1 Classical Confucianism and Traditional Chinese Ethics

In Li’s view, Confucianism presents the basic underpinning of all traditional Chinese systems of philosophical ethics (Li Zehou 1992). After the Cultural Revolution, Li was among the first Chinese scholars who began to strive for a rehabilitation of Confucianism. Many of his writings on Chinese intellectual history, especially the ones published in the 1980s, played a significant role in revaluing Confucian tradition in modern times. In addition, traditional Chinese ethics also served as a powerful inspiration for his redefinition of human morality, which is not based on pure voluntarism nor upon absolute determinism, but still remains in accord with historical materialism. In the Foreword to the Reading the Analects Today Li interprets the rise and the development of Confucianism through the method of deconstruction (jiegou 結構), which is then followed by reconstruction (chongjian 重建) (Li Zehou 1995, 27). In this heavily annotated translation of classical teachings into Modern Chinese, he directs our attention to the crucial traits of pre-Qin, Qin, and Han Confucianism. In this as well as in several other works, he examines which parts of these early teachings could be combined with the most important theories of Western ethical thought, to better confront contemporary questions, not just for China but also more broadly for humankind. He emphasizes that there is no single Confucian tradition but, rather, a broad scope of competing schools of thought, with the classical Confucian teachings found in the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xunzi depicted as integrally more valuable than the Neo-Confucian doctrines of the Song and Ming dynasties. In his view, the early classical teachings can be better adapted in contemporary societies. Through a combination of classical Confucianism and Western theories, Li aims to expose a new ethical discourse by providing an analogy with what Kant did in the early modernization of Europe (Nylan 2018, 137).

In such an agenda, Li differentiates (among other issues that will be illuminated below) between the surficial (biao ceng 表層) and the deep (shen ceng 深層) structure of Confucianism (Li Zehou 2010a, 7). While the former refers to its teachings in the sense of a rational, normative, ethical, and axiological system of thought, the latter pertains to the unconscious influence that arises from the cultural-psychological formation possessed by a broad population of Chinese people.

In his deconstruction, Li sees traditional Confucian thought as intrinsically connected not only with Daoist and Buddhist ideas, but also with Legalism, which was commonly seen as standing in direct opposition to Confucian thought. Hence, he not only speaks about the mutually complementary empowerment of Daoism and Confucianism (Rudao hubu 儒道互補), but he also lays stress on the reciprocal utilization of Confucianism and Legalism (Rufa huyong 儒法互用).

In this regard, he sharply criticizes the Neo-Confucian and Modern Confucian (Xin ruxue 新儒學) approaches, which deny the important role of Legalist factors in the shaping and in the historical evolvement of Confucianism as a main pillar of the Chinese intellectual and cultural tradition. In contrast to such approaches, which see the history of Confucianism as divided into three main phases, Li emphasizes that it has to be analyzed through the lens of four developmental stages.

In both Neo-Confucian and Modern Confucian views, the present stage is the last one. The present stage denotes the era of reconstruction and renovation of Confucianism (and, in a broader sense, of the entire Chinese philosophical tradition), which began at the threshold of the twentieth century and is marked by attempts to mold traditional Chinese philosophy into a framework suitable for its survival and enhancement in contemporary times.

However, essential differences between the Neo-Confucian and Modern Confucian lines of thought on the one side, and Li Zehou’s on the other, had already appeared in their particular understandings of the first phase, i.e., the phase of establishing the original Confucian teachings. While the interpretations of the former exclusively focus upon one particular line of Confucian thought that was further developed by Mencius, and thus denote Confucianism as the “Way of Confucius and Mencius” (Kong Meng zhi dao 孔孟之道), Li argues for a return to the pre-Song way of referring to Confucianism as the “Way of Duke Zhou and Confucius” (Zhou Kong zhi dao 周孔之道). In Li’s view, the Confucian teachings were developed from the early ancient shamanistic historical tradition (wushi chuantong 巫史傳統), which was later modified, ordered, rationalized, and institutionalized by the Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong 周公). But Confucius, who in this schema is seen as a follower of Duke Zhou, has elaborated upon different issues that were later further developed by his most prominent followers, including Mencius 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子, who both represent two major but different lines of original Confucian thought. The original teachings have encompassed elaborations on aspects of inner morality as well as facets pertaining to external ethical and political practice. Hence, the original Confucianism covered a dialectical interaction between both oppositional notions of the traditional idea of “inner sage and external ruler” (neisheng waiwang 内聖外王). It hence encompassed both the concept of empirical as well as the transcendental self.

However, even though Li often mentions that early Confucianism included both, the “inner sage” as well as the “external ruler,” he is still not satisfied with the nature of their mutual relation, because in his view the former has always been seen as a primary and dominant element of the two. Therefore, this category, which mirrors the empirical and the transcendental self, has to be essentially modified in order to meet the demands of the modern era:

From the contemporary point of view, the “external ruler” can by no means be reduced to politics, for it implies the concrete vital existence and the material life of the entire humankind. It includes problems linked to technology, production, and economy. Neither can the “inner sage,” be reduced to morality, because it pertains to the entire cultural-psychological formation and includes art, aesthetics, and so on. Therefore, the original Confucian and the Song-Ming Neo-Confucian model in which the “inner sage” always determines the “external ruler” must be eliminated and replaced by a new one.

“外王”, 在今天看來, 當然不僅是政治, 而是整個人類的物質生活和現實生存, 它首先由科技, 生產, 經濟方面的問題; “內聖” 也不僅是道德, 它包括整個文化心理結構, 包括藝術, 審美, 等等. 因之, 原始儒學和宋明理學由 “內聖” 決定 “外王” 的格局便應打破, 而另起爐灶.

Li Zehou 2008c, 332

Nevertheless, Li emphasizes the important differences between the original Confucianism and the Neo-Confucian philosophies: while the former still included representatives who concentrated on the external, political, and technological aspects of human life, the latter became somewhat obsessed with inner aspects of human morality. Gu Mingdong reveals (Gu 2018: 88) that Confucius’s disciples Yan Hui 顏回, Zengzi 曾子, and Mencius focused upon the methods of evolvement, cultivation and perfection of the “inner sage,” whereas Zi Zhang 子張, Zi Gong 子貢, Zi Xia 子夏, and Xunzi elaborated on the external, political dimensions of the moral person and therefore laid stress on the development of the “external ruler.”¹ In Li’s view, the exclusion of Xunzi and the denial of his significance has led the Neo-Confucian and Modern Confucian scholars to a one-sided (and hence, incorrect) interpretation of China’s Confucian past and its ethical thought.² For Li, such a negation of important parts of China’s ideational history is based upon prejudices (Li Zehou 2016, 10).

Because of this same reason, the Neo-Confucians and the Modern Confucians have never understood the historical importance of the first reform of original Confucianism, which took place during the Han dynasty, and which was focused upon the amalgamation of Confucian thought with Legalism in a new, unified state doctrine.³ They never regarded this significant period of modifying original Confucianism to be the second period of developing Confucian philosophy. In this context, Li emphasizes that it is important to see that the Han dynasty philosophers, particularly Dong Zhongshu, successfully merged the external (i.e., ethical and political) dimensions of Confucian philosophy through Xunzi’s elaborations not only with Legalism, but also with the cosmology of yin-yang and the five phases theory (wu xing shuo 五行說).

Dong Zhongshu and other Han dynasty scholars who have “established the yinyang theory as belonging to the constitutive pillars of Confucianism,”⁴ have absorbed and assimilated into their works numerous ideas, concepts, and outlines of Daoism, Legalism, and the yinyang scholars. They created a framework of interconnected mutual responsiveness and feedback between heaven or nature and human beings based upon the theory of yinyang and the five phases. This accomplishment was immensely important not only for the Han era but also in later periods, and their theoretical value is no lesser than the one that was produced by the Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Song and Ming periods.

“始推陰陽，為儒者宗” 的董仲舒，以及其他漢代儒者，吸收消化了道法家、陰陽家許多思想、觀念和構架，所創立包羅萬有的天人感應的陰陽五行反饋圖式，在當時及後代都具有重大意義，其理論地位並不在宋明理學之下.

Li Zehou 2016, 9

In this respect, it is important to note that this second phase, which was marked by incorporations of ideas created by other schools of thought, was extending its influence and radiating into the following Wei Jin period, in which the so-called Neo-Daoist philosophers such as Wang Bi 王弼 and Guo Xiang 郭象 merged Confucianism with Daoism (Gu 2018, 87).

Hence, it is obvious that Li has studied and elaborated on Confucianism in a broader sense; in his synthetic reconstruction, he saw it as a system of thought that—besides the teachings of Confucius and his various direct followers—additionally comprises several different traditions, all belonging to the wider field of the “Teachings of the educated (Ru xue 儒學),” which is, by the way, the original meaning of the Chinese name for Confucian philosophy. Li has clearly shown that inner connections exist among all the traditional Chinese schools of thought (ibid., 88), emphasizing that it is not only feasible, but also necessary and significant to integrate the positive sources from the other important schools into a reconstructed Confucianism in such a widened sense. For him, the Confucian-based Chinese tradition is constituting the substance of historical ontology, which manifests itself in the Chinese cultural-psychological formation (Ishii 2018, 324).

The third stage of Confucianism began about 1200 AD, during the Song dynasty. In this phase, Confucianism accepted and assimilated numerous elements of Daoism, and also of the originally Indian Buddhism. During this time, Neo-Confucian schools and their main representative Zhu Xi created a very complex but coherent system of moral metaphysics that had a great impact on the whole of society for more than seven hundred years and that is still being developed further. During this third phase, the original Confucian teachings were interpreted anew and mainly explained through the lens of Mencian philosophy. The fourth stage of Confucianism appeared at the end of the nineteenth century; it was developed by the intellectual current of Modern Confucianism and is still ongoing in contemporary China.

In contrast to Li’s approach, Modern Confucians omitted the second phase of development, merely acknowledging the Neo-Confucian reform as representing the second, and the modern transformation as the third phase.

Regarding the nature of Confucian teachings, Li believes that it is neither a religion nor a philosophy but is at the same time both a religion and a philosophy. He described it as a “semi-religion” as well as a “semi-philosophy” (Li Zehou 2008a, 4).

As a semi-religion, Confucianism does not discuss notions such as an anthropomorphic god, the revelation or miracles, but simultaneously, it is bestowed with religious qualities such that people can find in its ideas their emotional home, their spiritual consolation, and the meaning of life. In his view, Confucianism does not rule out religious beliefs. In the triadic union of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, such a belief subtly permeates other discourses and converts itself into a discourse that contains numerous vital and substantial elements of the other two religions (ibid.). It is through this symbiotic function that Confucianism has been able to perform the role of a secular religion (ru jiao 儒教) containing strong “ultimate concerns” (Gu 2018, 76). In Li’s view, Confucianism

keenly tracks the meaning of life and seeks to experience and to understand the transcendent moral and ethical realm of Heaven and Earth. In real life, these qualities and functions of Confucianism can therefore serve people (individuals) as a safe home, in which they can secure their social position, follow their personal fate, and find their spiritual devotion. It is therefore a “semi-religion” without an anthropomorphic god, and without any miracles or magic.

它折著地追求人生意義, 又對超道德, 倫理的 “天地境界” 的體認, 追求和啟悟. 從而在現實生活中, 儒學的這種品德和功能, 可以成為人們 (個體) 安身立命, 精省皈依的歸宿. 它是沒有人格神, 沒有魔法奇蹟的 “半宗教”.

Li Zehou 2008a, 3

But, as we have seen, Li also regards Confucianism as a “semi-philosophy.” It cannot be denied that the original Confucian teachings did not rely on speculative or logical reasoning. Their central source, the Analects, illustrates its views through descriptions of everyday experiences, narratives, and anecdotes.⁵ This is also the main reason why Hegel critically refers to it as a collection of popular sayings lacking the conceptual precision and logical power of a philosophy. In his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1969, 142–143), Hegel described Confucius as an ancient “master” who had disseminated a collection of thoughts on morality without creating any real philosophy. This superficial and false understanding of ancient Chinese texts continues to hold sway in Western theory not only with respect to Confucius, but also in terms of Confucianism in general, and the whole of traditional Chinese thought (Rošker 2019, 101).

Li acknowledges that Confucius was not chiefly interested in investigating the metaphysical ordering of the universe and human life; instead, he was mainly preoccupied with reflections on human life in the concrete society. However, these reflections were based upon deep contemplations on rational terms “as he was engaged in investigating, demonstrating, and discovering reasons and rational categories by way of edifications and practical answers to his disciples’ questions” (Gu 2018, 77). Instead of creating far-reaching generalizations, Li quotes various passages from the Analects in order to demonstrate their philosophical bearings and dimensions. Although he admits that Confucius’s thought differs fundamentally from Plato’s ontology and from Hegel’s logical construction of philosophical systems, he points out that Confucian philosophy was based on different, equally profound foundations. For instance, an important difference between Western and Confucian approaches can be found in the fact that Confucius’s pragmatic reason is filled with emotional qualities of poetry (Li Zehou 2008a, 4).

Indeed, the Confucian system of teachings admonishes people to live not only morally and ethically but also poetically and artistically. In this sense, Confucius’s way of reasoning easily reminds us of the way Heidegger in the latter half of his career conducted poetic investigations of philosophical issues.

GU 2018, 77

In Li’s view of Confucianism, the notion of pragmatic reason is of utmost importance, for it essentially characterizes the general nature of these teachings. For him, the functioning of this kind of reason is grounded on strictly materialist foundations. Therefore Li denotes Confucianism not only as a “Chinese philosophy of pragmatic reason” but also as a “philosophy of eating” (chifan zhexue 吃飯哲學, see e.g., Li Zehou 1998, 142, 176–177).⁶ Gu Mingdong adds (2018, 77) that from this perspective, Confucianism could also be denoted as a “Chinese philosophy of life,” for it cannot be reduced to any particular philosophical discipline or religious doctrine but rather represents a triadic unification of philosophy, religion, and life.

In Li’s view, traditional Chinese, especially Confucian, ethics is extremely important in any attempt to modernize the philosophical and religious discourses of ancient, medieval, and premodern China. In this regard, he does not stand alone, for many other “major scholars and thinkers have noted the importance of modernizing Confucian ethics as the major strategy to transform Chinese culture” (ibid.). Therefore, it is understandable that Li regarded classical Chinese ethics as a theoretical and methodological basis of his own system.

As is well known, traditional Confucian ethics is relational and based on the identification of individuals with the multiplicity of their particular dynamic social roles.⁷ It evolved around the axiological notion of humaneness (ren), which is essentially a form of social empathy. It cannot be reduced to pure reason as it also involves emotions. In this sense, it is an important part of that basic paradigm of Chinese ideational tradition, which Li named “emotio-rational structure” (qingli jiegou). In its concrete reality, humaneness is rooted in the collective psychological formations or the “Great Self” (da wo 大我), which represents the unification of the individual with their community. This type of awareness was created through primitive sedimentation and shaped through shamanistic dances (Rošker 2019, 112).

As we have seen in previous sections, primeval culture has in Li’s view gradually regulated human behavior through rituals and endowed it in this way with directions, patterns, and order. In addition to the shaping and nurturing the sense of the collective and of order in human action and thought, rituals also constituted the normalization of individual emotions and thoughts (ibid., 115). In the human mind these patterns contain the sprouts of intellectual activity while simultaneously allowing for the expression of feelings. According to Li Zehou, these emotions and beliefs that were in China shaped by shamanistic rituality also represented the crucial foundations for the later Confucian moral virtues and values.

Traditional Confucian ethics was developed in a cultural milieu that Li defined as “culture of pleasure” (legan wenhua 樂感文化)⁸ as opposed to the “culture of sin” (zuigan wenhua 罪感文化), which prevailed in the Western world, or to the Japanese “culture of shame” (chigan wenhua 恥感文化) (Li Zehou 1999, 3). This traditional Chinese culture is rooted in a “one-world view” in contrast to the Western “two-worlds view” as expanded throughout the evolvement of Western philosophy. Its essential foundation is the emotion-based substance (qing benti 情本體). Hence, this culture is not guided or organized by any kind of supreme rationality because its final purpose is the human being living in it. The experience of this feeling of pleasure is the highest experience:

Although it is individual, subjective, and sensual, it represents the bodily recognition or the ultimate experience of the “substantial root.”

它雖仍是個體的、感性的, 卻是對「本體」的體認或最高 經驗.

Li Zehou 2016, 195

In the Confucian agenda, such a feeling of pleasure is an essential precondition for the shaping of humaneness, which occur precisely because of such amalgamation or unity of human material and spiritual life (Li Zehou 2011, 61). Hence, it becomes very clear that in the culture of pleasure, the ideal or the most important goal of human life is to live happily and to enjoy harmonious relations with other members of society through the unity of one’s own body and mind. In such life, no higher transcendent realm is needed in order to guide human conduct. Hence, Chinese tradition is essentially different from those that grounded their ethical and social codes or the meaning of individual existence in the idea of transcendent supernatural beings such as a divine creator.

Pragmatic reason, which guides the development of such a traditional culture, is—inter alia—a specific form of “moral reasoning” but one that is grounded in actual historical experience. This culture can only be analyzed through the lens of the holistic one-world view, which does not distinguish the noumenon from phenomena, heaven from earth, or body from mind. But the Confucian one-world model is not only cognitive and epistemological, but also ethical implications. As already mentioned, it sharply contrasts with those ethical systems that derive their social codes and ethical norms from external supernatural beings. Instead, here, people’s longing for existential meaning is limited to the realm of their concrete living environments. Such a worldview does not value self-abnegation or the feeling of failure because of the impossibility of reaching a more desirable realm or state:

In a contemporary context this means that Confucianism, especially in terms of the attention it pays to the ‘emotio-rational structure,’ can function as a corrective to curb certain shortcomings of modern thought associated with liberalism, formal justice, abstract reason, and notions of the atomic individual.

D’Ambrosio, Carleo and Lambert 2016, 1059

Proceeding from this holistic framework, Li decidedly criticizes the Modern Confucian supposition that holds the elementary paradigm of the classical Chinese philosophy to be that of immanent transcendence, because he believes it is an artificial abstraction and hence incompatible with the basic structuring of the Confucian system, which in his view is based on what he calls the one-world view.⁹

However, the methodological tool of the one-world approach is not only limited to Li’s philosophical ethics but is also intrinsically connected with other crucial methods and concepts pertaining to his general theoretical system. In general, Li’s theory follows traditional approaches, in which there is no division between substance and phenomena or between the human beings and the transcendent world. In such a paradigm, the subject of cognition cannot be divided from the acting subject, and human consciousness cannot be detached from its bodily (or material) existence, including its social relationships. Because of this, Chinese epistemology is tightly connected to Chinese ethics, and in this respect, Li’s theoretical system also follows the same structure.

In spite of this amalgamation, the practical aspects are more important within the unity of knowledge and action. Li emphasizes that traditional Chinese ethics was practical rather than theoretical, and more closely connected to empirical than to purely rational aspects of humaneness. In this aspect, it focused upon moral emotions than upon rational knowledge.

Hence, this unity of ethics and epistemology is structured in a dialectical and interactive manner, in which action clearly precedes and to a certain degree even determines knowledge.

Morality is not about “knowing” but rather about “practice”; although it includes knowledge (ideas or concepts), it is without knowledge, for it belongs to practice. Morality does not ask whether we know that we should act in a certain way. It neither asks whether we know how to act, and even less whether we are willing to act or not. It does not raise questions about knowing, being able, or being willing. It only asks whether we act or not act.

道德不是 “知” 而是 “行”，道德中含有知識（即觀念），但並非知識，道德屬於行為本 身。道德主要不是知不知應該去做或不做，也不是知不知如何去做或不做，更不是願不願意去做或不做的問題，它不是知不知、會不會、願不願的問題，而是 “做不做” 的問題.

Li Zehou 2017a, 58

In this context, individual moral emotions are certainly important, for they are interwoven with the essential ethical concepts of right and wrong; in Chinese ethics, as we have seen, these two aspects arise in a tight, interactive, and inseparable mutual connection:

The Chinese tradition has constructed humaneness upon the foundation of the “emotio-rational structure,” in which the feelings of like and dislike are cultivated simultaneously with the concepts of right and wrong. They permeate each other and integrate to form a unity. This is a specific characteristic of Chinese ethics. In other words, it is a kind of inherent Confucian mode of soaking reason with emotions in a “Reciprocal utilization of Confucianism and Legalism.”

中國傳統以塑 建 “情理結構” 為人性根本，強調 “好惡” (情感) 與 “是非” (觀念) 同時培育、相互滲透，合為一體。這就是中國倫理學的品格，它也可說是一種儒學內部的 “儒法互用”，即以情潤理.

ibid.

In Confucian ethics, Heaven (or nature) is perceived as a great, boundless organism, of which all people are its parts. In its system, every human being is detached from but simultaneously integrated into this organism. Hence, the promotion of Confucian humanism does not mean that human beings have to separate themselves completely from the transcendent. As Liu Shu-hsien (1972, 48) proclaims, “Once they understand the creative sources within themselves, they can take part in the creative process of the universe and forget their troubles, which are linked only to their ‘small selves.’”¹⁰ A human being who has no concerns other than those of the small self is not a wholly developed person. Although people cannot achieve personal immortality through self-cultivation it can offer them something which is equally important: the method of living in accordance with their environments and the path to join into the transmuting and sustaining process of everything that exists. What classical Confucian teachings aimed to mediate to later generations was the awareness that this process of our integration into external reality will never come to an end, even if the cosmos ceases to exist in its present form.

According to Li Zehou, there is no metaphysical or supernatural origin of human cognition. The Confucian (one-world-dimensional) pragmatic reason can by no means be reduced to a law that is established by a “one-to-one correspondence” (Lynch 2016, 718) with the empirical world.¹¹ In this context, Li highlights that such a Confucian reason

accepts, honors, believes in, and even emphasizes its congruence with objective principles, rules or orders, which are in a certain sense independent from human thought or experience. These objective principles, rules or orders can be denoted as “the Way of Heaven” or the “decree of Heaven.”

它承認、尊重、相信甚至強調去符合一個客觀的原則、規則或秩序，此一原則、規則或秩序在某種意義上乃是獨立與人的思維和經驗的，這就是天道，或稱天命.

Li Zehou 2008, 247

This is also the reason why Li claims that Confucianism contains some “semireligious” elements, although it is not rooted in the conception of an external supernatural deity or an anthropomorphic god. Li highlights that in essence the Confucian theoretical groundwork was agnostic,¹² which was philosophically relatively mature because the existence of supernatural beings is very hard to affirm or to falsify in terms of scientific demonstration (Rošker 2019, 143). For him, Confucian agnosticism is an evidence of the “clear rational spirit” inherent to its ethical system of humaneness (Li Zehou 1980, 89).

The rationalization of emotion, which took place in China during the process of converting natural religions into ethical systems of humaneness, was never grounded upon restrictions of desires; in this process, humans were instead presented with positive methods of regulating, ordering, and controlling the satisfaction of their needs and wishes. According to Li, Confucianism does not need an external god whose orders should be blindly followed in spite of the fact that they were derived from irrational authority. But in such a worldview, people could still possess the hope for self-fulfillment through humanism and their individual sense of mission without negating this world or humiliating themselves. Everything could be left to the regulative function and the balanced measure (du 度) of the pragmatic reason (ibid.). Li often emphasizes that in these processes people have the freedom to create, select, and regulate their own lives in and through their relations with other members of their own social group.

Besides, the Confucian pragmatic reason, which functions in accordance with emotions, encourages people to better adopt historical experiences and adjust them in a way such that they could best function in the interests of society. In this context, Li points to the development of science and technology in China. Even though the prevailing traditional streams of Chinese ideational history never developed to a significant extent logic reasoning, abstract cognition, or any other fundamentals of scientific thought, the Chinese nevertheless rapidly but competently and efficiently adopted all these modes of reasoning immediately after Western thought was introduced to China because they soon became aware of their pragmatic value. Therefore, Li believes (2008, 251–252) that Chinese tradition, Confucianism, and pragmatic reason cannot be seen as hindrances to modernization.

As we have seen, the notion of emotion-based substance lies in the center of Li’s conception of the culture of pleasure. Since this emotion-pervaded substance (benti 本體) is not seen as a noumenon, it is not different or separated from the sphere of phenomena. Li understands it as the “(substantial) root,” which manifests itself as the “ultimate reality” (zui hou shizai 最後實在) of everything concretely existing in the material world. Therefore, emotion, which is rooted in the deepest grounds of existence, also represents the very foundation of concrete human life (Li Zehou 2008, 54) and is something that belongs to the empirical world (Li Zehou and Liu Xuyuan 2011, 27).

According to Li, this fundamental significance of emotion was important because it helped Confucius lead people away from the worship of external deities into the network of interpersonal emotional bounding, grounded in kinship relations.

In his essay “A Reevaluation of Confucius,” Li points out that Confucius plays a crucial role in developing the emotio-rational structure of the people in his times away from the worship of external deities to interhuman emotional bounding that was rooted in kinship relations (Li Zehou 1980, 85). Through rituality, emotions were melted and assimilated into the all-encompassing, integrated system that included sacral ethics as well as concrete practical activities.

In its interactive amalgamation with reason, the fundamentally significant emotion was centered upon the creation, cultivation, and development of humaneness (ren), which belongs to the most important and vital factors in the system of Confucian ethics. Li highlights that Confucius used humaneness to interpret and preserve rituality, through which external ethical regulations were internalized (Li Zehou 1985a, 16).

As we have seen, the Confucian (and to a great extent, the entire system of traditional Chinese) ethics was rooted in concrete interpersonal relationships. Li denoted such a system “relationalism” (guanxizhuyi 關係主義). Therefore, some scholars believe it should be seen through the lens of the so-called role ethics (Ames 2011; Rosemont and Ames 2009), because Confucian relational ethics (or, in Li’s words, “relationalism”) does not fit well in any of the existing Western categories of ethical models that are based upon the notion of an isolated or fragmented individual.¹³

Li claims that the idea of the unity of reason and emotion—rather than the concept of pure reason—is the philosophical basis that enables us to understand the crucial differences between Chinese and Western ethics (Li Zehou 2014, 2). On this basis, he attempted (as we shall see in later sections), to compare and merge some basic conceptions of the Confucian ethics with certain elements of Kantian deontology. In his view, such a reinterpretation of Confucianism could provide valuable components for the establishment of a new form of public reason, suitable for contemporary globalized societies.

Following such an endeavor, Li aims to use Chinese philosophy to process not only Kant’s thought, but also the ideas of other prominent Western philosophers in order to create a modernized Chinese thought based on his regulatory standard of “(assuming) Western substance, and (applying) Chinese function” (xiti zhongyong 西體中用), which is an inversion of Zhang Zhidong’s famous motto “(Preserving) Chinese essence and (applying) Western functions” (中體西用).¹⁴ Li aims to illuminate the new system’s continuity with the traditional one through what he calls “transformative creation” (zhuanhuaxingde chuangzao 轉化性的創造). Li coined this phrase as a reconceptualization of Lin Yusheng’s proposal for a creative transformation of tradition, arguing that the original phrase implied that China’s tradition should be transformed in accordance with Western paradigms. Instead, he strives to create new forms and models in agreement with the specific conditions of both Chinese history and contemporary Chinese reality.

Among other issues, such an endeavor is linked to the necessity to transform certain traditional concepts and categories, or to replace them by similar modern notions (Li Zehou 2005, 1–2). In his Anthropo-historical Ontology, Li explains, for instance, why it is necessary to replace the traditional Confucian concept of the ruler with a modernized notion of country. In his view, the word “country” is not limited to any state, government, political regime, or political system but rather refers to a sort of psychological identification with a vague and comprehensive historico-cultural commonwealth (Gu 2018, 84).

In such a renewed form, in Li’s view Confucianism could truly serve as a basis for a new global ethics. According to him, the Confucian system is capable of assuming this role not only because of its presumption that we are all bound together by our very humanity (ibid., 90), but also because of its generally inclusive and assimilative nature. Li often exposes the significance of such a vital potential inherent in the classical Chinese Confucianism, “even in the face of mass defections by Western-trained intellectuals who tend to reject Confucian teachings as ‘outmoded’ and ‘anti-progressive’” (Nylan 2018, 139). Confucian culture is widely seen as authoritarian and hierarchical, oppressing individual freedom. In his work, especially in his aesthetic studies, Li shows that such an understanding is based on prejudices and establishes a novel account of freedom rooted in a valuable form of individuality with Confucian characteristics.

This freedom involves orienting desires and emotions toward shared communal objects and experiences, which allows for the coordination of desires (not merely private desire satisfaction) and the capacity to generate aesthetic goods such as beauty, delight, and a sense of ease.¹⁵ This freedom is something that has to be cultivated; it cannot be possessed only as a right and it emerges from a variety of cultivated psychological responses that are grounded in stable social structures and human relationships (Lambert 2018, 96). In Li’s view, the Confucian notion of freedom and individual personhood is different from the Kantian one that is rooted in the idea of a firm moral will but instead is based upon the culture of pleasure and the aesthetic sensibility possessed by human beings.

In contrast to a conceptualization of freedom evolving from the categorical imperative, which operates in the rational or cognitive realm, Confucian freedom is manifested in the human self that is marked by aesthetic sensibility. It is not only an intellectual aptitude, expressed through conscious volition, but also a form of cultivated aesthetic responses, tightly connected with practical skills and imagination. In such a view, aesthetic sensibility functions as the foundation for practical action in the social world. Li exemplifies this connection through the function assumed by music within the framework of Confucian rituality: the structure of musical harmony is congruent with the structure of harmony in human relationships (Li, Zehou 2010, 20). The Confucian classics were grounded in the presumption that the structure of music was compatible with the structure of the cosmos (see Rošker 2012). Thus, the performance of “proper” music (ya yue 雅樂) could reunite men with the “regularity” of the cosmic order; in other words: the structure of music could incorporate human beings into the totality of everything that exists. Therefore, music was seen as an important element of the re-creation of the highest ideal of Confucian holism, namely the “unity of men and nature” (tian ren heyi 天人合一). Ritual as such was seen not just as an arbitrary form but as a formalized pattern that, properly executed, could be structurally connected with the cosmic order. Thus, in Confucian discourse, “proper” music played an important part as a well-ordered tool for the social integration of individuals, for whom the consideration of the “proper” structure that determined “proper” music was essential for a harmonious society.¹⁶

This presumption, which can be found in various Confucian classics, suggests that practices that intensively convey sensuous experiences (as for instance playing or listening to music) can powerfully influence human emotions and desires and can therefore “properly” guide actions and prevent conflicts. Here, freedom is not seen as a simple absence of limitations or as simple satisfaction of needs and desires. Instead, it is an ability that can only be developed through conscious self-cultivation. This insight is important because it shows that various characteristics of Confucian philosophy that initially appeared conservative and rigid—the demanding of and need for attention to personal attachments and roles—can be understood as constituents of a different, more meaningful freedom (Lambert 2018, 112). Such a freedom is an active, positive form of freedom, contrasting with accounts of negative freedom that focus solely on noninterference. In Li’s view, the latter is “empty” because it fails to take into account the humanness of individual persons, which includes a commitment to social interaction and exchange. “Libertarian ideals of freedom as isolation or independence are thus opposed at the level of metaphysics and foundational accounts of the self” (ibid.).

In general, Li’s reconceptualization of traditional Chinese, particularly Confucian ethics, can essentially be viewed as a transcultural one. It aims to assimilate Chinese thought with its Western counterparts while departing from both categories through his transformative creation (Wang, Keping 2018, 246), which enables Li not only to generate new theoretical and methodological elements, but also to achieve new and challenging insights into the very nature of moral philosophy. These innovative insights have led Li Zehou to establish his own system on the grounds of the traditional one-world paradigm, characterized by the synchronicity of human beings with the emotion-based universe and the energetic fusion of empirical with transcendental worlds. This dynamic holistic system is determined by the guidance of pragmatic reason and allows for the situationally appropriate grasping of the proper measure (du). Such a system is able to embrace the entire complexity of humaneness, for it can meet the demands of both human becoming and human accomplishment in interpersonal relations.

2 Neo-Confucian Philosophies and Modern New Confucianism

When dealing with the crucial virtue of humaneness (ren), Confucius always focused upon its role in the concrete circumstances of societies and in regard to concrete people. According to the Analects, it was never guided by an abstract categorical imperative belonging to transcendental reason (Li Zehou 2010, 67–68). In this regard, Confucianism was interpreted in a different way during the third phase of its evolvement. The Neo-Confucian philosophers from the Song and Ming dynasties, who were influenced by Buddhist thought, aimed to find such a guiding reason in the Confucian discourses through ontological explorations. They tried to establish the concept of such a transcendental reason through the notions of cosmic structure (tianli 天理) and innate knowledge (liangzhi 良知), respectively. They established the metaphysical system of the so-called philosophy of heart-mind and inner nature (xinxing 心性). While the first concept denoting this system (xin 心) is empirical, the second one (xing 性) is transcendental. Irrespective of these different aspects through which each is defined, they still represent one and the same entity (Li Zehou 2008c, 323). For the Neo-Confucians, inner nature (xing) was a moral imperative guiding proper interpersonal relationships while the heart-mind (xin) was based in concrete experiences and in human emotions (Li Zehou 2010, 67).

Li finds major differences between original Confucianism and the Neo-Confucian discourses already existed in the works of the two crucial representatives of the Song School of the structural principle (Li xue 理學), namely Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Cheng Yi 程頤 who interpreted the virtue of family reverence (xiaoti 孝悌) as the foundation of humaneness. Original Confucianism saw the relation between the two in the opposite way, for according to the Analects humaneness was founded upon family reverence.¹⁷ For Cheng and Zhu, the virtue of family reverence is based on love, which belongs to emotion (and hence, to the empirical sphere), while humaneness is a part of the transcendental inner nature and is thus guided by the all-encompassing structural pattern or principle called li 理, which surpasses the realm of changeable empirical situations and emotions. Even though Mencius, who represented the main source of Neo-Confucian reinterpretations, unambiguously claimed that “the reality of humaneness is to be found in the service to one’s closest persons (i.e., family members)” (仁之實，事親是也, Mengzi s.d., Li lou shang: 27), Cheng and Zhu interpreted this “reality” (shi 實) as a kind of substance (or noumenon),¹⁸ which allowed them to establish a transcendental principle comparable to Kant’s categorical imperative (Li Zehou 2010, 69). However, in the traditional Chinese one-world paradigm, such a principle was difficult to constitute:

In Kant’s philosophy, this transcendental imperative has no connection to the empirical world and thus, the noumenon can be separated from phenomena. But due to the long lasting shamanist tradition that prevailed in Chinese culture, such an idea of separation was difficult to establish in Cheng’s and Zhu’s thought. Even though their “structural pattern” belongs to the “cosmic structure,” this “cosmic structure” is always merged with the empirical existence in the material, physical world.

在康德那裡, 這作為先驗律令與經驗世界毫無干係, 本體和現象界可以截然兩分. 而在程, 朱, 由於中國久長的巫史傳統, 很難產生經驗先驗, 本體現象截然兩分的觀念. “理” 雖然是 “天理”, 但這 “天理” 又總與作為自然物質的經驗生存混同在一起.

ibid., 69–70

Because of this reason, Li believes that their endeavor to launch a transcendent philosophy has essentially failed (ibid., 70). In their system, natural sensuality could never truly be divided from rational principles, but was rather still firmly infiltrated into them.

Li also highlights that Kant has strictly separated reason from recognition and substance from phenomena. His practical reason (ethical actions) is merely a “categorical imperative,” tightly linked to the concept of “duty.” It is completely detached from any kind of sensitivity that belonged to the phenomenal, empirical world. It has nothing to do with the law of causality or time and space. Such a view enabled Kant to establish and to preserve its transcendental ontological position.

But the Chinese pragmatic reason was completely different: it was never based upon a differentiation of substance and phenomena. On the contrary, it always sought to achieve the former through the latter. It belonged to the tangible world, but surpassed it at the same time. While Kant’s categorical imperative was a pure transcendental form, which was inexpressible and without origin, the Neo-Confucian “Decree of Heaven (Tian ming)” was a part of the inner nature (xing), which functioned in accordance with the all-encompassing structural pattern (li), permeating the concretely tangible as well as the transcendental realm. As such, inner nature was linked to the heart-mind; besides possessing a transcendental nature, it was thus also connected to sensitivity and belonged to the empirical world. Hence, in the Neo-Confucian discourses of the School of the structural principle (Li xue 理學), the world of natural sensitivity was never truly divided from the noumenal world of rational ethical norms. In such a framework, heaven (nature) and human beings were marked by both reason and emotion.

The same holds true for the later Neo-Confucian philosophy, which manifested itself in the “school of the heart-mind” (Xin xue 心學).

Even though the school of the heart-mind emphasizes that its “heart-mind” is not a heart-mind of perception or sensitivity, but rather a pure transcendent moral substance, they still describe, express, and define it with phrases such as “continuous life,” “restlessness,” “compassion,” and so on. Isn’t it clear that such notions pertain to sensitivity and perceptual experiences?

儘管心學強調 “心” 不是知覺的心, 不是感性的心, 而是純道德本體意義上的超越的心, 但是它又總要用 “生生不已”, “不安不忍”, “惻然” 等等來描述它, 表達它, 規定它. 而所謂 “生生”, “不安不忍”, “惻然” 等等, 難道不正是具有情感和感知經驗在內嗎?

Li Zehou 2010, 71

In contrast to such discourses, the original Confucian philosophy was based upon principles of emotionality included in the psychology of sensitivity. Here, the category of humaneness (ren) was seen as something belonging to the inner nature (xing) and to the structural principles (li) that regulated all existence. On the other hand, however, it was defined by natural growth and development. All such categories, including the notion of heaven (tian) or heart-mind (xin) were parts of nature, but simultaneously they also surpassed it. They included rational and emotional elements. Hence, the Neo-Confucian endeavors to establish a dual metaphysic implied an inherent contradiction, for their search for a transcendental reason was rooted in the traditional Chinese holistic philosophy, in which the empirical sensitivity was inseparably linked to inner nature (ji qing ji xing 即情即性), and there were no divisions between body and mind (xin bu li shen 心不離身). In Li’s view, this failure of the Neo-Confucian philosophy to establish a moral metaphysic of transcendental reason belonged to the most intriguing problems in the Chinese ideational history and should be thoroughly examined (Li Zehou 2010, 72). But irrespective of their philosophical worth, the Neo-Confucian “deviation” could never be integrated into the field of Li’s historical anthropology. Neither can it be compared to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, for the Neo-Confucian scholars never managed to liberate themselves from the paradigms postulated by the long-lasting shamanist tradition of all-embracing, holistic one-world view. Having said that, Li still emphasizes that the Neo-Confucian studies came closer to Kant’s philosophy than any other school of traditional Chinese thought, because like Kant they also aimed to constitute a transcendental ethics.

All in all, Li thinks that as a philosophy, the Neo-Confucian stream of thought is valuable, although it was strongly influenced by Buddhist thought, which does not belong to the Chinese (and even less to a purely Confucian) tradition. On the other hand, he also emphasizes that many elements of this thought were harmful because of their conservativism, especially regarding the position of Chinese women, which began to worsen with the rise of Neo-Confucian social ideologies (Li Zehou and Liu Yuedi 2014, 200).

Another important point of Li’s critique of the Neo- and Modern Confucian discourses was linked to their attitude toward the concept of feelings and emotionality. While Li, as we have seen, thoroughly highlights the significance of emotion as a basic ontological value of the original Confucian understanding of the universe, the Neo-Confucian scholars viewed emotion, which also included intentions, wishes, and desires, as something negative, something that had to be eliminated or fought against.¹⁹

On the other hand, most of the Neo-Confucian philosophers have followed the philosophical current that was established by Mencius, even though Li highlights the fact that Zhu Xi’s line of thought also included and developed many elements of Xunzi’s rational philosophy. In his view, Zhu Xi has “raised the Mencian flag while acting in accordance with the teachings of Xunzi” (ju Meng qi, xing Xun xue 舉孟旗、行荀學). Thus, Zhu Xi’s “anti-emotional” line can also be seen as a result of such tendencies. In spite of this, Li Zehou values this line of thought higher than most of the later ideational developments of the Neo-Confucian philosophy (Li Zehou 2016c, 8).

As is well known, the Neo-Confucian philosophy was one of the chief sources for later Modern or New Confucian (Xin rujia 新儒家) interpretations of and elaborations on traditional Chinese thought. Hence, Li’s critique of the central theoretical approaches developed by the Neo-Confucians was also reflected in his critique of the Modern Confucian discourses. He values the achievements of most of the representatives of the first generation, especially the philosophical contributions of Xiong Shili (1885–1968) and Feng Youlan (1895–1990), who was also his teacher at the Peking University.²⁰ In contrast to the latter, Xiong was a more genuine follower of the Neo-Confucian philosophies, for his work included Confucian as well as certain Buddhist elements. While Xiong’s elaborations upon and interpretations of Western thought remained rather superficial, Feng’s greatest contribution laid precisely in this field; as he was one of the first Chinese scholars trained in Western philosophy. Feng managed to create an innovative renovation of Confucian philosophy through the lens of a rather rigid logical framework derived from Western philosophical methodologies. In contrast to Feng’s relatively analytical approach, Xiong applied a more traditionally Chinese, holistic methods of interpretation, at the same time criticizing Western as well as Buddhist philosophy for their strict separations between substance and phenomena, subject and object of comprehension, and all the other connotations derived from this basic dualistic model. He also assumed their basic framework of static logical paradigms (Li Zehou 2008c, 316). In this respect, Li regarded Xiong as a more suitable continuer of genuinely Confucian thought, although he also based his reconstruction of original Confucianism upon certain concepts of these two traditions (ibid., 295). The main point of Li’s critique on Xiong was merely that he focused too extensively upon the Mencian interpretation, which means that he excluded Xunzi and his more rational, logical, <?> and proto-scientific approaches. In this context, Li encouraged Xiong to exclusively concentrate upon the elaboration of human inwardness and moral psychology, or, to put it in more traditional terms, upon the “inner sage” (內聖 nei sheng), diminishing thereby the significance of politics, science and technology that were of central importance for the “external ruler” (外王 wai wang). In other words, he solely focused on the elaboration upon and the evolvement of the traditional Chinese transcendental subject instead of simultaneously developing the empirical one (ibid., 293).

However, Li’s critique of Modern Confucianism is mainly directed toward the philosophy of Xiong’s most famous student, namely Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), who also belonged to the most well-known scholars of this intellectual movement. In Li’s view, Mou was also the only significant philosopher of the second generation of Modern or New Confucianism (xin ruxue)²¹ (Li Zehou 2008c, 321). Mou was especially interesting because he also attempted to produce a synthesis of Confucian and Kantian ethics, although in this respect, his methodology and his basic theoretical approaches essentially differed from those applied by Li in his own theory.

According to Li, Mou’s method of integrating Chinese with Western philosophy was essentially problematic. He exposes that this contemporary Modern Confucian scholar has

proceeded from the Confucian positions but tried to incorporate into it certain foreign elements in order to endow it with a new guise. However, might it be even better to combine them when proceeded from the opposite view, and to apply the contents of the foreign, modern ideas as a driving force or an essence? In this way, it would be possible to transformative create a new dimension of our tradition.

站在儒學傳統的立場上吸收外來的東西以新面貌, 是否可以反過來以外來的現代化的東西為動力和軀體, 來轉化新的創造傳統以一新耳目呢?

Li Zehou 2008c, 332

This remark is especially important under consideration of Li’s specific understanding of Chinese modernization. As is well known, he inverted Zhang Zhidong’s famous slogan, which suggested that in the process of modernization China should “preserve Chinese essence and apply Western functions” (Zhongti Xiyong 中體西用). Li has namely proposed that it should rather “assume Western substance and apply Chinese functions” (Xiti Zhongyong 西體中用). Although numerous scholars misunderstood Li’s new phrase and interpreted it as a proposal for a wholesome Westernization, Li often emphasizes that this is not the case:

The main flaw of the (slogan) “Chinese substance and Western applications” is to be found in the assumption that technology is application and not substance. But the exact opposite is true: technology is substance, because technology is connected with social existence as well as with productive forces and the modes of production.²²

中體西用論的最大的錯誤就在於認為科技是用而不是體，其實科技恰恰是體，因為科技理論是與社會存在，與生產力、生產方式聯繫在一起的.

Li Zehou 1996, 253

Hence, the correct interpretation of the new slogan hinges on the understanding of the concept ti, or substance, which the proponents of the original motto viewed as the “substance of tradition,” while Li instead saw it in Marxist terms as the material basis of society (Rošker 2019, 174). This interpretation of ti is in accordance with both original Marxism and original Confucianism. On the other hand, the “function” (or application) is of immense importance, because it determines the concrete circumstances of people’s lives.²³

Mou Zongsan, however, has widely assumed the central concepts of Western (especially Kant’s) philosophy and tried to explain the central features of Mencian morality through the lens of Kant’s transcendental notions. In this respect, he found that the moral philosophy of heart-mind and inner nature implies the highest dignity of human beings as moral agents; in this regard, it also included concepts comparable to Kant’s free will. However, in his view, Kant did not succeed in establishing a genuinely moral metaphysics (daodedi xingshangxue 道德的形上學) because he regarded notions such as the free will merely as postulates, concepts, or ideas. According to Mou Zongsan, moral notions had to be seen as real entities that concretely come into appearance or become present (chengxian 呈現) through the moral practice and cultivation of individuals. On such grounds, Mou aimed to establish a genuine moral metaphysics in contrast to Kant’s metaphysics of morality (daodedi xingshangxue 道德底形上學), which in his view could only function as a mere methodological framework for systems of moral thought. In Li’s view, however, Mou did not truly manage to upgrade Kant’s philosophy, for he was unable to escape the inner contradiction of Neo-Confucian philosophies, which, as we have seen, aimed to establish dualist models in a holistic “one-world” framework.

Regarding the traditional Chinese philosophy as such, Mou has mainly elaborated on the so-called Lu-Wang stream of the Neo-Confucian philosophy.²⁴ Because in a certain sense the school guided by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi was also upgrading several approaches derived from Xunzi’s philosophy, Mou has regarded these two rationalist philosophers as heretical, and their philosophy as “deviations from the orthodox Confucian teachings” (bie zi wei zong 別子為宗). Hence, he tried to establish his new moral metaphysics on the grounds of the Lu-Wang school. He was not interested in rational metaphysics of morality, but rather in the possibility of achieving practical bodily experience of metaphysical substance through morality. Therefore he believed that the Neo-Confucian concept of inner nature (xing), which is in their discourses a transcendent notion, could not be detached from the concept of the heart-mind (xin), which belongs to the empirical realm. Although they are two separate entities, the innate moral substance (xingti 性體) and the substance of heart-mind (xinti 心體) are continuously being unified in the process of their endless mutual interaction (Li Zehou 2008c, 323). Therefore, they both belong to moral practice and can actually be equated to the original Confucian notion of humaneness (ren). Mou wrote:

The entire content of humaneness is embedded into the original heart-mind, which can be equated to the innate moral substance … Humaneness, which is the origin of all morality, is simultaneously the substance of our innate moral nature. This innate moral nature is being absorbed by humaneness, and humaneness is being absorbed by the heart-mind. In this way, the existence is being absorbed by action, and hence, we can speak about moral practice.

仁之全部義蘊皆收於道德的本心中, 而本心即性 … 作為一切道德之源之仁, 亦即是吾人性體之實也. 此惟是攝性於仁, 攝仁於心, 攝存有於活動, 而自道德實踐以言之.

Mou Zongsan 1973, 26

He also pointed out that Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi viewed the relation between the substance of inner nature and the heart-mind in a completely different way, for they considered both concepts to be a part of the all-encompassing structural pattern (li). In this way, they have only elaborated on existence without considering its inseparable connection to human actions and moral practice. Hence, Mou regarded their philosophy as a mere theoretical metaphysics or an empty logical structure based on and limited to speculative abstractions (Li Zehou 2008c, 323).

As we have already seen, Li has also questioned Mou’s interpretation of the relation and interaction between the empirical and the transcendental self, i.e., between the “inner sage and external ruler” (neisheng waiwang). Because Chinese culture has a tradition of moral subjectivity but no tradition of intellectual and political subjectivity, it is strong with respect to the inner sage and weak with respect to the external ruler. As a consequence, Chinese culture encountered serious challenges from Western culture in modern times (Gu 2018, 78). To modernize Chinese culture, it is necessary to reconceive and renovate these aspects of the Confucian tradition.

Mou Zongsan has attempted to develop the external ruler in order to enable the free progress of science and technology, which in the history of Chinese traditional thought and culture have always been repressed. He constructed the basic shift, which could cause such an enforced development of the “external ruler” by means of a conscious self-negation (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷) of the “inner sage.” However, this self-negation of the (moral) subject was seen as a merely temporary phase in a “dialectical process” (Rošker 2016, 88), for if the static, primary position of morality precluded a recognition of the full plurality of knowledge, its total absence would have devastating consequences for society, which would become like “a lone boat without a compass, tossed in a stormy, limitless sea” (He Xinquan 2000, 93–95). In the dialectical process that linked the possible acquisition of scientific knowledge with axiological regulation (or moral guidance), the moral reason (daode lixing 道德理性) was thus seen as a “bridge connecting Confucianism with modern democracy” (ibid., 97).

In simple terms, Mou’s theory is to call on the moral subject who has attained sageliness to stoop down to the level of ordinary life, thereby engaging in activities of democracy and science. What forms the philosophical basis of his new theory is an integration of the heart-mind thought of Confucius, Mencius, Lu Xiangshan, and Wang Yangming with Kant’s philosophy. Mou’s theory is certainly modern and innovative in its ideas, but it has obvious drawbacks.

Gu 2018, 78

Irrespective of the purely theoretical difficulties of such an endeavor, Li Zehou emphasized that such a proposal was redundant, because the solution of the problem had to be sought in a more radical procedure: in Li’s view, the whole traditional model of the inner sage and external ruler had to be eliminated or “broken” (Li Zehou 2008c, 332) because its very structure implied a superiority and absolute dominance of the former upon the latter. Being posited into such a subordinated position, in Li’s view the “external ruler” could never be developed high enough to function in a modern society with highly developed democracy, technology, and modern social morality. Besides, Li highlights the fact that Mou Zongsan overlooked the much more positive tradition of the external ruler, namely the one that was pioneered by Xunzi who explored people’s relations with the natural world and presented thereby some exquisite insights into the inner workings of the cosmos. However, this is not surprising if we consider that Xunzi’s line of Confucianism was not regarded as the orthodox one. This prejudice was shared by almost all Modern Confucian scholars. Besides, to argue that Chinese tradition completely lacks intellectual and political subjectivity means to ignore an important aspect of the Neo-Confucian Confucian tradition, which is the core of the Great Learning and was sanctioned by the Cheng-Zhu school and later continuously promoted by numerous Confucians. This is the percept of investigating the (external) object in order to achieve the ultimate knowledge (gewu zhizhi 格物致知). Zhu Xi explained this conceptualization (which doubtless included some foundations that could be developed in terms of scientific exploration), in the following way:

Investigate things to acquire the ultimate knowledge: this means that your heart-mind has to be appropriated, and you should always act according to a sincere mind. In this way, you can cultivate your own self, order your family, participate in state affairs and maintain peace for all under heaven.

格物、致知事；此是正心、誠意事；此是修身事；此是齊家、治國、平天下事.

Zhu Xi s.d., Gang ling: 22

In his own reconceptualization of “inner sage and external ruler” Li has an advantage over Modern New Confucians. While the latter have an idealistic conceptual grounding, Li has formulated a practical philosophy based on his idea of the two kinds of morality (Gu 2018, 79). In such an arrangement, the external ruler would represent a concept pertaining to the modern social morality, while the inner sage would belong to the realm of traditional religious morality. In this framework, the basic position would be occupied by the external ruler. This means that modern law, science, and technology would assume the prior and dominant position, which also implies that the society is defined by a priority of right over good. Similar to the very concept of private religious morality, the traditional “inner sage” would in this modified model merely adopt the “regulative and properly constitutive” function (Li Zehou 2010, 11–12).

In contrast to Li, who regarded Confucianism as a kind of semi-religion and semi-philosophy, Mou Zongsan believed it was a kind of religion, for it was based upon the notion of sacred inner morality. Li radically questions Mou’s view that Confucianism only represents the moral metaphysics of the heart-mind and inner nature. He believes that this is how Mou reduced this ancient philosophy to a doctrine, limited to religious thought (Li Zehou 1999, 1). Li sharply criticized the complicated and purely academic nature of this religious theory:

Although Mou Zongsan emphasizes the religious nature of Confucianism, he overlooks the practical influence and the popular potential that should be parts of any religion. Mou describes this religion in a very mystical, speculative, and purely academic or theoretical way that is very difficult for ordinary people to understand. His highly elevated, noble theories have no connection with the concrete society. In this way, Mou has actually lost the essence of the truly religious elements that are included in Confucianism.

牟宗三雖然強調了儒學的宗教性, 但由於忽視了宗教所應有的現實作用和通俗性能, 扁仍然把儒學的宗教性弄了凡人難懂的書齋理論, 玄奧思辨和高頭講章, 於大眾生活和現實社會完全脫節. 這就恰恰失去了儒學所具有的宗教性的品格和功能.

Li Zehou 1995, 30

Because of his difficult language and due to the highly theoretical nature of his work, Mou is actually very similar to those scholars who see Confucianism strictly as a philosophy and whom he sharply criticizes (ibid.).

However, the main point of Li’s critique on Mou Zongsan is linked to his basic methodological approach, namely, to his concept of the so-called immanent transcendence. As we have seen, Mou Zongsan aimed to interpret Chinese philosophy through this concept, in which rational and spiritual notions possess a double ontological nature. Therefore, each of them must simultaneously belong to both the transcendent and the immanent realm. Li Zehou sharply opposed this idea and believed that it is incompatible with his own one-world paradigm.

He believed that this huge contradiction can be traced back to the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming periods. However, because Mou tried to place it into the Kantian framework, it became even more problematic. In the foreword to his Five Essays From 1999, Li offered a simple explanation of this contradiction:

On the one hand, the theory of immanent transcendence emphasizes the continuation of the Confucian tradition. In this regard, it negates the existence of transcendent, external deities and places the moral imperative upon the fundaments such as “the unity of human heart-mind and the heart-mind of heaven” or “the unity of human inner nature and the sacred inner nature.” In this framework, the innermost heart-mind and inner nature represent the basis of substance. On the other hand, it imitates the Western “two-world view,” a framework that separates heaven and the worldly people, the world of ideas and the world of social reality, substance and phenomena.

一方面強調遵循儒學傳統，否認外在超驗的上帝神明，把道德律令建立在 “人心即天心”、“人性即神性”，即將內在心性作為本體的基礎之上；另方面又模擬西方 “兩個世界” (天堂與人世、理念世界與現實世界、本體與現象界) 的構架.

Li Zehou 2003b, 133

In this schema, the human heart-mind and their inner nature are necessarily transcendent. In Western philosophy, transcendence means something that surpasses the empirical world. Hence, the transcendent (God) decides, determines, and guides humankind—including all human experience. But this is not true in reverse as human beings cannot determine (and not even influence) God. Everything that exists in reality belongs therefore to the appearances; substance or essence is only that which surpasses this reality (or the realm of experiences). The traditional Chinese culture, which deals with everything from the perspective of the one-world view, is fundamentally different.

On the one hand, (the Modern Confucians) emphasize Chinese tradition with its “unity of humans and nature” or its “unity of the moral and empirical self,” but on the other hand, they held notions such as “humaneness,” “compassion,” or “innate knowledge” that can never be divided from sensitivity and emotions to be immanent transcendental notions or notions of immanent transcendence. In this way, they create a huge contradiction between the transcendental (i.e., that which is transcendent, that is, not connected to sensitivity) and the empirical (i.e., that which is inward and connected to sensitivity) or between deities or God on the one side, and concrete, real people on the other.

一方面既強調中國傳統的 “即人即天”，“性體” 即 “心體”；另方面，又要將本不能脫離感性以及感情的 “仁”、“惻隱之心”、“良知”，說成是內在的 “超越” (transcendent) 或 “先驗” (transcendental)，便不能不產生既超驗 (與感性無關，超越) 又經驗 (與感性有關，內在)，既神聖 (上帝) 又世俗 (人間) 的巨大矛盾.

ibid.

Li believes that Mou’s conceptualizations cannot be combined with the traditional Chinese paradigm of the unity of heaven and people nor with the view that holds substance and function to be inseparable (tiyong bu er 體用不二), although even Mou’s teacher Xiong has emphasized this aspect in his philosophy. Hence, Li repeatedly highlights that the Western notion of transcendence can by no means fit into the Chinese one-world view. Consequently it is completely wrong to lay stress upon the traditional Chinese notions of the unity of heaven and people, and not explain the concepts that are originally confined to the sphere of sensuality and emotions such as humaneness or inborn knowledge (liangzhi 良知) as something immanently transcendent or transcendental (Rošker 2019, 137). In this context, he also exposes (ibid.) that it was precisely due to the one world-view that the social and ideational development in ancient China could lead to the culture of pleasure (legan wenhua 樂感文化) because in such a holistic system people could have no tensious relation (jinzhang guanxi 緊張關係) toward external deities or fear of a god.

As already mentioned, Li claims that all such inconsistencies and contradictions are rooted in the Song period’s Neo-Confucianism. He regrets that Modern Confucianism has not succeeded to generate truly innovative philosophical approaches or theoretical advances that could function as a basis for future philosophical detections or novel philosophical systems (Li Zehou 1999, 8).

3 From Kant to Marx and Back

As an important part of his anthropo-historical ontology, Li Zehou’s ethics is based upon the methodology of historical materialism. In this regard, he relied on Marxist sources of inspiration. He was profoundly influenced by Marx’ earlier works, especially by his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844, and adopted the basic paradigms on which they were grounded, particularly their basic assessment, according to which the historical development of humankind was based upon material foundations. This view was rooted in Hegel’s dialectical view of history, but Marx has substituted the idealistic Hegelian foundation with Feuerbach’s materialistic groundwork.

Li’s basic paradigms were tightly connected to the early Marxist view of the human being as a living being capable of producing and reproducing the elementary conditions of his/her existence through the making and using of tools. According to Li, this ability represents the characteristic feature of humanness, which means that the production and application of technology is that which essentially makes human beings human. In this context, Li also assumed the early Marxist humanism promoted in Marx’s theories of human value and his critique of alienation. Both of these elements represent important factors of Li’s ethical theory.

On the other hand, he disapproves of Marx’s later economic theories, which mainly criticized the structural grounds, historical conditions, and the functioning of the capitalist mode of production. Li pointed out that in these later theories, which form the essential part of his most famous book Das Kapital, Marx has linked the “two-fold character of commodities” with the “two-fold character of labor,” claiming that “exchange value” was a result of “abstract labor.” Li criticized this view in which the exchange of commodities was determined by an overall abstraction from use value, because for him, such ideas that were formulated in Marx’s theory of the “socially necessary labor time” are sensible only in rational analyses and cannot function in empirical reality. Because of this, Li reproaches Marxist economic theories with an artificial separation of human labor from concrete human life. Li emphasizes that in such abstract view, the “labor-power” has nothing to do with actual human practice of making and using tools, which differs according to various societies, cultures, and developmental stages of history. In such a framework, Marx has attempted to verify his concept of surplus value through a homogenized and overgeneralized concept of the “expenditure of human labor-power.” Due to such abstractions, in Li’s view he has unconsciously reproduced abstract Hegelian idealistic speculations, which were actually in contradiction with his basic materialist view of history. Hence, Marx’s idea of communism basically rests on a Hegelian, purely logical inference regarding abstract labor. Because Marx did not take into consideration any of the complex, historically determined factors that were, in Li’s view, distinctly influencing human development, he managed to reduce it to a mechanistic model of abstract relations between the class of the owners of the means of production and commodity-possessors on the one hand, and the working class on the other. In such a synthetic model, theoretical concepts such as class struggle or proletarian revolution functioned as a central force of social development. According to Li, this idea of class struggle between the capital and the labor has led Marx to the necessity of eliminating the market-guided production of commodities. Li believes that such logic is tricky, for it has no relation to the actual material practice, which is the fundamental element of genuine historical materialism (Li Zehou 2006, 141).

Li compares such models of thought with Kant’s notion of “transcendental illusion” (see Kant 1998, 389 /B359/)²⁵ and demonstrates the problems arising from them with the example of the system of equal distribution, which has been implemented in the Chinese “people’s communes” during the first decades after the constitution of the People’s Republic. This system attempted to achieve equality and justice in society. However, due to the fact that its founders did not consider the empirical factors determining human practices and interpersonal relations, it led to a deterioration of economy: even though it succeeded in establishing equality of economic wages, the overall living standard and the quality of people’s life stagnated and even declined (ibid., 146). Hence, for Li, it is quite understandable that Marx’s economic ideas could not be further advanced within general outlines of prevailing economic theories and that his concept of labor value was substituted with various price theories.

However, because he considered the basic Marxian paradigm of historical materialism to be immensely important for the establishment of his own philosophical theory, Li still regards himself as a Marxist philosopher, although with some reservations (Li Zehou 2016d, 1). He also exposed that in several aspects, Marxism is compatible with Confucianism. First of all, Confucianism is in his view also a materialistic discourse. Besides, the Marxist view of the communist system is also comparable to certain Confucian ideals; he exemplifies this idea by quoting a passage from The Book of Rites:

Commodities should not be thrown to the ground; people must not store them only for themselves, and neither should they employ the power of others only for themselves.

貨惡其棄於地也，不必藏於己；力惡其不出於身也，不必為己.

Li ji s.d., Li yun: 1

In Li’s view, such sections of Confucian texts can be associated with certain communist devices such as “From each according to his abilities to each according to his needs.” Hence, he actually considers himself to be a “Confucian Marxist” (Li Zehou 2016d, 1).²⁶

Li Zehou was influenced by Marx from an early age. Later, during the late sixties and early seventies when he started to study Kant’s transcendental philosophy, he was immediately captivated by the German philosopher’s highlighting the idea of the human subject as a free, active, and morally autonomous agent.

As is well known, the notion of human subjectivity in Kant’s philosophy was rooted in the transcendental forms, which were a priori structures of human mind. As such, they have distinctly determined and redesigned the human perception of objective realty. In Kant’s philosophy, such forms were independent of human experience. In this regard, Li’s theory is different: although he also presumed the existence of similar forms determining human consciousness, he placed them into a scheme of historical materialist development derived from early Marx.²⁷ In his later evaluation of his Critique of Critical Philosophy: A New Approach to Kant, Li described the elementary grounds on which he attempted to connect Kant with Marx and to upgrade their theories with Confucian thought:

On the surface, this book explains Marx proceeding from Kant, but actually, it begins with Marx and returns then to Kant. It proposes a new explanation of the origins and the shaping of the seemingly “transcendental” forms and structures of cognition, morality, and aesthetics from the perspective of the material practice and social relations, in which human beings produce and apply tools, and which represent the basis of their sustainable existence. This means that Kant has been turned upside down.

本書表層述評是由康德講到馬克思，實際上是由馬克思回到康德，即由人以製造一使用工具的物質實踐活動和社會關係作為生存基礎，提出和論說似乎是 “先驗” 的認識、道德、審美的心理形式結構的來由和塑建，這就把康德顛倒了過來.

Li Zehou 2016d, 1

Although early Kant was profoundly influenced by the germs of modern liberal individualism, Li Zehou does not see a strong notion of the atomic individual in his work, especially regarding his later, mature philosophy. He sees this later Kantianism as being in direct communication with Hegel and Marx (Li, Zehou 2016, 1116). His inheritance of Kant diverges greatly from that of various forms of liberalism. It is in this context that Li finds his way back to Kant through the theories of Hegel and Marx (ibid., 1117). Hence, he analyses Kant’s work as linked to and in line with these to pioneers of historical materialism. In other words, he sees Kant as a crucial pivot from the individualism of thinkers like Locke and Rousseau to the collectivist outlooks of Hegel and Marx. Li explains:

When I take the transformative and innovative approach of looking at Kant through Hegel and Marx, it does not negate Kant’s own thought but rather provides a critical new way by which to understand Kant.

ibid.

His discussion of Kant through the lens of Hegel’s and Marx’s ideas of historical process and material life diverges considerably from numerous other interpretations of Kant’s thought. Through such perspective, Li aimed to relocate Kant’s transcendental forms into a dynamic and historical context, defined by the principles of a materialist development of humankind. Simultaneously, Li altered the teleological and deterministic Marxist view of social development, which can in its basic dialectical framework be traced back to Hegel through the stimulating element of such an autonomous, i.e., morally aware human subject who is not only defined by his or her materialist practice, but also unpredictable and by no means completely determined by the laws of social development. In such a system, the formations of the human mind were no longer absolutely permanent, stagnant, and therefore persistent and even predetermined. Similar to the sedimented layers of earth, sand, and clay from ancient times, they were only seemingly permanent from the viewpoint of individuals. From the viewpoint of humankind as a unified historical body, which evolved through millions of years, they are by no means a priori.

In such an upgrading, the “meeting point” of Marx and Kant was for Li especially relevant (Li Zehou 2016, 154). He has reshaped, altered, and modified the basic paradigms of these two German philosophers, and combined them into a theoretical system that differed from both theories.

He agreed with Marx’s presumption that tools represented the basic means of production. Nevertheless, he saw Marx’s further evolvement of this theory as problematic because he saw it as being one-sided: progress from means of production to the relations of production and then on to the superstructure only concerned the external developments of the relation between the manufacture and use of tools. At this point, Li was more interested in their internal influences, i.e., in the ways in which the making and use of tools has reshaped human mind. In other words, Li was interested in establishing and investigating the phenomenon of the cultural-psychological formations that were shaped in human inwardness in this process.

Rošker 2019, 27

Li’s elevation of Marxist theory is also visible in his development of the nonalienated relation between men and nature. As we have seen, he enriched the significance of Marx’s vision of the “humanization of nature” (zirande renhua 自然的人化), by complementing it with the corresponding concept, “naturalization of humans” (rende ziranhua 人的自然化).

Besides criticizing Marx through the lens of Kant’s transcendental illusion, he also questioned certain basic approaches of the latter through the elementary notions of the former. Although Kant never explained the origins of his transcendental forms, and merely stressed that they were prior to any experience, Li believes to have found their genesis. In his theory, the formations of perception and cognition arose from collective human experience through the long-lasting process of sedimentation, by which the empirical is being transformed into the transcendental (jingyan bian xianyan). This process of transformation is always embedded in the cultural-psychological formations (wenhua-xinli jiegou) of human beings.

Kant and Marx were important not only in regard to Li’s general theory but also for the establishment of his ethics. Even though in general, he remained loyal to the conceptual framework of Marxist historical materialism, he also upgraded it by exposing the problem of the active and autonomous human potential through his concept of subjectality (zhutixing 主體性). He established and applied this notion to ground human agency in the historically conditioned and environmentally subsumed, but nonetheless conscious, subject. Such a view has essentially modified the understanding of consciousness, which was in Marx’s theory limited to a merely mechanical reflection of the material world. Through its conceptualization of subjectality, Li’s theory surpassed the deterministic view of history and emphasized the importance of coincidental factors in its development (Li Zehou 2017a, 60).

As we have seen in the previous chapters, subjectality is tightly connected to material practice of human beings. Li Zehou’s concept of practice, however, differs from that originally established by Marx. On the one hand, Li approved Marx’s emphasis on the prime position of objective conditions, productive forces, and the material base. On the other hand, however, he departs from traditional Marxism because he believes that we cannot separate the objective contents of human practice from all those features that constitute human beings as autonomous subjects, particularly in terms of their creativity, innovativeness, and their willingness to act. However, it would be wrong to reduce Li’s philosophy to a simple combination of these two important European thinkers. On the contrary: “He uses Marx as his starting point to reexamine issues initiated by Kant and then deals with unsolved problems arising from these considerations” (Ding 2002, 247). With such a theoretical reinterpretation of the human subject and her autonomous agenda, Li wanted to surpass Kant’s idealist standoff and to reestablish a new understanding of Kant’s transcendental philosophy by positioning it into a historical and materialist context. In this regard, Li criticized Kant’s rationality because of its lack of any social and historical perspective. In his understanding, Kant reduced the human subject to a stagnant entity, determined to a large extent by structural relationships between transcendental forms, subjective principles, and objective settings.

In giving Kant’s notion of subjectivity a holistic, historicist turn, Li argues that all subjective structures are the products of historical process. They are not empty, but have their concrete, historical contents. As for the formation of these structures, the material, productive activities of practice are the determining factor.

Gu Xin 1996, 224

In this way, Li enhanced the traditional historical materialist concept of practice by complementing Marx through Kant and in turn by expanding the latter through the former. Following this approach, subjectality as a mental formation is surpassing the mere subjective awareness of individuals, for it also pertains to collective human history and those of its products, which materialize themselves in developments of intellectual and spiritual cultures, as well as in formations of ethical and aesthetic awareness (Li Zehou 2001, 43).²⁸

While he endorsed Marx’s socialist ideals, he also valuated Kant’s important role in the consolidation of the ethical principles of enlightenment, his notions of human freedom, dignity and autonomy, and his rejection of feudalism, epitomised in his calls for autonomy, independence, and equality (Li Zehou 2007, 302). For Li, Kant was also a most relevant pioneer of modern deontological ethics, established upon the notion of the inner moral responsibility as an inseparable part of humanness. However, in his view, Kant’s proscription of using human beings as means to achieve certain other goals does not belong to the elements constituting the inner arrangement of the categorical imperative.

In my view, the two notions of “universal legislation” and “free will,” which belong to the three propositions of Kant’s “categorical imperative,” also represent formal structures of human psychology that were shaped through millions of years. But the third proposition, i.e., his notion of “human beings as ends” is actually not a part of the “categorical imperative.” In a certain sense it is universal, but it also includes ideals and hence, it belongs to modern social morality.

康德著名的三條 “絕對律令” (categorical imperative), 我以為其中 “普遍立法” 和 “自由意志” 兩條, 也是百萬年人類心理塑建的形式結構。“人是目的” 則並非 “絕對 律令”, 它是具有某種普遍性並兼理想性的現代社會性道德.

Li Zehou 2016d, 2

Nevertheless, Li certainly admires Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative and even though he does not agree with him in the presumption that the notion of human beings as ends is a part of such an absolute criterion of moral actions, he still emphasizes that, in essence, this idea is an important basis of modern ethics, which needs to be preserved and developed.

According to Li, another weakness in Kant’s philosophy is also his presumption that practical reason belongs to our inborn a priori forms; it is a historical concept formed through pragmatic necessities and based upon the demands of social life. Even though it is determined by the relatively stable formation of the free will, it contains ideas and concepts that are being changed in accordance with concrete circumstances and defined by the need for the preservation and the sustainable survival of the humankind as an entirety.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Li also criticizes the notion of ethical relativism, which is sometimes also understood as a necessary consequence of Kant’s emphasis on the role of the human subject. Although Li Zehou admits that in politics, this idea can sometimes support and protect minorities and marginalized social groups, it fails to consider that all forms of ethics basically share the same universal forms. Therefore, he believes that ethical relativism actually neglects the free choice and the role of the human subject as an independent and autonomous agent (Chong 1999, 165).

In certain aspects, Li’s particular critiques of Kant and Marx can be seen as somewhat problematic or simply too one-dimensional. In the following, I will begin with exposing these problems separately in regard to Marx and to Kant in order to illuminate through a contrastive analysis the culturally determined, paradigmatic background of Li’s specific understanding of human beings and their historical evolvement.

In regard to Marx, Li seems to have misunderstood some of the crucial notions pertaining to the Marxist idea of humanism. At least in his young age, he interpreted Marx’s idea of alienation in a somewhat peculiar manner. Li started to develop interest in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844 since the 1950s, when he wrote his famous essay Lun meigan, mei he yishu 論美感，美和藝術 (On the aesthetic feeling, beauty and art). Li wrote this essay at the age of twenty-six, which was exactly the age Marx was when he wrote his Manuscripts. Hence, Li’s first interpretation of the Marxist term alienation can be seen as a dialogue between two very young philosophers from Europe and China, respectively, and it offers us an interesting insight into the nature of intercultural misunderstandings rooted in accustomed Western and Chinese thought patterns, respectively.

According to Marx (2007, 29), the estrangement of the workers from their products means not only that their labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside them, independently, as something alien to them, and that it becomes a power that confronts them on its own. It means that the life they have conferred upon the object confronts them as something hostile and alien. The workers put their lives into the object and, consequently, their life no longer belongs to them but to the object. In developing his theory on estranged labor and alienation, Marx (2005, 42) described the phenomenon of the estrangement (Entfremdung) of human beings as a species from their human essence or their species-being (Gattungswesen). In Marx’s view, this phenomenon is a consequence of forced, exploitative labor and of stratified social classes, because being a part of such institutions estranges people from their humanness.

In his abovementioned essay on the nature of aesthetic feeling, however, Li seems to have misunderstood the concept of alienation, for he endowed it with rather positive connotations. He wrote:

Nature as such is not beautiful. Beautiful nature is a product of socialization and a product of the objectivization (i.e., alienation) of the human essence.

自然本身並不是美, 美的自然是社會化的桔果, 也就是人的本質對象化 (異化) 的桔果.

Li Zehou 1956, 57

He also wrote:

Humankind has created objects that caused nature to be socialized. Simultaneously, it also created a subject, which means that people achieved the ability to appreciate the beauty of nature. Hence, ultimately, the beauty of nature is a special form of existence of the beauty of social life (or the beauty of reality)—it is the form of existence of estrangement.

人類創造了客體對象, 使自然具有了社會性, 同時也創造了主體、自身, 使人自己具有了欣賞自然的宙美能力。所以, 歸根桔蒂, 自然美就只是社會生活的美 (現實美) 的一種特殊的存在形式, 是一種 “異化” 的存在形式.

ibid., 59

In this passage, Li obviously equated “alienation” with a certain kind of “objectification” in the sense of the uniquely human capacity to establish mutually separated concepts of “subject” and “object.” For him, alienation was also a precondition or even a method of the specific human ability to project subjective feelings or sensations onto external objects, and hence, to consciously separate the objects of the external world from the internal world of the human subject.

In the limited framework of this book, we cannot go deeper into the reasons for this misunderstanding. However, it certainly has much to do with the fact that in the mid-20th century China, the establishment of a clear separation line between the subject and the object of comprehension was still a most urgent and progressive endeavor.

As we have seen above, Li exposed that Marxist ideas such as socially necessary labor time were derived from the concept of abstract human labor. He reproached Marx with a denial of any of the complex, historically determined elements (as for instance, the developmental stage of technologies in different societies and cultures). However, this critique seems to be too superficial, for in his definition of the socially necessary labor time, Marx explicitly wrote about the importance of these factors, which are historically and culturally defined and represent important elements of the category of the socially necessary labor time. These elements can vary throughout different societies and they profoundly influence the value of particular individual and social labor. Marx has defined the socially necessary labor time under consideration of specific social conditions, the average degree of skill and the intensity prevalent in concrete historical periods:

The labor time socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time. The introduction of power-looms into England probably reduced by one-half the labour required to weave a given quantity of yarn into cloth. The hand-loom weavers, as a matter of fact, continued to require the same time as before; but for all that, the product of one hour of their labour represented after the change only half an hour’s social labour, and consequently fell to one-half its former value.

Marx 2015, 29

Li’s critique, which concentrates on his alleged separation of socially necessary labor time from the actual concrete conditions of the production, is therefore simply wrong. As we can see in the following quotation, Marx also explicitly emphasizes that productiveness is determined by various circumstances, the state of science, and the degree of its practical application, the social organization of production, the extent and capabilities of the means of production, and even by physical conditions of particular societies:

The value of a commodity would remain constant, if the labor time required for its production also remained constant. But the latter changes with every variation in the productiveness of labor. This productiveness is determined by various circumstances, amongst others, by the average amount of skill of the workmen, the state of science, and the degree of its practical application, the social organization of production, the extent and capabilities of the means of production, and by physical conditions.

ibid.

As we have seen, Li criticized Marx, among other issues, by claiming that in his system, it became necessary to eliminate the market-guided economy and to establish a planned economy. First of all, as Chandra (2002) shows, Marx has never strictly defined the concept of class, even though it allegedly belongs to the most central concepts of Marxism. And second, he never explicitly wrote about replacing the market-guided production of commodities with a systematized conceptualization of a planned economy.²⁹ Planned economy is a concept developed by the theoreticians of the Soviet-type state socialism. On the contrary, Marx even criticized the germs of such theories as could be found in the works of several utopian socialists (ibid., 56).

Regarding Li’s reconceptualization of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the problem of its critique and integration into the theory of Li’s anthropo-historical ontology becomes even more complicated. The question of gradual conversion of empirical elements into universal mental forms belongs to the key issues by which Li Zehou has altered and transformed Kant’s views on pure and practical reason, on the very nature of perception and cognizance, and also on the autonomous human subject and his or her acting.

Numerous scholars believe that Li’s theory can be considered as an upgrading or a completion of Kant’s philosophy (e.g., Ding 2002, 248). However, such an interpretation is problematic, for Kant himself has often cautioned against a blending of the empirical with the rational, claiming that such procedures are unscientific and that the metaphysics of morality has to be cautiously purified of all empirical elements (Kant 2001, 23–24). Therefore, he would probably regard Li’s approach as pure nonsense. Hence, Li’s “transformation of empirical into the transcendental” (jingyan bian xianyan 經驗變先驗) is not an element that could directly be compatible with, or even assimilated into, Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Because it rests on dynamic and holistic paradigms, which form a specific framework of Chinese philosophy, it cannot be compared or even denoted as “an upgrading” of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, but rather as an independent and unique theory.

On the other hand, however, we cannot but emphasize that Li’s theory is definitely a kind (although a “different” kind) of philosophy in spite of the Eurocentric interpretations of suchlike methodological approaches, which can be found in Kant’s as well as in Marx’s work. While the latter describes his concept of the “Asiatic Mode of production” through the lens of the alleged immaturity of the Asian people, which is allegedly reflected in their “inability to separate themselves from Nature” (Marx 2015, 52), Kant explicitly states (2001, 6) that such modes of thought “do not deserve the name of philosophy” at all.

Irrespective of what one might think of such approaches, it seems certainly better and more suitable to categorize Li’s ethical system as a theory that rests on completely different paradigms that are not comparable to (and, even less compatible with) the ones that determine Kant’s and also Marx’s referential framework^. Instead of speaking of Li’s theory as a system based upon Kantian and Marxist approaches, it could be claimed that for Li, their theories were a valuable source of inspiration. They merely stimulated his creativity and thus supported the creation of his philosophical system, which is definitely more than a mere hybrid blending of Marx and Kant.

4 Further Dialogues with the West

The problems linked to different frameworks of reference are by no means limited to Li Zehou’s elaborations on Kant and Marx, but also have to be kept in mind whenever we aim to compare his theory to any of those belonging to various discourses of Western ethics. In many particular aspects, different models of Western ethical thought have also served him as inspiring objects of investigation, critiques, and comparisons, though not to such an extent as those generated by Marx and Kant. Li is familiar with the works of all important premodern and modern Western theoreticians of ethics and frequently comments on their theories, often also critically comparing them to the Chinese tradition and/or his own ethical work. In contrast to numerous other Chinese scholars who almost exclusively focus upon their own tradition, Li does not support a separation between Chinese and Western thought and is strongly against such an isolation or alienation of his tradition. A dialogue with other philosophical theories is for him the best way to develop Chinese thought and at the same time, the most efficient method of breaking beyond the global domination of Greco-European philosophical discourses (Li, Zehou 2016, 1075). Hence, besides being established within a revival of the Chinese tradition, his theories are also based upon absorptions and incorporations of those aspects of Western ethics that he considers to be beneficial and reasonable.

Such an attitude is in line with his famous inversion of Zhang Zhidong’s slogan, “Preserving the Chinese substance and applying the Western function” (Zhongti Xiyong 中體西用). At the edge of modernity, this slogan was promoted by conservatives who claimed that in the process of modernization, China should preserve its own ideational tradition, which should serve as the essence of society. China should not assume Western thought but only apply Western technology.

Li’s reversed formulation, “Assuming Western substance and applying Chinese function” (Xiti Zhongyong 西體中用) was harshly criticized by a vast number of Chinese scholars who reproached him for holding a completely anti-traditional and pro-Western position. However, such a critique was absolutely groundless, for Li never meant to imply anything like this. Even in the heady days of the anti-traditional fever of the early 1980s, Li did not endorse the fashionable idea of “wholesale Westernization” and consistently emphasized the importance of the Chinese ideational tradition (Chan 2003, 110–111). In this regard, Li clarifies that he sees “Western substance” (ti 體) primarily as modernization, which cannot be equated with Westernization, even though modernization undoubtedly began in the West (Li Zehou 1998: 156). Hence, the concept “function” (yong 用) conveyed the culturally determined mode of life, production, and reproduction: in this sense, it assumes a crucial significance for Li, for it outlines the concrete circumstances of individuals in a society. Li believes that identifying with one’s own tradition is a precondition for the positive development of any individual or society. Hence, the methods of modernization that correspond to specifically Chinese social conditions (i.e., the “Chinese function”) is immensely relevant to the future of the Chinese culture and society. In this sense, “function 用” is very important. According to Li, it is actually crucial (Li Zehou 2016e, 379). It defines the mode of transition toward a modern society, making it easier and more effective (Li Zehou 2002, 385).³⁰

Therefore, Western thought was an important brick in building his philosophical and ethical system. His intellectual interaction with the West was not so much focused on classical European ethics but dealt with early modern, modern, and current theories, beginning with Kant and his contemporaries.

Although Li Zehou believes that morality is based on reason rather than emotion, and even though in this respect he is closer to Kant than to David Hume,³¹ he often suggests that in a coherent ethical system, the theoretical framework of the former should be complemented by certain elements of the latter; just like in Chinese philosophy, Xunzi should be complemented by Mengzi (Li Zehou 2017a, 59–60). This fits well into his theory of the Chinese emotional cosmology (youqing yuzhou guan 有情宇宙觀) and is tightly linked to his concept of emotion-based substance (qing benti 情感本體). His endeavor to include human emotion and moral sentiment into ethics is logically consistent because in his own ethical system reason can never be completely divided from emotion, albeit it should occupy the primary and vital position in moral decisions and actions. Therefore the concept of emotio-rational structure of the human mind (qingli jiegou 情理結構), is a relevant factor in Li’s ethics.

By complementing Kant with Hume, Kant’s practical reason could be elevated above his originally purely formal status:

This is why I say that Kant’s capacity of human nature (the condensation of reason) has to be complemented by Hume’s sentiment of humanness. Only in this way, the categorical imperative would achieve a practical character instead of remaining merely a formal principle.

所以我說康德的人性能力（理性凝聚）要加上休謨的人性情感，絕對律令才不會是形式原則而有實踐品格.

Li Zehou 2011a, 9

Precisely because of its emotion-based substance, Li believes that the Chinese ethical tradition can surpass the dividing line between Kant and Hume, between rationalism and empiricism (Li Zehou 2016c, 10).³² This is one of the reasons for his conviction that traditional Chinese ethics bears in itself the potential for becoming a new global ethics for the entire humankind (Li Zehou 2017a, 60). For Li, the moral sentiment cannot be reduced to Kant’s feeling of respect, but also includes Hume’s concept of empathy, which is comparable to Mengzi’s feeling of commiseration (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心). Both notions belong to the anticipative origins of moral conduct. However, while in Hume’s ethics such feelings lie at the heart of morality, Li emphasizes that that they are merely an (albeit not unimportant) auxiliary force of otherwise rationally determined morality (ibid., 61). He does not at all agree with Hume’s famous saying, “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (Hume 1817, 106). On the contrary: he exposes that Hume’s idea of empathy is rooted in a type of natural instinct and determined by suffering and joy. It is grounded in animalistic biological needs and desires, which are not characteristics of human moral psychology. An empathetic heart is not automatically capable of implementing moral actions, and moral actions do not necessarily necessitate an empathetic heart as their motivation. Hence, Li insists on the view that moral actions always conform to reason. They are basically performances of duty, and are not connected with empathy.

Li Zehou also elaborated upon Hume’s important distinction between facts and values, according to which human beings are unable to derive ought from is, because normative arguments cannot be grounded in the positive ones. Li claims to have found a solution for the dichotomy in the dynamic mutual amalgamation of facts and values:

In my philosophy, the problem of “is” and “ought to” that was first raised by Hume is solved by a unification of both elements.

我的哲學, 就把休謨以來提的這個問題, is 和 ought to, “是” 與 “應該”, 合起來了.

Li Zehou and Liu Yuedi 2014, 201

Although in fact, a simple equation (or a simple causal inference) of facts and values lies at the core of Hume’s problematization, Li does not see this unity as a problem in the first place. Facts and values are interactively embedded into a dynamic reciprocal relation in which they mutually influence one another. Even though on the formal, theoretical level the former precede the latter, normative propositions are not simply deducted from the positive ones. In such a schema, there is no fixed, motionless borderline between the two levels of ontology and axiology, respectively. The existence of facts as such is meaningless without the existence of values. And due to the fact that we are human beings, our existence is necessarily permeated with meaning, we can only exist in a realm of inseparability of facts and values. Therefore, all formal attempts to separate the two concepts are, in fact, irrelevant and artificial.

In Li’s view, the alleged necessity of a strict separation of facts and values derives from the specific Western understanding of values, which are in the two-world schema reduced to axiological concerns. In this respect, Li rather assumes the traditional Chinese understanding, which identifies the “absolute good” with the sustainable existence and reproduction of the humankind through our vital practices.

I believe that according to the Confucian point of view, the original good, that is, the so-called goodness of humanness, is by no means a “good” that is separated from and stands in opposition to the “evil.” It is not a good derived from some ethical or moral standards. Similar to the idea that “the motion of the universe produces strength” it grounds in the human “emotional cosmology.” Humanness is originally without any connection to good or evil, for it can be expressed by notions such as “life equates humanness,” and “humanness includes bodily desires,” but from the viewpoint of humankind as a whole it can be endowed with the moral virtue of good. This also means that in the Chinese tradition, the sustainable extension and the vital practical activities of humankind are understood as the highest (ultimate) good. Therefore, it is a design in which human beings incorporate both reason and emotions.

我以為, 從儒家來看, 本源的善即所謂 “人性善” 的這個 “善”, 並不是與 “惡” 相區別而對立的那個善, 並不是某種倫理道德規範的善, 而是與 “天行健” 一樣, 是由人的 “有情宇宙觀” 在根本上把本無所謂善惡的 “生之謂性”, “食色性也” 的性, 在人類總體意義上賦予善的品德. 也就是說, 中國傳統把人類的生存延續及人的生活實踐活動當作最高的善 (至善). 因此, 它只是對人的一種情感兼理性的設定.

Li Zehou 2016b, 222

This is clearly an opinion pertaining to evolutionary ethics, for it presupposes that human evolution has instilled human beings with a moral sense and with a disposition to be good. In such a view, the ultimate criterion of moral conduct is directly linked to the survival and reproduction of humankind. As is well known, evolutionary ethics has been challenged by George Edward Moore, who has faced it with his notion of naturalistic fallacy. Moore was an ethical nonnaturalist, which means that for him, morality cannot be defined; all attempts to define morality necessarily lead to fallacy. He explains that morality cannot be defined by any kind of natural properties; pleasure, for instance, can be defined by good, but good cannot be defined by pleasure. In this view, it would be fallacious to explain that which is good reductively in terms of natural properties such as “pleasant” or “desirable.” Simultaneously, Moore claims that the “question of how ‘good’ is to be defined, is the most fundamental question in all ethics” (Moore 2000, 57). Li would not have agreed with such a position, albeit he certainly agrees with the presumption, according to which, the “good” cannot be defined:

Regarding the question of what is good there are different opinions in different cultures and nations. It is impossible to find a consensus. Hence, we have to forget about it.

對於什麼是善，各個文化、各個民族的看法都不一樣，沒法取得共識，所以要與它脫鉤。所以，儒學無原罪或原惡，而只有原善.

Li Zehou 2016, 53

These difficulties (or the impossibility) of defining moral values such as “good” are shared by Moore and Li. For both men, the good needs to be understood in its own terms. Moore exposes that, like the notion yellow, good is a simple notion, which cannot be explained to anyone who does not already know it (Moore 2000, 59). According to him, this was the crucial flaw of the so-called natural ethics, which implied that what normally happens in nature should determine the way in which we act. In other words, it implied a simple equation of is and ought, of fact and value. He demonstrated that such definitions cannot be correct by turning any proposed definition of good into a question. For instance, if we try to define good with the statement “Good is pleasurable,” then the question, “Is (everything) pleasurable good?” points to the fallacy of the definition.

Some scholars claim that Moore seems to imply that just like “yellow,” “good” is a kind of an intuitive knowledge and one that has a great intuitive force (see Stratton-Lake 2016, 11). Li sees Moore’s argument in a more differentiated way:

G.E. Moore believes that “good” is like “yellow,” namely, a self-evident intuitive axiom that cannot be defined. Because of this, he thinks it is important to analyze numerous moral terms, concepts, meanings of judgments, functions, and potentials in order to reveal the dominant position that has been held by the discipline of meta-ethics for many years and until the present day. But is moral psychology indeed just an intuitive judgment? When I participated in the aesthetic debate in the fifties, I exposed the intuitive nature of aesthetic feeling in my essay, “The Double Nature of Aesthetic Feeling.” Aesthetic intuition is certainly much more obvious and explicit than the moral intuition. But in conclusion, the majority of the scholars seemed to acknowledge the proposition of the practical aesthetics, according to which beauty and the aesthetic feeling both are derived from the practice of humankind. In this view, the aesthetic feeling is not just an undefinable sense. It is also not an animalistic biological intuition. Therefore, it is by no means a self-evident axiom but still a product of education, which is acquired on the basis of inborn physiology. The same applies to moral intuition.

摩爾（G.E. Moore）認為 “善”（good）有如 “黃” 的顏色一樣，是不可定義、不容解說的直覺自明公理。因之重要的是去分析道德諸多語詞、概念、判斷的含義、作用、功能，從而開啟元倫理學（meta ethics）數十年至今的學院派統治。道德心理是否就是直覺判斷呢？在上世紀 50 年代的美學討論中，我在 “美感兩重性” 中便提出過美感直覺性問題，美感直覺比道德直覺遠為明顯突出。但討論的結果，似乎多數學人讚成實踐美學所提出的: 美與美感均來自人類實踐，美感並非不可定義的感覺，也非動物性的生理直覺，更非自明公理，它仍然是在先天生理基礎上的後天培育成果。道德直覺當更如此.

Li Zehou 2016c, 7

To Li Zehou, there is no need to search for a formally justifiable definition of moral values, for in his view ethics can well be established without them. He emphasizes that in Chinese culture, for instance, the concept of good has never been defined by its relation to evil. It was always self-evident, for its ultimate function was to preserve and develop the life of humanity.

Essentially, there was no place for evil in Chinese culture. It was seen as something contradicting life itself, and therefore, it was regarded as unimportant. Human beings have no original sin. On the contrary, the life of human beings and of everything that exists is good in itself.

中國傳統在本原上沒有惡的位置, 惡是派生的, 次要的. 人生而無罪, 相反, 人和萬物的生, 本身就是善.

Li Zehou 2016b, 223

From the viewpoint of Li’s philosophical anthropology, this supposition naturally leads to the unification of facts and values, which was, as mentioned above, a crucial concern in his reconstruction of the classical question, posed by Hume.

The same applies for humanness. Humanness is originally good, which also implies that humanness ought to be good.

人性善依然, 人性本善也就包含了人性應善.

ibid.

In this schema, the concept of good seems to be purely pragmatically defined, for that which is beneficial (for the existence and survival of humankind) is automatically good. But these germs of utilitarianism do not bear relevant fruits in Li’s ethics. His system cannot be denoted as utilitarian even though he still endorses certain elements of this stream of thought, including the philosophy of its most famous pioneer, Jeremy Bentham. Li does not think his ideas are outmoded and writes explicitly: “I think utilitarianism is reasonable in certain ways and can or even should still be used in political policy making and the implementation of laws” (Li, Zehou 2016, 1081). However, he points out that Bentham’s theory arises from the perspective of what the government should do to ensure people’s happiness and cannot be extended to become a moral standard for individual behavior (ibid.). Li emphasizes that utilitarian rules cannot be used as abstract principles of justice, for moral valuations and decisions cannot be made without consideration of concrete circumstances determining different situations. In his view, Bentham’s famous notion of “greatest happiness for the greatest number” can only refer to material aspects of life. Hence, Li connects Bentham’s central notions of pleasure and pain to his own materialist outlook because they are based on physical, bodily feelings, which means that they are directly related to concrete human existence and can thus provide the basis for certain ethical norms. For Li, this materialistic view on questions related to human happiness and well-being plays an important role in the constitution of political ethics. However, even on this strictly materialist level, happiness cannot be (as Bentham suggests) completely quantified.

In spite of this problem, Li does not think that John Stuart Mill’s attempts to differentiate between greater and lesser kinds of happiness are reasonable, because such conditions are difficult to categorize or measure. On the other hand, Li endorses Mill’s emphasis on long-term benefit over immediate pleasure and pain and his emphasis on the importance of human freedom and dignity. In Li’s view, Mill does not belong to the orthodox line of utilitarianism because he was strongly influenced by European continental thought. Li emphasizes that these influences “make him more than just a British empiricist” (Li, Zehou 2016, 1082). Hence, he places Mill among the most important representatives of modern European liberalism.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Li has mixed feelings about this important stream of thought. He acknowledges its relevance for the establishment of important modern notions such as human rights or the value of individual freedom. However, he criticizes its exaggerated emphasis on the seemingly independent individual, which had begun with Thomas Hobbes and was later developed further by John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.³³ Li highlights that in such a view, human beings are understood as completely self-reliant entities. In this regard, Li rather relies on the traditional Chinese account, in which people are seen as being internally constituted through the social relationships in which they live.

On the other hand, Li is also highly skeptical about some central elements of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s thought, although he generally endorsed Hegel’s conception of the first theoretical system based on the notion of historical change. Li agrees with Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism and with his replacement of Kant’s moral mandate by an ethics that includes concrete historical contents. Without such specific contents provided by the actual social practices and institutions, Kant’s principles would remain empty formulas. Even though he does not agree with the moral relativism implied in Hegel’s position that what is real is rational, Li acknowledges the importance of his historicist methodology, which states that values, justice, politics, and education must be concretely analyzed and evaluated within specific historical conditions. On the other hand, he dislikes Hegel’s notion of philosophy because he sees it as being reduced to abstract thought regarding truth or absolute concepts, which rests on inferences of strict logical thought inherited from ancient Greek philosophers. Thus, it is not surprising that “Hegel completely dismisses Confucius’s aphoristic teachings on human conduct as nonphilosophical” (Li, Zehou 2016, 1072).³⁴

At first glance, it might seem as though Hegel would be the natural point of connection for Li’s historical approach to human development (Garrison 2018, 126). He highlights that we have to learn from Hegel, for his outstanding sense of history belongs to the greatest contributions of modern European philosophy. Such a view clearly illuminates the development of human history as a totality. Besides, Hegel’s emphasis on necessity and reason is also well established and of utmost importance.

On the other hand, Li claims that overall, Kant was much more insightful than Hegel, who remained trapped in an idealistic, pan-rational worldview. In contrast to him, Kant, who proceeded from a broader perspective, succeeded in raising the problem of subjectivity in a more comprehensive way. Hence, Li is suspicious of Hegel’s ethical absolutism, which manifests itself in his totalitarian political theory and is rooted in his all-encompassing “rational state” (Chandler 2018, 302). In Hegel’s system, the principle of totalistic subjectivity has become the single foundation of ethical normativity. In this context, Li also sharply criticizes Hegel’s central concept of the “absolute Spirit” because it neglects the importance and the value of the individual human being. Hence, in this respect, it is doubtless better to follow the Marxist upgrading of Hegel’s theory because Marx founded his principle of human subjectivity on the foundation of the material practice of the humankind. Gu Xin, however, points out that Hegel’s notion of mediation shows that the subject in Hegel is not static but dynamic, not passive but active. Gu highlights that in Hegel’s philosophy, the subject is not only a source of the mediating process, but is undistinguished from that process itself (Gu Xin 1996, 232):

In this light, we can say that it is irrelevant to differentiate Kant from Hegel with regard to whether or not they dealt with the problem of subjectivity. Actually, both Kant and Hegel paid great attention to it. The difference between them does not lie in that Kant intensifies while Hegel emasculates human subjectivity, but rather that they established the principle of human subjectivity using absolutely different approaches. Kant adopted a dualistic approach, Hegel a monistic one. It is precisely at this point that Li Zehou is a Hegelian rather than a Kantian. In fact, Li, like most Chinese intellectuals who share a propensity for totalistic philosophies and ideologies, is reasonably estranged from and against the dualism of Kant’s philosophy. His practical philosophy of subjectivity is actually monism, namely the monism of practice. Of course, Li is a materialist, and thus his Hegelianism is reversed.

ibid., 233

Such a view, however, is a bit problematic, for it interprets Li’s philosophy through the lens of Western categories. It certainly holds true that Li’s thought is in sharp contrast with Kant’s dualistic system. However, this does not automatically imply that his thought is necessarily monistic, even though it can be deducted to a single entity of human material practice, which represents the central categorical entity in Li’s anthropo-historical ontology. On the other hand, however, he also borrows much from his own ideational tradition. Hence, his system is binary structured and includes active and dynamic interactions between the material basis and the ideational superstructure, between reason and emotion, as well as between the subject and the object of cognition, the individual and society, and all other connotations, derived from the basic model of correlative complementarity. Given that monism is by no means the only alternative to dualism, it seems wrong to label Li’s thought as a monistic philosophy, just as it would be wrong to denote him as a collectivist only because he rejects exaggerate individualism. Instead, his philosophy is based upon dynamic correlativity and relationalism, both of which belong to the basic specific paradigms of Chinese philosophy.

Li agrees with Hegel’s evolutionary understanding of the growth of human freedom, but he rejects Hegel’s understanding of how the process evolved (ibid.). Similar to numerous other Western philosophers, Hegel placed too much importance on religion and on the cognitive as well as the political and did not pay enough attention to the aesthetic realm of human subjectality.³⁵

Some scholars believe that Li Zehou has a distinctive position within pragmatism (e.g., Lynch 2016) and contrast his ethics to the one established by one of its most prominent representatives, John Dewey. Li himself acknowledges that in many respects, Dewey’s thought can be compared to an important foundation of his own thought, namely to Confucian ethics, although Marxism comes even closer to it (Li Zehou 2016, 22). He nevertheless points out that Dewey’s theories can contribute a lot to a development of a new ethics. Hence, they should be revitalized, linked and combined with Marxism in the framework of a reconstructed Chinese tradition (Li Zehou 2011, 158–159).

Li also points out ways in which his ideas depart from and go beyond those of Dewey, such that Li’s own philosophy, he argues, must be seen as distinct from Dewey’s pragmatism. If, however, with Cheryl Misak, one understands pragmatism as a broad, still-developing tradition, then Li Zehou can take his place within that tendency and emerge as one of its most creative exponents.

Lynch 2016, 705

Dewey’s pragmatist ethics emphasizes the importance of experiences and practice. In Li’s view, these aspects of his theory represent a significant development, complementation and concretization of Marxism. He furthermore validates Dewey’s concept of operation, which allowed him to develop his theory further on abstract levels of mathematical logic (Li Zehou 2016, 263). Li nevertheless identifies several flaws in Dewey’s theory and criticizes it because it lacks the historical perspective of the long-lasting development of humankind. Hence, Dewey overlooked the importance of the accumulation of human experiences, which plays a significant role in Li’s own theory (ibid.).

On the other hand, Dewey’s and Li’s ethics have several common grounds. Similar to Li, Dewey also opposes the Kantian presumption, according to which human cognition is rooted in a priori forms and concepts. Therefore, they both believe that morality also comes from human experience (Lynch 2016, 707). In addition, similar to Li, Dewey also believes that the basis of human existence is material life. Regarding the evolvement of humankind, he also speaks of the importance of using tools, although in Li’s view, he fails to develop such ideas further. As we have seen, the making and using of tools lie at the very center of Li’s anthropo-historical ontology. As Catherine Lynch exposes (ibid.), this is precisely the idea that permits him to develop a different theory that surpasses Dewey’s and other pragmatist’s systems of thought.

On the other hand, Dewey and Li are also similar in accepting the presumption that the operational activities of work provide the fundamental contents of human experiences. Symbolic operations abstracted from this basis then obtain an independent character, which can be separated from concrete experiences. In this regard, the two philosophers are also in accord in claiming that logic or mathematics is not something with substance, but merely a method of cognition. Hence, reason as such cannot be hypostatized. But in Li’s view, Dewey reduces his theory to these operational aspects, without recognizing that it is precisely this instrumental, operational practice that makes human beings human and allows them to evolve beyond the animal world. “With this narrower focus, everything is an instrument for Dewey. What is useful is what is true, and to know is to do” (ibid., 714).³⁶

Li acknowledges that the concept of usefulness (youyongxing 有用性) also belongs to important elements of both the Chinese pragmatic reason as well as the American pragmatism, for both of them apply a similar criterion for judging the truth, which should be “practically useful or functional in the pure sense of this term” (Wang, Keping 2018, 227). In such models, right and effective actions in everyday life are more important than abstract metaphysical theories. However, Li Zehou also emphasizes that “the Chinese pragmatic reason differs from Dewey’s pragmatism in that the former stresses and even incorporates a belief in the adaptation to an objective principle or ordination” (ibid.). This principle can be found in the Dao of Heaven (tian dao), which is—in the holistic Chinese tradition—always intrinsically and dialectically connected with the Dao of human beings (ren dao).

In Li’s view, Martin Heidegger belongs to the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.³⁷ But he did not talk about ethics and even neglected it, or at least he did not approve of speaking about ethics because in his view we cannot talk about absolute values. However, Li acknowledges that Heidegger’s dismissal of ethics has to be situated in the broader context of his thought as a whole, for he denied the existence of entire philosophy as an academic discipline. Hence, some similarities can still be found in their respective views on the fundamental principles determining the paradigmatic grounds of ethical discourses. As we have seen, Li’s notion of the “ontologically fundamental psychology” (xinli cheng benti 心理成本體) belongs to the important bases of his ethical system. Some scholars suggest that this notion could be compared to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, which similarly implies an ontological quality that fosters the process of human living haunted by care and fear (Jung 2018, 189). Talking about Heidegger’s historical ontology, Li affirms that his own concept of psychological substance (xinli benti 心理本體) can be linked to Heidegger. Hence, for Li, certain aspects of his philosophy can be compared to the foundational elements of the “culture of pleasure” (legan wenhua 樂感文化):

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into a kind of Being of ‘the Others,’ in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more … We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure.

Heidegger 2001, 164

As Heidegger’s idea of such a “Being-with-one-another” suggests, Li can also be compared with Heidegger regarding the elementary presumption of his own ethics (and also, of his general theory), which proceeds from the fact that human beings are alive (ren huozhe 人活著). Li considered this presumption to be crucial because it expresses an established fact and not a decision or a choice that could be made by an individual. It is also important that “being alive” involves coexisting with others, or, in Heidegger’s words, “the world is always the one that I share with Others.” (ibid., 155).

Another meeting point between Heidegger and Li Zehou can be found in their common endeavor to break through the limitations of language through ethics (Li, Zehou 2018, 27). In this context, Li highlights that this is one of the main reasons why he has established the concepts of “emotio-rational structure” and “emotion-based substance.” But Li reproaches Heidegger, on the other hand, with an incorrect interpretation of Kant’s “unknown common origin of sensitivity and cognition.” While Heidegger sees this origin in the “transcendental imagination,” Li believes it is a result of the material practice of making and using tools (Li Zehou and Liu Xuyuan 2011, 77). Heidegger’s neglect of the importance of the material aspects of human life and his anti-rational stance can already be overturned by Kant’s understanding of the capacities of humanness, and even more by Marx’s historical materialism, but also by the specific sense of history derived from the Chinese tradition, which can be used as a first step in proposing a new theory of humanness. On the other hand, Li exposes that even though Heidegger’s anti-rationalism is emotional, it still relies on standard rational manifestations to express this anti-rationalism. It is for this reason that Heidegger, not Plato or Kant, is the most appropriate Western reference for discussing Chinese culture and emotions as substance (Li Zehou 2016b, 82).

In this context, he refers to the similarity between some Chan-Buddhist metaphysics and Heidegger’s philosophy.

In the transcendental amalgamation of Buddha and my own self, all these binary pairs (such as presence-absence, occurrence-emptiness, hollowness-fullness, life-death, sadness-joy, love-hate, good-evil, right-wrong, glory-decline, poverty-richness, valuable-unworthy, and so on) are not mutually differentiated. And this is precisely the meaning of Being.

在我即佛佛即我的真正超越裡，這一切 (有無、色空、虛實、生死、憂喜、愛憎、善惡、是非、榮枯、貧富、貴賤 …… 等等) 渾然失去區分，而這也就是那個不可言說的 “存在”.

Li Zehou 2016, 236

He highlights that Heidegger himself has exposed the most important influence of Suzuki’s work upon his thought (ibid.), although he believes this position to be in exaggeration, because the ancient ideational patterns of motionless tranquility implied in the Chan Buddhist thought cannot be compared to the active, modern form of Heidegger’s philosophy (ibid.).

But in this context, Li Zehou also emphasizes that Heidegger’s notions of condition, feeling, and Dasein are still rational, abstract, and universal, whereas his own theory is concrete, particular, and actual. In his view, all such notions are, in fact, a living part of concrete human reality, just as the Being itself:

I think that in this respect, history can be assimilated into metaphysics. Such a metaphysical realm is posited in the physical one, in reality. This is the real question of Being, which primarily belongs to the humankind, and is then further expanded to the entire universe.

我以為用在這裡, 可將歷史引入形而上學. 這形上恰恰就在形下中, 在現實中. 這才是真實的 Being 問題, 這 Being 首先是人類的, 擴而涉及宇宙.

Li Zehou 2016b, 226

After Heidegger’s notion of “being-towards-death” and “angst” people still need to live. It is important to see that human beings live in concrete social relations and circumstances. Hence, for Li, Heidegger’s attempts to strip away this concrete and actual existence in order to pursue an illusory nothingness is somewhat ridiculous, and he compares it to the attempt to catch a fish by climbing a tree (ibid., 86). Besides, the atheism such as Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s has led to nihilism, prevailing in the present societies, although this is also a necessary outcome of the Enlightenment’s exaggerated praise of individualism and rationality.

Although in principle, Li acknowledges the progressive historical role of the theories of social contract, he is still skeptical toward its basic model, which is grounded in a purely formal relation between independent isolated individuals and a mechanistically structured society. For Li, human life is always concrete and it necessarily contains coexistence with others. Accordingly, the context of relations cannot be simply understood as being rooted in a social contract that would presuppose relations as an outcome of will or inclination. In this respect, Li’s theory also differs from most Neo-Marxist, e.g., from Jean-Paul Sartre’s, who proposed that “existence precedes essence,” which means that human beings are highly individualized subjects, external to interpersonal relations. According to Li, such relations essentially represent a “social existence” in the classical Marxist sense and cannot be seen as a result of choice (Banka 2018, 360). He basically also disagrees with the proponents of Western Marxism in several other aspects:

Sartre’s existentialism, the philosophies of the Frankfurt School, and other fashionable currents (like the philosophy of rebellion or the philosophy of emotion), on the other hand, are blindly propagating the individual subjectiveness. They have nothing to do with the practical philosophy of subjectality.

沙特的存在主義, 法蘭克福學派等, 則可說是盲目誇張个體主體性的熱哲學 (造反哲學、情緒哲學), 它們都應為主體性實踐哲學所揚棄掉.

Zehou 1985, 21

But the main common flaw of most “fashionable” contemporary streams of thought emerging in the Euro-American region throughout the twentieth century—apart from their overemphasis on the individually conditioned type of subjectivity—is also their negation of humanness as a comprehensive entity including not only reason, but also emotions:

Analytical philosophy, structuralism, and many other streams of the contemporary capitalist world (for instance, philosophical methodology or epistemology) are cold philosophies, which overlook the substance of subjectality.

目前資本主義世界中的分析哲學結構主義等等, 可說是無視主體性本體的冷哲學 (方法哲學、知性哲學).

ibid.

A common aspect of Li’s ethical thought and numerous proponents of the Critical theory could be found in the fact that they all equally aimed to reformulate Kant’s ethics—although each of them in their distinctive way. As we have already mentioned in previous chapters,³⁸ Habermas tried to upgrade Kant’s moral philosophy by integrating moral norms in what he called “discourse ethics,” a dynamic framework of intersubjective communication (Habermas 1989, 38). Li harshly criticized this notion. First of all, he exposed that it was grounded in an unclear and not well-founded differentiation between ethics and morality, which differed completely from the one pursued by himself.³⁹ Second, he reproached Habermas with an exaggerated emphasis on individual biographical contexts, which has—in Li’s view—led the contemporary theoretician to neglect the importance of material practice on the one hand, and of the universal factors of ethics and morality on the other. In other words, Li thinks that Habermas overlooked the significance of the fact that social existence endows interpersonal communications with a sturdy material basis, which decidedly influences the ethical conditions in all human societies.

Nevertheless, we might add in this respect that Habermas’s concept of ethical discourses is still built upon the notion of historicity implied in the Hegelian and Marxist traditions. Namely, for Habermas, this historicity functions upon two levels: on the first, the discourse ethics came into life as a part of complex real-world processes, involving changes in interpersonal relations, social institutions, and material conditions. Only the second developmental level is linked to the individual “life history,” i.e., into individual biographical contexts (Anderson 2014, 95). Although Li has criticized the entire discourse of the Critical theory (including Habermas who belongs to the second generation of the Frankfurt School) for their overstress on individuality, this might not entirely apply to Habermas, for he views all individual processes as deeply dependent on supportive social conditions (ibid.). Hence, Li’s reproach that Habermas only talks about negotiations and rational discussions without considering the influence of the material basis (Li Zehou and Tong Shijun 2012: 169) might be a bit exaggerated. Habermas has repeatedly criticized the proponents of the first generation of the Frankfurt school, notably Horkheimer and Adorno, for their transformation of original Marxist, historical-materialist assumptions into “pseudonormative propositions concerning an objective teleology in history” (Habermas 1985, 382).

Among contemporary liberal theoreticians, Li endorses John Rawls, who offered an alternative to utilitarianism with his systematic theory of what one ought to do. Rawls’s approach has led to conclusions about justice that were very different from those of the utilitarians. In Li’s view, Rawls’s “difference principle,” which belongs to the crucial ideas of his famous book A Theory of Justice, has unwittingly been implemented in China during the last decades. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of economic liberalization was namely grounded on the idea to allow some parts of the population to get rich first with the purpose that, after a certain time, even those in the remote and backward rural areas could also benefit.

If we say that free trade and fair exchange throughout society under a market economy of large industrial production can be seen as the first principle from A Theory of Justice as well as the basis of liberalism in general, then China’s Reform and Opening can be seen as an actual example of the difference principle of Rawls’s second principle. This more or less resolves theoretical issues of general benefit despite a lack of economic equality.

Li, Zehou 2016, 1092

He emphasizes, however, that the application of such principles is only the first step in establishing a society of fairer and more sensible distributive justice and shared prosperity. In his view, the next step requires a new theory, which could be created by placing Rawls upon a Marxist foundation. Such an approach could open new possibilities and is also completely realistic, for Rawls’s theory is already grounded on the conditions of modern economic life. In this context, Li regrets the fact that “there have been thousands of essays on Rawls, but almost no one has emphasized this point” (ibid.). The establishment of just, equal, and free political structures, based upon a Marxist understanding of Rawls’s principles, would require a broad and extraordinarily complex theoretical debate.

Li also endorses Rawls’s notion of “overlapping consensus,” which refers to how supporters of various ample normative guidelines—that include seemingly incompatible ideas of justice—can come to an agreement on certain concrete principles of justice that warrant a stable political foundation of social institutions in different societies. He sees it as an important concept that allows a separation of individual rights from the austere fights over different understandings of “good.” In the course of global economic integration, public reason, individual autonomy and equal human rights will carry on to spread, and to pursue “overlapping consensus” as a standard of modern political life that can be accepted and implemented by adherents of various traditions, cultures and religions. However, Li highlights that Rawls does not explain how “overlapping consensus” is possible in concrete societies. In Li’s own view, it is possible because in every society, human beings share a common, material ontological foundation, or in Li’s own words, “because people have in common that they live within the modern economic order” (Li, Zehou 2016, 1133). In contrast to Rawls’s “overlapping consensus,” Li’s historical ontology takes modern market economy and today’s globalized “unified” markets as the actual basis.

On the other hand, Li agrees with Rawls in his presumption that rights have to be separated from axiological notions of good and evil, because in his own ethics, Li also lays stress on the priority of right over good and on a strict separation of religious from social moralities in order to avoid the clash of tradition and modernization.

Li is also interested in Rawls’s “sense of justice,” especially since it has often been compared to seemingly related concepts in Confucian thought.⁴⁰ In his view, however, there are major differences between the two discourses. Rawls’s notion of the sense of justice is rooted in the original position of free and equal citizens in a well-ordered society who may well be morally motivated by their sense of justice to do what is right and just for its own sake. In Li’s view, such a sense of social justice is too vague and abstract, since it is established on purely rational foundations. Rawls’s conception of emotion, which is a necessary part of his sense of justice, is also too indistinct. In contrast, Chinese or Confucian traditions are rooted in different, highly socialized, and cultivated human emotions that continuously appear within various particular social relationships. Such relationships are based upon structural inequality, but simultaneously on a ratio-emotional ethical order defined by mutual responsibilities, which can warrant social harmony without relying on overall conceptions of independent, free and equal individuals. This differs profoundly from the ancient Greek conceptualization of virtue ethics that is grounded in the idea of an autonomous, equal, and even homogeneous individuals; correspondingly, it cannot be compared to Rawls’s concept of the sense of justice. Because of similar reasons, Li also criticizes Rawls’s notion of the “veil of ignorance,” because in the real world, there is no such thing as an entirely independent, pure self, stripped of all objectives and relationships (Li, Zehou 2016, 1117). He concludes that because the veil of ignorance theory overlooks actual particulars and emotional responses, Rawls fails to consider the entirety of the concrete situations. Therefore, this concept cannot be used exclusively, but only as a regulatory guideline (D’Ambrosio 2016, 726).

But overall, certain aspects of contemporary liberalism such as those of Rawls’s ideas of “the difference principle,” “overlapping consensus,” and “the priority of the right over the good” are precisely what China needs today:

Western societies have differentiated between politics and religion for a long time. To do so [in China, where] religion, politics, and ethics are intermingled, is not only necessary, but also quite difficult. Here I very much like to use John Rawls’s notion of “overlapping consensus” that can be found in his book, Political Liberalism, as a support to explain the distinctions between right and wrong, good and evil, and between political philosophy and ethical theories.

西方政教分離且歷史悠久, 使今天區分 “宗教, 政治, 倫理三合一” 不僅必要, 而且很難. 這裡, 我非常喜歡引用 J. Rawls 的 “政治自由主義” 一書中的 “重疊共識” (overlapping consensus) 理論作為支撐, 將 “對錯” 與 “善惡”, 將政治哲學與倫理學分別開來.

Li Zehou 2016b, 47–48

In this context, however, Li Zehou also warns of exaggeratedly rational economic and political mechanisms contained in these theories. In his view, China should apply the emotion-based substance and relationalism (guanxizhuyi) of its own tradition and apply it as the “regulative and properly constitutive” principle to overcome the mechanistic nature of these immensely rational discourses.

Li sees Rawls as posited in the leftist tradition of liberalism. For him, the main representative of the rightist liberal theoreticians is Friedrich Hayek, even though this famous social theorist and political philosopher does not regard himself to be a libertarian. Hayek, who has been very influential in modern China, advocates spontaneous ordering of societies and free competition instead of rational constructs such as policies of state welfare. However, while Rawls certainly elaborates on some important elements of Kant’s tradition (e.g., on Kant’s principle of helping others), Li is skeptical of whether Hayek could also fit into this tradition, even though he could be seen as upgrading Kant’s principle of developing oneself. Besides, Li does not agree with Hayek’s presumption that individual freedom is not something humans have created, but rather a part of the evolution of tradition, in which it has been gradually formed. In contrast to such a view, Li’s ethics is founded upon the notion of active human subjectality. Furthermore, Hayek’s empiricism does not explain clearly that the tradition he talks about is actually a modern one—one that was developed in the last couple hundred years. Hence, such a concept of freedom cannot be generalized as something that human societies have always possessed. Before capitalist societies, there was no such thing as a tradition of individual freedom. So Li views Hayek’s “universality” of freedom as an abstract notion that relies on a purely theoretical and ahistorical hypothesis (Li Zehou 2016b, 43).

As we have seen, Li also elaborated on the numerous communitarian critiques of liberalism. However, the present section does not include his views on the issue because they have already been exhaustively discussed in the section that deals with Li’s interpretation of Sandel’s communitarian ethics.⁴¹

Li commented on many other tendencies in contemporary world ethics, especially on those that have often been compared with the Chinese tradition. Such an ethical discourse, for instance, is the feminist care ethics. In some aspects, Li’s view on the idea of the social contract is similar to the contemporary feminist critique, which argues that understanding interpersonal relations solely in terms of contracts pertains only to a narrow scope of human ends (e.g., Held 2006, 81). The main mistake of such ideas is that they are unable to reflect upon or to represent the multifariousness and richness of human psychology. In this light, the feminist care ethics proposes alternative models of interpersonal relationships while simultaneously searching for new insights into the very nature of morality. The search for such new ethical systems that concentrated on gender equality in moral development began with Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (1982), which was often described as a starter of a (gender) revolution. Many proponents of the feminist care ethics, e.g., Sara Ruddick and Virginia Held, suggest the model of the mother-child relationship as a substitute for the liberal paradigm, which is characterized by individual agents guided by self-interest negotiating with each other through normative contracts. In their view, the mother and child model is more realistic and suitable, because it allows people—and particularly women—to live their relationships in a more authentic way, namely, in and through genuine moral experiences (Rošker 2019, 241–242). Similar to numerous feminist critics, Li does not entirely support this approach, for in a certain sense, it propagates the values of premodern times. Hence, it can lead to a reoccurrence of such values and is therefore, in essence, conservative. In his view, this line of present-day feminist theory belongs to postmodern discourses, which are essentially anti-rationalist and question the important, arduously achieved Enlightenment ideals.⁴² He highlights that he is definitely against any kind of retro-sentimental ethics, which relies on sympathy or empathy (Li Zehou 2016b, 173). In this regard, feminist care theories cannot be compared to Confucian ethics.

According to Li, numerous flaws that can be found in the works of modern moral and ethical philosophers, including the works of Mill, Kant, Rawls, and Sandel, are due to a failure to recognize the distinction between the two categories of moralities that he established in his own theory. As we have already seen, Li believes that the theory of the two kinds of morality (liang de lun) belongs to his most important contributions to contemporary ethics (D’Ambrosio 2016, 723–724). Besides, he thinks that his concepts of modern social morality and of the priority of the right over the good are not directly established on Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls’s theories of the atomic individual, social contracts, the veil of ignorance, and other liberal hypotheses, but rather on the basis of actual circumstances determining modern capitalist societies and economies. But even though these theoreticians of modern ethics did not establish an explicit concept comparable to his own distinction between the two kinds of moralities, many aspects of their theories⁴³ can still be explained through the lens of such a differentiation.