[God is not the subject matter of metaphysics]

It is not possible that [God’s existence] should be the subject matter. For the subject matter of every science is something whose existence is granted in that science, the only thing investigated being its states. This has been explained elsewhere. The existence of God, exalted in His greatness, cannot be granted as the subject matter in this science; rather, it is something sought (maṭlūb) in it. For if it were otherwise, then [God’s existence] would have to be either (a) granted in this science [4] but sought in another, or else (b) granted in this science but not sought in another, and both alternatives are false. (a) For it cannot be sought in another science, since the other sciences are either moral, political, natural, mathematical, or logical. None of the philosophical sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya) lie outside this division. In none of them does one investigate a proof of God the exalted . Doing so [in these other sciences] is not possible. This is something you will acknowledge after minimal reflection upon principles that have been repeatedly stated for you. (b) Nor can it be that it is [granted in this science but] not sought in any other, for then it would not be sought in any science at all. [God’s existence] would then have to be either self-evident, or something one despairs of proving through theoretical reflection. But it is not self-evident, nor is it something one despairs of demonstrating; for there is indeed a proof for it. Besides, how could an existence which one despairs of demonstrating be legitimately granted [without argument]? It thus remains that the investigation into it is undertaken precisely in this science.

[causes are not the subject matter of metaphysics]

We say then: examination of [causes] cannot be with respect to their being causes without qualification (asbāb muṭlaqa), such that the purpose of this science would be to examine features that belong to the causes inasmuch as they are causes without qualification. This may be shown in a number of ways.

Firstly, on the grounds that this science investigates notions that are not proper accidents (al-aʿrāḍ al-khāṣṣa) of causes just insofar as they are causes, [notions] such as universal and particular, potentiality and actuality, possibility and necessity, and so on. Now, it is quite obvious that these topics in themselves call for investigation. Moreover, they are not among the proper accidents of natural and mathematical things. Nor are they among the accidents proper to the practical sciences. So it remains only that the investigation of these belongs to the last remaining science, namely this science.

Again, knowledge of causes taken without qualification arises only subsequent to the science that proves the existence of causes for those things that have causes. For, so long as we have not yet proved the existence of causes for caused things by proving that the existence of [the latter] is attached to something that precedes them in existence, reason will not yet infer that there is a cause without qualification [i.e. that there are causes at all], and that there is some cause in this case. Sensation yields only conjunction. And the fact that two things are in conjunction does not necessarily imply that one of them [6] is the cause of the other. The conviction that comes to the soul due to a number of things conveyed by sensation and experience (tajriba) is, as you have learned, made secure only through knowledge that the things that exist are, for the most part, either natural or voluntary. And this, in reality, depends on proving reasons (ʿilal) and settling the existence of reasons and causes. This is nothing obvious or immediate, but just commonly held; and you have already learned the difference between these two. Nor is it the case, even if it is easily understood by reason that temporally originated things have some [causal] principle, that this must be self-evident. (Just like many geometrical issues demonstrated in the book of Euclid [sc. the Elements].) Moreover, the demonstrative proof for this does not belong to any of the other sciences. So it must belong to this science.

[the subject matter of metaphysics is the existent as such]

It is thus clear to you from all [that has been said] that the existent, insofar as it is an existent, is something common to all these things and that it must be posited as the subject matter of this art, for the reasons given. Moreover, given that its quiddity need not be learned or proven, which would require that some other science explain what it is like (al-ḥāl fīhi) (because it is impossible [10] to prove the subject matter of a science, or to ascertain its quiddity in the very science whose subject matter it is; rather, [that science] just grants its being (anniyya) and quiddity), the primary subject matter of this science is thus the existent insofar as it is an existent.

[the topics of inquiry are the accompanying features of the existent]

And the things sought after in this science are those that accompany [the existent] insofar as it is an existent, without any qualification (min ghayr sharṭ). Some of these things belong to [the existent] as if they were species, as for example substance, quantity, and quality. For, when divided into these, the existent does not need to be divided into divisions that are prior to them, as substance needs [prior] divisions in order to be divided into human and not human afterwards. Some [of the things that accompany the existent as such] are as if they were proper accidents, like one and many, potentiality and actuality, universal and particular, and possible and necessary. For the existent, in accepting these accidents and in being apt to receive them, need not [first] be specified as natural, mathematical, ethical, etc.

[metaphysics can still prove the principles of the existent]

Someone might say: if the existent is made the subject matter of this science, then the principles of existents cannot be proved in it. For in every science, one investigates the accompanying features (lawāḥiq) of its subject matter, not the latter’s principles.

Response to this: theoretical inquiry into the principles is also an investigation into the accidents of this subject matter. For the existent’s being a principle is neither constitutive of it, nor impossible for it. Rather, it is accidental relative to the nature of the existent, and among its proper accidents. For nothing is more general than “existent,” such that it could be a primary attachment for something else. Nor does the existent need to become natural, mathematical, or something else, in order for being a principle to occur accidentally to it. Moreover, the principle is not a principle for “the existent” as a whole. For if it were, then it would be a principle of itself. On the contrary, “the existent” as a whole has no principle, as the principle is a principle only for the caused existent. So the principle is a principle for part of the existent. Thus, this science does not investigate the principles of the existent [11] without qualification, but only the principles of some of what it includes, just like the other particular sciences. For, even if these [latter] do not demonstrate the existence of the principles they share in common (since they have principles shared in common by everything that they pursue), still they demonstrate the existence of that which is a principle for things posterior to those things that are included within them.

[designations for metaphysics]

This, then, is the knowledge sought after in this art (al-ṣināʿa). It is first philosophy (al-falsafa al-ūlā), because it is knowledge of the first thing in existence, namely the First Cause, and the first thing in generality, namely existence and unity. It is also wisdom (ḥikma), which is the best knowledge of the best object of knowledge. For it is the best (that is, certain) knowledge of the best [12] object of knowledge, namely God the exalted, and of the causes after Him. It is also understanding of the ultimate causes of the whole (al-kull) and understanding of God. It has the definition of “divine science,” which consists in a knowledge of things separable from matter in definition and existence. For, as has been explained, the existent as such, its principles, and its accidents, are all prior in existence to matter, and none of them is dependent for its existence on the existence of [matter].

[how metaphysics is about immaterial things]

If, in this science, one investigates that which is not prior to matter, what is being investigated therein is only an idea (maʿnā), this idea not requiring matter for its existence. But the things investigated in [this science] fall under four headings. (a) Some of them are entirely devoid of matter and whatever attaches to matter. (b) Some of them are mixed with matter, but it is the presence of the cause in the mixture that is constitutive and prior; matter is not constitutive for it. (c) Some of them may be found with or without matter, for example, causality and unity. So what these share in common, taken as such, is that they do not need the existence of matter for their realization. This class also shares that they are not material in existence; in other words, they do not derive their existence from matter. (d) Some of them are material things, like motion and rest. But what is investigated in this science is not their state of being in matter, but only their mode (naḥw) of existence. Thus, if this last class is taken together with the others, they would all have in common that the manner of investigating them pertains to an idea whose existence is not constituted by matter. This is just like in the mathematical sciences, where one sometimes posits something delimited by matter, but the mode of inquiry and investigation concerning it is with respect to an idea that is not delimited by matter, and where the connection of the topic of investigation to matter does not make the investigation cease being mathematical. So it is here. […]

[“before” and “after” nature]

[17.2] The meaning of “what is after nature (mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa)” is posteriority relative to us. For when we observe existence and come to understand its states, what we are observing first is natural existence. But considered in itself, this science deserves to be named “what is before nature,” because the things investigated in this science are, in essence and generality, prior to nature.

[benefit of metaphysics]

So the benefit of this science, whose approach we have explained, is to bestow certainty upon the principles of the particular sciences, and to verify the quiddity of the things they share in common, even when these are not principles. This is therefore the sort of benefit the ruler gives to the ruled, or of the master to the servant, since the relationship of this science to the particular sciences is the same as that between the object of knowledge pursued in this science and the objects of knowledge pursued in those sciences. For just as the former is a principle for the existence of the latter, so knowledge of [the former] is a principle for verifying the knowledge of these [latter sciences].

[the subject matter of metaphysics]

The subject matter of the science known as “metaphysics (mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa)” is the existent as such (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd). The things sought in it are those items (umūr) that accompany the existent as such, without any qualification. Some of these items are like species for it, such as substance, quantity, and quality, since the existent is primarily divided into these. Other features are like proper accidents for the existent, such as unity and multiplicity, potentiality and actuality, the universal and the particular, the necessary and the contingent. For the existent [as such] does not need to be specified naturally or mathematically in order to receive those accidents and be disposed for them.

[principles and the existent]

The investigation into principles is an inquiry into the accompanying features (lawāḥiq) of that subject matter, since being a principle is neither a constituent for the existent, nor something impossible for it. Rather, being a principle is something accidental relative to the nature of the existent, and is among its proper accompanying features, [3] since there is nothing else more general than the existent, to which [being a principle] could belong as an accompanying feature; nor does the existent need to be become natural, mathematical or some other way, in order that it have “being a principle” as an accidental feature.

Furthermore, the principle is not a principle for existence as a whole. If it were a principle for the whole of existence, it would be the principle of itself. Indeed, there is no principle for “the existent” as a whole. There only is a principle for caused existence. The principle is a principle for some existence or other. For this reason, [metaphysics] investigates the First Cause, from which emanates all caused existence as such. It is a science of the first thing in existence, the First Cause, and of that which is first in being common, namely existence and unity.

[the scope of kalām]

Kalām means understanding (maʿrifa) the world and its parts, and its true realities, and its being originated, and knowledge (ʿilm) of Him who has originated it (muḥdith), and those attributes which must be ascribed to Him, those that cannot be ascribed to Him, and what might apply in His case. In addition: the knowledge (ʿilm) of prophecy, and how it is distinguished by miracles from the claims of the fraudulent, and the features (aḥkām) of prophecy, as well as the discussion of which universals of the law are permitted and excluded. The goal in kalām does not fall under a definition, but it can be derived from how we grasp the distinction between knowledge and other kinds of beliefs (iʿtiqādāt), from what we know about the difference between demonstrations and spurious arguments, and from what we attain about the methods of inquiry.

[kalām is only theology]

There are four intended axes [of kalām]. All of them are restricted to the investigation (naẓar) concerning God. If we investigate the world we do so not insofar as it is “world,” “body,” “heaven,” and “earth,” but insofar as it is the work of God. If we investigate the Prophet we do so not insofar he is “human being,” “noble,” “knowing,” and “virtuous,” but insofar he is sent by God. If we investigate what he has said, we do so not insofar as it is “speech,” “discourse,” and “explanations” (tafhīmāt), but insofar as they inform us about God the exalted, through [the Prophet’s] mediation. It inquires into nothing other than God, and searches after nothing but God. All aspects (aṭrāf) of this science are included in the inquiry into God’s essence (dhāt), attributes (ṣifāt), acts (afʿāluhu), and messenger (rasūluhu), as well as into the information about God has conveyed to us by what He has said.

[the path of kalām from theology to philosophy]

Indeed, when the art of kalām arose and there was extensive engagement with it, after a time the mutakallimūn longed to go beyond the defense of the Sunna into the investigation of the true realties of things (al-baḥth ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-umūr), and they engaged in the investigation of atoms and accidents and their features (al-baḥth ʿan al-jawāhir wa-al-aʿrāḍ wa-aḥkāmihā). But as this was not the aim (maqṣūd) of their science, their discussion of this has not reached its utmost limit, and so it has not yielded anything which entirely removes the shadows of perplexity among people’s differing views.

[kalām as the universal science of the existent]

The universal science among the religious sciences is kalām. The other ones, like jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, and Qurʾānic commentary, are particular sciences. […] [5.17] The mutakallim is the one who investigates the most general thing, namely the existent (al-mawjūd). He divides the existent first of all into eternal and originated, then divides the originated into substance and accident. [6] Accident is divided into that for which life is a condition, like knowledge, will, power, speech, hearing, sight; and that for which [life] is not needed, like color, smell, and taste. He divides substance into animal, plant, and inanimate (jamād), and shows that they are differentiated either by species or by accidents. Then he inquires into the eternal, and shows that [God] is not multiple or divisible like the temporally originated things are. Rather, He must be one, and must be distinguished from originated things by attributes (awṣāf) that are necessary for Him, by things (umūr) that are impossible for Him, and by features (aḥkām) that are possible in His case, being neither necessary nor impossible. He distinguishes between the possible, the necessary, and the impossible with regard to Him. Then, he shows that action in general (aṣl al-fiʿl) is possible for Him, that the world is a possible [creation] of His act, and that since it [the world] is possible, it is in need of an originator (muḥdith). Moreover: that the sending of prophets counts among His possible actions, that He is capable of it and of making their truth known through miracles, and that this possibility has actually occurred. At this point, the discussion of the mutakallim comes to an end, as does the remit of [human] reason. Indeed, reason argues for the veracity of the Prophet, but then it retreats and avows that it takes instruction from the Prophet by accepting whatever he says about God and the day of judgment, such that reason neither understands it independently [of revelation] nor deems it impossible.

[whether “existent” or “thing” is the subject matter]

Any thing must have existence. So there is no existent of either sort [i.e. mental or extramental] that cannot but be a thing, and no thing that cannot but have one of the two kinds of existence. So “thingness” is among the necessary concomitants of the true realities of things, and if you attempt to conceptualize thing or existent, you will inevitably wind up going in a circle. Still, even though both are [maximally] general, the existent is more appropriately the subject matter of the universal science, since it is more evident in conception.

[all sciences are about existents]

Understanding and knowledge (al-maʿrifa wa-al-ʿilm) are, on our view, two attributes that relate our souls to the things that we understand and know. The things we understand and know are primarily those that exist in concrete individuals. Our understanding and knowledge of them are attributes that relate (al-ṣifa al-iḍāfiyya) them to our minds. Furthermore, we understand the mental relational attributes [themselves], and we understand understanding and knowledge [themselves], and know them both. We call these two, that is, the understanding of concrete existents on the one hand and the understanding of mental relational forms on the other hand, “knowledge” and “understanding” only equivocally. […] [2.18] The most deserving of sciences (ʿulūm) in respect of knowing and the most entitled among them to be meant by “knowledge (ʿilm)” is the knowledge of concrete existents. The knowledge of mental relational forms of knowledge comes close to it in this respect, since even though these are not among the primary existents, which are what one knows primarily, they are nonetheless attributes that exist in minds [3] and souls, which [in their turn] are concrete existents. And the attributes of existents are existent as well, albeit that the existence of the latter is consequent and accidental to the existence of the former. […]

[is metaphysics a study of existence, or a study of the divine?]

[3.16] Sometimes the inquiry into the existent is a general one. There is no more general inquiry into [the existent] than insofar as it is an existent. It was Aristotle who singled out as a science the inquiry into the existent as such. The ancient scholars had already agreed in dividing the sciences of existence (al-ʿulūm al-wujūdiyya) into natural, mathematical, and divine things (ilāhiyyāt). But [Aristotle] said that the science of divine things is the science of the existent as such, since it inquires into the principles of existent things. That is why he singled it out as a science. He called it the science of “metaphysics,” “first philosophy,” and “divine science.”

By calling it metaphysics [lit. “what is after nature”], [Aristotle] meant that which comes after sensible, natural things in our understanding, even though it is prior to them in existence. For whatever is in the nature prior in existence is posterior for us in understanding, as has been explained in the opening section of natural philosophy. For this reason some people used to speak of the science of “pro-physics” [lit. “what is before nature”]. But there is no real difference between “after” and “before” here, [4] apart from relation to different conceptions.

By calling it “first philosophy,” [Aristotle] meant that it is the understanding of first principles, and of the common, universal attributes whose understanding paves the way for the understanding of its principles. Knowing [principles] is primary knowledge, through which the science of metaphysics is completed.

By calling it “divine science,” [Aristotle] meant that the understanding of God the exalted and His angels is a fruit of this science and its result. The subject matter of this science, on which its inquiry focuses, is the existent as such. For this reason, its inquiry is general in respect to the rest of sciences. The understanding of God the exalted and His angels is among the results, sought-for objects, and goals of [this science].

[hierarchy of principles in sciences]

Its inquiry is a general, universal one, dealing specifically with its objects of inquiry, so as to issue in the principles of particular sciences, through which science is brought to fruition. For the principles of particular sciences are among the existing things, and “the existent” as unqualified is more general than them. A particular science that falls under [metaphysics] takes its principles for granted from that science [i.e. metaphysics], and does not itself bring the inquiry [into the principles] to fruition, since the understanding of something more specific becomes complete and perfect only by understanding the more general, as we have stated in the science of demonstration, when we said that the particular is understood through its universal [predicates]. […]

[the arbitrariness of Aristotle’s division of sciences]

[5.1] This is the gist of what Aristotle intended, and a complete account of his remarks about this science insofar as he singled it out from other sciences and made it a single science due to its focus. However, the science of all existents—be they natural or divine—is one and the same: when a mathematician inquires into sizes, shapes, and numbers, he inquires into the existent as well. If one wishes to divide and separate [the sciences], one can specify each division on the basis of an idea held jointly by the objects after which it searches. I do not know how those scholars arrived here at the necessity of dividing the sciences into exactly three, no fewer and no more. What Aristotle posits concerning the division of the sciences, following the ancients in that respect, is possible, but not necessary.

[each science is complete in itself, but all are arranged under metaphysics]

Whoever has particular knowledge uncritically accepts the principles of his knowledge from wherever his inquiry began, and from whichever point of departure, since he knows something through its principles, and knows [its] principles through the principles [of these principles], and so on until he reaches the first principles which Aristotle specified as belonging to this science [sc. metaphysics]. So long as he does not reach the first principles, his knowledge is cut off at the point where he started, since his knowledge of whatever he seeks is brought to fruition through the proximate principles when he starts to inquire into that object of inquiry. For seeking knowledge of the proximate principles is starting out afresh for knowledge of that principle or principles. This [principle] or these [principles] are then the primary object, or objects, sought in [a further] science. The principles that are applied in coming to know these objects of inquiry are different from the ones we called principles [at the first step]. This does not stop until one reaches the first principles. At that point, knowledge is the universal, encompassing science from which one takes principles for whatever comes after it.

[the division of sciences has pedagogic aims]

The ancients did not make [all branches of] knowledge one science because of what is said about teaching: some teaching is merely for practice, familiarization, and reminding (al-tanbīh), while some is for verification and [full] attainment. The kind of teaching used for mere reminding comes first, and starts from what is proximate for sensation, and then what is proximate [to these first things], then it takes us to what is remote, and finally that which is most remote. By contrast, the kind of teaching used for verification and attainment starts from the universal and the most general, and from the first principles, which are remote from sensation, and from what is innate (ġarīza) for the soul. The soul is not innately capable of [understanding] whatever it has not yet seen and accepted, and [needs] to be reminded on the basis of some starting-points of the existing principles, starting from something that is more proximate to what is innate to it, on which it can rely through sensation. If you seek for true knowledge in this [more proximate starting-point], this comes through its principles, which one learns through [further] principles of [these principles], which one cannot [understand] innately. So [the soul] accepts them from scholars by simply granting them, in order that it may learn on the basis of them whatever particular sciences it comes to know. But once [the soul] has seen those [particular] sciences, and by this vision prepared itself for whatever is higher, then it ascends to the latter, insofar as [6] the former has provided a reminder of it. They [sc. the ancients] put down as the beginning particular sciences, whose principles are granted, and from these they ascended to the highest science, so as then to verify, on that basis, the knowledge of principles. The eminent scholar begins in this way from something particular, familiarizing himself with it, and ascending to the universal, through which he comes to understand the principle of that from which he started, and likewise on up to the highest science. When he reaches it, he takes a new beginning in his knowledge and learning from where he has stopped [viz. at the top of the ascent], and returns, now with true knowledge that provides full attainment (fī al-ʿilm al-ḥaqīqī al-taḥṣīlī), to where he first began. Thus, when it comes to true knowledge that provides full attainment, he begins where he ended when it came to learning that was for practice and reminding, and ends up where he started.

[the structure of “divine science”: from ontology to theology]

It is clear from the usage of the ancients that the expression “divine” has a relative meaning, in relation to that for which it is a divinity. “Divine” is that to which the soul of the thing is devoted which has it as its divinity, in [the soul’s] action and in the motion of the body in which it dwells, in a voluntary way and in accordance with its wish, setting [the body] in motion. Thus a student may call his teacher, to whom he is devoted, “divine” and “lord.” Hence it is also clear that the divine is something that performs an action without being seen, and it has sovereignty (sulṭān) over humans, while they have no sovereignty over it. According to the doctrine of [the ancients], souls are active without being seen, and they have sovereignty over humans; yet [humans] also have sovereignty over them, since human souls can harm one another and exercise sovereignty over each other. They also used [the expression “divine”] to refer to the spiritual angels; we already mentioned this in On the Soul, and the inquiry there was sufficient.

Divine science (ʿilm al-ilāhiyyāt) is thus the science through which we understand divine attributes without qualification, and then the attributes of the Divinity of Divinities and Lord of Lords. He is the one who acts without being acted upon, and who is the first principle for every existence and every existent, whether an object or an act, as will be shown in the philosophical inquiry of this section. For it begins and then undertakes an inquiry, until it ends with understanding of the divine. It understands [the divine] in terms of the divine without qualification, then in terms of the divine in relation to existence, and then in terms of the first Divinity, insofar as it connects them and inquires into the relational idea by which a divinity is “divine.” [Divinity] is more specific than what makes the principle a principle, the cause a cause, and the agent an agent. The divine is indeed a principle and a cause, but not every cause and a principle is something divine. The divine is an efficient and a final cause but not every efficient and final cause is something divine. So one must first inquire into principle and cause [in general], putting this first in the method of inquiry, before going on to inquire into the divine. The same goes for the efficient and the final cause. And the existent, above all, [7] should be dealt with at the beginning of the inquiry, since it is more general than all this. So the beginning of inquiry in this science lies with the existent. At this stage, one inquires into it insofar as it is an existent, this being the most general [subject matter of inquiry], without any qualification. Then, one goes on to inquire into principle and cause, since they are among the attributes of the divine and are more specific than the existent. Then, one inquires into the efficient and final cause, since they are more specific than principle and cause. Then one inquires into the divine in general; then into the Divinity of divinities, if indeed the inquiry indicates that there is one. […]

[a preferred tripartite division of sciences, against Aristotle’s]

[7.15] The ancients called this science “divine science” because they were accustomed to use the notion of divinity by applying it to spiritual, angelic individuals, and to human souls that have separated from bodies. They believed that [human souls] separate and then remain as they are, while separated, in the realm (zumra) of the spiritual angels. Some of [the ancients] believed that angels and spirits belong to this group, that is, the group of human souls that have separated from bodies and been freed from them. When mentioning the names of angels, they used to say “so-and-so, son of so-and-so,” and “so-and-so, son of so-and-so.” This was common usage and generally accepted among them. So they called this science, whose inquiry includes [those entities] within its remit, and which shows whether they are, what they are, how they are, and why they are, “divine science.”

Now, natural science is the science of sensible things. So according to [the ancients], the science of the existent may be divided into natural and divine, so long that is as one is inquiring into concretely existent things. [8] As for mental conceptions, they belong to the science of the existent as well as to psychology, insofar as one inquires into forms of the mind, which do belong to the whole class of existents. The form of the existent itself is something that exists in existence. But logic also inquires into [mental conceptions] in a way, namely insofar as it helps in teaching and understanding some [existents] on the basis of others, and leads in its inquiry from some of them to others. Mathematics, in its turn, is that which inquires into numbers and sizes that are numbered and delimited by shapes, without further qualification, as minds freely move between them, connecting and relating some of them to others. Its inquiry is not specifically concerned with shapes, sizes, and numbers of [only certain] existents among them. Thus it is this [general inquiry into mathematical features] that is specifically designated by the term “mathematics,” so that if the inquiry were specifically concerned with the number of the stars and the sizes and shapes of the spheres, then this would doubtless belong not to the science of the existent, but to natural science. It is in this way that they ordered the sciences, by dividing them into these three divisions, namely natural, mathematical, and divine science.

[metaphysics as the highest perfection for humans]

We have already explained in [the section on] psychology that philosophical sciences share in common one and the same benefit, namely the attainment of the human soul’s perfection in actuality, and thereby its preparation for happiness in the afterlife. However, sciences differ in this respect. Some of them are beneficial in themselves, namely the knowledge of God the exalted and His angels, as well as the soul’s knowledge of itself, its principles and its activities. Others provide this benefit accidentally, in that the knowledge that is beneficial in itself is benefitted by from them, for instance geometry and logic, as has been said. […]

[11.1] This science, which is the divine science, is beneficial in itself for the attainment of human perfection. In fact, it is intellectual perfection itself (bal huwa al-kamāl al-ʿaqlī bi-ʿaynihi), since the perfection of the understanding is the understanding of the utmost perfection. The other sciences are pursued only for the sake of this one, insofar as the soul benefits from them in the attainment [of this science]. Just as every existence and every cause of existence comes from the Necessary Existent in Himself, so likewise every good and every cause of goodness comes from Him also. The good of the understanding is understanding of the absolute good, which is absolute existence, that is, the Necessary Existent in Himself. And it is understanding of Him that we attain in this science. This is the most beneficial of sciences, indeed, it is the beneficial science. […]

[11.15] [Divine science] is the science of sciences, even if logic is the sciences of sciences in a different way. The benefit from this science [i.e. divine science] is perfection of knowledge for all the other sciences. Whoever reaches this science obtains intellectual human perfection, to the extent that this may be achieved. [This science] is in truth the excellence of humans. Or rather, it is the excellence of human excellences. None of the scholars have ever disagreed with this, except insofar as they were ignorant of what they were disagreeing with. For the ancients did disagree with and reject what Aristotle and other philosophers said regarding this science, or what others said who came after; but they never rejected the science in itself. They rejected only whatever they believed to be ignorance, not what they believed to be knowledge. They said: this is an error, and a mistake which does not deserve to be called human excellence. But if one asks them about true knowledge, they will not deny that it is human excellence.

[reconsideration of the division of sciences]

We have ordered this summa (majmūʿ) in three books. We want to give [first] a general clue as to the order (tartīb) of this summa; then we will write down a list of the chapters and sections, then we will get into the intended discussion (al-maqṣūd).

(a) Know that it has been established that the more general something is, the more perfect and complete is our knowledge of it. Given that existence is the most general and most comprehensive thing, we cannot but begin our first book with an inquiry into [existence], and into its properties (khawāṣṣ) and features (aḥkām). Then we mention what is opposed to it, namely non-existence. Then we mention what comes close to existence in comprehensiveness and generality (shumūl wa-ʿumūm), namely quiddity, unity, and multiplicity. Then, [91] having finished with these topics of inquiry (mabāḥith) that are connected to these general things, we move on to the primary division made within the existent, namely “necessary” and “contingent.” We make a thorough enquiry into their true realities, their properties, and their features (aḥkām). Then, we pass on to topics of inquiry that are related to eternity and origination, because the existent is also divided primarily into these two, according to certain viewpoints (iʿtibārāt). All this is contained in the first book. […]

[91.6] (b) As for the second book, it contains the divisions of contingent things. The contingent is primarily divided into substance and accident. […]

[93.6] (c) The third book is about purely theological issues (al-ilāhiyyāt al-maḥḍa). It has four sections. (c1) The first deals with establishing the existence of God, His unity, and His transcendence over any multiplicity and any similarity with substances and accidents. (c2) The second is an exposition of His attributes, how He knows universals and particulars, His volition and power, His being complete, pure good, pure truth, and generosity; and [it is shown] that human minds fall short of comprehending Him, or how many names He has. (c3) The third deals with His actions. Here we explain how His actions proceed from Him, and explore the claims made about the ten Intellects and how they are ordered, as well as how the elements are generated from them. Then we show that contingents can only exist through His decree and predestination. Then we explain how evil enters into what has been divinely decreed. (c4) The fourth section deals with showing why the existence of a prophet is necessary, and indicates his proper characteristics. With this the book comes to a close.

[widening the scope of metaphysics]

We have already mentioned in natural philosophy that there are three sciences, namely metaphysics (ilāhiyyāt), mathematics, and natural philosophy. We say then: the accidents that occur to the existent might do so insofar as it is existent, or insofar as it is some specified existent.

[4] As for the first option, namely the accidents that occur to the existent as such, the Master [Avicenna] has mentioned three of them in this passage: its being one or many, its being universal or particular, and its being actual or potential. But I enumerate [more of them] here:

First: the existent is either space-occupying; or something that inheres in what is space-occupying; or neither of these. This division applies to the existent as such, since if the existent is necessary, one might still think, at first glance, that it could fall under any of these three divisions; and likewise if it is contingent. This shows that the existent, by virtue of being existent, is suitable to be divided into these three classes. Second: the existent is either only a cause; or only an effect; or both cause and effect in relation to two different things; or neither a cause nor an effect in any respect. One may also express this differently, by saying that the existent is either a producer (muʾaththir) and not an effect of production (this is the Necessary Existent), or an effect of production without itself producing (this is prime matter), or both an effect and a producer, like the spiritual existents whose existence occurs due the bestowal of existence by the Necessary Existent, but they are also productive in the governing of bodies. Or finally, an existent might be neither productive nor an effect of production. […] Third: the existent is either actual in all respects and from all points of view (this is the Necessary Existent and the separate spiritual substances); or potential in all respects (albeit that this is absurd, since otherwise it would be a potentiality in a further potentiality, and so on, which is absurd); or actual in some respect but potential in other respects. [5] Fourth: the existent is either perfect, sufficient, or deficient. […] [5.7] Fifth: the existent is either one or many. Under unity fall identity, equality, similarity, equivalence, resemblance, and correspondence. Under multiplicity fall the opposites of these. Sixth: the existent is either universal or particular. Seventh: the existent either has no beginning and no end, or does have a beginning and an end, or it has no beginning, but does have an end. (Albeit that scholars say this is absurd, because the eternal cannot possibly fail to exist.) Or, it has an end, but no beginning. Eighth: the existent is either simple or composite. […] [5.22] Ninth: the existent is either necessary or contingent. Or to put it in another way: it is either self-sufficient, or in need of something. To put it yet another way, the existent is either true or false. [6] Tenth: the existent is either eternal or originated. […] [6.3] Eleventh: the existent has either stable or unstable essence. […] [6.7] Twelfth: the existent is either finite or infinite. […] [6.10] Thirteenth: the existent either is that which has an attribute, or is [itself] an attribute, or is neither of these. Fourteenth: the existent is either place or time; or it is neither of these but is either in place or in time; or it is none of the above. This is an important division which comprises much knowledge. Fifteenth: the existent may be difficult to perceive, or easy. […] [7] Sixteenth: the existent either has another existent comparable to it (examples of this are obvious), or does not. […] [7.3] Using this approach, one may refute the claim that there is a connection between the hidden and the observed […]. [7.5] Seventeenth: the true reality of an existent either may be known independently of anything else, or not. […] [7.10] Eighteenth: the existent exists either in concrete individuals, or in the mind, or in linguistic expression, or in writing. Then it might be said that the existent in the mind is also existent in concrete individuals, because the mental existent is a particular, perceptual form that exists in an individual, concrete soul. So the existent in the mind is existent concretely. So in what respect is the mentally existent mind distinguished from the concretely existent? As for the “existent” in linguistic expression and in writing, this is only a figure of speech. It just means that the expressions or writings refer [to something] by convention and usage. Nineteenth: the existent either exists through an existence that is not identical to it, or through an existence that is identical to it. […] The existent that exists through an existence that is identical to it is existence [itself]. [7.21] Twentieth: the existent either is a substance or an accident.

[the subject matter of metaphysics is the existent as such]

Proof that the subject matter of divine science is the existent as such. On this, there are two divergent views. (a) First, that its subject matter is God the exalted, and its goal is an understanding of His attributes and His acts. (b) Second, that its subject matter is the four causes.

We say: (a) the first view is false, as may be shown in two ways. (a1) Firstly, because the existence of God is something sought by a proof. It cannot be established in any other science. But if it is among the sought conclusions of this science, it cannot be its subject matter. [9] (a2) Secondly, because this science inquires into universal and particular, potentiality and actuality, cause and effect, unity and multiplicity. These modes do not to apply to the essence of God the exalted, insofar as it is what it is, but rather insofar as it is existent.

(b) The second view is false too, and for the same reasons: (b1) firstly, one needs a demonstration in order to establish the cause insofar as it is a cause. But this is established only in this science. If something is among the sought conclusions of a science it cannot be its subject matter. (b2) Secondly, this science inquires into things that are not among the proper accidents of causes, insofar as they are causes, like universal and particular, necessary and contingent, and one and many.

Now that you know the falsehood of both views, we say: the subject matter of this science is the existent as such. This is shown by the fact that those modes we enumerated are what is sought in this science; so the subject matter of this science must be something to which those modes occur, insofar as it is what it is. Since this can be nothing other than the existent, we know that the subject matter of this science is the existent as such.

[the nobility of kalām]

The nobility of the science [of kalām] may be shown in several ways.

First, the nobility of the object of knowledge. There is no doubt that the most important aim and the greatest object one may seek in the science of kalām is the knowledge of the essence of God the exalted and His attributes, and of how His actions [proceed from Him]. There is no doubt that He is the noblest object of knowledge, may He be praised and exalted, so this must be the noblest of sciences.

Second, the reliability of the proofs. There is no doubt that the proofs used in the inquiries of this science must be put together from items of necessary knowledge (ʿulūm ḍarūriyya), in such a way that it is known by necessity that they have been put together correctly and that the objects of inquiry must follow from [the conjunction of those items of necessary knowledge]. There is nothing more powerful or reliable.

[98] Third, that there is great need for it. There is no doubt that the acquisition of happiness is the most important thing one may seek, and the greatest of intentions. Further, happiness in the afterlife can be acquired only by belief (īmān) in God and His prophets, and in the day of judgment. This can be grasped as it ought to be only with this science. As for happiness in this world, it can be grasped perfectly only through the arrangement of the states of this world, which is fully attained only by longing for reward and fear of punishment (al-raghba fī al-thawāb wa-al-rahba ʿan al-ʿiqāb).

Fourth, the need of the other religious sciences for it. It is known that all other sciences are either religious, or not. The benefit of the non-religious ones falls short of procuring the advantageous and warding off the harmful; this is how things are with the sciences of trades and arts. There is no doubt that the religious sciences outrank them. Now, the correctness of all the religious sciences is based on the correctness of this science. Until it is established that the world has a Maker who is knowing and powerful, how would it be possible for a scriptural commentator, a ḥadīth scholar, or a jurist to undertake their sciences? Thus all other religious sciences need it, but it does not need them. From this it necessarily follows that its nobility surpasses that of the others.

Fifth, a thing’s nobility may also be taken from the inferiority of its opposite. Since making a mistake in this science constitutes unbelief and innovation, which are among the most base of things, it necessarily follows that hitting on the truth in this [science] is among the most noble of things.

[metaphysics has two parts: universal and theological]

Theoretical philosophy (al-ḥikma al-naẓariyya) is divided into three parts. The first among them is the one connected to immaterial things, which have no need for material conditions in order to be realized, like the Necessary Existent, the Active Intellects, and the primary divisions of existence. Even if some of these are mixed with matter, this is not because they need to belong accidentally to matter in order to be rendered concrete, the way it is with contingency or causation, for instance. They have called this division the highest science. Its subject matter is the most general of all things: the existent as such. [This science] consists of the universal science, which focuses on the divisions of existence, and divine science. [The remaining two parts are mathematics and natural philosophy.]

[the subject matter, absolute existence, is immediately evident]

You have already learned that the subject matter of every science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in the science. The investigation in this science confines itself to an inquiry into the modes (aḥwāl) of the essential accidents of absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq). So absolute existence is its subject matter. Knowledge of this is not acquired, since everyone knows his own existence immediately, and it is more appropriate that absolute [existence] be immediate [than specified existence]. The subject matters of all other sciences do not go beyond particular instances of existence.

[the nobility of metaphysics, in light of its goal]

The aim of the investigation in this science is understanding of pure goods, which are separate beings, and the principles of generated things, and understanding of the Necessary Existent, and of how goods emanate from Him and trace back to Him. The aim of the investigation in other sciences is more base than the aim of this science: the nobility of each science is in accordance with the nobility its subject matter and its end. As the subject matter of this science is the noblest of subjects, and its end is the highest of ends, this science is the noblest and most exalted of sciences.

[designations for metaphysics]

In consideration of what is understood through this science concerning the Divinity and His states (aḥwāl), this science is called “divine science.” But in consideration of its investigation into the states of universal, absolute existence, and of the fact that other sciences are understood by understanding this science, and that the practitioner of every particular science accepts his premises from this science, either as starting-points [of demonstrations] or as postulates, this science is called the “universal science.” One must learn this science after other particular sciences: [after] logic, because [logic] brings one to the understanding of its sought conclusions; [after] natural philosophy and mathematics, because [metaphysics] is separated from matter both in conception and in existence. The natural is subject to change, and is separated from matter neither in conception nor in existence. The mathematical is separated from matter in conception, but not in existence. Whatever is more remote from matter is more remote from our understanding in comparison to our senses, while whatever is closer to [matter] is closer to our senses. But it is more appropriate to […]⁸ with that which is closer to us than with that which is more remote. That is why the natural science is prior to the mathematical science. For the same reason this science is called metaphysics. Sometimes it is called “what is before physics,” insofar as that which is investigated in it, like the Creator, the exalted, and the separate beings, are essentially prior to nature, and insofar as the principles of all sciences are demonstrated in it.

[the task of kalām]

Since the perfection and fulfillment (tamām) of anything is achieved by obtaining the perfections which are possible for it, the perfection of human souls arises through their perfections. This is comprehension of intelligibles and knowledge of what [was previously] unknown. The sciences are many, and the things to be known are numerous. Time does not allow for thoroughly acquiring them in their entirety, and life is too short for comprehending them as a whole. Additionally, aspirations fall short, motivations are weak, there are many distractions, and hindrances may be overwhelming. So one must aspire to attain the most perfect of them, and to comprehend the best among them. One prioritizes whatever is most important, and that whose understanding offers the most complete utility. And so it emerges that the most appropriate thing for the insightful to set their sights on through inquiry and for the limit of aspirations and thoughts to strain towards, is that whose subject-matter is the most elevated of all, and whose end is the most noble of all, and which is needed for attaining eternal and unending happiness. The religious sciences trace back to it, and the rules of the religious Law (al-nawāmīs al-sharʿiyya) depend on it. Through it come the welfare of the world and its arrangement, its loosening and tightening. The ways and paths that lead to it are certainties [68] and decisive arguments (qaṭʿiyyāt). This is the science known as ʿilm al-kalām, which investigates the essence of Necessary Existent, His attributes, His actions, and what is connected to them.

[metaphysics as the study of general features]

By “common things (umūr al-ʿāmma)” [al-Rāzī] means things that the Necessary in itself and the contingent in itself share in common. These are existence, as will be shown, and unity. [Unity is shared in common] because every existent has being (huwiyya), and this being is unity, so that unity occurs [even] to multiplicity as such, so that one may say, “this multiplicity is one.” When he says, “things that are along the same lines as the common things,” [al-Rāzī] means those things that are shared in common between most [but not quite all] existents; namely, essence, for every existent apart from the Necessary in itself has an essence distinct from its existence, and necessity through another, since this is something shared in common by most existents. […] [176v9] Also contingency, that is, the fact that all [existents apart from God] are such that their essences demand neither existence nor non-existence; rather, each of these two [options] arises only through an extrinsic cause. And multiplicity: even though it does not include all contingent existents, it must belong to most of them, since the species whose instances are multiple outnumber those that are proper to just one individual. Then there is impossibility. In itself, it is something shared in common by multiple non-existents (maʿdūmāt) from which existence is excluded. So it is also counted among those things that are along the same lines as common things, even if in truth, and according to what we have offered in explanation (tafsīr), it is not really so. Then, by “things that are along the same lines as species of common things,” [al-Rāzī] means those things into which the common things are divided. These are necessary and contingent existence, since the division of existence into these two is obvious; and eternity and origination, since the existent is divided into the eternal existent, that is, the existent not preceded by non-existence, and the originated existent, which is preceded by non-existence.

[the place of the study of common notions]

As for the second division of divine science, it is further subdivided. [First], that for which the object of knowledge cannot be in matter. This is knowledge of the essence of God the exalted, the attributes of His transcendence, the properties of His Majesty, His acts, judgments, names, and the angels that are near [to Him]. This science is called the “science of unity (tawḥīd) and Lordship (rubūbiyya).” [Second] that for which the object of knowledge may or may not be in matter. Here the topics of inquiry are the common things (al-umūr al-ʿāmma), like existence, non-existence, necessity, contingency, cause, quiddity, universality, particularity, unity, multiplicity, eternity, temporal origination, and the Lights. This division is called “universal science.” Logic too is included in this division. This division of divine science is the most general of divisions in the sciences, and the most readily known, so it should come first in the [order of] instruction. For this reason, we come to these topics of inquiry right after logic. Then after this section [on the common things], we inserted natural philosophy (al-ṭabīʿī), since it is an imprint (ṭabʿ) of made and created things, which are signs and indications for their eternal Maker and wise Governor. Indeed, signs and indications must be mentioned first, before those things that are sought and intended. Then we add to it the divine science.

[metaphysics is about the existent]

Know that the universal goal of occupying yourself with scientific inquiries is divine science. How could it be otherwise, given that among the sciences, this science is one without which no other science could be [properly] considered? It is the universal science, with no other science above it. Hence, it inquires into the most general of all existents, namely unqualified existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq). Because it inquires into this, it [also] inquires into the attachments connected to it and into its principles, by contrast with natural philosophy and mathematics, since these are particular sciences. […]

[263.14] The divine science is one: otherwise it would not be universal. If it were in itself multiple, then it would be composed out of sciences, and whatever is like this is more specific in comparison to that from which it is composed. [264] As this science inquires into existence and its attachments, it also inquires into unity and its attachments, since a thing cannot be rightly called “existent” without being rightly called “one.” Thus even multiplicity, its remoteness from the nature of unity notwithstanding, is said to be “one.” Given that this science does inquire into unity, and multiplicity is something opposed to [unity], it inquires into multiplicity, I mean, inquires into it insofar as it inquires into what is opposed to [unity].

[divine science arranged in a kalām structure of foundations and branches]

Divine science has foundations (uṣūl) and branches (furūʿ):

Its foundations are five. First, common things, such as being a cause and being an effect. Second, an inquiry into the principles of those sciences whose subject matter falls below it. Third, establishing the First Cause and His unity, and whatever is connected with His majesty, great and exalted. [528] Fourth, establishing the spiritual substances. Fifth, [an inquiry] into how passive, earthly things are connected with the power of celestial agents, how contingent things are arranged, and how they trace back to the First Principle.

Its branches are two. First, investigation into how revelation [occurs] and how the intelligible becomes sensible, in order that the kingly prophet can see it, and hear its words; and regarding the understanding of revelations and of the guardian spirit. Second, the knowledge of the spiritual return, and that the intellect can neither perceive nor verify anything bodily independently.

[the relation between metaphysics and kalām]

The sciences may be distinguished as species into several divisions, and further distinguished as branches within these divisions, but divine science is the noblest among them in rank and highest in position. By way of decisive demonstrations and clear proofs, it inquires into the divine modes and lordly secrets, which are the highest of objects of inquiry and the utmost of goals for the genuine sciences and certain understanding. For through [those objects of inquiry] one arrives at an understanding of the essence of God the exalted and His attributes, and at a conception of His making and the things He has made. In addition, [this science] includes [60] noble inquiries and subtle points by which the soul is disposed for the verification of true realities (taḥqīq al-ḥaqāʾiq), and becomes independent in understanding fine details. These ideas led us to write a book that would succinctly cover the questions within this science, and the splendid benefits of this discipline (fann), according to the canon of Islam: it is called the science of kalām. […]

[65.5] On the quiddity of kalām and its subject matter. Given that the science of kalām itself inquires into the essence of God the exalted, His attributes, His names, and into the modes of angels, prophets, saints, imams, the obedient and disobedient, and other matters besides in both this and the next world, and given that it is distinguished from divine [science], which shares in common with it [66] those objects of inquiry, by proceeding in accordance with the method of this [religious] Law—[given all this,] the definition [of kalām] is “the science in which one inquires into the essence of God the exalted, His attributes, and the states of contingent throughout the procession and the return (fī al-mabdaʾ wa-al-maʿād), in accordance with the canon of Islam.” With this one may know that in [kalām] we inquire only into the essential accidents of the essence of God the exalted, as such, and into the essential accidents of contingent things, inasmuch as they stand in need of God the exalted. Its subject matter is thus the essence of God the exalted, as such, and the essence of contingents insofar as they are bound by their need [for God], since it is known that the subject matter of every science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in it.

[the relation between kalām and metaphysics in falsafa]

By the “canon of Islam,” I mean the foundations of Islam, consisting in the Book of God, the customs of His prophet, consensus (ijmāʿ), and any deliverance of reason (maʿqūl) that does not contradict them, since these too are among the foundations of Islam. The philosophers (falāsifa) too inquire into the [same] things [investigated by kalām], but according to the foundations of philosophy, for instance that only one proceeds from one; that one and the same thing cannot be [3r] active and passive at the same time; that contingency is an existential attribute; that the return [of what no longer exists] is impossible; that revelation and [God’s] sending the ruler is absurd. They call [their investigation] “divine science.” The distinction between kalām and divine science is that kalām is in accordance with the foundations of this religious law, whereas the divine science is in accordance with the foundations of philosophy (al-falsafa).

[on the division of his work on kalām into principles and problems]

The parts of sciences are three: subject matters, principles (mabādiʾ), and problems (masāʾil), since whichever science you take, it must have certain propositions (aḥkām) that are intended (maqṣūda) to be shown in it. But we may also mention things in [a science] which are not intended in themselves, but are rather for the sake of showing the propositions intended in [that science]. These things are of two kinds: necessary and not necessary. The necessary are either common to all sciences, such as the principle of non-contradiction […] [2r16] or they are specific to one science or to several sciences, like the fact that what is equal to the equal is itself equal […]. [2r18] The unnecessary is either intended in some other science, and shown in it (such as the fact that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, this being among the propositions found in the book of Euclid), or not. In the latter case, [those propositions] may not be shown in any other science at all, and then the practitioner of kalām should consider them doubtful and refute them, such as the claim that one infinite cannot be bigger than another; or [those elements that are not shown in any other science] are shown in this science on some other occasion. There are many such [propositions]. Thereby, one may know that among the things mentioned in a science, some are intended in themselves, others accidentally. Those things that are intended in themselves are the “problems” of the science, while those that are intended accidentally are its “principles.”

[kalām does not properly prove God’s existence]

The specific existent which is God, mighty and exalted, is the subject-matter of the science of kalām, which is [also] called “foundations of religion (uṣūl al-dīn).” In it are investigated His attributes and the actions proper to Him. You have already learned repeatedly at other places that the subject-matter of each science is that whose proper concomitants are investigated. So, this specific existent is the subject-matter in the science of kalām. But that there is this specific existent, that it exists (inniyyatuhu wa-wujūduhu), is investigated in divine science, in which one investigates the existent as such; thus it may be taken for granted in this science [i.e. kalām] that there is God, that He exists. The subject-matter of a science is not something sought in [the science]. One does not investigate whether there is the subject-matter, but rather the items proper to it that are its concomitants. Therefore, the fact that there is the Necessary Existent, and that it exists, is not something sought in this science, but is taken for granted in it.

If you say: we see that the theologians persist in establishing the Necessary Existent in this science, arguing at times from the contingency of essences, sometimes from the contingency of attributes, and sometimes from the origination of both.

I say: by this, they intend not to establish that He is, and that He exists, but that all [102] existents terminate in Him and that He is the principle for them. This is one of His proper attributes, even though it may follow from this that He exists, that He is. This is like the philosopher (ḥakīm) who establishes that there is a Necessary Existent on the grounds that all existents depend on it. His intention is not that God is the principle of all existents, even if that may follow from this.

[on the name “divine science,” and why kalām is not called this]

If you say: why is divine science called “divine science,” while this science is called “the science of kalām”?

I say: the first is because its utmost goal is understanding the existence of the Divinity, great and exalted. This is its most significant (aʿẓam) question, and the noblest thing it seeks, even though it does seek other things too. Often a whole or aggregate is called after individual members or parts, especially after the most perfect part and the noblest individual member.

If you say: all the things sought in this science, that is, the science of kalām, or at least most of them, are the attributes of the Exalted and the actions that are proper to Him. Would it not be more appropriate, then, for this to be called “divine science”?

I say: the essence of a thing is nobler than its attributes. Given that it is in divine science that one inquires into the existence of the essence of the Divinity, the name “divine science” is proper to it, and the science of kalām has a different name.

The second [science is called the science of kalām] because it was a custom for the first practitioners to say, regarding the things sought in this science, “the kalām about this issue is …,” as if saying, “on this issue what one says (qawl) is …” Hence it came to be called the science of kalām. The reason why it is [also] called “the science of the foundations of religion (uṣūl al-dīn)” is obvious.

[God is not proven in kalām]

We do not concede that [God’s existence] is established in [the science of kalām]. Rather, the problem of establishing the Necessary lies outside the problems of the science of kalām.

Let it not be said: in which science, then, can it ever be established, given that kalām is the highest of sciences? Nor [should it be said]: given that the inquiry [into proving God’s existence] is mentioned in the middle of books on kalām, how can it not belong to it?

For we say: we do not concede that [God’s existence] must be established in the highest science. Why can’t other sciences find the solution and pass this on to the science of kalām? Then, the science of kalām would in the case of this individual, distinct problem need demonstrations that are not offered by kalām, but it would still be mentioned in books on kalām. Its occupying this later position, having been taken from elsewhere, does not require that it is later by nature, since it may simply be easier for it to occupy this position.

[distinguishing kalām from metaphysics]

It might be said: the subject matter of [kalām] is the essence of God and the essence of contingent things, insofar as they are traced back to the Exalted in a chain in which [each thing has] need [of the next]. For the theologian (mutakallim) inquires into both of these things, and, taken together, they are the subject matter.

The objection to this has already been mentioned [i.e. Avicenna’s arguments against God’s being the subject matter of metaphysics].

It might be said: the subject matter of [kalām] is unqualified existence, since [this science] inquires into the essential accidents of [existence], like eternal and originated, its divisions, like substance and accident, [106] and the divisions of these two, like the First, His Attributes, and His actions.

To this it may be responded: in that case, it usurps the role of divine science. But if one adds the qualification “according to the rule (qānūn) of Islam,” then this will no longer be the case, since the metaphysician inquires according to the rule of reason alone.

[the structure of the theoretical sciences; the branches of metaphysics]

Theoretical (naẓarī) sciences concern either that which is separate from corporeal matter in both modes of existence [i.e. mental and concrete], or that which is not separate. In the former case, it is the highest science, also known as the universal science, first philosophy, metaphysics, and the divine science. In the latter case, if it can be separated from matter in the mind alone, it is the middle science, also known as mathematics. Otherwise it is natural science, which is called the lowest science. All [subordinate] sciences branch out from these.

The science of logic is one of the branches (furūʿ) of the highest science. But some [scholars] locate it in the initial division [of sciences], as follows: a science is either sought as an instrument for other sciences, or not. The former is logic, the latter is either practical or theoretical, in the way you have learned regarding the other division.

Other branches of the highest science are how revelation occurs and the states of the return (al-maʿād). Both have been mentioned in this book.

[the subject matter is existence and not “thingness”]

[Suhrawardī] said: “the subject matter of [divine science] is the most general of things (al-ashyāʾ), namely unqualified existence, and [this science] investigates its essential accidents and its divisions.”

You should know that some people claim that thingness (shayʾiyya) is more general than existence, basing this on the [claim] that thingness may hold true of something intelligible that has no existence in concrete individuals, which is not the case with existence. And furthermore, on the [claim] that one can predicate [thingness] of existence itself, and of the quiddity to which existence occurs. But this is a mistake. The intelligible that lacks existence in concrete individuals still exists in the mind. Whatever is a thing in the mind is likewise an existent in it, just as whatever is not existent in concrete individuals is not a thing there either. As for the point that thingness may be truly said of existence and quiddity, this may be refuted on the grounds that mental existence is truly said of thingness and a specific quiddity. So it is more general than both.

[7] Thereby it becomes clear that the existence which is the subject matter of this science does not mean specifically extramental existence, nor specifically mental existence alone, but rather unqualified (muṭlaq) existence, as the author of this book [i.e. Suhrawardī] has mentioned.

[existence is transcategorical and known in itself]

Things that can be separated from matter are either substances (ūsīyās), or quantities, or fall into other categories. As there is no other notion apart from “it is” (īṯ) that can account for them, hence, this is the subject matter of this science. As it [i.e. existence] can be known by itself, it requires no other science in order to be made manifest.

[existence is maximally evident]

This science is above all [other] sciences, with no science above it in which its subject matter could be shown. So the subject matter of this science must be something that does not need to be shown, but is self-evident. The most evident and obvious thing there is, is the existent as such. Hence it must be the subject matter of the divine science.

[the unity of sciences; ascent and descent through the sciences]

Someone who offers a correct division of existence in the universal science, will be able to arrive, through these divisions, at all the precepts (qawāʿid) of natural philosophy, mathematics, divine science, and ethics, so that all sciences become one and the same science, as was the case in antiquity, before Aristotle came along. Philosophers have distinguished these sciences from one another because the distinction is easier, and more conducive to teaching and learning. For if the sciences were not distinguished and ordered as they are now, and were instead all a single science, then one would begin teaching with what is universal and most general, namely existence and the first principles, which are remote from sensation, imagination, and the instinct of the soul, which is too weak to perceive this, because of its connection to instances of matter, and because influences from [these instances of matter] affect it. Therefore, the soul is at first incapable of perceiving universal, general items and the remote first principles, without prior practice, reminding, and familiarization with the particular sciences. But when the student (ṭālib) begins with instruction about whatever is closer to the instinct and nature of the soul, namely sensible things, he thereby relies on sensation and comes to understand whatever is close to it, accepting its principles and the principles of whatever is close to it, so that in this fashion the particular sciences are attained by him. If he should look to ascend from these to the highest, above which there is no other science, and in which all the principles of the particular sciences are shown, then at that point he will have verified the knowledge of principles. Then he can reverse his direction and return through the sciences from where he ended to where he started. The ancients called his return real instruction and attainment.

[against existence as the subject matter]

It will soon become evident to you that existence, and the existent as such,⁹ are mental considerations that have no existence in concrete individuals. But that which does not exist in concrete individuals cannot be the subject to which real, existing things are attributed, and so cannot be the subject matter for metaphysics. Thus existence cannot be its subject matter.

[against existence as the subject matter]

The subject matter of this science is every existent, or the Necessary Existent, or the contingent existent. But each option is false. The first, because [this science] inquires into things that do not occur to every existent. The second, because this science has the task of proving it. The third, because in this case [existence] is subject to doubt.

Objection: this set of options has omitted existence as such.

[412] Response: we will show that existence as such, being among things that accidentally occur to existents, is contingent, and so falls into the third division.

[the subject matter and scope of kalām]

In the science of kalām, one inquires into the most general of things, existence. Existence is divided primarily into the eternal and the originated. Then, the originated is divided into substance and accident. Then, accident is divided into that which has life as a condition and that which does not. Substance, meanwhile, is divided into animal, plant, and mineral. And one shows the way that [these all] differ from one another, whether the differences be essential or accidental. Then, one inquires into the eternal, showing the absence of multiplicity in it in all respects, and showing that it differs from originated things by virtue of the attributes that are necessary for it, and [by virtue of] those which are impossible. A distinction is drawn between the necessary, the possible, and the impossible. Then, one shows that action is in principle possible for Him, that the world is His action, and that the sending of prophets is among His effects, and that [12] they confirm that they are genuine by working miracles. Then reason must acknowledge the Prophet, whose genuineness may be inferred from what he says about God the exalted and about judgment day: this is something that reason cannot perceive, but nor can it judge that it is impossible. There is no doubt that these things are among the accidents of existence as such. Hence the subject matter of [kalām] is unqualified existence.