Elías Ortiz, a letter sent by Rafael de Eslava, president, governor and captain-general of Santa Fe, to the Council of the Indies on November 27, 1733, prompted the idea.⁶ In this letter, presumably seen within the Council early in 1734, Eslava would have described the situation in which he found the New Kingdom on his first arriva in Santa Fe, attributing the stagnation and inefficiency of its administration to the lack of sufficiently ample powers and authority invested within his office. According to Elías Ortiz, Eslava proceeded to recommend that the government of New Granada should be entrusted to an official “with greater attributes of command, who could impress more strength upon his decisions, so that his orders would not be evaded”.⁷ The tone of Rafael de Eslava’s letter, however, seems to have been similar to that of a letter sent by his predecessor Antonio Manso Maldonado, who in 1729 had similarly complained about the lack of authority of his office and the need for a figure with a superior standing to head the province’s government.⁸

Within this document, Manso stated that having inquired about the reasons why the inhabitants of such a wealthy kingdom lived in such abject poverty he “found that [he] could not remove them [the reasons], and that only the powerful arm of YM was capable of extricating them and of bringing back to life a Realm almost dead”.⁹ According to him, the governor of New Granada should have wider powers in matters of economic government.¹⁰ He also sought restrictions on appeals of his orders to the audiencia, which out of enmity or other reasons invariably found against the president, thereby obliging him to accept their decisions in order to avoid further confrontation.¹¹ It is unclear why Eslava’s letter would have had more impact than Manso’s;¹² or why although both letters were addressed to the Council of the Indies it would be Patiño, rather than the Council, who would act upon them. Nevertheless, what is known is that on August 7, 1734, Patiño presented Bartolomé Tienda de Cuervo, former accountant of the royal treasury of Cartagena, with a royal order, requiring him to prepare a detailed account of the reasons behind the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and its suppression five years later. Patiño added a verbal request that Tienda de Cuervo also inform about the financial benefits that could be expected from re-establishing the viceroyalty.¹³

Bartolomé Craywinckle (he hispanized his surname as Tienda de Cuervo) was born in Antwerp in 1682. In his youth, he settled in Seville, where he married the daughter of another émigré from Antwerp. In 1712, he bought an appointment as accountant of the treasury of Cartagena de Indias for 6,000 pesos. Antonio de la Pedrosa later dismissed him from this office under suspicion of involvement in fraud against the royal treasury and participation in illegal trade. In 1723, however, he obtained a pardon from the crown, was reinstated as accountant of the treasury of Cartagena and was granted license to return to New Granada. In the early 1730s he was appointed military veedor general in Cartagena—and, ironically, became renowned for his involvement in the fight against contraband as a leading proponent of the system of land-based sentries. Upon his return to the Peninsula, he served as intendente of Puerto de Santa María, in Andalucía, where he was serving when Patiño commissioned his report on the restoration of the viceroyalty.¹⁴ Thus, like Alberoni with Antonio de la Pedrosa, Patiño had chosen a man with abundant experience of New Granada (and with an equally checkered past) to advise on the process of the creation of the viceroyalty.

Tienda de Cuervo produced his report on August 20, 1734, and Patiño then presented it for discussion to a Junta of several ministers, which included Admiral Manuel López Pintado, a veteran sailor, speculator and naval officer who had been involved in Bourbon projects to reform trade with the Indies since at least 1710.¹⁵ Little is known about who else was summoned to this Junta, or the specific motives that led to its creation. López Pintado indicated in a report written a couple of years later that Patiño had convened the Junta in April 1734, several months before commissioning Tienda de Cuervo’s informe. It is therefore clear that Patiño did not create the Junta specifically to discuss this document, which López Pintado’s text would otherwise seem to imply.¹⁶ It is highly likely, that the committee that discussed Tienda de Cuervo’s report was the same Junta of “ministers of integrity, devotion and experience” mentioned in chapter seven. Patiño had convened it—also in April 1734 and also with López Pintado amongst its members—to discuss a series of proposals made by representatives of the Consulados of Lima and Cadiz-Seville concerning possible ways of improving trade across the Atlantic, upon whose recommendation the galeones were suspended in 1735.¹⁷

After a detailed examination of “each and every part” of Tienda de Cuervo’s report, Patiño’s commission concluded that it needed to enquire from the Council of the Indies the reasons why its members had deemed it convenient to suppress the viceroyalty in 1723. The members of the Junta saw the Council’s consulta along with “other documents and a secret vote which [Antonio de la] Pedrosa had made”. They found no evidence to justify the suppression of the viceroyalty, arguing that “it must have been confusion on behalf of the ministers who produced the consulta, and of Pedrosa himself” which led to such a decision. The Junta, thus, recommended that the viceroyalty be re-established, an idea which Patiño approved and presented to the king along with Tienda de Cuervo’s report and other documents. According to López Pintado, Patiño later informed the Junta that the king had agreed with their recommendation and would order New Granada to be created a viceroyalty once again.¹⁸

The project, however, seems to have been abandoned at this point, possibly because of more pressing foreign policy issues and other preoccupations. After all, within the context of the War of the Polish Succession, Spanish forces had occupied Naples without much difficulty in 1734, and found even less resistance in Sicily. War in Italy, however, continued well into 1735 and relations with allied France were not particularly smooth, to the extent that Spain was excluded from the secret negotiations leading to the Peace of Vienna in October 1735. At the same time, escalating tensions with Portugal threatened to force a confrontation with Britain, which kept Patiño busy in critical meetings with the British ambassador. Finally, in late 1735 and early 1736, Patiño seems to have devoted much of his attention to chasing the author of the Duende Crítico, the satirical newspaper that had made the minister its preferred target, and a forger who had been sending orders to the Indies bearing Patiño’s falsified signature.¹⁹

In any case, Patiño’s death in November 1736 (must have) dramatically affected the workings of the Spanish government. Even though Patiño himself had ceased making policy decisions since becoming ill during the summer and had entrusted the administration of each of his four ministries to their respective chief officers,²⁰ his death meant that effectively four of the five offices of Secretary of State were vacant. As done following the dismissal of Alberoni sixteen years earlier, Philip V decided not to rely upon a single minister again and to take a more active part in the monarchy’s government.²¹ At the same time, he appointed some of Patiño’s closest collaborators and subordinates as Secretaries of State.²² The Councils, as well as the Consulado, once again seem to have attempted to advance their position,²³ but despite the weak personalities and lack of talent that many contemporaries, and some historians, have attributed to the new Secretaries of State, the vía reservada retained the upper hand.²⁴

Thus, in 1737 the king appointed a new president to the Council of Indies, after Patiño had kept the post vacant since the death of the previous president in 1727. The appointee, Cristóbal Gregorio Portocarrero, fifth Count of Montijo, was a man of the king’s utmost confidence and a prominent member of the queen’s household.²⁵ Something similar happened in 1738, when the Council of War was bold enough to suggest to the king that the office of joint secretary for the Councils of War and State was abolished and that each Council was appointed a separate secretary as before 1714. The king not only denied this request, but even seized the opportunity to replace the president of the Council of War with Casimiro Uztáriz, chief officer of the Ministry for War under Patiño, who was simultaneously appointed Secretary of State and the Cabinet for War.²⁶ The merchants of Seville and Cadiz had no better luck when, in 1737, they decided to reject the crown’s demand for a donation of fifteen percent of the total value of monies and merchandise brought back on-board the flota and azogues recently returned to Cadiz. The new Secretary for the Treasury and the Indies, Mateo Pablo Díaz Labandero, first Marquis of Torrenueva, former treasurer-general under Patiño, rejected the Consulado’s counter offer of a lump sum donation of 250,000 pesos and established an ad hoc commission charged with investigating the merchants’ finances. The commission “discovered” widespread fraud within the flota of 1737 justifying not only the crown’s demand for what was really an indulto, disguised as a donation, but also finding grounds to impose an additional fine upon the Consulado.²⁷

Yet, it was not until late in 1737 that the new Secretary of State for the Indies, the Marquis of Torrenueva, recovered the project for re-establishing the viceroyalty of New Granada. On December 11, he sent Tienda de Cuervo’s report from 1734 to López Pintado, by then first Marquis of Torre Blanca, asking him in the name of the king, to express his opinions of it in writing. Torre Blanca replied a few days later, giving his backing to Tienda de Cuervo’s proposal to re-establish the viceroyalty.²⁸ Then, on January 7, 1738, the Secretary for the Indies sent Tienda de Cuervo’s report to both Francisco de Varas, long-time collaborator of Patiño and president of the Casa de Contratación, and Jorge de Villalonga, former viceroy of New Granada, for their opinion. Both men replied later that month, also giving their support to Tienda de Cuervo’s proposal.²⁹

On February 9, Torrenueva finally took the step that most significantly differentiated the second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada from the first one. In a letter addressed to the Count of Montijo, the minister asked the Council of the Indies, in the king’s name, to produce a consulta to aid him in “arriving at the right resolution [. . .] in a matter of such importance and consequence”.³⁰ True to form, the Council began to explore Tienda de Cuervo’s report, along with the opinions issued by Torre Blanca, Varas and Villalonga, the records from the early 1720s on the proposed move of the viceroyalty’s capital from Santa Fe to Cartagena, and the Council’s own consultas recommending the suppression of the first viceroyalty. On June 27, 1738, with the president and nine councilors present, the Council decided by a majority of six votes in favor and four against to recommend that the viceroyalty be re-established. The four dissenting ministers then issued a minority report, which prompted those who had voted with the majority to issue a rebuttal of their arguments and a defense of the Council’s original decision. A definitive consulta was only issued on October 20, 1738.³¹

This profound division within the Council seems to be indicative of the changes of personnel taking place within the corporation. After all, of the four councilors who voted with the minority, three were amongst the four more senior members of the Council.³² By contrast, the group voting on the majority included the president of the Council, two councilors de capa y espada,³³ two togados recently promoted from the Casa de Contratación, and thus, quite probably men of Patiño,³⁴ and José de Carvajal y Láncaster. The latter was a staunch defender of the role of the Secretaries of State and other reforms introduced by the Bourbons within the central administration of the Monarchy and had only been appointed to the Council in January 1738.³⁵ This is further evidence that, as argued in Chapter 7, since the 1720s the crown had succeeded in replacing the personnel within the Council with men more sympathetic to its proposals. After all, two former and two future Secretaries of State were serving in the Council at the time.

Later that year, the king acquiesced with the Council’s consulta (that is, with the majority vote) and on December 15, 1738, informed the Council of his decision to re-establish the viceroyalty of New Granada. At the same time, he advised the Council that the new viceroy’s letters of appointment should be issued by that tribunal, and ordered it to create ex novo an instrucción specific to the new viceroy based upon the reasons and objectives that had prompted the second creation of the viceroyalty. The king further instructed the Council that, due to his knowledge and experience of the country, he had decided to send Tienda de Cuervo to New Granada as a special adviser to the viceroy. Finally, he ordered the Chamber of the Indies to recommend for appointment as viceroy of New Granada at least three men “of standing, experience, proven conduct and known disinterest [and] of other qualities that should be appropriate to the particular situation that he is to establish a new institution”.³⁶

In response to the king’s order that the Council should prepare an instrucción exclusively for the new viceroy, the tribunal requested on January 11, 1739, that Tienda de Cuervo expand some of the arguments made within his 1734 report.³⁷ The intendente did so two days later.³⁸ On February 25, the Chamber of Indies recommended six possible candidates for the office of viceroy of New Granada;³⁹ from amongst them the king chose Sebastián de Eslava y Lasaga on April 24.⁴⁰ Finally, on August 20, the letters of appointment and powers of the new viceroy, along with his instrucción based loosely upon Tienda de Cuervo’s reports, were issued by the Council of Indies’ Secretary for Peru.⁴¹

Thus, the procedure that led to the second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada differed significantly from that followed twenty-one years earlier. It seems that in both instances the idea came initially from a royal minister close to the crown and the executive institutions of the new “administrative” monarchy. Yet, whilst in 1717 the whole process was handled through the vía reservada, involving a rather limited number of people, in the 1730s a much wider process of consultation was used. In this regard, it is significant that Eslava’s letters of appointment were issued by the Council of the Indies, in contrast with those of Villalonga, produced through the vía reservada. It is impossible to say with any certainty if this was done deliberately. Yet, whilst the procedure followed in 1717 suggested a certain degree of exceptionality, and allowed the viceroy to question the authority of the Council of the Indies, the one followed in 1738–1739 not only presented an impression of normality, but also guaranteed that the viceroy was implicitly made to recognize the authority of the Council of the Indies.

Of course, this does not mean that the Council had recovered the almost absolute power that it had enjoyed before the accession of Philip V.⁴² Alberoni’s decrees of 1717—which had deprived the Council of its privilege of exclusive communication with the Indies—had never been repealed. In 1738, the crown still retained the authority necessary to implement policy in Spanish America without the intervention of the Council, and the fact that both Patiño and Torrenueva began by consulting individuals outside the Council indicates that the ministers were well aware of their power of initiative. Yet, by including the Council in the latter stages of creating the viceroyalty—perhaps only as a gesture, if, as Torre Blanca claimed, the king and Patiño had already made the decision by 1735—the crown had ensured that the second viceroyalty of New Granada enjoyed an additional degree of legitimacy. What is more, by having involved the Council within the decision-making process, the crown had reduced the probability that the tribunal would decide, at a later stage, once more to target the newly created institution in order to reassert its own power.

8.2 A Viceroy’s Magic Touch: The Discourse of Economic Development and the Calls for the Creation of a Viceroyalty in New Granada

The differences between the first and second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada went beyond procedural matters. There were also noteworthy differences in the objectives pursued in both instances and in the arguments used to justify the decision. Of course, some motives remained the same; particularly the need to increase royal authority at the center of the New Kingdom and to increase the royal revenue derived from its jurisdiction. Yet, whilst in 1717 the argument for creating a new authority in New Granada had focused on the controversies and confrontations amongst the oidores and presidents of the different audiencias, in the 1730s, the most serious issue seemed to involve provincial governors. In his 1734 report, Tienda de Cuervo argued that the presence of a viceroy was necessary to bring under control the various provincial governors. Their arrogance, the Independence which they derived from their titles as captains-general and their tendency to “breed bands and factions”, had led them to oppose one another and even to resist the authority of the audiencia of Santa Fe to the detriment of the public and the royal treasury.⁴³ In his view, the insubordination of provincial governors was such that during the brief existence of the first viceroyalty, using their titles as captains-general as an excuse,⁴⁴ they had opposed the viceroy’s every action. They had complained directly to the crown and the Council with all sorts of invented and unjustified claims, thus destroying the viceroy’s reputation, and finally succeeding in having the viceroyalty suppressed.⁴⁵

In his own report, Jorge de Villalonga concurred with this assessment, stressing that provincial governors had repeatedly sabotaged his viceregency.⁴⁶ Yet what he found more worrisome was the multiplicity of reports and consultas that these men sent to Spain, often motivated simply by their desire to undo whatever their predecessor had done, which unnecessarily delayed the work of the central institutions of the monarchy. In his opinion, the only possible remedy was to appoint a viceroy clearly identified as being superior to these governors and to make it clear that, rather than governors and captains-general, they were merely governors and captains-at-war.⁴⁷ In this way, he argued, the efficiency of government within the New Kingdom would be increased, whilst reducing the bureaucratic burden that these unfounded requests represented for the institutions in Spain to the benefit of both the king and his subjects.⁴⁸ The Council agreed with this argument, recommending within its consulta stressing that all provincial governors were subordinate to the viceroy. However, it also considered that it would be appropriate to make the governors of Panama, Cartagena and Caracas comandantes generales, inferior to the viceroy, but superior to the other governors of the coastal cities and provinces that were to be divided into three circumscriptions, each to be placed under one of the comandantes generales. In the Council’s view this arrangement would make coordination and accountability easier whilst still enforcing the viceroy’s superior authority.⁴⁹

Another reason for establishing a viceroyalty in New Granada, common to both its first and second creation, was the increase of revenue to the royal treasuries. According to Tienda de Cuervo, a comparison of the state of the royal coffers of Santa Fe, both before and after the short-lived viceroyalty with their situation during the tenures of de la Pedrosa and Villalonga, left no doubt about the benefits to be derived from the presence of a viceroy. Whilst de la Pedrosa had found only nineteen reales in the treasury and debts more than ten years old, he had succeeded in collecting over two million pesos—some sixteen million reales—during his brief time in office. Moreover, if after paying some of the backlog and introducing some reforms de la Pedrosa had left only 78,000 pesos in cash to his successor, Villalonga had managed to leave the significant amount of 200,000 pesos, despite the allegedly high expenses of his guard and household.⁵⁰ This argument was also backed by a report sent to the king by the Cathedral Chapter of Santa Fe and seen by the Council of the Indies during its debates of 1738.⁵¹

However, the members of the Council who voted with the minority questioned the validity of these claims. They argued that any increase in revenue was not the result of the creation of the viceroyalty, but rather of the suppression of the audiencia of Quito and of the transfer to Santa Fe of monies that had, for different reasons, been retained within other treasuries.⁵² The councilors within the majority replied that, from the information available to them and the report produced by Francisco de Varas, it was clear that income from the collection of the royal fifth on the production of gold had increased in the same proportion as the output of the mines during the years of the first viceroyalty. Yet, since the suppression of the viceroyalty, whilst production at Chocó had continued to increase dramatically, income from the royal fifth had declined; a situation which the Council attributed to the absence of a superior officer with sufficient authority and commitment to the royal service, and, therefore, as evidence of the convenience of restoring the viceroyalty.⁵³

There were also some new arguments, however, for believing that the creation of a viceroyalty woul not only be convenient but even necessary. In the opinion of all the informants, creating a viceroyalty in New Granada would help, above all, to tackle what Tienda de Cuervo considered the “most radical abuse [committed] in the Indies”: illicit trade.⁵⁴ For the intendente, the presence of a viceroy, as “immediate person to H[is] M[ajesty]”, would be sufficient to prevent the inhabitants of the kingdom from participating in contraband, instead “striving to fulfil their obligations and [the] trust” placed on them, out of fear of the vast powers enjoyed by such a high-ranking official.⁵⁵ Perhaps less naively, the Marquis of Torre Blanca emphasized the viceroy’s extraordinarily wide “and despotic” powers, as the key that would allow him to end the contraband trade. In his opinion it was justified for the viceroy to proceed summarily against those involved in illicit trade; it would be the only means of ending this elusive practice, because allowing those involved, particularly provincial governors, to plead their cases in Spain was a sure way of guaranteeing that no-one was ever punished.⁵⁶

Examples of instances in which viceregal intervention would help to stop contraband trade were plentiful. In Tienda de Cuervo’s view, for instance, the presence of a viceroy would contribute to end illicit extractions of bullion produced in the provinces of Chocó and others. This would reduce the feasibility and attraction of illicit trade. Afterall, gold was used for trading along the wide unprotected coasts and even within various ports due to the negligence or connivance of local and provincial governors.⁵⁷ In the opinion of the Cathedral Chapter of Santa Fe, the first viceroyalty had been particularly effective in reducing this evil.⁵⁸ A similar argument, but with regard to Guayaquil’s extensive trade with New Spain, was made by former Viceroy Villalonga.⁵⁹

Similarly, it was argued that the presence of a viceroy would help to tackle the multiple abuses committed by subordinate officials and even by some governors who charged exorbitant commissions for the most menial tasks, including those activities from which the laws explicitly prohibited them from claiming an additional income.⁶⁰ Moreover, as both Tienda de Cuervo and Torre Blanca argued, only a viceroy could design and implement with sufficient authority the necessary policies to end abusive practices that often crossed the borders of various provincial jurisdictions.⁶¹ In Tienda de Cuervo’s opinion, this was particularly the case with contraband in and around the province of Chocó which was connected to Panama and Guayaquil through the San Juan and Atrato rivers. Since these trade routes, which dealt mostly with salt, aguardiente and fabrics, would not be easily suppressed, it would be more efficient to legalize them and to bring both Panama and Guayaquil under the viceroy’s jurisdiction so that unified policies could be implemented. The same, he argued, applied to Caracas, Maracaibo and even Portobello.⁶² Villalonga echoed this argument, pointing out that only a viceroy who was informed of the situation within the different provinces could effectively identify the trade routes and commercial links that connected the different provinces and, thus, implement policies which would contribute to the common benefit.⁶³ Tienda de Cuervo’s argument with regard to the connections between Chocó and Panama proved decisive in the Council’s recommendation that Panama was effectively placed under the jurisdiction of the newly created viceroyalty, unlike what had happened in 1717.⁶⁴

The same unity of command that the superior authority of a viceroy would provide was, in Tienda de Cuervo’s view, necessary to coordinate the different military forces of the New Kingdom and adjoining provinces and thereby increase the effectiveness of the realm’s defense. This was crucial, for instance, because a joint operation between the governors of Panama, Cartagena and Santa Fe was the only means of subduing the rebellious Cuna Indians, who continued to wreak havoc within the province of Darien.⁶⁵ Similarly, a joint military command was needed to contain, and hopefully push back, the Dutch settlements in Suriname, a problem that, according to Tienda de Cuervo’s report, had also been aggravated because of the disunity and rivalry amongst provincial governors.⁶⁶ A viceroy’s supervision was also the most effective way of guaranteeing that city walls and other defensive infrastructure received appropriate maintenance at reasonable costs.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the most striking characteristic of the arguments put forward during the discussions about the second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada was the insistence upon the material benefits that the kingdom itself would derive from the viceroy’s powers and active participation in its economic government. Tienda de Cuervo, Villalonga and Varas all stressed the incredible potential wealth of the New Kingdom and the abject poverty in which its inhabitants lived for lack of appropriate government.⁶⁸ Although less convinced about its relevance, even the councilors who voted within the minority accurately identified this as the main argument in Tienda de Cuervo’s plan for re-establishing the viceroyalty.⁶⁹ Most significantly, however, the Council was convinced that guaranteeing that New Granada achieved its full economic potential was the real reason why the king was entertaining such a proposal. Quoting the terms of the royal order which had asked the Council to produce a consulta on the matter, the councilors within the majority chastised the authors of the minority report for their short-sightedness in trying to reduce the proposed viceroyalty to a mechanism for fighting contraband.⁷⁰

In defending the idea that appointing a viceroy would improve the economic condition of the inhabitants of New Granada, the Council resorted to the metaphor of how a good administrator, solely by his dedication and skill, could return to glory a household ruined by confusion and neglect, claiming that the same applied to a city, a province or a kingdom.⁷¹ The metaphor, of course, was completely appropriate; not only because economic government technically means government of the household but because, as we have seen,⁷² the argument that the king could do within his kingdom all what a pater familiae could do within his household had been central to the articulation and expansion of the economic prerogative of the monarch.

Once again, the idea that the king—or in this case his viceroy—could have an impact and, moreover, a responsibility for the wellbeing of his subjects was not new. Ever since Philip V’s accession to the Spanish throne his decrees had consistently stressed, or at least hinted at, this ideation.⁷³ This argument simultaneously justified the king’s efforts to extend the power and authority of the crown and evinced the new hierarchy of the obligations of the king towards his subjects—which prioritized the provision of good (economic) government above the provision of justice. Indeed, as Colin M. MacLachlan has argued, coinciding with the accession of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne, a major change within the ideological justification of monarchical government took place. Although the fundamental principle of the king’s benevolent intent was not abandoned, its impulse “shifted from a remote divine source to a definite material foundation”. This new articulation was based upon “an economic justification [. . .] that linked the state to the prosperity and [material] well-being of the individual”.⁷⁴ In this regard, Tienda de Cuervo’s report and the Council’s adoption of it represent perhaps the culmination of this transformation. In examining Tienda de Cuervo’s report within the context of previous requests for the creation of a viceroyalty in New Granada, there can be no doubt that a change in the understanding of the role of the king, or of monarchical government, had taken place during the first four decades of the eighteenth century. By the late 1730s, then, the understanding of the king’s role in matters of economic government had acquired a new importance.

The earliest documented request for the creation of a viceroyalty in New Granada is the one attributed to José Daza Guzmán, governor of Cartagena between 1675 and 1679.⁷⁵ The governor began his argument by describing the geographical location of Cartagena, its fortresses and city-walls, its harbor, the fortresses guarding the entrance to the bay and the war ships destined for its defense. The only defect that the author found in these constructions was the chronic lack of a garrison strong enough to man them. In his view, the city’s location and fortifications made it such an important element in the defense of Spanish America, and particularly of Peru, that its fall would be catastrophic to Spain’s imperial structure. He, therefore, advised the king to create a new viceroyalty in northern South America, with its capital in Cartagena, so that the city’s defenses would be “as inexpugnable in reality as they are in appearance”.⁷⁶ Moreover, the author argued, appointing a viceroy and transferring the audiencia of Santa Fe to Cartagena would—in imitation of the wise government practices of the Romans, Greeks and Carthaginians—guarantee that the inhabitants of all the region would have equal access to litigious and distributive justice.

As part of his argument, the author referred to the vast resources and wealth of Cartagena—including “gold, sugar, cotton, timber [. . .] cocoa beans, rice, maize, pigs [. . .], cows, goats, rams, and [. . .] plenty of fish”.⁷⁷ The sole purpose of this list, however, was to demonstrate that Cartagena was never short of supplies; these riches were taken as a given, which contributed to the paramount importance of the port and city but which had nothing to do with the government. The author recommended the appointment of a viceroy simply because Cartagena was a rich and important port, the foremost defensive bastion of Spanish America, which would gain further improvement of its defenses, the presence of a sufficient number of troops and easier and quicker access to justice. In this sense, the author’s argument suggests an understanding of the role of monarchical government perfectly in keeping with Spain’s traditional philosophical matrix: the king—through his viceroy—was primarily expected to guarantee his subjects access to justice and protection from foreign threats.⁷⁸

José de Zúñiga y la Cerda, governor of Cartagena from 1706 to 1713, penned on March 15, 1708, a second request for the establishment of a viceroyalty, in which some significant differences are immediately evident. Military considerations were still very much present, and the letter described Cartagena was once more as the key to the kingdoms of New Granada and Peru. Rather than detailed descriptions of the privileged location and excellent fortresses of the city, however, the author began by detailing the “miserable state to which the city had been reduced on account of the extreme poverty of its inhabitants”.⁷⁹ According to the author, the ruin of the city and its province were largely the long-lasting legacy of the French ransacking of 1697 and of the almost complete collapse of maritime trade during the on-going War of the Spanish Succession. Cartagena, it emerged, had been one of Spain’s richest ports and its wealthy merchants had always been able and willing to lend money to the crown in any emergency; but none of this remained. By 1708, amongst the few merchants living in the city “there were men [. . .] so poor and overburdened with debt that they would consider it financially convenient to be lost at sea or high-jacked by the enemy”.⁸⁰

Yet, this dire situation was not beyond remedy. In the governor’s view, all the city’s problems could be easily resolved by establishing a viceroyalty with its capital in Cartagena. Such a measure would result in “population growth, increase of royal revenue and private wealth and the perpetual defense of the city”, thus constituting “the easiest and cheapest means of preserving those domains”.⁸¹ In addition to this, and whilst the viceroyalty could be established, the author recommended that the crown promoted trade by allowing for regular ships trading in foodstuffs to visit Cartagena from other parts of the Spanish Caribbean and from the Canary Islands. This would encourage producers from the inland provinces to bring their wares to the city, increasing both revenue and private profit. At the same time, such a measure would perhaps attract new residents amongst those merchants, sailors and transporters participating in this trade and once they had settled they would begin to cultivate the fertile lands of the province.

This argument and the few specific suggestions put forward by Zúñiga indicate that, for him, there was more to monarchical government than the provision of justice and defence. Firstly, in stark contrast with earlier documentation, there was not a single mention of the provision of justice within the text. Secondly, although there was still a very clear demand for appropriate defense—and in some ways a critique of the poor job previously done on this front during the invasion of 1697—the whole argument was structured around the poverty and economic ruin of Cartagena and its province; conditions which, the author suggested, was the crown’s job to remedy. The mechanisms through which this would be tackled were only partially explained. It is certain, though, that in 1708 Cartagena expected to secure, through the appointment of a viceroy, the appropriate defense of its coasts and the recovery of both its population and wealth, a recovery that it was repeatedly pointed out, would benefit both the inhabitants of the city and the king.

By the later 1720s and 1730s the economic concerns first put forward in 1708 had gained in prominence and the articulation of the mechanisms through which tangible economic benefits could be obtained were growing in clarity. Thus, Antonio Manso Maldonado began his already-mentioned letter of 1729 in a similar fashion to Zúñiga’s request for the creation of a viceroyalty. Upon his arrival in Santa Fe, Manso had found the Kingdom “in utmost desolation [. . .] and lamentable poverty”.⁸² Yet, when he turned his attention to finding out whether, despite this situation, the province was as rich as it was reputed to be, he found that the resources available in New Granada far surpassed the idea of them circulating at court. Not without some exaggeration, Manso claimed that within 50 or 60 leagues of Santa Fe, one could find “every precious and valuable thing found in the most opulent kingdoms of the Orient”.⁸³ Gold and silver were found everywhere, as were sources of precious stones. The kingdom had copper enough to “provide artillery for the entire Monarchy”,⁸⁴ lead, tin, excellent timber, resins, alum, sulphur, and many other resources to the extent that one could argue “nothing that is precious or useful is lacking in this Kingdom which could even supply others with its surplus”.⁸⁵

Faced with this apparent contradiction between a kingdom rich in resources and a population sunk into poverty and economic desolation, Manso set out to identify the reasons why the country’s riches had not been transformed into wealth. Foremost amongst these was “the ruler’s oversight [. . .] which had left the people become lazy to the extent that [. . .] there is no-one willing to work”.⁸⁶ To remedy this situation he proposed the draconian method of condemning all vagrants and unoccupied people to forced labor within the mines; such a measure, Manso argued, would increase the productivity of the mines, scare the unproductive members of society into finding suitable occupations and free Indian laborers to cultivate the land.⁸⁷ Simultaneously, he suggested that the king should implement other measures to encourage economic activity, such as advancing both quicksilver and African slaves to the miners, upon the agreement that they would repay their value directly from the metals extracted, thus benefiting both the miners and the royal treasury.⁸⁸ However, as mentioned before, he found that his authority was not enough to put these measures into place and that only the king’s strong arm could solve New Granada’s problems. He, thus, urged the king to increase the power and superiority of the royal official charged with the government of the New Kingdom so that his authority might be closer to the king's.⁸⁹

What is most relevant in Manso’s argument, beyond the solutions that he proposed, is the reasoning behind these. It is evident that by the late 1720s royal government was seen as having a direct impact in and responsibility for securing a region’s economic wellbeing. It was only the implementation of the appropriate policies that could “resuscitate an almost deceased Kingdom and give happiness to its subjects, abundance to the royal treasuries and envy to the most opulent nations”.⁹⁰ Within this argument the desire for Spain to regain its position amongst the European powers, the recovery of the royal finances and the happiness—understood as material wellbeing—of the inhabitants of New Granada were all linked to the appropriate economic government of the realm.⁹¹ The letter made it very clear that it was the crown’s responsibility to provide adequate incentives to transform New Granada’s plentiful natural resources into wealth.

The same reasoning guided the arguments made by Tienda de Cuervo in 1734. His description of New Granadan resources was even more hyperbolic: he described a kingdom rich in fertile soils, abundant fresh water and a variety of climates such that all sorts of plants, both American and European, could be grown. The subsoil was loaded with gold, silver, emeralds and other precious stones, its riverbeds with pearls, and even sources of copper and quicksilver had been discovered. Its different provinces already produced cocoa beans, indigo, tobacco, and Brazil wood, woollen fabrics and cotton enough to “load several ships each year”.⁹² The abundance of both industrial timber and precious woods and of all sorts of cattle were beyond description.⁹³ Nonetheless, these vast resources were invariably underutilised and wasted, primarily through “lack of encouragement (fomento)”.⁹⁴ In his view, New Granada’s vast resources were incontestable, and only through the establishment of a viceroyalty could “necessary and consistent measures be put into practice and sustained by his authority [ . . . thus] transforming [New Granada] in a short period of time into the most powerful, rich and profitable [of Spain’s provinces], both for the king and his subjects”.⁹⁵

Yet, what set Tienda de Cuervo more clearly apart from previous authors was the detailed plans and information that he provided concerning why and how a viceroy could deliver appropriate economic government for New Granada. For example, he suggested that by creating certain incentives and implementing specific policies, a viceroy should advance the draining of flooded mines,⁹⁶ the reestablishment of crews of African divers, and the necessary boats for fishing pearls out of the Hacha River,⁹⁷ as well as the suppression of marauding Indian groups who made the roads impossible to travel.⁹⁸ He also advocated the provision of adequate garrisons and fortresses that would help protect the property of the king’s vassals, the defense of royal fiscal interests, and the control of forced laborers.⁹⁹ Simultaneously, the viceroy should guarantee that Indians were well paid and regularly rotated so that they worked better in the mines while their fields were maintained.¹⁰⁰ He should introduce controlled navigation in certain rivers, as well as improving and opening new roads, order the minting of new coins at the crown’s expense to be later exchanged for un-minted gold directly from the miners without them having to transport their own product to Santa Fe.¹⁰¹ His argument was packed with innumerable examples of the effects that even the short-lived experience of the first viceroyalty had on the productivity and development of the region. In particular, he continued at great length about the province of Chocó. He attributed its success to the presence of a particularly skillful governor who had provided adequate facilities and incentives so that the miners would import slave laborers, have access to tools of both iron and steel, and other necessary supplies such as beef, maize, salt, firewater and tobacco. Yet, all over the country, he argued, mines lay abandoned or under exploited “due to absence of commitment and lack of people” or because of “great decadence [. . .] both of monies and of spirits”.¹⁰² All, however, could be remedied if the appropriate incentives and resolutions were put into place with “the authority of a viceroy”.¹⁰³

Certainly, Tienda de Cuervo’s understanding of what a viceroy could do seems often unrealistic, if not outright fantastic. For instance, he seemed to completely disregard the huge distances separating the various provinces of the New Kingdom, claiming repeatedly “if there were a viceroy in [Santa Fe . . . ] he could from there remedy all the abuses suffered by such a vast kingdom”.¹⁰⁴ Yet, to his contemporaries there was substance within his propositions. The Council’s consulta of August 20, 1739, shows clearly that the members of the tribunal, as well as the king, were impressed by the variety of concrete proposals that he put forward and his broad grasp of the different areas of New Granada’s economy. This combination of detailed planning and comprehensive understanding of “the interlocking nature of the country’s problems” is precisely what set eighteenth century proyectismo, based on the economic justification of monarchical rule, apart from the proposals of seventeenth century arbitristas.¹⁰⁵ This was the reason why the crown and the Council decided to include a number of Tienda de Cuervo’s specific recommendations in the instrucción given to the new viceroy. The same reasoning was behind the decision to send Tienda de Cuervo to New Granada with the title of “visitador of the provinces of the New Kingdom, and of the warehouses, provisions and ammunitions of its district”, to advise and assist the viceroy in obtaining the aims intended by the creation of the viceroyalty.¹⁰⁶ In all likelihood, this was also the reason why the Council decided to give its backing to Tienda de Cuervo’s ultimately unsuccessful request to be made councilor of the Indies.¹⁰⁷

8.3 Choosing a New Viceroy: Sebastián de Eslava and the Defense of New Granada

The sources make it perfectly clear that the perceived need to provide appropriate economic oversight for the provinces of the New Kingdom was the central motivation behind the decision to reestablish the viceroyalty of New Granada—along with the need to increase the royal revenues and the reinforcement of royal authority over the arrogant and quarrelsome provincial governors. Yet, given the timing of and the international context within which the decision was made, it is difficult not to think that defensive concerns must have weighed heavily in the minds of those involved in making it.¹⁰⁸ After all, despite Patiño’s earlier efforts at appeasement, tensions between Spain and Britain had escalated during the latter 1730s; by 1739, a break between both nations seemed increasingly likely.

The joint commission established by the Treaty of Seville of 1729 to discuss mutual complaints arising from the implementation of the asiento treaty had begun meeting in 1732, but made little to no progress, leaving the governments and merchants of both nations dissatisfied.¹⁰⁹ Since at least the late 1720s Spanish authorities, both within the Peninsula and the Indies, had blamed British contraband in the Caribbean and Buenos Aires—and increasingly that performed under the cover of asiento activities—for the deterioration of trade between Cadiz and the Indies.¹¹⁰ From the British perspective, Spain had failed to comply with a number of its international commitments, repeatedly violating the commercial treaties of 1667, 1670, and 1713–14. Moreover, the operations of the Spanish coast guards, aimed at tackling illicit trade in the Caribbean, were seen as encroaching upon British privileges, impeding normal trade between Britain and its possessions in the West Indies.¹¹¹

Nonetheless, despite persistent tensions over trade issues, at the time of Patiño’s death, relations between Britain and Spain had been mostly cordial; they continued to be so until at least the autumn of 1737.¹¹² This was due, at least in part, to the fact that Spanish persecution of British contrabandists and interlopers in the Caribbean and off the American coasts was eased between 1733 and 1737, largely for political reasons.¹¹³ At this point, however, there developed what Jean McLachlan has termed “a crisis of depredations” which soon escalated, bringing Britain and Spain to the brink of hostilities, despite the attempts of both courts to avoid war. In the summer of 1737, the governor of the Leeward Islands complained of new attacks by Spanish coastguards and privateers on a number of British ships.¹¹⁴ This led the British ambassador in Madrid to present a series of claims for compensation between October and December 1737;¹¹⁵ Sebastián de la Cuadra, Philip V’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Council of the Indies, replied to these claims with promises to investigate further those cases that were not entirely clear. In the meantime, he ordered the return of those ships that were indeed in Spanish possession and offered to punish the governors of Puerto Rico and Cuba who had tolerated these actions.¹¹⁶ Unfortunately, it took five months, from the time when the most serious of British complaints had been put forward, for the Spanish authorities to produce a reply. During this period indignation within Britain mounted and the ambassador was instructed to press his claims and to remind the Spanish court of all the previous demands which had gone unresolved, dating at least back to the 1720s.¹¹⁷ This further complicated the situation, because, whilst the Spanish crown seemed willing to offer compensation to the victims of recent captures, it was less receptive to older claims; public opinion within Britain received badly the excuses and justifications put forward by the Spanish ministers.¹¹⁸ At the same time, the British ministry began granting letters of reprisal to those merchants whose ships, or property, were being held by Spanish authorities, thus marking the starting point of an all-out “battle of corsairs” which long pre-dated the formal declaration of war between both countries.¹¹⁹

By the spring of 1738, West Indian merchants—a community which had been actively involved in (illicit) trade with Spanish America since the late seventeenth century—¹²⁰ had inundated the British parliament with stories of Spanish abuses and brutality, demanding compensation.¹²¹ With support from the opposition, they had ventilated their cause through the press. When news arrived in late March that thirty-one British sailors were in a prison in Cadiz, other groups, including the cities of London and Bristol, joined in their clamor against Spain.¹²² Throughout the summer Robert Walpole, the head of the British government, tried to appease the merchants and resist the pressure from the House of Commons, whilst negotiating with Spain an arrangement that, it was hoped, would resolve the grievances on both sides and preserve the peace.¹²³ However, the tactless communications of the Duke of Newcastle, Britain’s Secretary of State for the south, plus the presence of a British fleet off Gibraltar, reduced the efficacy of Walpole’s manoeuvres and increased Madrid’s fear that Britain might be on the warpath.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, in September 1738 a convention was signed in London, later to be ratified in Madrid, by which the king of Spain agreed to pay a lump sum for the settlement of all claims by West Indian merchants. At the same time, both nations agreed to appoint plenipotentiaries to settle their disagreements over navigation rights in the Caribbean, as well as other disputed matters.¹²⁵ Hopes that the convention would avert war were high on both sides.¹²⁶ It soon became clear that the convention could not be fully implemented in the terms it had been drafted.¹²⁷ Both sides, though, still hoped that war would be avoided by the signing of a new convention that would include all the conditions of the first one whilst excluding the specific phrases which had rendered it impracticable.¹²⁸ The new agreement, the Convention of El Pardo, was signed in January 1739 and ratified the following month. Both sides were still hopeful that the new convention would avoid hostilities: in Britain orders were issued for the fleet stationed off Gibraltar to return home and the ambassador in Madrid received instructions to explore the possibility of establishing a permanent alliance between the two crowns. Similarly, in Spain, ships were disarmed and military officials given leave, whilst instructions for the restoration of trade with the Indies, particularly for the immediate return of the azogues, were issued. The fury with which opposition within the British parliament met the news of the Convention must have dissolved most expectations, however.¹²⁹

By spring 1739, it was clear that war was imminent. Pressure from parliament had forced Walpole and Newcastle to redeploy the fleet off Gibraltar and the Mediterranean;¹³⁰ within Spain Torrenueva had been dismissed from office as both Secretary for Finance and Secretary for the Navy and the Indies. He was replaced in the latter office by José de la Quintana, a man whom the British ambassador described as “ ‘the enemy of all strangers’ with ‘his head full of Spanish smoke’ and than whom ‘a more difficult, tenacious, disputable antagonist never was met with’ ”.¹³¹ Continued disagreements between the Spanish crown and the South Sea Company meant that by May the Spanish king was still to pay the stipulated compensation to British merchants; when Newcastle demanded payment Madrid made it conditional upon the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean.¹³² By the beginning of the summer, British merchants had been advised to remove themselves from Spain. Shortly thereafter, the South Sea Company ordered its factors in Spanish America to suspend trade and to transport all company property to safe ports.¹³³ Almost simultaneously, an additional detachment was sent to reinforce the fleet off Gibraltar and a squadron under Admiral Edward Vernon was sent to the Caribbean.¹³⁴ In August, the British ambassador in Madrid was recalled to London.¹³⁵ Thus, although the official declaration of war did not occur until October 1739 the inevitability of hostilities must have been known to all involved at least six months previously.

It is impossible to say with certainty what impact the tensions of the “crisis of depredations” had upon the early stages of the process that led to the second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada. Although it is undeniable that the threat of war was looming at various points during 1738¹³⁶ —whilst the Council of the Indies was debating the convenience of re-establishing the viceroyalty—it is striking that no defensive considerations, which specifically referred to the possibility of an international war, were present in the debates. Moreover, whilst a number of measures related directly to the possibility of war were halted or abandoned in late 1738 and early 1739—when hopes that diplomacy had successfully averted war were high—the plans for re-establishing the viceroyalty seemed to continue at full steam. Only as the expectations that peace could be maintained faded during the spring of 1739, preparations for the re-establishment of the viceroyalty began to reflect the imminence of war.

As previously mentioned, on February 25, 1739, the Chamber of the Indies presented the king with a list of six candidates for the office of viceroy of New Granada.¹³⁷ Five of those nominated were experienced military officers, all with the rank of mariscal de campo of the royal armies. First on the list was a grandee, the Duke of Abrantes, of whose life and military career, unfortunately, very little is known.¹³⁸ In second place, the Chamber proposed Sebastián de Eslava, at the time teniente de ayo, or deputy head of the household, of Philip’s third son, Infante Philip. Eslava had a long career in the royal guards and was a distinguished veteran of the conquest of Oran and the Italian campaigns of earlier in the decade.¹³⁹ In third place came councilor of the Indies, José de Carvajal, the only man without a military background to be included on the list. The fourth candidate was Bernardino Marimón y Corberá, commanding officer of the mounted company of royal grenadiers, an elite force incorporated into the royal guards under Patiño.¹⁴⁰ At their head, Marimón had participated in the conquest of Oran in 1732 and in the Italian campaigns of 1733–35. Fifth on the list was Francisco Javier de Avellaneda Sandoval y Lucena, third Marquis of Torre Mayor, another veteran of the campaigns of Philip’s second reign, who had fought in the siege of Gibraltar of 1727 and the conquest of Oran where he had been taken prisoner by the Turkish armies.¹⁴¹ In last place, the Chamber recommended Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, captain- general of Cuba since 1734, also a veteran of Gibraltar and Oran.¹⁴²

Whilst only one of the candidates of 1739, Güemes y Horcasitas, had any previous governmental experience, this is not to say that the rest lacked administrative expertise altogether. A number of them—especially Eslava, Torre Mayor and Güemes himself—had served as military inspectors; as such, they had held significant responsibilities in the internal administration of army corps during peacetime.¹⁴³ At least three of them were still, or had until very recently been, in command of active troops and had distinguished themselves in the military campaigns of Oran and the War of the Polish Succession—earning their promotions to the first ranks of the choice corps officers- general in these campaigns. It is, therefore, probable that the Chamber’s decision to nominate precisely these individuals, rather than nominating officers with more politico-military experience—who would had been away from the theatre of war for a longer period of time—, was directly related to the perceived imminence of war. Of course, the Chamber produced its six-man list in February, when apparently there were still hopes that the Convention of El Pardo would manage to avert war with Britain. It seems significant, though, that during the “crisis of depredations” at least three other men, fresh from active duty, had been appointed to the viceroyalty of Navarre, and the captaincies-general of Extremadura and Old Castile.¹⁴⁴ In any case, there can be little doubt that by late April, when Philip V chose Sebastián de Eslava from amongst the candidates presented by the Chamber,¹⁴⁵ war had begun to look more and more likely, and that the need to appropriately defend the fortresses of northern South America must have seemed more pressing.

Eslava—like many of the military officers appointed to Spanish American government posts before him—was a descendant of a minor branch of an ancient family of provincial nobility. His relatives and ancestors had served for generations within the provincial institutions of Navarre and in the Spanish army.¹⁴⁶ Urged on by an older cousin, Eslava started his military career in 1701 as an alférez in one of the tercios of Navarre; when Philip V reformed the royal guards, he secured a place as cadete in the guardias de corps.¹⁴⁷ By 1705, he had transferred again, this time to one of the Spanish companies of the infantry guards where he continued to serve for thirteen years, progressing steadily up the promotion ladder and participating in the principal battles of the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁴⁸ In 1714–1715, he participated in the siege and final assault on Barcelona. By then he had reached the rank of captain in the infantry guards, equivalent to that of colonel in the regular regiments and the following year he received a knighthood in the Order of Santiago.¹⁴⁹ In 1718, under the future viceroy of Peru, Marquis of Castelfuerte, Eslava participated in the conquest of Sicily, receiving in 1720 an encomienda in the Order of Calatrava and an appointment in 1721 as inspector of the infantry of Aragon, Navarre and Guipuzcoa.¹⁵⁰ He spent most of the 1730s in Italy, arriving in Tuscany with the troops of the Count, later Duke, of Montemar in 1731.¹⁵¹ He participated in the conquest of Oran and earned a promotion to brigadier in 1732.¹⁵² His participation in the campaigns of the War of the Polish Succession and his continued services as army inspector earned him a promotion to the rank of mariscal de campo in 1734.¹⁵³ He remained in Italy, stationed in Florence, as inspector for several infantry regiments in the service of both the Spanish crown and the king of the Two Sicilies,¹⁵⁴ before returning to Madrid in 1737 and receiving his first appointment in the household of Infante Philip.¹⁵⁵

Although Eslava’s military record was certainly impeccable, the documents related to his viceregal appointment make no specific mention of his merits as a soldier. In February 1739, the Chamber of the Indies had recommended him on account of “his good judgement, demonstrated capabilities and conduct, disinterestedness, [ . . . and] sufficient wisdom to adopt measures, create rules and new institutions”.¹⁵⁶ In April, the king had chosen him “on account of his services, his demonstrated conduct, and the particular traits which will aid him in successfully fulfilling such an important task”.¹⁵⁷ Perhaps most striking, his letter of appointment, issued on August 20, simply stated that it had been deemed “convenient to appoint to the office of viceroy [of New Granada] an individual of the necessary qualities [and that] seeing that these [we]re present in [. . .] Sebastián de Eslava” the king had chosen him as his viceroy.¹⁵⁸ In other words, it seems that despite the imminence of war, Eslava’s promise as an ideal military-administrator played a major role in his nomination as second (first) viceroy of New Granada.

However, there can be no doubt that increasingly throughout 1739 Eslava came to be seen as the perfect man to have at the head of New Granada in preparation for the coming war. Already in July, the crown had repeatedly expressed the need for the new viceroy to set sail as soon as possible so that he could take command of the defenses of Cartagena.¹⁵⁹ Then, in September, as the details of his transportation were being organized, Eslava received new orders, prepared through the vía reservada. These instructed him to remain on the coast upon his arrival in New Granada, making full use of his powers as viceroy, to ensure the defense of its ports, “especially of Portobello, in the present constitution of the hostilities executed by the English”, without needing to go inland to Santa Fe to take up office.¹⁶⁰ In fact, the crown’s awareness of the need to defend Portobello was clear since August 1739, when letters addressed to the viceroy of Peru and the governor of Cartagena had informed them of the imminent departure from Cadiz of two warships transporting Eslava and six hundred men for the port’s garrison.¹⁶¹

As it happened, however, Eslava did not leave Cadiz until October 18, 1739;¹⁶² by the time he arrived in Cartagena de Indias on April 24, 1740, there was little that he could do to defend Portobello. Following Britain’s declaration of war in October 1739, Admiral Vernon, who had set sail for the Caribbean in July, had launched an attack on the city, forcing its surrender on December 2nd, 1739, destroying its fortifications before abandoning the port two months later.¹⁶³ Yet, Eslava had a chance to prove his worth soon enough. For, in March 1741, Vernon turned his attention to Cartagena, confident that he would meet with the same result as the previous winter, only to be proved wrong by the outstanding defensive manoeuvres of Viceroy Eslava and Admiral Blas de Lezo.¹⁶⁴

Thus, some important differences set the first and second creations of the viceroyalty of New Granada apart. Whilst in 1717 the whole process had been handled through the vía reservada, in the 1730s the inclusion of the Council of Indies in the discussions and the implementation of the restoration of the viceroyalty imbued the whole process with an air of normality and legitimacy that had been absent under Alberoni. Involving the Council of Indies may have been possible in the 1730s because of the profound changes within the tribunal’s composition, which had taken place during Patiño’s long tenure as minister of the Navy and the Indies. There is no doubt, however, that by doing so the crown removed one of the main causes of tensions between the viceroy and the Council, which had ultimately brought the first viceregal experiment to a close. However, there is little doubt that just as it had been the case in 1717, the creation of the viceroyalty in 1739 reflected very clearly the new understanding of the role of monarchical government, which had come to characterize early Bourbon reformism. If anything, Bartolomé Tienda de Cuervo’s report, its adoption by the Council and the instrucción given to Sebastián de Eslava, show how strongly accepted the idea that the king’s main responsibility was the provision of good economic government and conditions for development had become.

Finally, it should also be noted that the second creation of the viceroyalty differed from the first in some aspects of how the various territories which conformed the viceroyalty were integrated. Unlike in 1717, when the viceroyalty was re-established in 1739 the audiencia of Quito was not suppressed, although it became explicitly subordinated to the viceroy. Similarly, the province of Tierra Firme, which this time was included within the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty, retained the audiencia of Panama; at least until 1750, when the reality of the extinction of the galeones allowed for the tribunal’s permanent suppression. Finally, although the provinces of Venezuela became once again part of the viceroyalty of New Granada, its inhabitants were only placed under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Santa Fe for matters of political and fiscal government; for matters of strict justice, they remained subjected to the audiencia of Santo Domingo. These differences with the first creation of the viceroyalty showed more sensitivity towards local conditions. Unintentionally, perhaps, so did Eslava’s permanence in Cartagena de Indias throughout his term as viceroy. Although spurred on by defensive concerns, the anomaly of the viceroy’s presence on the coast, whilst the audiencia remained in Santa Fe, neutralized, at least temporarily, the rivalry between both cities.