1.1 Taha Abderrahmane

As an ethicist philosopher, Abderrahmane calls for a moral and spiritual renewal in the Arab-Islamic world. This renewal should consequently be expanded to the globalized world (Hashas 2015, 72). He is convinced of the worldwide need for more solidarity between religions, peoples, philosophies and cultures. In order to realize his vision to formulate an ethical project of thinking, he has been working on the elaboration of a theory he calls iʾtimāniyya (trusteeship paradigm), or al-naqd al-iʾtimānī (trusteeship critique), since 2000. Central points in his thinking are his critique of Western secular modernity, the spirit of religion, and its practice (Hashas 2015, 73).

For an adequate understanding of the iʾtimāniyya-theory, a particular fact seems central: Abderrahmane’s affiliation with the Morrocan Sufi-order of the Boutchichiya. This affiliation might be the reason for certain Sufi motives in his personal convictions and writings, such as the motive of the heart, purification, sincerity of intention, and a binary division of existence into the world of the seen and the unseen (Ben Driss 2002, 203). To express his conviction of the latter Abderrahmane speaks of al-ʿālam al-marʾī (the world of the seen) und al-ʿālam al-ghaybī (the world of the unseen). Also the purification of the soul and the character is a recurring motive in his thought, which he seems to regard as a prerequisite for any fundamental and positive change. For instance, when he speaks of the heart he says that there are things in the universe that can only be conceived with the baṣīra (spiritual farsightedness) and not with the baṣar (eyesight). In order to train the baṣīra, human beings need spiritual training and education (Ben Driss 2002, 47). This Sufi element is also found in Abderrahmane’s writings, as when he speaks about an educator (murabbī) who should accompany people in their spiritual and personal development.

1.2 Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī

The Mālikī scholar Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī al-Shāṭibī al-Gharnāṭī was born in Granada, the capital of the dynasty of the Nasrids, where he was taught by great scholars such as Ibn Lubb (d. 782/1380), and Abū ʿAbdullāh al-Maqqarī (d. 759/1358). It is reported that he acted as a preacher (khaṭīb) and as an Imam in a mosque and that he also taught at the madrasa (university) in Granada. Already during his lifetime he was considered a famous scholar known for his profound knowledge in the disciplines of Islamic jurisprudence and language.

In modern times, al-Shāṭibī’s reclaimed fame primarily goes back to his book al-Muwāfaqāt, considered an unprecedented work that attempted to conceptualize the intentions of the Sharia.

It is particularly his contribution in the field of maqāṣid which is adopted intensively today. Today his approach is regarded as a reaction to certain legal practices of jurists that do not look at the possible intentions behind divine legal prescriptions. His maqāṣid-ideas are seen as exemplary and necessary in order to respond to the challenges of modernity in a flexible way. Besides his advances in legal thought, his interest in social developments and changes are apparent in his works as well. For instance, in his book al-Iʿtiṣām he mentions certain Sufi practices which he critisize for not having a theological basis and explanation for their specific spiritual convictions and rituals.

2.1 The Concept of Iʾtimāniyya

This paradigmatic concept represents a late development of Abderrahmane’s thinking, and many of his early interests and engagements are found in this concept. His criticism of Western hegemony, its influence on local intellectual developments, Western materialism, secularism, his attempt to elaborate an Islamic philosophical-ethical concept, his interest in language, are all themes and topics that lie at the background of the iʾtimāniyya theory in some way or another.

The idea of this concept is built on the Qurʾanic conviction that human beings accepted the amāna (trust or responsibility) to be vicegerants on earth from God, which He had offered to all creatures and were not able to hold it or carry it out. By accepting it, humans also accepted the consequences of the decision: the responsibility to act according to God’s will on earth. The concept is also grounded in the idea that this life and the world of the unseen (al-ʿālam al-ghaybī) are connected and human beings are conntected to it through their spiritual needs as well as acts. Abderrahmane concludes that due to the interconnectedness between this world and the world of the unseen no separation is supposed to be drawn between worldly matters and spirituality (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 449).

With the iʾtimāniyya Abderrahmane intends to present a philosophical counter project to the Western secular and materialistic worldview. He critisizes the dichotomies that characterize Western thought, such as religion vs. politics, divine vs. secular, physical vs. metaphysical. Abderrahmane aimes to overcome this dichotomy (Hashas 2015, 67). According to him this categorization and reductionist way of thinking lead to a moral dilemma and to several forms of injustice. He understands his philosophy as comprehensive and it includes four components: revelation, reason, ethics and doing (or practice). In order to work on the elaboration of a contemporary Islamic philosophy, these components are not supposed to be separated and their centripetal force is essentially ethical (Hashas 2015, 67).

Against the globalisation of the Western dichotomous thought, he regards it as essential that each and every culture should be allowed to generate their own philosophy (see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2005). The iʾtimāniyya should be the philosophy produced by the Arabic-Islamic world. The aspiration of iʾtimāniyya is a life philosophy that is suitable for every person and which can be practised by everyone. On the global level, it is hoped that through the iʾtimāniyya a peaceful, respectful and just society can be established (Hashas 2015, 104).

2.2 The Maqāṣid-Thinking of Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī

The complex juridical and social circumstances at al-Shāṭibī’s time demanded a new approach in order to find profound answers to questions of the time. Al-Shāṭibī was of the opinion that it was necessary to reflect on new approaches in the discipline of jurisprudence and to try to capture the aim(s) of the divine orders. Once unveiled, the law should be formulated according to these findings. Questions that were of importance for his reflections were as follows: “What are God’s intentions when revealing the Sharia?”, and “Can human beings know with certainty what the Sharia wants from them?” After he had studied the Islamic sources he was convinced that God aims to realise the interests of human beings and that the Sharia intends to protect the following values, which earlier scholars of Islam developed. Once the aims of the Sharia are recognized, any further ijtihād must be according to this principle and the law must be formulated according to them (Rifāʿī 2004, 238). If this is not done, the interpretation of revelation will be restricted to the text, and will therefore be separated from the reality of human affairs (Rifāʿī 2004, 32).

Al-Shāṭibī presented his conceptualized ideas on the law in his multivolumed work al-Muwāfaqāt. One volume is entitled Kitāb al-maqāṣid in which he speaks of two main categories of maqāṣid: those of God and those of the mukallaf, i.e. the religiously responsible (rational and adult) person (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 7 f.). He divided the first main category again into four subcategories, but he did not categorize the second main category. He called the first subcategory the intention of the divine legislator when revealing the Sharia (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī waḍʿ al-sharīʿa). The second intention of the devine legislator is that it may be understood by people (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī waḍʿ al-sharīʿa lil-ifhām). The third one is the intention of the obligation towards the commandments of the Sharia (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī waḍʿ al-sharīʿa lil-taklīf bi-muqtaḍāhā). The fourth intention is the subjugation of the mukallaf under the rules of the Sharia (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī dukhūl al-mukallaf taḥt aḥkām al-sharīʿa).

In the second main category, al-Shāṭibī speaks about the intention of the mukallaf regarding the taklīf (qaṣd al-mukallaf). Al-Shāṭibī’s treatise on the maqāṣid has become highly appreciated in modern times, and is considered a theory by some scholars like Aḥmad al-Raysūnī (1428/2007), and a central theme in the current maqāṣid and legal discourse.

3.1 Humankind in the Paradigm of Iʾtimāniyya

The concept of iʾtimāniyya assumes that human beings are a special creature which differs fundamentally from the rest of creation. The reason for that is that they consist of two existences: of a created, mortal body and of an immortal soul. It is the mortal body that connects human beings with this life (or: the life of the seen, al-ʿālam al-marʾī). In this world, body and soul get connected. The other world, the world of the unseen, al-ʿālam al-ghaybī, human beings have access to through the soul only (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 34).¹ Different from Abderrahmane, al-Shāṭibī does not use terms such as al-ʿālam al-marʾī, but he uses common notions such as this life (dunyā) and the hereafter (ākhira). He believes that this life is fading and that the hereafter lasts forever. Unlike his soul, the human body is mortal. People must be conscious of the fact that this life does not last forever and that they therefore better spend their time wisely and follow their religion to be happy in this life and in the hereafter (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 32).

Because the human being unites two realities: the mortal-sensible (i.e. the body) and the immortal and non-sensible (i.e. the soul), Abderrahmane calls human beings a being of existence with double dimensions (muzdawaj al-wujūd). But even when human beings live their life in this fading world it is possible for them to keep the connection with the unchanging world. This is possible because, according to Abderrahmane, human beings were created with a fiṭra. While this Islamic concept is usually translated as God-given natural nature of human beings, Abderrahmane interprets it as an expression of a particular memory (dhākira sābiqa) of human beings. This particular memory means that people, in a way or another, remember that they not only consist of a body but also of a soul and that their true homeland is not this world. Since Abderrahmane assumes that human beings are more than matter but that they also have the God-given fiṭra, he concludes that religion is a fundamental and indivisible component of human life (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 52).

On the one hand, Abderrahmane is convinced of the existence of this particular memory, but he says, on the other hand, that human beings are highly oblivious beings who forget who they owe their existence and sustenance to. Furthermore, the philosopher says that human beings often tend to forget the particularity of their creation. This happens because of people’s lust, egoism, and thirst for power and sovereignty (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 14).

To protect people from their forgetfulnes, the iʾtimāniyya offers to human beings a way of life that differs from the Western materialistic worldview. It helps people to remember their extraordinary position in creation and reminds them that, according to the Islamic worldview, progress and true productivity are not represented by the accumulation of goods and by the realisation of worldly interests; this life should be first and foremost about striving for moral improvement (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012).

If people’s worldview is narrow because of the exclusively materialistic dominant view, the iʾtimāniyya is supposed to expand people’s view of themselves and of the world in general. Because this life and the world of the unseen are connected by the life philosophy of the iʾtimāniyya and because a connection beween worldly activities and spirituality and the relationship with God is established through this ethics of amāna, Abderrahmane declares his interpretation of Islam as an encompassing philosophy, which comprises all aspects of human life (Abderrahmane 2008, 87).

Different from Abderrahmane, al-Shāṭibī does not mention a particular ethical concept. But the scholar does speak of the Islamic idea of the nafs (appetitive soul) of people which needs to be controlled. If this is not done, they follow their desires and lust, deviate from Allah’s path, and harm their life in the two worlds (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 292). To avoid this, the dunyā (life) should be understood as a means to gain salvation in the hereafter and not as a purpose to satisfy all fleeting needs (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 63). Although Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī have different approaches to the issue, they do arrive at the same conclusion: it is clear that the nafs needs to be controlled and religion, spirituality and salvation are what human beings need to strive for in order to enjoy happiness in this world and in the hereafter.

3.2 Human Beings and God: An Extraordinary Bond

As it is common in the Islamic-religious thinking, Abderrahmane, too, believes in the existence of a creating God who holds the privilege of being worshiped by human beings (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 479). Human beings differ from the rest of creation and were given the freedom to choose the way to live. This freedom entails responsibility. With this initial freedom, the existence of devine orders implies that human beings are capable to implement them (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 450). Al-Shāṭibī, too, follows this religious assumption, and the existence of a creating, all-knowing God (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 168). The Andalusian scholar asserts that God does not require from human beings more than they are able to accomplish. This is a central point in al-Shāṭibī’s legal thinking and he stresses it by mentioning that the Sharia considers the human nature and does not require from human beings to, for example, refrain from food. Also if the body is deformed or incomplete, human beings are not required to correct or beautify what cannot be changed. However, as long as they prevent their appetitive souls from doing what they are forbidden to do human beings are allowed to enjoy and to make use of what has been allowed to them, within certain limits (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 175).

If Abderrahmane argues that it is God’s right to be worshiped, al-Shāṭibī says that human beings were created to worship God, and that people should always return to God and should implement His prescriptions. This is the true meaning of worship, al-taʿabbud li-Llāh (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 289 f.). Worshipping Allah is the direct opposite of an uncontrolled surrender to lust, and the two can never meet. Doing the one is correct, doing the other is wrong, and both decisions/choices have consequences: either they receive reward or punishment in the hereafter (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 290 f.). A central aspect in al-Shāṭibī’s concept of God is his conviction that God wants what is best for His creation. He has revealed the Sharia to protect human beings from blindly following their appetitive choices and to preserve their interets for this world and the next (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 291 f.). Conntected with this thought is al-Shāṭibī’s conviction that Allah has made this Sharia easy so that people love it. This love is connected with the human conficence that they receive a reward for having accepted religion (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 233).

Although Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī express their views differently it is obvious that in their opinion worshipping God leads to the happiness of human beings in this world and in the hereafter. Abderrahmane says that iʾtimāniyya intends to prevent people from worshipping themselves. He says that this worship happens in one of two ways: either people think that they are sufficient unto themselves (al-istighnāʾ bi-l-dhāt) or that they become tyrannical (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 482). Al-Shāṭibī raises a similar point, i.e. the consequences if peope start to worship their appetitive choices: they set no limits to their lusts, which causes evil and injustice (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 292). According to Abderrahmane, this can be avoided by adhering to religious ethics and, thus, violence in wordly affairs can be avoided (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 18). However, says al-Shāṭibī, if Muslims cause injustice they have to expect punishment for their evil deeds (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 282).

Differently from al-Shāṭibī, Abderrahmane speaks in his concept about the origin of human beings before they existed on earth. In the world of the unseen, human beings gave Allah the promise to act on earth according to His will. Unlike a civil contract, this promise has a spiritual basis and contends that humankind is not primarily connected with this world but with the world of the unseen. If people are conscious of the fact that they are not the real owners of this world and that they only steward it, they develop a responsible behaviour with creation. If human beings, after they have taken the responsibility in the world of the unseen, behave immorally, then it needs the iʾtimāniyya paradigm so that they remember who they really are and what their responsibility is.

In order to know what actions and behavior concord with God’s will, human beings, and believers in the lead, presumably, have as a reference model the attributes and names of Allah (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā), considered absolute ideals and morals to follow in practice. Al-Shāṭibī mentions the names-attributes of God, but he does not mention exactly whether and which lessons human beings should take from them. (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 141). However, his notion of morals gets clearer when he speaks of the noble character (makārim al-akhlāq). He says that teachings on the noble character were the contents of the first revelations and that these are the contents which can mostly be found in the Meccan suras (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 122). He mentions some immoral acts which are spoken of and critisized in the Qurʾan, like the prohibition of polytheism and lying about affairs of the afterlife, drinking alcohol or gambling (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 123). The Sharia was revealed so that human beings strive through it to improve their character (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 124).

3.3 Spirituality, This Life and the Hereafter

According to Abderrahmane, human beings have a special relationship with God: even if someone only thinks materialistically, his soul remains in a way connected to the world of the unseen, even when he is not aware of it. He calls this unconscious person “a dead person”; an enlivement of the person’s heart can only happen if that person tries to improve his character and internalize certain virtues. The most important value human beings can internalize is decency (ḥayāʾ) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 20). According to Abderrahmane, decency is the highest and best virtue. Once human beings have internalized it, it is possible for them to embrace iʾtimāniyya (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 25). A person’s heart can only be “alive” after the soul is purified through certain deeds or processes of purification (al-ʿamal al-tazkawī). After the soul is purified, this should be followed by positive changes in a person’s behavior. Abderrahmane compares that to the state of a person that is reanimated (after death). If a person strives to change for good, Abderrahmane hopes that this can impact society positively as well. The key for this to happen is the purification of the soul by love for creation over hunger for power; by this purification the veil that covers the soul can be lifted. Only then a person reaches love for Truth, and the True (al-ḥaqq, i.e. God) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 503).

Al-Shāṭibī does not speak about the “death of the hearts” but he warns that even if people are religious there is still the danger of being seduced by this wordly life and people can still go astray (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 281); he mentions that the Qurʾan confirms that property and children can be very demanding and may cause people to forget about their religious duties and the afterlife. Then he remarks that the Prophet Muḥammad allowed his companions to enjoy what is allowed in the dunyā, up to a certain limit, and that he did not command them to live an ascetic life (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 284). As indicated, he seems to think that people should strive to find a balance between their involvement in world affairs and religion’s expectations. One way so as not to sink into world affairs is to perform good deeds. Thus a person’s heart expands and becomes enlightened (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 150).

Even if it seems that al-Shāṭibī and Abderrahmane address the same issue, it has to be said that there is a difference in their perspectives. Abderrahmane holds the opinion that in order for the heart to be alive it needs the iʾtimāniyya, so that it does not become completely unconscious in this “dead” dominantly Western materialistic way of life. Indeed, al-Shāṭibī says that there are seductions in this world and that it can happen that human beings are tempted and abandon religious ethics. But he does not say that a certain concept is needed, which has to be internalized so that people are saved. He does not say either that for the salvation of a person someone else who acts as an educator is needed. Abderrahmane, however, does say that a certain educator, who he calls “al-faqīh al-iʾtimānī” [the trusted faqīh/educator], is needed for the improvement of character. This person is called a murabbī [educator/teacher] (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 23). It is the duty of the murabbī to care for the spiritual development of the individual; he is also supposed to help to solve problems on the social level (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 25).

One issue which both scholars speak about is the centrality of the sincerity of intention, and the question of when acts are accepted by God. Abderrahmane argues that no reinvigoration of ethics happens if the intention is not sincere. Humankind should therefore always take Allah as their witness for all their deeds; decency (ḥayāʾ) stems from this fundamental point (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2008, 88). Al-Shāṭibī does not speak about the spiritual aspect of the sincerity of intentions but about the conditions so that acts get accepted by God from a legal perspective. He mentions that if the mukallaf does not know in detail about the aims of the Sharia or about the ranking of the maqāṣid within the law, it is sufficient for him to know some of the maqāṣid and act according to them for Allah to accept them (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 160).

4.1 The Role of the Faqīh

Abderrahmane distinguishes between al-faqīh al-iʾtimārī and al-faqīh al-iʾtimānī. He critisizes the first and accuses him of focusing only on the rules or religious orders (sing. amr, pl. awāmir) since he does not look at the law from an ethical perspective, whereas the second cares about morals in the divine orders, and the noble character they teach (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 21). Al-Shāṭibī does not use particular terms when he suggests or critisizes a particular behavior or understanding of scholars. But from his elaborations on the maqāṣid, one can understand that he strongly recommends jurists to build their legal thinking on an ethical basis. Regarding the role of the faqīh, both scholars are of the opinion that the jurist or scholar has a high religious and social responsibility. In Abderrahmane’s opinion the faqīh should ideally be a faqīh iʾtimānī who educates people and helps them to improve their character and to develop their spirituality; the faqīh should feel responsible to help in solving problems in society. Al-Shāṭibī is also of the opinion that the faqīh has a great responsibility. In his book al-Iʿtiṣām he critisizes the jurists of his time. He writes that some of them issue legal opinions that do not have a strong juridical basis, and are issued only to please changes in society (al-Shāṭibī 2005, 17 f.). However, in al-Muwāfaqāt his idea of a responsible faqīh gets clearer when he speaks of a group of scholars of whom he says that Allah has chosen them to reflect, study and defend religion with strong evidence. He calls this group “soldiers of Allah” and “defenders of religion” (ḥumāt al-dīn) (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 94 f.).