Li Zehou’s ethics cannot be understood without considering his basic distinction between ethics and morality. Even though in Chinese and Western theory, the demarcation line between the two notions is often blurred, and although they are being defined in many different ways, Li’s differentiation must necessarily be taken into account if we want to grasp the entire meaning and the inherent coherence of his ethical thought, which forms a coherent and intelligible theoretical system. Similar to the traditional connotations implied in the Chinese notions (lunli 倫理 and daode 道德, respectively), ethics refers here to the external social norms or standards, which includes customs, rules, and legal regulations, whereas morality denotes internal psychological formations. While the former is mainly a subject of political philosophy, the latter leads to moral psychology.

Li’s understanding of morality as an internal formation determining human beings differs profoundly from the notion assumed by most Western moral philosophies standing in the Kantian tradition. In Li’s view, this formation is embedded into a dynamic emotio-rational structure (qingli jiegou 情理結構), in which reason and emotions do not exclude each other but are intertwined. Hence, they both influence moral decisions. In this sense, Li’s philosophy differs radically from most of the systems that have prevailed in the history of Western thought and mostly strictly separates the empirical sphere from the rational one. In this context, he highlights that even though certain combinations of reason and emotions are also treated in various Western discourses, such views are by far not as influential in the Western culture as they are in the Chinese.

Certainly, various Western discourses have also elaborated on feelings and on the relation between reason and emotions with respect to life, system, and theory. The only thing I want to expose is the following: in regard to the focus of attention, theoretical concern and philosophical construction, their role was not as explicit and important as it is in China.

當然, 西方在生活, 制度, 理論上也講情感和情理關係, 這裡只是說, 從意識重點, 理論關切, 哲學構造看, 不像中國這麼突出和重視.

Li Zehou 2017, 25

On the other hand, it is important to note that in this structure, human will as a form, belonging to reason, is the primary and decisive power, whereas emotions play a secondary and an auxiliary role. In this rough sense, we could say that Li Zehou differs from both Kant and Hume (or rationalism and empiricism or sensualism, respectively). However, due to the important role of human will, freedom, and the categorical imperative in Li’s system, he often emphasizes that he is more of a Kantian than a Humenian philosopher.

Li’s meta-ethical position regarding moral values is semi-relativist in the sense that their contents (ideas, beliefs, and moral emotions) are changeable, although they are simultaneously always defined by the ultimate criterion and the categorical foundation of human ethics, namely, the sustainable existence and reproduction of humankind. Therefore, he strongly opposes relativist ethics. He regards postmodern discourses as problematic or even dangerous, particularly with respect to societies that find themselves on the difficult edge between tradition and modernity. The firm grounds of human reason must not be questioned again, and humankind should not slip back into the irrational mysteries that determined the world before the Enlightenment. Although this might change somewhere in the distant future, for now we need to respect, maintain, and defend the values of freedom, autonomy, and individual human rights—and to combine them with other values that can be just as important for our globalized world. Precisely because of its inherent humanism, but also due to its interpersonal and intersubjective nature, Li often highlights the contemporary value implied in the traditional Chinese virtue of humaneness (ren).

In Li’s view, the laws determining the coherent development of humankind as a whole influence and indirectly control the basic, general guidelines of human moral conduct. This view also plays an important role in his emphasis on the unity of facts and values. As we have seen, Li exposes that values are not transcendent but a basic precondition of human existence. In his schema, the core value of goodness is not defined by its opposition to the concept of evil but is rather seen as the ultimate standard conditioning and determining the ontology of humanness (ren xing). This ultimate criterion is linked to the aforementioned sustainable preservation and development of the humankind through its continuous vital practices. In this schema, the possibility of an amalgamation of facts and values arises from the conditions determining the concrete human world. Even though the “is” is primary, human beings would not be able to survive in the factual world without incorporating the “ought”; in other words, human beings as such can only exist by living and acting in accordance with values. Analogously, it is human beings, who—due to their existential needs and to their ability of surpassing the mechanistic laws of history—necessarily endows the emotionless nature of the universe with feelings and meaning.

The “absence of emotion” is the original stance of the universe, but the only actual reality of human life lies in its “emotionality.”

“無情” 是宇宙的本相, 但 “有情” 才是真實的, 現實的人生.

Li Zehou 2016b, 224

Li’s linkage between facts and values is not implemented into a formally logical model of causal inference. In this schema, one still cannot simply infer from facts to values. Facts necessarily precede values, just as the emotionless universe precedes human emotional responsiveness. But on the other hand, facts and values also form a binary correlative formation of mutual interaction. Even though in a strictly theoretical sense, facts can be distinguished from values and even precondition them, values are a vital and essential part of human existence. They are not only one-dimensionally influenced by facts but also have a retroactive effect upon them. This is the reason why values, as we all know, endow facts with meaning and purpose. In Li’s view, both are embedded into a dynamic continuous interaction of human being and becoming. Their reciprocal relation is one between unity and particularity, for while the variety of different beings belongs to the realm of particular facts, their unity is rooted in the one (and only) world that includes both values and facts.

There are some apparent similarities between Li’s view on the relation between the universe and human values on the one side, and the prevailing modern Chinese metaphysical theories on the other. However, there is still an important split between the two. While in the Modern New Confucian understanding, for instance, values are still positioned into the transcendent metaphysical realm, Li views them as a historical necessity through which history is entering the metaphysics (ibid., 226). According to him, such metaphysics is positioned in the physical sphere of concrete reality. Li’s view on the relation between “emotionless” facts and “emotionally permeated” values also differs from most other contemporary Chinese theoretical approaches to this problem, particularly, as we have seen, from Chen Lai’s notion of the ontology of humaneness (ren), for Li’s emotion-based substance has wider and more fundamental implications than Chen’s notion of humaneness as the substantial root of the universe.

It is demanding (and probably redundant) to try to squeeze Li’s ethics into one of the clearly determinable types that were shaped in the history of Western ethics. The overall approach which defines his system can—at least at first glimpse—be seen as belonging to the theories of evolutionary ethics, since for him, the “sustainable preservation of the existence of humankind as a whole” (renlei zongtide shengcun yanxu 人類總體的生存延續) is the basic origin and the chief imperative criterion of human morality. The evolutionary foundations of his ethical thought are visible in his central approach to morality, which is rooted in his emphasis on the important role of human material development (i.e., a development based on the manufacturing and using of tools) in the forming of human psychology. Yet, in spite of his persistence on such strictly materialist dialectical development of human evolution, he simultaneously upholds and highlights the idea of the significant roles played by human subjectality, and the coincidental factors of history in this process.

Therefore, Li never explicitly endorses classical Darwinian evolutionary presumptions such as natural selection or the survival of the fittest. He criticizes Darwin’s mechanistic view of history and reproaches it for its neglect of the important role of the human subject and subjectality in historical processes. Li also questions his explanation of the origin of human morality, by which Darwin aimed to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals. Hence, Li does not agree with his presumption that an advanced moral sense could have evolved through a natural evolutionary process guided by social instincts (Darwin 2018, 98) that were allegedly grounded in our nature as “social animals” (ibid., 44).

Darwin did not take into account that human beings are more than just animals evolved by natural evolution. He overlooked the fact that at the same time, they are also producing and using tools, which allowed for the creation of reason and of social animals. Because of this reason, many of his hypotheses … are falsified by history, which evolved over several millions of years. If we only take a look at some of his crucial notions such as “intelligence” or “good development,” we can see that they are blur and ambiguous. Besides, the natural evolution of numerous primates have already lasted several millions of years, and yet, none of them has invented airplanes or mobile phones. They have neither developed ethical relations, freedom or equality, individual human rights, and so on.¹

達爾文沒有註意或重視人類不只是自然進化的動物，而同時更是製造、使用工具，從而產生理性和社會的動物。因之，達爾文的許多論斷 … 數百萬年的歷史證明並非如此，僅所謂 “智力” “良好的發展” 等詞語，非常含混模糊，而且許多靈長類動物自然進化也已數百萬年，但至今不能造出飛機和手機，也沒有什麼父慈子孝、兄友弟恭，自由平等、個體人權，等等.

Li Zehou 2016c, 7

We could at the most suggest that Li’s system is close to—but not completely congruent with—the ones belonging to the classical theories of evolutionary ethics, although the very process of human evolution plays a crucial role in his entire philosophical system.

In our attempt to classify Li’s thought in accordance with the main categories of Western theories of ethics or moral philosophy, we will always end up with identifying certain similarities with particular disciplines included in the globally prevailing ethics. But at the same time, we will necessarily detect a basic incongruence between Li’s thought and any of these systems. On the one hand, this incongruence is (at least partly) a result of differences in referential frameworks, for Li’s ethics is based upon a dynamic processual methodology of the holistic one-world view, while most of the foundational approaches applied by prevailing (i.e., “Western”) ethical theories are grounded on static suppositions and dualistic approaches. On the other hand, Li’s theory considers many elements derived from essentially different systems of thought, namely the ones developed in the Chinese, especially Confucian tradition.

However, as already mentioned, Li’s ethics cannot be seen as a mere combination of these diverse approaches. It is innovative and unique because it surpasses the conventional disciplinary and methodological boundaries, aiming to shape a new view on human morality, and to create possibilities of a new, global ethics that could guarantee the further development of humanness in our common world.

His theory certainly does not belong in the category of virtue ethics, even though he recommends certain elements of approaches that can be found in the Chinese ideational tradition. On the other hand, nor can it be denoted as a consequentialist system, although Li also strongly supports certain elements of utilitarianism.

At a first glance, Li’s ethics seems to roughly follow the lines of deontological schemes. His deontological views manifest themselves, for instance, in his emphasis on the urgent necessity to become aware of our basic human mission. As human beings, we are necessarily a part of the natural and—even more importantly—social environment, which allows for, enables, and creates our very existence. Hence, we all are inevitably obliged to the society in which we live, and we have to fulfill our duties toward the social network of which we are a part without further ado.

As soon as an individual is born, they received the following “obligation”: without being able to choose, you were born into a long river of human history (into a situation and an environment, which provides you with all basic necessities for your life). The civilization and the culture that are legacies of this “entirety of humankind” will nurture you and raise you, and therefore you are indebted to them. At all times you have to be completely committed to them, even to sacrifice yourself, if necessary. There are no other special reasons for this: one must absolutely follow and obey this “categorical imperative” and this “practical reason.”

個體一出生, 即有此道德「義務」: 你出生在一個沒法選擇的人類總體的歷史長河 (衣食住行的既定狀況和環境) 之中, 是這個「人類總體」所遺留下來的文明, 文化將你撫養成人, 從而你就欠債, 就得準備隨時獻身為它, 包括犧牲自己。這就是沒有什麼道理可說, 只有絕對服從堅決執行的「絕對律令」和「實踐理性」的來由.

Li Zehou 2016, 315

This shows that in Li’s system, the categorical imperative is—similar to Kant’s—a kind of universal necessity.² In contrast to Kant, however, he offers an explanation of the basic origin, in which this imperative is rooted. In Li’s view, it arises from the elementary requirements for a sustainable existence and continuous reproduction of the humankind. In this light, he also sees the genuine significance of Kant’s maxim “duty of assisting others.” On this ground, Li explains the difference between liberal attitudes to the fundamental driving force of ethical behavior and his own.

“To assist other people” is different from the right-wing liberalist philanthropy or charity. From the viewpoint of anthropology, it is a duty, arising from our life in community. This can involve deep emotions, which can be helpful for achieving social harmony.

“幫助他人” 不像右派自由主義所說的是慈善事業，是施捨。從人類學角度看，它是生活在共同體中的義務。其中可滲入深厚情感，有助社會和諧.

Li Zehou 2013, 7

In a similar manner, he also criticized the concept of equality, which lies in the center of liberal ethics. In this context, he also questions the concepts of (moral) duty underlying such approaches. In his view, the liberal concept of duty is—similar to the notion of equality—simply too abstract, and therefore unrealistic.

Such problems cannot be solved by some kind of abstract ideas of justice or moral duty. Our great world was always a unity of manifold differences and inequalities.

不能用某種抽象的正義觀念、道德義務來對待這些問題，大千世界本就是一個千差萬別而並不平等的多樣性的組合體.

Li Zehou 2013, 5

Despite some superficial similarities, Li’s “deontology” is profoundly different from the liberalist one. He criticizes the liberal approaches for their exaggerated emphasis on the individual and because they overlook the importance of social and communal concerns that are rooted in the collective nature of humanness.³ But while he thoroughly negates the mechanistic approaches that were grounded upon the liberalist idea of (formally) equal individuals, Li still endorses Kant’s idea of the universally valid categorical imperative, albeit he places it into a dynamic and changeable context of continuous human practice.

As we have seen above, Li’s notion of duty is hence not a purely rational or static concept. It is more than a pure form, for it comprises concrete contents of will and emotions, even though in the process of moral decisions, the latter is merely viewed as an auxiliary force. However, in certain phases of human social development, duty necessarily achieves a normative character. In modern societies, duties must be universalized in the form of legal regulations, which have to be constituted in the framework of modern social morality.

Yet, in Li’s system, this universality is not one of a rigid or absolute nature. Legal regulations are always necessarily subjected to complex and dynamic contexts of the multifarious situations brought about by the concrete life of individuals who live in certain social reality. Hence, the implementation of such regulations needs to be continuously supported and reinforced by criteria, rooted in and influenced by the particular conditions of the concrete life. In other words, legal norms as an important and predominant part of modern social morality have to be supported by values, beliefs, emotions, and ideas belonging to the traditional religious morality, albeit the latter must remain limited to the offering of “regulative and properly constitutive” principles or standards. In such a view, the concepts of general necessity and particular circumstances are being placed into a model of mutual interactivity, defined by the social, and supplemented by the religious morality.

Li admits that it is not always easy to find a proper way of interaction and mutual influence of these two kinds of morality. The concrete answers to the question of how, when, and to what degree the values belonging to a certain kind of religious morality can influence the prevailing social morality and thereby define the specific implementation of policies and regulations requires a wise politics. This would operate in accordance with du, the dynamic “proper measure” that can guarantee the most balanced (and hence most just and most effective) execution of concrete legal decisions.

Besides, Li’s theory of the two kinds of morality can also be seen as an innovative model of maintaining the paradigm of the priority of right over good, which is again a typical presumption of most contemporary deontological ethics (Hübner 2018, 205). This presumption, which is also repeatedly assumed and emphasized by Li, can be interpreted in many different ways. However, according to Dietmar Hübner (ibid.), it can always serve as a milestone that separates the advocates of deontology from those theoreticians who follow the suppositions of virtue and teleological ethics respectively.

Irrespective of these difficulties arising from our (hitherto fruitless) attempts to place Li’s ethical system into the frameworks of the prevailing discourses, we can try to take a peek into the methodological bases of his ethical philosophy. Proceeding from this elementary angle, we might become able to identify some exiting and attention-grabbing elements of his thought.

The main features of Li’s methodology can—inter alia—be found in his Overview Scheme of Ethics (see appendix). As we have seen, it is based upon a development that is outlined by four arrows, leading from collective human condition or shared emotionality through (à) rituality (àß) and reason to (à) individual emotions. These arrows not only define a simple causal or chronological development of the four segments, but also point to their relations, which are by no means one-dimensional. To a certain extent, they can also mutually influence one another. This mutuality is clearly visible in the relation between the segments of rituality and reason. Similar to the fact that the situationally determined collective human circumstance and people’s collective emotionality precondition the constitution of rituality, reason determines the forming and functioning of individual emotions, which represent the final segment of the basic scheme. At first glance, the first and the fourth arrow are (in contrast to the second and the third one, which present reciprocity) one-dimensional, but their basic qualities are still different. While the first arrow is guided by the laws of historical development, the fourth one is based upon a mutually interactive relation between reason and emotion, in which the former controls and guides the latter.

But in addition to its inseparability from emotion, Li’s notion of reason differs in many further aspects from the ones defined by the Euro-American philosophical traditions. His “pragmatic reason” is more than just a practical version of the pure, i.e., strictly formal reason. In Li’s system, reason consists of elements that are relatively static (the form of human will) and the dynamically changing (the contents of ideas, concepts and believes). Together with emotions, these two elements imply the basic foundations of human inward morality, while the external level of morality, i.e., the morality of human interactions in the public agendas, is outlined through the important aforementioned distinction between the modern social and the traditional religious morality.

A basic feature that defines Li Zehou’s notion of “pragmatic reason” is a rational spirit or attitude, such as the one which prevailed in the Chinese tradition. In Li’s view, such an attitude is essentially oriented toward the fulfillment of the requirements of the material grounds of human existence. Such reason cannot be purely transcendental, for it never departs from human history and experiences. However, in spite (or precisely because) of its being rooted in the material practice, it also determines our modes of perception and shapes particular thought patterns and laws of reasoning. It has ethical and epistemological proportions. Since it is rooted in material practice, which is the basic and defining element of human existence, it also possesses an ontological dimension of physicality, although, as implied by Li’s notion of emotion-based substance, the ultimate substantial root of human existence is based upon emotionality and situational responsiveness. Hence, in Li’s system, reason does not occupy the sole and highest position in determining moral decisions and conducts. Its dynamic (albeit authoritative) interrelation with situationally defined emotional (or sensitive) responsiveness allows it to not only preserve, but also develop humanness, for it still belongs to the deepest and most foundational features of that which makes us human. Precisely due to such flexible and dynamic nature, the form of pragmatic reason offers people the possibility to adapt to the development of history and to regulate their conduct in accordance with specific conditions of their respective natural and social environments and, simultaneously, to remain open for changes and for the learning from new situations. Such a notion of reason can doubtless be considered as a unique contribution to the establishment of modern Chinese, and possibly also to the shaping of a modern global ethics. In this context, Li also believes that his theory of emotio-rational formation, in which the pragmatic reason is firmly embedded, could serve as a possible inspiration for the construction of new moralities.

With his emphasis and his elaboration on the notion of emotion-based substance, which presents a basic characteristic of the Chinese tradition, Li highlights his presumption that emotions are essential elements of human consciousness; therefore, they belong to the elementary features defining the actual human existence. Since all human experience is based on sensual perception, ethical norms evolve not only in accord with rational presumptions, but also in concurrence with emotion-based factors. Even though Li shaped his notion of the emotion-based substance on the grounds of the Chinese philosophical tradition, he believes that it can be important for all contemporary societies: it can help us surpass the limits of instrumental rationality without relying on mystification or exaggerated relativization of reality. Emotions are also instrumental in our views on and attitudes in interpersonal and communal relationships; in Li’s view these are by no means limited to rational practices or normative orders of social systems.

In Li’s model of social ethics, the individual does not occupy a central position. It is not a basic concept defining the structure of society. On the other hand, Li’s schema of social order is not a construction of mechanistic collectivism. The basic design of the relation between the individual and the social groups, on which Li’s ethical system is grounded, is based on a structural network of relationalism (guanxizhuyi 關係主義), which can be found in traditional Chinese models of social life. In this framework, people are constituted by the social relations that they live because they cannot be abstracted from their vital connections to other fellow humans. In reference to Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames (see Rosemont 1991; 2015; Ames 2011, Rosemont and Ames 2016) I denote these relations as “social roles,” even though Li himself denies the necessity of replacing the term “virtue ethics” with the neologism “role ethics” in, the Chinese tradition.

Role ethics is just a virtue ethics, it is all about relations! Relations are always pertaining to a virtue ethics. But this kind of virtue ethics differs from the Aristotelian one. However, as soon as they think about virtue ethics, they always automatically presuppose the Aristotelian version; China, however, can also possess its own virtue ethics!

角色倫理也是美德倫理，就是關係嘛！關係當然也就是美德倫理。但它與亞里士多德的美德倫理不一樣，他們想起美德倫理就是亞里士多德那個，中國也可以有它的美德嘛.

Li Zehou and Liu Yuedi 2014b, 21

This basic observation, which is certainly well grounded, does not directly pertain to the term roles as a suitable definition of the main guidelines determining ethical interaction. The specifically Chinese, or Confucian version of virtue ethics is doubtless determined by its strong focus upon the quality of each relation, which manifest themselves in particular codes of conduct. Hence, the term “roles” is certainly applicable in this regard.

These roles are not based upon a concept of equality, and for the most part, they are hierarchically structured. Nevertheless, the hierarchy by which this model is defined is rooted in mutual care and responsibility. In its philosophical grounds, it is not based upon formal authority but rather upon the power of experiences. In Li’s view, such a model could serve as an alternative to the absolute rule of normative and fixed laws, abstract and therefore empty principles of equal rights, or of a mechanistically constructed concept of justice (Rošker 2019, 154).

Similar to all other binary relations that form parts of his ethical system (as for instance the relation between reason and emotion, between facts and values, between social and religious morality and so on), the relation between individual and society is also based upon a model of dynamic reciprocity, which is interactive and comprises mutual influences, albeit it is not a relation of two equally dependent or equally dominant oppositions. In this relation, society is primary and more essential than the individual. The same holds true for other similarly structured binary oppositions: reason guides and orders emotion, facts precede values, and the social morality is the ultimate decisive factor in its interaction with the religious one. These models differ from dualistic designs, which are constituted by two mutually exclusive notions forming an opposition that is simultaneously a contradiction. Even though in theory, one of the oppositional notions always precludes and overrules the other, they are always interdependent in practical reality. In such a design, oppositional notions are continuously interacting with one another, thereby creating a reciprocal tension that is necessary for a dynamic development of the entire model. This tension can be balanced out by the harmonious functioning of du as a central criterion of all decisions regarding the concrete valuation of a discrete human condition. It can delineate shares and positions of any concept within any binary oppositional notions appearing in particular situations that are always embedded in a concrete time and space, and characterized by particular forms of emotional responsiveness and rational concerns.

Such a model reminds us of certain approaches followed by Western structuralism⁴ in which one of two opposites typically assumes a role of dominance over the other. In Li’s system, there is nevertheless always a simultaneous, constant emphasis upon the importance of their continuous mutual influence and interdependence. This complex, hierarchically structured inter-relativity is also one of the main reasons for the unceasing necessity of “grasping the du” and choosing the natural order of balance, which always tends toward universality. This tendency belongs to the essential features of du, and the balanced order toward which it is directed, is precisely the basic network from which this measure continuously originates and which it simultaneously creates.

Through the lens of du, we can also better understand many significant facets of human subjectality in Li’s system. As we have seen, subjectality is a characteristic feature of both, humankind as an entirety, and the individual selves. It is an inherent element of each particular human being, but also an internal design of social groups, collectivities, communities, nations and states. It is an integral factor that constitutes humanness, or, in other words, it belongs to the crucial features of that which makes us human. Although it functions in accordance with the dynamically structured division between the subject and the object of cognition, it is not only an epistemological notion, but even more an ontological one, for it determines the basic mode of our human existence. Subjectality is that which enables us to actively create, maintain, reproduce, and develop the means and conditions of our very existence. Western theory still lacks a specific term for defining this notion, for it denotes both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the human subject with the same expression “subjectivity.” Li Zehou’s “subjectality,” on the other hand, is rooted in a modern Chinese neologism (zhutixing 主體性), which came into existence as a result of the Chinese adoption of all connotations implied in the Western notion of the human subject.⁵ Hence, it can be viewed as a concept that unites the Enlightenment ideas of human autonomy with the pragmatic, traditional Chinese (and original Marxist) understanding of human embeddedness into the dynamically evolving material conditions of life. In this sense, it also represents a major factor that influences human relationships and ethics. As such, subjectality is strongly connected to both human material practice and morality. It co-creates and changes the world, but it also adapts to it. All these measures are connected to the individual and the collective, conscious and unconscious decisions that can be made in a most positive and effective way precisely by grasping the dynamic proper measure of du.

Similar to all other elements that constitute humaneness, subjectality is continuously being shaped, accumulated, preserved and developed through the dynamic and long-lasting process of sedimentation, which is in Li’s view an instrumental condition of human evolution. Through sedimentation, experiences are being transformed into transcendental forms that are more or less moldable and never truly depart from the concrete life. These forms are not static, neither are they “pure” in the sense of a complete detachment from the contents. In Li’s system, the immensely important form of reason, for instance, is stable and unchangeable in its basic quality of representing a formation. And yet, it is inherently connected to particular contents of will and ideas, which are dynamic and changeable. Hence, in real life, there can be no reason without reference to these alterable, continuously changing contents, which also includes emotionality.

As we have noted before, Kant looked down on any theoretical attempts to unify or fuse the realms of experience and the a priori (Kant 2001, 23–24), and branded them as being un-philosophical (ibid., 6). But to Li Zehou at the other end, any abstract morality based upon a rigid division of empirical and transcendental has nothing to do with a real-life morality that forms the very root of human existence. Such schema of morality (and ethics) arises directly from the typically Chinese “one-world view,” which not only unites facts and values but also the spheres of universality and particularity, placing all these concepts into an inter-relational network of mutual reciprocity and influence.

Such a uniquely dynamic agenda underlies all segments of Li’s ethics. In his moral philosophy, it refers to the vibrant amalgamation of is and ought. In his social ethics, it manifests itself in the reciprocal relation between the individual and the community or social group to which s/he belongs. In his anthropo-historical treaties, it can be found in the emphasis on the multifarious interaction between social material practice on the one side, and human cognition and emotional responsiveness on the other.

Not all elements constituting Li’s ethical system are theoretically accomplished down to the last detail. He points out, for example, that further research could improve and identify additional arguments supporting his theory of the unity of facts and values, especially regarding the actual mode of such a unification (Li Zehou 2016b, 225). Yet, in its basic lines, the system is not only innovative and thus interesting, but also coherent, albeit it is somewhat difficult to understand when being approached from the perspective of the Western “two-worlds view” and the underlying paradigmatic images of static, unchangeable entities constructing and determining reality.