[essence-existence distinction and doubt argument]

You should know: everything that has a quiddity is realized (yataḥaqqaqu) as existent in concrete individuals, or as conceptualized in the mind, while its parts occur together with it. If it has any true reality (ḥaqīqa) apart from its being existent in one of the two modes of existence, and is not constituted by [existence], then existence is something added to its true reality (maʿnā muḍāf ilā ḥaqīqatihi)—either as a necessary concomitant, or not. Also the grounds of its existence (asbāb al-wujūd) are different from the grounds of its quiddity. Take for instance humanity. In itself it is a true reality and a quiddity, but the fact that it is existent in concrete individuals or in the mind is not constitutive of it, but rather additional to it. If it were constitutive of it, then since it would be impossible to form a notion (maʿnā) of it in the soul in the absence of its constitutive parts, it would be impossible for an understanding (mafhūm) of “humanity” to have existence in the soul while one doubts whether or not it has existence in concrete individuals. As for human, perhaps there is no doubt concerning its existence, yet this not because of the understanding of [human] but because there is sense-perception of its particular instantiations. You can then find examples to make the same point with other notions.

[shorter version of the doubt argument]

You should know: you understand the meaning of triangle, while doubting whether or not existence among concrete individuals is attributed to it. After it occurs to you that it consists of line and plane, it does not [thereby] occur to you that it exists in concrete individuals.

[priority argument]

The quiddity of something may be the ground for one of its attributes (ṣifa), and one of its attributes can be the ground for another attribute, for example a specific difference [may be the ground] for a proper accident. Nevertheless that attribute which is the existence of something cannot be grounded by its quiddity, which is not [itself] existence, nor can it be grounded in some other attribute. For the ground is prior in existence, and nothing is prior in existence to existence.

[infinite regress and “being existent (mawjūdiyya)”]

As for establishing the existence of the subject-matter of this science, namely existence, this is unnecessary. For, when we say “this is existent,” we mean two things by this. First, that it possesses existence (dhū wujūd), as we say: “head is related (muḍāf) to somebody who possesses a head.” This statement is [however] metaphorical. In reality the existent is existence and the related is relation. For existence is not that through which (mā yukūnu bihi) something is among concrete individuals, but is “something’s being (kawn) among concrete individuals” or “coming-to-be (ṣayrūra) in concrete individuals.” If something were among the concrete individuals through its being among concrete individuals, it would lead to an infinite regress, with the result that nothing could ever rightly be said to be among concrete individuals. Thus, the existence which is [something’s] being among concrete individuals is “being existent (mawjūdiyya),” and the Existence necessary in itself is [just] its being existent.

[extramental existence is an accident intrinsically related to that which exists]

If existence is something common (ʿāmm), then its existence must be in the soul. For existence exists in the soul through existence, since it is like other conceptualized meanings. As for the [existence] which is among concrete individuals, it is [only] “something existent (mawjūd mā).” The specification (takhṣīṣ) of each existent obtains through a relation (bi-al-iḍāfa) to its subject; that is, it is constituted by its relation to its subject and its ground, so that the relation does not attach to it extrinsically. For the existence of that which is caused is an accident, and every accident is constituted through its existence in its subject. The same goes for existence. For instance, the existence of the human is constituted by its relation to the human, and the existence of Zayd is constituted by a relation to Zayd. […]

[283] The proof for this is that if [existence] were something self-subsistent, and then a relation to different subjects attached to it extrinsically, the relation would have to be existent for the existence,⁹ which is assumed to be self-subsistent, through that very existence; but then the existence of the relation to a subject would have to pertain to the existence which is assumed to be self-subsistent, and this is a contradiction. Thus, the relation of each existence to its subject is not an attachment to it, but rather a constituent. But that which is constituted through an accident, that is, [through] a relation, is itself an accident. […]

[283.7] The [specific] existents are entities whose names are unknown. Their names can be explicated as “existent as such-and-such” or “existent which does not have a ground.” Then, a common existence is associated with all of them in the mind. Likewise, if we did not know the names and descriptions of quantity, quality and other accidents, we would say about quantity e.g. that it is a particular kind of accident (ʿaraḍ mā) or a particular kind of existent in a subject (mawjūd mā fī mawḍūʿ).

[existence is a secondary intelligible]

“Thing” is one of the secondary intelligibles that are traceable to the primary intelligibles. [“Thing”] has a role analogous (ḥukm) to “universal,” “particular,” “genus,” and “species.” No existent among the things that exist is [just] a “thing.” Rather the existent is either a human, or a sphere [etc.]. And then, when one grasps this intellectually, it follows that it is a thing. Likewise with “essence (al-dhāt),” and likewise too “existence (al-wujūd),” in relation to its different types.

[infinite regress argument]

Before we enter into the solution of this doubt (shubha), we put forward a necessity demonstration that existence is something merely conceptual (amr iʿtibārī). We say: if existence in an existent were something additional (maʿnā zāʾid) to it in concrete individuals, then it would be existent. But it was said that every existent is existent through existence. Hence, existence would be existent through existence, and likewise its existence, and so on to infinity, but this is absurd.

[existence as a mental judgment that an essence is extramentally instantiated]

As for [existence’s] being something conceptual that exists in the soul (shayʾan iʿtibāriyyan mawjūdan fī al-nafs), you must realize that everything has a true reality through which it is specified and distinguished from everything else. This judgment is primary and no intellect can reject it. If an intellect grasps that true reality intellectually, I mean if a trace (athar) of that true reality occurs (ḥaṣala) in some intellect, and this intellect furthermore relates that true reality and quiddity to a form that occurs as existent in concrete individuals, then “being in the concrete individuals” is something additional to the essence of that quiddity and true reality, but is nothing additional to the essence of the existent (dhāt al-mawjūd). For the existent in concrete individuals is not that quiddity, since that quiddity cannot exist in the concrete individuals as such (bi-ʿaynihi), given that intellect can only think of something by grasping it intellectually as abstracted (mujarradan) from its individual accidents; and it is not possible that this exists extramentally insofar as it is something abstracted. […]

[65.18] As for the claim made by one who says, “if the existence of Zayd is not existent in the concrete individuals, how then is Zayd existent?”: this is a false, barefaced, sophistical argument. Its absurdity may be seen in two ways. [First]: their saying “if the existence of Zayd is not existent, how then is Zayd existent?” is tantamount to saying that the existent exists due to existence, which is just to insist on the fallacies of the first investigation. [Second]: the existence of an intellectually grasped Zayd is something intellectually grasped, existing in the soul. Indeed, the fallacies fail to distinguish between two modes of existence: in concrete individuals and in the soul.

If they say “we mean that Zayd is a particular grasped by the senses and by the intellect, so that his existence is something additional to the quiddity in the soul,” we reply: universal predicates may be applied to the subjects only after they are intellectually grasped; but existence is a universal predicate, so it can be predicated of a subject only after [the subject] is intellectually grasped. It does not matter whether, upon grasping it intellectually, the intellect takes it to be one and without multiplicity—as in God’s case—or not. […]

[66.11] Thus, it is clearly right to say that the existent among concrete individuals is one and the same thing as its existence. The multiplicity occurs only once it is intellectually grasped and when it becomes an intellectually grasped quiddity, to which is added that intellectually grasped entity (maʿnā) that is called “existence.”

[rejection of the solution that existence needs no further existence]

Some of them say: the attribute of existence requires no further existence in order to be existent. Rather it is existent without any further existence. Response: the person who says this simply wants to ward off the infinite regress, but does not manage to do so [108]. Instead he falls into a number of other absurdities, including:

We ask whether an indicated existence is existent or not. […] If they answer no, we ask: this existence that you believe in, is it something that has its own essence (dhāt) or not? If they answer no, [their notion of existence] is meaningless and absurd. But if they answer yes, we say: you have now accepted that there is an essence which is not existent through existence. Why then you would not accept this in respect of every existent and every essence, in order to be delivered from these contradictions and absurdities? Furthermore if your original claim was true, namely that the existent whiteness requires an existence additional to it, then it [sc. the existence of whiteness] also inevitably requires an existence additional to it, and this is absurd. […]

[108.14] If the attribute of existence¹⁰ is existent [109] in itself and not through another existence, and it is conjoined to the quiddity so that the quiddity becomes existent through it, then the predicate of the part would be applied to the whole, but this is absurd. Indeed, if this were so, the quiddity would not become existent. Instead, it would become conjoined to some existent item, so that the attribute of the part would not be predicated of the whole. For instance, whiteness is in itself whiteness. When it is conjoined to body, the composite does not become whiteness but rather becomes white. If whiteness were in itself white, then the body would not become white, but would rather become conjoined with something white. Admittedly, people in general do call whiteness “white” and say, “this is a white color.” However, this is metaphorical usage, not strictly accurate (lā ʿalā sabīl al-taḥqīq). If existence too were said to be existent in a metaphorical sense, and not with strict accuracy, then it is applied only as a metaphorical predication, and we have no quarrel with this. […]

[109.14] I heard one of them say that existence is existent with no need of a further existence, just as human is human through humanity, yet humanity does not require another humanity in order to be human.¹¹ [110] Someone who says this fails to distinguish between humanity and human. For if humanity were described as “human,” it would require a further humanity. Rather it is described as “humanity.” But then why not say the same about existence: that existence is not described as existent, such that it would require another existence; rather it is described as existence, and nothing else? Thus one could avoid the absurdity.

[indication of the priority problem]

It is essence [not existence] that derives [its being from something else] (al-mustafād); for essence is non-existent and then it exists. Therefore, the essence derives [its being from something else]. This kind of essence cannot be in need of existence or of a relation to existence, since essence is non-existent before existence, and how can one thing be in need of another before it even exists? A need for something can belong only to existing things, not non-existents. So, what really happens is that when the soul intellectually grasps that kind of essence, considers its states (aḥwāl) and distinguishes between them intellectually, some of them get classified as essential and others as accidental. [111] [The soul] then finds that existence in all things is accidental to them. So, it is beyond any doubt that existence is something additional to the intelligible quiddity. There is no quarrel about it. Rather, we quarrel about existence in concrete individuals.

[whether existence needs a further existence]

Another proof whose weakness they [i.e. the proponents of real essence-existence distinction] [can show] is something mentioned by the author of the Baṣāʾir [ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī] in several passages. The upshot of which is: “the existence of the quiddity that is in concrete individuals is either something occurring as an entity (amran mutaḥaṣṣilan al-dhāt) or not. If the existence [of the quiddity] does not occur as an entity, then the quiddity is non-existent. If however its existence occurs, then existence belongs to existence, and this yields an infinite regress.” This is nothing other than replacing the word existence by “occurrence (ḥuṣūl).” For occurrence is the same as existence, so it’s as if he asked, “is the existence of [the quiddity] existent or not?” Some of them say that existence is not existent. For nothing is attributed to itself (yūṣafu bi-nafsihi). For instance, one does not say that whiteness is white. Others say that existence is existent and its being existence is identical to its being existent. This is the “being existent (mawjūdiyya)” of a thing in concrete individuals, with no further existence belonging to it. Instead, it is existent insofar as it is existent. That which belongs to things other than it—that is, the attribution “existent”—belongs to it in itself (fī dhātihi), and is the same as its essence (dhāt). This is the basis of their position concerning these issues, and is the most prominent way they use to rebut the proofs of their opponents. Yet the argument is no different just by using the word “occurrence.” It’s amazing that he [i.e. al-Sāwī] elsewhere mocked this argument [i.e. asking whether existence is existent or not], but [here], when he replaced the word “existence” with “occurrence,” he admired it, although it is just the same argument.

[on the claim that existence needs no further existence]

The author of the Baṣāʾir [ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī], establishing existence as merely conceptual (iʿtibārī) by way of raising doubts, asked whether [existence] occurs as an entity or not. If it occurs as an entity, then existence belongs to it. However he [also] argued against those who ask whether existence is existent or not, claiming that it is incorrect to say that whiteness is white. Yet he commits the same sin he decries, since “occurring” is the same as “existent.”

[infinite regress and whether existence needs further existence]

One understands (yaʿrifu) existence primarily, along with the understanding of any existent or non-existent. We have already said that whatever one understands is existent. In light of this, existence [too] is existent; how could it be otherwise, given that whatever fails to exist (laysa bi-mawjūd) is non-existent (maʿdūm)? How then could existence, through which the existent exists, be non-existent or fail to exist? But if existence is existent, so that both the existent and the existence of this existent¹² exist, then the existent exists through existence, and the existence [likewise exists] through existence, which yields an infinite regress. Or [the infinite regress] stops with an existence that is existent in itself, not through some [further] existence that is attributed to it. This existence would inevitably be existent. When we say that such a thing is existent, we do not mean a composition of an attribute (ṣifa) and a subject of attribution (mawṣūf), that is, an existent to which existence belongs. Rather, we mean the existent whose essence is existence, like white color, not like white body. For white body is only white through white color, whereas white color is white through itself, not through [white] color yet again. For the existent essence of [this] color is existent whiteness, and color is a mental attribute (ṣifa dhihniyya), [64] whereas whiteness is a concrete, simple, existent object (al-ʿayn al-mawjūd), in which there is no composition. The composition is purely mental, insofar as one passes from one conception to another as generic and specific, given that whiteness and redness are similar in both being colors. Likewise, “existent” is said about that simple, first existence (al-wujūd al-awwal al-basīṭ), just as the white is said to be color. This isn’t because of any composition of color and whiteness in its essence. Likewise, in the essence of the first existence there is no such composition of existence and existent. Rather, “existent” is said about [first existence] and other existents by way of similarity and participation in the mind, just as color is said about the white and other colored existents. In the first existence, the referent (maʿnā) of “existent” and “existence” is one and the same, just as white color and whiteness in the white are one and the same in the concrete particular and being (huwiyya), not however in mental conceptualization.

[infinite regress and substitution of wujūd with ʿayn]

If someone asks: Are the true reality and quiddity of body affirmed as real (thābita) in the mind prior to its [sc. the body’s] existence, with it then becoming existent afterwards, so that existence may rightly be said to be accidental to the quiddity of body? And likewise for anything that is contingent in existence. We respond: The true reality of body is conceptualized before the existence of body, yet the true reality in itself is not prior to existence, so that existence would be added to this true reality afterwards. For if this were the case, then you would have to say that existence becomes [63] existent in the quiddity of body. Then the same would follow for the existence of existence that was necessary for the quiddity of body, thus yielding an infinite regress. It would [furthermore follow] that existence itself has a quiddity, just as body has a quiddity.

To the contrary, the meaning of “the existence of body” is that the Omnipotent created a body, and it entered concrete individuals in its essence and concrete being (ʿayn). So its concrete being is described as existent, that is, it is one of the concrete individuals (huwa ʿayn min al-ʿayān). Evidently, the fact that it is described as being one of the concrete individuals is due to its concrete being itself (li-ʿaynihi), not due to something additionally associated with the concrete being, that is, with the essence of body.

[rejection of the doubt argument]

The proof of our statement that the existence of each thing is identical to its essence (dhāt) is that, if it were additional to the essence or true reality of the thing, like body for instance, then it would be possible to know one of them without [knowing] the other. It is however impossible to distinguish between them [i.e. essence and existence] in knowledge. Given that this is unfeasible, then, since we never know a concrete body without knowing that it is existent, nor do we know that it is existent without knowing that it is body, we say that existence is nothing additional to corporeality.

[the doubt argument clarified]

Everyone [should] wonder about the proponents of real states that they made species, like [162] substantiality, corporeality, accidentality, and “being color,” something real even while they are non-existent (ashyāʾ thābita fī al-ʿadam). For, [these proponents reasoned,] knowledge is connected to them and whatever is known has to be a thing, in order that knowledge can depend upon (yatawakkaʾu) it. Furthermore, the same objects, that is, substantiality, accidentality, “being color” and “blackness” are states in existence that cannot be known in their own right, and are never existent by themselves. What can this be, that is known while non-existent, so that knowledge depends on it, but is not known when it is in existence?¹³

If they went the well-trodden path of intellects in their conception of things with their genera and species, they [sc. the proponents of states] would know that the conceptions of intellects are the quiddities of things with their genera and species, which do not call for realized existence (mawjūda muḥaqqiqa) or being postulated as real, extramental things (ashyāʾ thābita khārija ʿan al-ʿuqūl). And¹⁴ what belongs to them in themselves and in respect of their genera and species in the mind (fī al-dhihn), in terms of essential constituents (al-muqawwimāt al-dhātiyya), by which their selves are realized, does not depend on the act of any agent. So it is possible for them to be known while disregarding the question whether they exist. For the grounds (asbāb) of existence are different from those of quiddity.¹⁵ And [the proponents of states] would know that sensory perceptions are the concrete things themselves. The way we become acquainted with them calls for their realized existence, and their being acknowledged as real things outside of sensation (ashyāʾ thābita khārija ʿan al-ḥawāss). And what belongs to them in themselves as concrete beings and the way we become acquainted with them through sensation, in terms of accidental specifiers (al-mukhaṣṣiṣāt al-ʿaraḍiyya), by which their concrete selves are realized, does depend on the act of an agent. So they cannot exist deprived of these specifiers. [Again,] the grounds of existence are different from those of quiddity.

When the Muʿtazilites heard the philosophers (al-falāsifa) drawing a distinction between the two cases, they thought [163] that conceptions in minds are real things among concrete beings (al-mutaṣawwarāt fī al-adhhān hiya ashyāʾ thābita fī al-aʿyān), and concluded that the non-existent is a thing (shayʾ). And they thought that the genera and species existing in the mind are states that are real among concrete beings.¹⁶

[conceptualism regarding existence and states]

We say: there is no existent in concrete individuals apart from the objects themselves (dhawāt), which (with the exception of God the exalted) are either substances or existing (wujūdiyya) accidents, like white and heat, not like [the state of] “being a color” or “being an accident.” Existence is among the universals and the other accidents which we affirm as existing in the mind alone. [They are affirmed] when the mind makes a comparison between existent objects which differ in their quiddities, and finds both commonalities (mushārikāt) and differences (mubāyināt) among the attributes that follow from the variation in the quiddities. Hence, it predicates these attributes of them, even though in extramental reality, there are only objects that differ in their quiddities—precisely as we said in the case of white. For the mind predicates of it that it is a color, a quality, an accident, an existent, and the other attributes that we mentioned in the preceding chapter. Yet we clarified that none of them is existent in concrete individuals, along with what we said about relational and associated items (al-umūr al-nisbiyya wa-al-iḍāfiyya), which we decided exist in the mind [only].

[rejection of the solution that existence requires no further existence]

One should not say: existence requires no further existence, because its essence is existence and its existence is from the Bestower of existence (al-mūjid), not through another existence, whereas other existents exist through it [sc. existence]—just as body is white through whiteness, but whiteness is white through itself, since its essence is whiteness, not through whiteness. [This is wrong,] because white is said of those [objects] in which whiteness subsists and exists, since the white is that which has whiteness, or is the possessor of whiteness. By contrast whiteness does not subsist in whiteness, nor does it have whiteness; whiteness is not that which possesses whiteness, so it is not strictly (bi-al-ḥaqīqa) said to be “white.” If one calls it “[white] color,” this would be in an extended sense, which is metaphorical and equivocal. Strictly speaking, one should say that it is “a color which is whiteness,” not “white color,” that is, color possessing whiteness. If “existent” were a name for something in which existence subsists, and if existence were existent, then existence would have to subsist in [existence], just as white is predicated of something in which whiteness subsists.

[essence is distinct from existence]

You should know that the existence of contingent things is either the same as their quiddities or not. If not, then it is either intrinsic (dākhil) to their quiddities or not. These three are the only options. The first is that their existence is identical to their quiddities, the second that their existence is a part of their quiddities, the third that existence is extrinsic to their quiddities. The truth is the third, as arises from the fact that the other two are false.

[essence is distinct from existence]

Let us mention in this chapter the proofs that existence is not [identical to] quiddity, of which there are four. First, existence is shared by the quiddities, whereas the quiddities, which are more specific than existence, share no specific aspect (khuṣūṣiyya) of any quiddity that is more specific than existence; hence existence is different from the quiddities. Second, if existence were identical to quiddity, then saying that a substance exists would be just like saying that a substance is a substance, and in general there would be no predication or assertion (al-ḥaml wa-al-waḍʿ) here, only the linguistic form of one. Since this is not so, we know that existence is distinct from substancehood. […] [113.16] Third, existence does not need to be understood (taʿrīf) whereas quiddities, in their specificity, do require this. Hence existence is not identical to quiddity. Fourth, existence is opposed to non-existence and can be distinguished into necessary and contingent, whereas the specificities of quiddities are not opposed to these notions. Hence existence is distinct from the specificities.

[priority of essence over existence]

The fact that a quiddity is concrete (taʿayyun), insofar as it is quiddity, is either insufficient for the reception (qubūl) of existence, or it is sufficient. (a) If it is insufficient, then it follows that the quiddity’s receptivity of existence depends on a further existence, so that it would be existent before being existent, leading to the absurdities you have mentioned. This being false, it must be right to say that the existence of contingent things is not additional to their quiddities, but rather identical to them. But in that case, existence would be predicated of existent quiddities equivocally. (b) Alternatively, if the fact that a quiddity is concrete, insofar as it is quiddity, is sufficient for the receptivity of existence, and the priority of the quiddity and its receptivity of existence do not conceptually imply (yaʿtabiru) its being existent before being existent, then why can’t the fact that a quiddity is concrete be sufficient for its producing (muʾaththiratan) [127] existence, so that its priority to existence in being productive does not conceptually imply its being existent before being existent?

[priority argument and the neutrality of essence with respect to existence]

If they say: if by quiddity’s “bringing about” you do not conceptually imply its “being existent,” you must allow that it brings about existence even while being non-existent, which is absurd. We say: this is a unconvincing challenge. For the conception (iʿtibār) of the quiddity is distinct from the conception of its existence and non-existence. We attach existence to this quiddity as such, not insofar it is non-existent. There are two things that indicate the truth of what we say.

First, they claim [themselves] that if the quiddity is qualified (shuriṭa) by existence or non-existence, then contingency does not occur to it, but contingency occurs to it as such. So, just as non-existence need not enter into it simply because it lacks existence at the level of the conception of the quiddity qualified as contingent, in the same way it does not follow in our problem.

Second, the quiddity receives existence without being qualified with (lā bi-sharṭ) a further existence. Besides, they need not make the receiver of existence a non-existent quiddity, such that one would have to say that existence is attributed to the quiddity while it is non-existent. Likewise here, we do not make that which produces to be a non-existent quiddity, so that it would have to be producing even while being non-existent. Rather, what is producing is the quiddity itself.

[more on the neutrality of essence]

Contingent quiddity entails contingency as such (li-mā hiya hiya); as for existence, it arises only due to a distinct cause. What is through itself is prior to what is through another. Hence, the fact that the contingent quiddity entails contingency is prior to the attribution of existence to [the quiddity]. It is therefore established that the fact that the quiddity entails its necessary concomitants is prior to the attribution of existence, and it is established that the fact that the quiddity entails its necessary concomitants does not depend on that quiddity’s being existent.

[affirmation principle and the neutrality of essence]

The one who denies that existence is additional to quiddity offers the following proof: if existence were additional to quiddity, then existence would subsist in the quiddity. But if it depends on the fact that the quiddity is existent, then it follows that either something is a condition for itself, [88] or there is infinite regress. Yet if it does not depend on [quiddity’s being existent], then an affirmative attribute (al-ṣifa al-thubūtiyya) would have to subsist in pure non-existence. This is absurd, because essences are perceptible for us only through the attributes. And if we allow that the existent subsists in the non-existent, then [consider the example] of looking at a wall: we perceive nothing of it apart from its color, its density and its weight. If we accept that an existent attribute could subsist in a non-existent subject of inherence (al-maḥall), then we cannot rule out that something described as having a certain color, density and weight might be purely non-existent. This gives rise to a doubt as to whether the essence of the wall, or a man, is existent or not. But this is known to be false.

The answer to which is: the quiddity is the subject of inherence for existence. Furthermore the quiddity as such is a quiddity distinct from existence and non-existence. This does not imply the subsistence of something existent in something non-existent.

[affirmation principle and priority problem]

We do not say that existence is an affirmative attribute (ṣifa thubūtiyya) whose occurrence (ḥuṣūl) to a quiddity can do without the [the quiddity’s] occurring beforehand. Otherwise an infinite regress would follow […] [78.6] For we answer that, obviously, attributing affirmation (thubūt) to something does not require a further prior affirmation as a precondition. Rather, it is obvious that this is impossible, and that [only] the attribution of a further affirmative attribute (ṣifa thubūtiyya) to a thing requires as a precondition the affirmation of the subject of attribution. Given that the difference between the two cases is obvious [i.e. an affirmative attribute and affirmation itself], any confusion between the two is ruled out.

[existence is not an attribute]

Existence is not that through which something is real (mā yakūnu bi-hi thābitan), rather, it is the fact of being real itself (nafs kawnuhu thābitan).

Verification: We do not mean by existence anything but the occurrence (ḥuṣūl) of something, its realization (taḥaqquq) and its reality (thubūt). […]

[133.14] If someone says that he means by “existence” an attribute (ṣifa) that entails the occurrence of a thing among concrete individuals, we say: the occurrence of a thing among concrete individuals cannot be caused by an attribute that subsists in it, and this for two reasons:

[priority problem]

First, the fact that this attribute which is the cause of existence is attributed to [that thing] would precede its occurrence (ḥuṣūl) in itself, whereas the occurrence of existence, if this means the occurrence of quiddity itself (nafs ḥuṣūl al-māhiyya), is not like this. For it is [the quiddity’s] occurrence itself, not the occurrence of something to it, as has already been discussed. For the occurrence of something in itself precedes the occurrence of something else to it. So if the occurrence of something else to it were the cause of its occurrence in itself, a [vicious] circle would follow.

[infinite regress]

Second, the cause of the occurrence has to be different from the occurrence itself with respect to true reality (fī al-ḥaqīqa). Otherwise it would not be more appropriate that one is the cause of the other, rather than vice-versa. Yet surely some occurrence does belong to that cause [too], so that the occurrence of the cause of occurrence would require another [cause of occurrence], [134] yielding an infinite regress.

[doubt argument concerning particulars]

Then there was the argument put forward initially, namely that if existence were not the very being among concrete individuals (nafs al-kawn fī al-aʿyān), one could know a quiddity which has being among concrete individuals before knowing that this additional [attribute of existence] is established for it. In that case, we would not necessarily have knowledge of the existence of sensible things immediately, but would instead acquire it through proof, so that a doubt concerning that proof would be a doubt about this [sc. their existence]. Since this is false, we know that existence is nothing but the very fact of occurring among concrete individuals.

[the doubt argument and a solution to the infinite regress]

If someone says: your argument [i.e. the doubt argument] can be turned and applied to existence. For we conceptualize the true reality of existence, and doubt whether it occurs to concrete individuals. Hence it follows that [a further] existence belongs to existence. We say: one can doubt something in two ways: in some cases, there is a doubt whether an item is affirmed of it, in other cases, there is a doubt whether it is affirmed of an item. The doubt concerning existence (al-shakk fī al-wujūd) is not a doubt whether a further existence is affirmed of it. For existence cannot be described either with existence or with non-existence. The former because, if existence were described with a further existence, then in that case one would posit three items: first the quiddity, which is receptive and not received; second the first-order existence, which is received by the quiddity and receptive [116] of a further existence; third, the further existence. There would be no escape from affirming these three levels, with nothing else in between them, whether or not there is an infinite regress. For if these items [sc. quiddity, first-order existence and second-order existence] did not exist at these [levels] as correlated (mutalāqiyatan), then none of them could have the others as attributes.

We say, then, that the quiddity’s receptivity of the first-order existence either depends on the second-order existence or it does not. If not, then the first-order existence might be received by the quiddity while the second-order existence is non-existent. Then the existence of existence [of the quiddity] would be non-existent while the quiddity is existent, which is absurd. If on the other hand it does depend [on the second-order existence], then (a) it is absurd, and (b) even if we granted it, it would still yield the conclusion sought.

(a) There are two ways to show its impossibility. First, the first-order and second-order existence share a true reality (al-ḥaqīqa), and it is no more appropriate that one should inhere in the other than that it should be the other way around. This leads to the result that each of them inheres in the other, while both of them inhere in the quiddity, that two indistinguishable things occur together, that one thing is existent twice, that multiple existents are one, and that one thing inheres in two subjects of inherence—all of which is absurd. Second, given that they are equal in respect of quiddity, and that the second-order existence provides (yufīdu) the first-order existence with a disposition to inhere in the quiddity, it follows that the first-order existence must provide itself with this disposition; for things that coincide in respect of species are equal in their characteristics.

(b) The reason why [it still yields the conclusion] even if we granted [that the first-order existence depends on the second-order existence] is that the fact that existence is accidental to the quiddity is one of the necessary concomitants of existence. This necessary concomitant is caused by the second-order existence. Hence it is impossible to separate the first-order existence from the second-order existence. Rather [the first-order existence] will not be receptive of non-existence so long as the second-order existence is together with it. Thus it will not be contingent in respect of existence and non-existence. Obviously then, existence cannot have existence and non-existence as attributes. Therefore, the doubt concerning the affirmation (thābit) of existence is not a doubt whether another existence is affirmed for it. Rather, it is a doubt whether or not existence is affirmed of the quiddity [to which it belongs], and it must be distinct from that item of which it is affirmed.

[existence is not a mere concept]

If someone says: yet we intellectually grasp two essences without knowing whether one of them is implied by the other, or vice-versa, or whether one of them has an effect (athar) on the other or is an effect of the other, or whether one inheres in the other or is its subject of inherence. It follows that one being implied by the other or vice-versa, one having the other as an effect or vice-versa, or one inhering in the other or vice-versa—[all of this] is additional to the essence. This is absurd, since it yields an infinite regress. […] [86.23]

As for the argument about implying or being implied, and so on, these are [87] mere mental concepts (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya), as opposed to extramental existents. By contrast, one cannot say that [existence] is a mere mental concept. Otherwise one would have to say that it does not exist in concrete individuals, and admit that its existence in concrete individuals is the quiddity itself (nafs al-māhiyya). But this would just take us back to the aforementioned agreement between what is denied [i.e. existence] and what is affirmed [i.e. quiddity] concerning one and the same thing, which is absurd.

[existence is not a mere concept, but its occurrence is]

As for their statement that the occurrence of existence to a quiddity would have to be additional to existence itself, we say: the occurrence of one thing to another cannot be additional. Otherwise it would have to occur to this subject of inherence too, yielding an infinite regress. Rather the occurrence of one thing to another is a mere mental concept (iʿtibār dhihnī) which has no extramental occurrence [in its own right]. As for existence itself, one cannot say that it is a mere mental concept. So the difference is clear.

[compromise wording, close to al-Khayyām’s terminology]

If someone says: when we say “the substance is existent,” we mean that what the intellect conceptualizes as existent is occurrent (muḥaṣṣil) in extramental reality. This does not imply that its occurring in the extramental reality is additional to it, but only that its occurring in extramental reality is distinct from its being conceptualized in the mind. […]

[113.6] We answer: as for the first argument, it just admits [our own] conclusion (taslīm al-maṭlūb). For we do not claim that existence is an item additional to the fact that [substance] occurs in extramental reality. Rather, we claim that its occurrence in extramental reality is something additional to the meaning of its substancehood, and you have now agreed to this.

[solving how we can doubt mental existence]

If someone says: let’s grant that quiddity has to be distinct from its extramental existence, since it is possible to grasp it intellectually while it is non-existent in extramental reality. However it is impossible to grasp intellectually a quiddity while it is non-existent in the mind. How then does it follow from this argument that mental existence is additional to the true reality (al-ḥaqīqa)?

We say: because we can intellectually grasp the quiddity while doubting whether this intellectually grasped object possesses mental existence or not. For many people claimed that “intellectual grasping” refers to a connection (taʿalluq) between the intellective power and the intellectually grasped object, without the intellectually grasped object occurring in the mind before it was affirmed by way of demonstration. Hence it is established that quiddity can be intellectually grasped even while one is in doubt as to its mental existence; but the demonstration of this is lengthy. The upshot is that mental existence is not a necessary concomitant within awareness (fī al-shuʿūr), although it is a necessary concomitant of awareness (li-al-shuʿūr).

[another solution to the impossibility of doubting mental existence]

As for mental existence, the answer is that quiddity can exist among concrete individuals without mental existence, just as it exists in minds free from extramental existence. So one must distinguish [between essence and mental existence].

[doubt argument and existence as occurrence itself]

If existence were additional to quiddity, then the occurring quiddity could be grasped intellectually as being realized even while one is ignorant whether it exists; or one could grasp its existence intellectually even while one is ignorant of [the quiddity]. […]

[119.17] This is a sophism. For existence is nothing other than the fact that the quiddity has occurred (kawn muḥaṣṣalata) in extramental reality. When we intellectually grasp the quiddity as occurring in extramental reality, existence is already included in this intellectual grasping. In light of this, how is it possible that [the quiddity] is grasped intellectually [as occurring and realized] even while one is ignorant of [its] existence? Granted, this argument might be supposed to follow, if existence were made the cause for the occurrence of quiddity. But it is ruled out for someone who makes existence just the same as occurrence (nafs al-taḥaṣṣul) in extramental reality itself.

[options in the debate]

Some people take existence insofar as it is understood (min ḥaythu mafhūmuhu), as well as contingency and unity, to be items additional to things, while featuring among concrete individuals. Against them, others hold that these things as understood (fī mafhūmihā) are items additional to quiddities, but have no form among concrete individuals (ṣuwar fī al-aʿyān). These two groups are worth taking into account among the theoreticians (ahl al-naẓar), albeit that there is another group among laypeople (ṭāʾifa min al-ʿawāmm) who, according to the reports, say that contingency, existence and the like are not additional to the quiddities to which they are related, whether in the mind or in concrete reality. But there is no point quarreling with them. For you know that if you say, “horse is contingent in respect of existence,” or “human is contingent in respect of existence,” you do not mean by “contingency of existence,” in the case of the horse, the horse itself, nor do you mean by “contingency of existence,” in the case of the human, the human itself. Rather it is with one and the same meaning that [344] you apply [contingency of existence] to the horse and the human. If the meaning of “contingency of existence” were horseness, and one applied “contingency” to human with the same meaning that is applied to the things described with horseness, then the human would be a horse!

[terminology: huwiyya]

Those who say that contingency, existence, unity etc. are items that have concrete being (huwiyyāt) that is additional to quiddity, to which they attach in concrete individuals, argued as follows […].

[existence in concrete individuals applies to the concept in the mind]

[346.3] You are wrong to say, in your first argument, that [something] is either contingent in concrete individuals or existent in concrete individuals, implying that [either way] its contingency and its existence are among concrete individuals. For from the fact that we truly judge [of something] that it is contingent in concrete individuals, it does not follow that its contingency occurs in concrete individuals. Rather it is from the perspective of the mind (min qibal al-dhihn) that [that thing] is judged to be among concrete individuals; and it can also be judged to be contingent in the mind. Contingency is a mental attribute (ṣifa dhihniyya), which the mind sometimes relates to something that is in the mind, sometimes to something concrete, and sometimes it makes a judgment absolutely, as equally related to both [what is in] the mind and [what is] concrete.

[Those responding may also] say: your way of arguing about contingency, unity and existence and such notions fails, when you say that such-and-such a thing is impossible of existence in concrete individuals. When we say “impossible in concrete individuals” we do not mean that impossibility has some form in concrete individuals. […]

[existence is a secondary intelligible]

[346.14] Attributes are distinguished into those that have existence both in the mind and concretely, like the white, and those which describe quiddities yet have existence only in the mind; their concrete existence is their being in the mind. For instance being a species, which is predicated of the human, and particularity, which is predicated of Zayd. For our saying “Zayd is a particular in concrete individuals” does not mean that particularity has some form among concrete individuals that subsists through Zayd. The same goes for thingness (shayʾiyya), [347] which many of them have acknowledged as a secondary intelligible (min al-maʿqūlāt al-thāwānī), although one can truly say, “X is a thing in concrete individuals.” Contingency, existence, necessity, unity, and such notions belong to this group.

[correspondence problem]

Those who believed that existence, contingency, unity etc. have a form in concrete individuals argued on the basis of the fact that we say that something is contingent in concrete individuals or that it is one or that it its existent, so that they have to have some entitative realities (dhawāt) and forms (ṣuwar) in concrete individuals. Otherwise the aforementioned statements would not be true. One may object to them on the basis of our saying, “X is impossible in concrete individuals.” For its impossibility does not have to have a concrete being (huwiyya ʿaynan) [as] it would [also] imply the reality of that whose [impossibility] has been established. So, it is conceded that these things—i.e. existence, contingency etc.—are something additional to quiddity, yet it is not conceded that they have concrete being.

[163] Question: Is not it the case that everything in the mind is a resemblance (mithāl) of the concrete [extramental entities]?

Response: we talk about correspondence (al-muṭābaqa) only in the cases when there is an entity (dhāt) in concrete individuals, such as blackness and whiteness. As for the merely conceptual items (al-iʿtibāriyyāt), they do not have any concrete being (huwiyyāt ʿayniyya). Rather their concrete existence is just their mental existence. Sometimes it is related to the concrete, as when one says “a thing such-and-such is impossible as a concrete entity.” Sometimes it is related to the mental, or to both of them, as when one says “the occurrence of a form and its simultaneous non-existence in the mind and absolutely is absurd.”

[doubt argument and infinite regress]

Another consideration is that the opponents of these followers of the Peripatetics understand existence, yet doubt whether it occurs in concrete individuals or not, just as they did in the case of the quiddity. Existence then would have another existence, yielding an infinite regress. It is clear from this that there is nothing in existence which is a concrete individual of the quiddity of existence (ʿayn māhiyyat al-wujūd); for as soon as we conceive of its meaning, we may doubt whether or not it has existence. Thus it would have a further existence, leading to an infinite regress.

[doubt argument and answer to Abū al-Barakāt’s solution that existence needs no further existence]

One cannot say that existence is additional to quiddity among concrete individuals, because we can intellectually grasp [the quiddity] apart from [existence]. For we understand existence as such too, for instance the existence of phoenix, without our knowing that it is existent in concrete individuals. Hence, existence needs another existence, and that forms an infinite series whose elements are ordered and exist simultaneously, which you already know to be impossible.

Counter-argument: existence and being existent are one and the same. What is other than it [receives existence] from it, [however existence] belongs to [existence] in itself (fī dhātihi).

Response: we understand [existence] in relation to the jinn, for instance (as has been mentioned above), without knowing whether it in fact occurs. The existence of existence is different from [existence], just like in the case of quiddity. If [existence] were existent simply due to its being existence, then this would be so by virtue of its quiddity, and its non-existence would be inconceivable.

[why there is no infinite regress]

Furthermore, if the existence of existence is added to [existence], leading to an infinite regress, then existence would not occur for anything until the Agent makes the existence of its existence exist, and it would go on like this, so that nothing would be originated in time until a preceding infinity were originated. But that which depends on an ordered infinity has never occurred and will never occur.

[infinite regress and another answer to Abū al-Barakāt’s solution that existence needs no further existence]

Existence applies with a single meaning and concept (maʿnā wa-mafhūm) to blackness, substance, human and horse. It is an intellectually grasped meaning (maʿnā) which is more general than any of these, as are the concepts of quiddity taken absolutely, and of thingness, and true reality, and essence¹⁷ taken absolutely. We claim that all these predicates are purely intellectual. For if existence were nothing but an expression of blackness itself, it could not apply with a single meaning to whiteness, blackness, and substance. If it were taken to have a meaning more general than substantiality, it would be either occurring (ḥāṣil) in the substance, subsisting in it, or it would be independent in itself. If it were independent in itself, then the substance would not have it as an attribute, since its relation to [the substance] would be the same as its relation to everything else. If it were in the substance, it would certainly occur in it, but occurrence (al-ḥuṣūl) is existence; so that existence, if it occurred, would be existent [yielding an infinite regress]. If though one takes its being existent as nothing but existence itself, then “existent” would not be [predicated] of the existent and other things with a single meaning. For its concept in respect to [other] things would be “something that has existence,” and in respect to existence itself, that it is existence. We ourselves apply [existent] to many things with a single meaning.

[priority argument]

Furthermore, if existence is an attribute of quiddity in concrete individuals, then quiddity is receptive (qābila) of it, and would be existent either after it—in which case [existence] would occur independently of [quiddity], without any receptivity or attribution—or before it—in which case [quiddity] is existent before being existent—or with it—in which case the quiddity would be existent together with existence, not through existence, and a further existence would belong to it.

[rejecting Rāzī’s solution to the “no doubt regarding mental existence” counter-argument]

Our Master said: the only meaning of the fact that something is existent in the intellect is that it is grasped intellectually. The disagreement [between the doctrine that knowledge is an impression in the mind and the doctrine that it is a relation] is not about the intellectual existence in this meaning, but about its modality (kayfiyya). Whether one says that intellectual grasp means the impression (inṭibāʿ) of the intellectually grasped form in the soul, or one says that it is a relation (iḍāfa) between the intellectual power [57] and the object of intellectual grasping, the disagreement is about the modality of existence and not the existence itself. Otherwise, if the meaning of the existence of something in something [else] to which it is related depended on the existence of its form in it, then it would not be correct to say that something has existence in word and existence in writing. For there is no form of it in either. Its existence in both of them only means that their meaning signifies it. If this is the case, then the counter-argument remains.

[essence is not existence, yet there is no priority in identity]

If someone says: if existence were additional to the contingent quiddity, it would have a concrete being (huwiyya) in concrete individuals apart from the concrete being of the quiddity, in which it would inhere. Then its subject of inherence (maḥall) would have an existence which precedes it with respect to existence, so that quiddity would have existence prior to its existence. This is absurd. For [243] if it were additional, it would follow that existence would subsist by virtue of something non-existent. We say: we do not concede the inference that the subject of the inherence of the concrete being of existence has another existence. Why can’t it precede it by virtue of itself (bi-nafs dhātihā), rather than by virtue of a further existence?

As to his inferring the subsistence of existence by virtue of something non-existent, we say: we do not concede this. Rather, what follows is the subsistence of existence by virtue of the essence so long as the essence is existent. Nonetheless, its existence is different from it.

[on al-Suhrawardī and the priority argument]

The author of The [Philosophy of] Illumination [al-Suhrawardī] takes another approach to existence. He says that the existence of contingent things in extramental reality is identical to the quiddities, since if they were distinguished from one another, then the quiddity would have one concrete being (huwiyya), the existence another, and they would be two [different] existents in extramental reality. Then the quiddity would have to have a further existence, and existence would also have a further existence. [Again] the quiddity would have concrete being, and that [second-order] existence would also have concrete being, and these two would be two existents. So it would follow that the quiddity has infinite existences. Therefore, existence and quiddity are one and the same thing in concrete individuals, but the intellect distinguishes the extramental quiddity into two things, quiddity and existence, so that two forms arise in intellect which correspond to the extramental quiddity. “Common existence (al-wujūd al-ʿāmm)” does not occur among concrete individuals; it is only in the mind. The only existence that occurs [among concrete individuals] is the necessary existence that is free of any quiddity. When it arises in the intellect, intellect does not distinguish [249] it into two things, quiddity and existence. Rather the only thing that arises from it is existence. Its existence among concrete beings is not connected to any kind of quiddity. […]

[rejection of al-Suhrawardī’s position]

[249.6] This calls for investigation. For we say: we do not concede that, if quiddity is distinct from existence and both of them are existent, then essence must have a further existence. Why can’t the quiddity be existent by virtue of an existence that is distinct from it, while the existence of existence is identical to itself?

As for his statement that the intellect distinguishes the extramental quiddity into two things, quiddity and existence, so that two forms arise in intellect which correspond to one thing, this is absurd, because it cannot be that two different forms correspond to one thing.

And as for his statement that “common existence” does not occur in concrete beings, this means that existence is a merely mental concept (iʿtibār dhihnī), which does not arise among concrete individuals; but this is not true. If it were, the nature of existence would be something non-existent (ʿadamī) among concrete beings, and the quiddity of the Necessary in itself, and as such, would be something non-existent among concrete individuals. But this is absurd. […]

[his own doctrine]

[250.3] The truth is what the Master [sc. Avicenna] teaches, namely that existence is shared among existents, that existence in contingent things is additional to their quiddities, and that the necessarily existent in itself is not connected to any quiddity, as we have established. The Imām [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] disagrees with [Avicenna] about whether [God’s existence] is free of quiddity. [Al-Rāzī] claims that it is connected to some quiddity, this quiddity being a cause for [God’s existence], with [God’s quiddity] not preceding [existence] with regard to existence. But this is unconvincing, as has been explained.

[general priority problem]

Extramental existence cannot be distinguished from the extramental quiddity. For if it were distinguished from it, existence would occur to the extramental quiddity in extramental reality and [the quiddity] would be prior in existence to the extramental existence, and would be existent before existence, but this is absurd.

[more on concrete being (huwiyya)]

Existence cannot be distinguished from quiddity in concrete individuals such that the quiddity would have a concrete being (huwiyya) different from the concrete being of existence. Otherwise, the quiddity in extramental reality would be receptive of existence and would be prior to existence in extramental reality. Rather, they have [90r1] one concrete being and are distinguished through their “selves (fī anfusihim).”

[summary of al-Rāzī’s position, with responses]

The opinion is widespread that the existence of contingent beings among concrete individuals is additional to their extramental quiddities. They argue that existence is either (a) identical to essence or (b) intrinsic to it or (c) extrinsic to it. The first two [options] are false.

(a) The first [option is false] for several reasons. (a1) We have an intellectual grasp of blackness while doubting about its extramental existence, and what is known is different from what is doubted. (a2) Blackness as such is susceptible of non-existence, whereas blackness-as-existent is not susceptible of non-existence. Hence blackness as such is different from blackness-as-existent. Therefore, existence is different from essence. (a3) Existence is common to all existents, whereas blackness is not common. Hence existence is different from blackness. (a4) If existence were identical to blackness, then our saying “blackness is existent” would be tantamount to our saying “blackness is blackness,” but this is not the case.

(b) The second [option is false], because (b1) if existence were intrinsic to the essences it would be the most general essential [property] common to them. So it would be genus for them, and the Necessary in itself would be composed from genus and specific difference, which is absurd. (b2) Further, because if it were intrinsic, it would be either a substance or an accident. If it were a substance, then a substance would be intrinsic to an accident. But if it were an accident, then the reverse [would be the case].

Since both possibilities are false, the third is to be considered true, which is what we wanted to prove.

But all this is unconvincing.

(a1) As to the argument that one can know blackness while doubting its existence, we say: we do not concede that from this, it follows that the existence of blackness in concrete beings is distinct from its extramental quiddity. What follows is that the concept (mafhūm) of blackness in the intellect is distinct from existence. (a2) As to the argument that blackness as such is susceptible of non-existence, whereas blackness-as-existent is not susceptible of non-existence, we say: if you mean by its “being susceptible of non-existence” that it is possible that it can be eliminated from [reality], then we do not concede that blackness-as-existent [281] is insusceptible of non-existence in this sense. But if you mean that blackness in the state of non-existence occurs in extramental reality and non-existence is ascribed to it, this is impossible. For blackness cannot have a concrete being (huwiyya) in extramental reality while it is in a state of non-existence. (a3) As to the argument that existence is common between all existent things: you already know that it is unconvincing. (a4) As to the argument that if existence were identical to blackness, then our saying “blackness is existent” would be tantamount to our saying “blackness is blackness,” we say: if you make the subjects of both propositions the extramental blackness, we do not concede the difference between them. But if you make their subjects that which is understood (mafhūm) by blackness, [your] desired conclusion does not follow. For from this follows their being different in the intellect, not in extramental reality.

(b1) As to the argument that if existence were part of a quiddity it would be the most general essential [property], we say: we do not concede this. This would only follow if existence were common (mushtarak) to all existents, and that this is unconvincing has just been shown. Even if we assume that it is common, it must be the most general essential [property] only if it is essential for the quiddity of the Necessary Existent. But its being essential would only follow if it had a quiddity beyond existence. Why would you say this is so? (b2) As to the argument that if it were intrinsic, it would be either substance or accident etc., we say: if you mean by “substance” the quiddity which, when it exists among concrete individuals, is not in a subject (mawḍūʿ), and by “accident” you mean “existent in a subject,” then we do not accept this division [as exhaustive], because a third possibility remains. Namely that—if it exists in concrete individuals—then it is in a subject. If you mean by [“substance”] the quiddity which, if it exists in concrete individuals, is in a subject, then existence is neither a substance nor an accident, because it does not have a quiddity beyond existence. If you mean by “substance” “what does not require a subject” and by “accident” “what requires a subject”—why is it not possible that on this reckoning substance is a constituent (muqawwim) of the accident, since it is possible that the whole requires a subject while one of its parts does not?

[his own doctrine]

The truth is that existence is identical to the extramental quiddity in concrete individuals. For otherwise, existence would be either a part of [quiddity] or an attribute (ṣifa) of it.

The first is absurd, since existence would be something prior to [the quiddity] due to the fact that the part has to be prior to the whole, and this is absurd. Also, if existence were intrinsic for the extramental quiddities, then all the simple quiddities would be composite, and this is absurd.

The second is also absurd, for if existence were an attribute of quiddity, then [existence] would presuppose (muftaqir) the [quiddity]. When one thing presupposes another, the concrete being (huwiyya) of the latter must inevitably be prior to the concrete being of the former. Therefore, the quiddity would have a concrete being in extramental reality that is prior to existence, and this is absurd.

This is the doctrine which some eminent [scholars]¹⁸ transmitted from the First Teacher.

[the doubt argument and the tautology argument]

Existence is distinct from quiddity (al-wujūd ghayr al-māhiyya), because we can conceptualize quiddity while doubting whether existence is attributed to it. If existence were not distinct from quiddity, this would be impossible. Also, because if existence were not distinct from quiddity, our saying “human exists” could be replaced by saying “the human is a person (bashar).”

[priority problem and conceptual distinction]

Yet when we say that existence is distinct from quiddity, we do not mean that the quiddity, which possesses existence, is realized in concrete individuals and existence occurs to it. Otherwise, [such a quiddity] would be individualized (mutashakhkhiṣa) before existence. Rather we mean that the contingent is in itself (fī nafsihi) a quiddity and existence. The intellect analyzes a concrete human into humanity and existence, and on this basis two different objects of intellection (maʿqūlāni) occur in the mind, so that the concrete human would be composed from humanity and existence.

[existence is “having a form in extramental reality”]

Even if we were to concede that existence is distinct from the quiddity as such, why would it follow from this that existence is distinct from the extramental quiddity (al-māhiyya khārijiyya)? For quiddity is sometimes mental and sometimes extramental. Existence can be distinct from the quiddity as such, just as it is distinct from the mental quiddity, without being distinct from the extramental quiddity. Why do you deny that this is so? The answer to other aspects [of the argument] emerges from this. For these show that existence is distinct from the quiddity as such, but from this it does not follow that [existence] is distinct from the extramental quiddity itself. For, according to me, existence is identical to the extramental quiddity but distinct from the quiddity as such.

[52] Our judgment that blackness is sometimes existent, and sometimes non-existent, is a judgment that it sometimes has a form in extramental reality (lahu ṣūra fī al-khārij) and sometimes does not. When we judge that the triangle is not existent, while being in doubt as to whether it exists in extramental reality, we mean that it has no form in extramental reality. When we judge that black can receive existence, we judge that it may have no form in extramental reality.

[anti-realism about essence qua essence]

[Regarding al-Rāzī’s theory of the neutrality of essence.] The answer is: this reasoning of his is based on his notion that quiddity has some reality (thubūt) extramentally apart from its existence, and furthermore that existence inheres in it. This is false. For the being (kawn) of quiddity is its existence. The quiddity can be separated from existence only in the intellect—not that it is deprived of existence in the intellect, since being in the intellect is an intellectual existence too, just as being in the extramental world is extramental existence. Rather, the intellect’s role is to consider it [577] by itself, without considering existence. The absence of considering something (ʿadam iʿtibār al-shayʾ) is not the same as considering an absence.

Therefore the attribution of existence to quiddity is an intellectual procedure (amr ʿaqlī), and is not like the attribution of white to body. For the quiddity has no distinct existence (wujūd munfarid), and its accident that is called “existence” has no further existence, such that [quiddity and existence] would relate to one another as receiver (al-qābil) and received. Rather if there is the quiddity (al-māhiyya idhā kānat), then its being (kawn) is its existence.

The result is that quiddity is receptive of existence only when it is existent in the intellect, and cannot be the efficient cause for an extramental attribute so long as its existence is only in the intellect.

[status of essence as such]

As for [al-Qūnawī’s] question whether [quiddities], just in being quiddities, are existing items, [105] the answer is no. For a quiddity just as such cannot be anything other than the quiddity. But when he glosses this by asking whether [quiddities] have some sort (ḍarb) of existence, the answer is yes. When they are conceptualized, they come to have intellectual existence. But if they are posited in concrete individuals, they have concrete existence. Concrete existence belongs to them only through the Bestower of Existence, whereas intellectual existence comes from whoever grasps them intellectually. Both existences are contingent.¹⁹ When they say that quiddity has existence before [concrete individuals], they thereby mean the intellection of it [by God], which is the cause for its concrete existence and is [called] active knowledge (al-ʿilm al-fiʿlī). When they say that [the quiddity] has existence together with [concrete individuals], they mean concrete existence. When they say that it has existence after [concrete individuals], they mean its intellection after its existence, that is, passive knowledge (al-ʿilm al-infiʿālī) [in humans]. If one however considers the quiddity alone, there will be nothing in the intellectual intention apart from the quiddity. Neither existence nor non-existence are included in this way of considering it. That is why they say that [quiddity as such] is neither existent nor non-existent. But then, when one considers its state insofar as it is being considered, [106] and is occurring in the intellect, then it must have existence, either intellectual or concrete. It is in respect of this existence that it is contingent. Likewise, if one considers either of its two modes of existence insofar as it is existence, it will be only that existence alone. If one however considers the affirmation of that existence for [the quiddity], then that existence will have another existence and so on, so long as the mind does not stop.

[the doubt and priority arguments, with a conceptualist response]

The existence of contingent things is not the same as [their] quiddity, nor intrinsic to it. For we conceptualize a triangle while being in doubt as to its extramental existence. So, in this state, one passes the judgement about the triangle in the intellect that it is a triangle, but one does not pass the judgement that it is existent extramentally. If its extramental existence were identical to its being a triangle or intrinsic to it, then it would be impossible to judge that it is a triangle without judging that it is existent extramentally. Therefore, existence is not identical to triangle, nor intrinsic to it. The same goes for the other quiddities: one may grasp them intellectually while being unaware whether they exist extramentally. Thus existence is not identical to contingent quiddities, nor is it intrinsic to them.

If it is said: if existence were distinct from the contingent quiddity, then existence would be attributed to the extramental quiddity and would be an attribute (ṣifa) of it. An attribute stands in need of a subject, and what is needed must be prior. Hence, the quiddity must be prior in existence to the existence; but then it would have another existence, and it would have to be prior to this [second-order] existence too. Thus, between quiddity and existence there would be an infinite number of existences, and something infinite would be fall between two limits, which is a contradiction. Then we say: we do not admit that if existence were distinct from quiddity, then the existence would be attributed to quiddity extramentally. This would follow only if the extramental quiddity were different from existence. Why do you say that it follows from existence being different from quiddity as such (al-māhiyya li-nafs al-māhiyya) that it is different from the extramental quiddity? This is so because extramentally, quiddity and existence are one thing, and when they are in intellect, intellect splits them into two things: quiddity and existence.

If you say: if it is affirmed that existence is different from quiddity in intellect, it follows that they are different extramentally too. Otherwise, the judgement of intellect that they are different would not correspond to what actually is the case (fī nafs al-amr). Then we say: we do not admit this, because intellect judges them to different in the intellect, but united extramentally. This judgement does correspond to what actually is the case, for the very reason that they are in fact different in the intellect but not extramentally.

If you say: if they are different in the intellect but unified extramentally, then one extramental thing would yield two representations (mithlāni) in the intellect, one for the quiddity, the other for the existence. Then we say: why can’t one extramental thing yield two representations in the intellect? After all, from an isosceles triangle result two representations in intellect, namely those of “triangle without qualification” and “isosceles triangle,”²⁰ although it is one and the same thing extramentally. [Extramentally], it does not have two different aspects (jihatāni) such that the triangle [as such] would correspond to one of them and the isosceles triangle would correspond to the other. Likewise, from blackness result two representations in intellect, those of color without qualification [132r] and blackness, even though extramentally they are one thing. Many other cases will occur to you, God willing.

[criticism of the doubt argument]

This way of arguing [i.e. the doubt argument] would establish a distinction between the existence of each contingent being and its quiddity, only if we could grasp intellectually every contingent being even while doubting whether they exist extramentally. But this is impossible. The Master [sc. Avicenna] indicated this objection in a chapter of the Ishārāt, saying “as for human, perhaps there is no doubt concerning its existence, yet this not because of the meaning (mafhūm) of [human] but because there is sense-perception of its particular instantiations.” The Master said in response to this objection that “you can then find examples to make the same point with other notions.” This calls for investigation. For it [only] entails that the existence of this [other] example would be additional to its quiddity, not that the existence of anything else would [be additional] to their quiddities. The goal [of the proof] is the fact that the existence of each contingent being is additional to its quiddity, and what he mentioned does not imply this.

[the solution that existence needs no further existence]

The existence of existence is not additional to its being existence. For existence has no quiddity apart from being existence. To the contrary, its quiddity and essence is that it is existence. Quiddities other than it are existent through it, but existence [is existent] through itself, not through an existence additional to it. The existence of other things is through it. This is like the beforeness and afterness that belong to time; they belong to it in itself, that is, they are not additional to it, and they belong to other things through it.

[extramental existence is “being existent,” as proposed by Bahmanyār]

Existence in concrete individuals is identical to “being in concrete individuals (kawn fī al-aʿyān)” and it is not “that through which something is in concrete individuals (mā bihi yakūnu fī al-aʿyān).” If something were in concrete individuals through its being in concrete individuals, then it would go on ad infinitum and being in concrete individuals would not be true [at all]. Therefore, existence, which is being in concrete individuals is “being existent (mawjūdiyya).” […]

[81.7] That [aspect] of existence which is in concrete individuals is “something existent (mawjūd mā).” [Moreover], not only every existence is concretized by its subject, as redness for example is concretized by its subject; every existence is [also] specified through some [item] which behaves like a specific difference [for this existence]. And then it is associated with some subject. [Particular] existences are meanings whose names are unknown and which are expressed as “existence as such-and-such” and “as such-and-such.” The common existence is attached to all these [particular existences] in the mind. If one did not know the species of accidents through their names and descriptions, they would still say that quantity is such-and-such accident and quality is such-and-such accident.

[on the doubt argument]

If from this argument [sc. the doubt argument] it followed that existence is additional to quiddity in the concrete individual, then the existence of existence would be additional to that existence, as he [i.e. al-Suhrawardī] mentions in the book [Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, saying]: we conceive of an existence, like the existence of phoenix and we doubt whether it occurs in extramental reality or not. If both existences were one and the same, i.e. the existence of phoenix and the existence of that existence, then it would be impossible to grasp of one of the existences intellectually while doubting the other—as they [i.e. the Peripatetics] mention in the case of the quiddity and its existence. Thus, the discussion turns to the existence of existence [183] and leads to an infinite regress.

[stating the real essence-existence distinction in terms of huwiyya]

The Peripatetics believed that [existence] is additional to quiddities in extramental reality and that it has a concrete being (huwiyya) which lies among concrete individuals.

[the priority problem in terms of huwiyya]

The judgment that existence is additional [to quiddity] is [true] only as concerns that which is grasped intellectually; it is not the case for concrete individuals. Otherwise quiddity would have a concrete being (huwiyya) besides existence. In this case there would be two existents, not one, which leads to an infinite regress.

[acceptance of essence qua essence]

They argue [against the essence-existence distinction]: if the subject of inherence for existence is non-existent, then existence is attributed to the non-existent, and this is necessarily false. If on the other hand it were existent, a circle and infinite regress would follow. The answer is: the subject of inherence is quiddity, understood with neither qualification (lā bi-iʿtibār al-qayyidayn).

[the ontological place of the essence qua essence]

[Al-Ṭūsī] said: [existence] subsists in the quiddity as such.

I say: This is an answer to the opponent’s proof that existence is identical to quiddity. The upshot of their proof is: if [existence] were additional to quiddity, then it would be an attribute (ṣifa) that subsists in it, [10] since it cannot be a self-subsistent substance independent of the quiddity, and since no attribute can subsist without that to which it is attributed. This being so, it subsists in the quiddity either (a) while it exists or (b) while it does not. Both options are false.

(a) The first [is false], because the existence that is the condition for the subsistence of this existence in the quiddity, is either this very existence, in which case it would follow that something is a condition for itself; or [the posterior existence] is distinct from [the prior existence], which implies that there are several existences in one quiddity. [That makes this option false], since we may shift the question to the [prior] existence that is the condition of [this posterior existence], leading to an infinite regress.

(b) The second [is false], because an existing (wujudiyya) attribute would have to subsist in a non-existent subject of inherence, and this is false.

Given that both options are false, the idea that [existence] is additional [to quiddity] is rejected. The upshot of the answer is that existence subsists in the quiddity as such, not insofar as it is existent nor non-existent; thus the limitation [to the two aforementioned options] is rejected.

[10.10] [Al-Ṭūsī] said: The addition [of existence] is in the conception.

I say: this is the conclusion of the preceding. The subsistence of existence in the quiddity as such can be grasped intellectually only in the mind and the conception, not in extramental existence. For no quiddity can be realized in concrete individuals so long as it is deprived (munfarida) of existence. How then can the addition [of existence], or its subsistence in the quiddity, be realized in extramental reality? Rather the existence of the quiddity is additional to it as it is in itself (fī nafs al-amr) and in conception, not in concrete individuals. The subsistence of existence in the quiddity is not like the subsistence of black in the subject of inherence.

[Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s argument against the essence-existence distinction]

The first argument against [the idea that existence is additional to essence] comes from Abū al-Ḥusayn [al-Baṣrī]: if the existence of a substance were an attribute additional to its being space-occupying (mutaḥayyiz), then we could know it to be space-occupying without knowing it to be existent. Or we might know it with the attribute of existence without knowing it to be space-occupying. For there is no connection (taʿalluq) between them that would exclude this. But in fact we can know [a substance] to be existent only when we know that it is space-occupying, and know it to be space-occupying only when we know it to be existent, so we understand that its existence and its space-occupation are one and the same. We say that there is no connection between them, simply because if one were connected to the other so as to be its basis (aṣl) (and it cannot be that each is [43] a basis for the other, because that would be circular), then one could know that basis without whatever is based upon it. But this is not affirmed in the case of space-occupation and existence, as explained above. […]

[43.14] Response to the first argument: it is utterly incoherent. For conceptual separability (al-infikāk fī al-taṣawwur) does not follow from [mere] distinctness. No doubt, there is a mistake here that falls under “suppositious conversion.” For [in fact it is the other way around]: things that are conceptually separable are distinct. Or we can just accept that there must be [conceptual] separability: why do you deem it impossible? For we can conceptualize a space-occupying substance that is not existent.

[existence does not relate to essence as an inhering accidental property]

[Our saying] “existence is additional to quiddity” does not mean the same as when we say [for instance] that “blackness is additional to the quiddity of body.” For body exists in extramental reality while unconnected to blackness. In light of which [blackness] is judged to be additional to [body] in extramental reality. But existence, in relation to quiddity, is not like this. Body cannot exist in extramental reality while unconnected to existence, with existence then inhering in it the way blackness does in body. For body being (kawn) in extramental reality just is its existence. Quiddity can be only separated from existence in the intellect. This does not mean that it is unconnected to existence in the intellect. For being in the intellect is intellectual existence (wujūd ʿaqlī), just as being in extramental reality is extramental existence. Rather, we mean that the intellect can focus on the quiddity alone without paying any attention to existence. The attribution of existence to the quiddity is something [45] intellectual (amr ʿaqlī), unlike the attribution of blackness to body. It’s not as if quiddity has an existence of its own and its accidental feature, which we call “existence,” has another existence, and they then come together as receiver and received. Rather, if quiddity has being (kānat), then its being just is its existence. Quiddity is only “receptive” of existence when it comes to be (kawn) in the intellect.