To use a word “univocally” means using it with the same meaning on different occasions. If you first say “I have to go to the bank to get some money” today, and then “there was a run on the bank because of a crisis of confidence,” you are using the word “bank” to mean the same thing, namely a financial institution. The same word could however be used “equivocally,” that is, with two or more different meanings, as in “my money is at the bank,” “let’s have a picnic on the river bank,” and “the pool player made a nice bank shot.” The difference was pointed out by Aristotle in the opening chapter of his Categories, meaning that it would have been among the first things learned by students of philosophy in late antiquity, and also in the Arabic-speaking world (where a standard example of an equivocal word is the word ʿayn: see e.g. [T8] [T29]). Yet this basic and familiar distinction gave rise to a complex and central debate in metaphysics. The question at stake was whether “being” or “existence” is used univocally of different entities. If we say, “blackness exists,” and then “whiteness exists,” are we using “exists” in the same way in both cases?
While it may seem obvious that we are, some thinkers in the Islamic world, notably in the Ashʿarite tradition, would have denied this [T7] [T32] [T33].1 For as we have just seen in the last chapter, they argued that there is no distinction between essence and existence. Since the essence of blackness and the essence of whiteness are obviously different, so must be their existence. If we consider items in different categories—so, not two qualities like blackness and whiteness, but a substance like human and a quality like blackness—there would be even more reason to deny that existence is applied to the two cases univocally. Avicenna takes on this view in [T3] and [T4], arguing that on the contrary, existence cannot be equivocal across its various uses. Rather we have a single concept that applies to all things we take to be real; his argument for this in [T3] is that otherwise, the law of excluded middle would not be of general application.
But things are not so simple. Avicenna is keenly aware of Aristotle’s doctrine that being is not a single genus [T1], cf. [T19] [T20], which would seem likewise to rule out that existence is used in all cases in an entirely univocal way. His solution is to offer a kind of compromise: “ ‘existence’ does not apply to the ten categories as a coincidental name”—that is, like “bank” and “bank,” where two unrelated things happen to have the same name—“nor does it apply as a univocal name” [T3]. Instead, it is used in an “analogous” (mushakkik)2 fashion, as nicely explained by al-Rāzī [T16]. Avicenna’s point is that existence does have the same meaning when used of blackness and human, yet is applied to the human in a way that is “prior”—because blackness is an accident, human is a substance, and accidents depend for their existence on substances, as explained by Avicenna’s student Bahmanyār [T5].3
This doctrine will have a famous later echo in Mullā Ṣadrā, but already in the 12th and 13th century Islamic East it plays a central role in discussions of God’s existence. For more on that, see the next chapter. In this chapter, we consider only the more general question of whether existence is univocal, analogical, or outright equivocal. Avicenna’s position prevails insofar as almost no one embraces equivocity of existence; as we will see shortly, the exception is al-Āmidī. The most prominent defender of the univocity of existence is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who in numerous works insists that existence is used with a “common” or “shared” meaning. (An exception is two works that may stand more firmly in the Ashʿarite tradition, the Muḥassal [T15] and Risāla fī ʿilm al-kalām.4) Characteristically al-Ṭūsī leaps to the defense of the Avicennan view by rebutting the arguments from [T15] in [T27]. Al-Rāzī’s championing of univocity fits with his defense of the existence-essence distinction. If existence is distinct from, and neutral, to essence, then it seems only natural to suppose that it is one and the same kind of existence that is joined to various essences, either necessarily in God’s cause or through a cause in the contingent case.
He duly offers a whole battery of arguments to show that existence is univocal, with three main arguments appearing in several of his works; for other arguments, including a charming one based on rhyme in poetry, see [T17] [T18]. They are laid out concisely in [T14]. First, we have the “opposition” argument, which echoes Avicenna’s appeal to the principle of the excluded middle in [T3]: existence is opposed to non-existence, but non-existence is univocal, hence so must existence be univocal. Second, the “division” argument: when we contrast God to created things by saying that He is necessary and they are contingent, the division we are making must be within some shared notion, and this is existence. (Compare here al-Shahrastānī in [T11]; but note that he thinks existence is used equivocally in the one case of God.) Third, a version of the “doubt” argument familiar from the last chapter: we can believe that something is existent while doubting, or simply having no view, as to whether it is necessary or contingent, substance or accident. An earlier version of this argument is found in al-Juwaynī’s defense of the reality of the properties called “states (aḥwāl)” at [T6].5 These properties must be real, since it is one thing to think generically about existence, another to think about a specific given property. This argument is not found in Avicenna, but it resonates with his thought. For one thing, it sounds very much like the “doubt argument” with which he used to establish the essence-existence distinction. For another, Avicenna distinguished between a kind of blanket concept of existence which is just the “affirmation” of something and the “proper” existence that belongs to each thing, which is simply the “true reality (ḥaqīqa)” of that thing [T2]. One response to al-Juwaynī is found in Ibn al-Malāḥimī: what all essences have in common is not existence, but the fact that they are essences [T9].
Al-Rāzī’s arguments are rehearsed and critiqued by al-Kātibī [T28], and also greeted with a spirited rejoinder by al-Āmidī [T21] [T22] [T23] [T24]. Against the opposition argument, he points out, one can say that the negation relevant to each essence is not the negation of sheer non-existence but of that particular essence. In other words, what is opposed to the existence of a cow is not just non-existence but specifically cow’s-not-existing. As for the division argument, he protests that we do not need to introduce a shared meaning. We can divide just the name “existence” itself. We can and do divide equivocal things; indeed this is just what it is to point out the equivocity of a term like ʿayn, as Kātibī points out [T29]. Ibn al-Malāḥimī points out another flaw in the division argument, namely that the division between, for instance, necessary and contingent existence is one within the class of being a concrete object (which is applied equivocally), not one within existence itself [T8]. Al-Abharī makes a similar complaint, arguing that the division between necessary and contingent is actually about essences, not existence [T26].
That leaves the third, epistemic argument for univocity. This fails too, says al-Āmidī, because belief about existence can just be a generic commitment that some essence is realized, a belief that can further be fully specified concerning some particular essence that has been instantiated [T24]. This seems a good response. Analogously, if I tell you I will be at the bank tomorrow you might readily believe me, but then ask whether I mean that I’ll be depositing money or having a picnic. Finally, al-Āmidī also dismisses another argument from al-Rāzī reminiscent of Quine’s example of “Plato’s beard.”6 Al-Rāzī argues that the very statement that there is no such thing as univocal existence commits us to a univocal understanding of existence. Not unlike Quine, al-Āmidī replies in [T23] [T24] that saying “There is no univocal existence” amounts to saying that “existence” has no referent, and thus commits us to nothing. It should be noted that al-Āmidī, who gives this and numerous other perceptive responses to the Rāzian arguments for univocity, himself embraces univocity in another work [T25]. So neither al-Rāzī nor al-Āmidī, the two leading protagonists of the debate as we have just sketched it, maintains a consistent position across all their works.
It might seem that the univocity of existence would be especially attractive to those who accept a distinction between essence and existence, either real or merely conceptual. Indeed al-Shahrazūrī argues for the distinction (in his case, the conceptual one) precisely on the grounds that existence is univocal. It is received, in the same sense, by essences which are different in other respects [T32]. The two theses are also connected by al-Ḥillī [T34], who also argues for the univocity of existence in [T35]. This is the reason why even those who adopted a “conceptualist” stance on the essence-existence distinction were happy to accept univocity of existence, with the caveat that this concerned only the concept of existence. For these thinkers, in other words, we have a single idea of existence that we can apply to anything, but in the real world being is different for each type of thing. This is how the conceptualists understood Avicenna’s idea of the “analogy” of existence, as we see in Ibn Kammūna. “Universal” existence is only in the mind, while real existence is “analogical” since it is simply the realized essence of each thing [T30]. This way of understanding analogy is already found in al-Suhrawardī, who speaks of four degrees of existence: the Necessary (i.e. God), contingent substance, and then two kinds of “stable” accidents, namely non-relative and relative [T13]. Analogy could also be applied to articulate the difference between mental and concrete existence, as ʿUmar al-Khayyām points out [T10]. His example is the first man Adam, who is long dead and so exists only in our minds, thus having a lesser degree of existence than that which belongs to a presently existing extramental object. Abū al-Barākāt al-Baghdādī agrees, but emphasizes that a thought of something is itself something that really, not only mentally, exists [T12]. To use ʿUmar al-Khayyām’s example, Adam exists only insofar as he is represented in my mind, but my idea of Adam exists concretely in my soul.7
Most modern readers will probably favor the position usually adopted by al-Rāzī: existence is simply univocal. We do not normally think, when we say that something “exists,” that we mean different things by this on different occasions. This is so even if the entities we have in mind are as different as humans, properties, times, numbers, and God. (Bear in mind that even atheists apply the notion to God, when they affirm the proposition that God does not exist.) This indiscriminate understanding of existence is captured by the use of the existential quantifier: Ǝx means “there is an x” or “there exists an x,” and anything can be put in for the variable x. A point like this is made by al-Samarqandī at [T33]. But among our texts, perhaps the one that comes closest to capturing the “modern” intuition is [T31], where al-Nasafī points out that something or other (amr mā) must be common to everything that there is. And what could this be, if not existence?
Texts from: Avicenna, Bahmanyār, al-Juwaynī, al-Shahrastānī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, ʿUmar al-Khayyām, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, al-Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, al-Abharī, al-Ṭūsī, al-Kātibī, Ibn Kammūna, Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī, al-Shahrazūrī, al-Samarqandī, al-Ḥillī.
Univocity and Equivocity of Existence
[T1] Aristotle, Met. B 3, 998b22–27 [trans. Ross, mod.]
[being is not a genus]
But it is not possible for either unity or being to be a genus of things; for the specific differences of any genus must all have both being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the specific differences taken apart from the species (any more than for the species of the genus to be predicated of the proper differences of the genus); so that if unity or being is a genus, no specific difference will either be one or have being.
[T2] Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.5, 24.9–13 [trans. Marmura, mod.]
[proper vs. affirmative existence]
“The thing,” or its equivalent, may be used in all languages to indicate some other meaning (maʿnā). For, to everything there is a true reality (ḥaqīqa) by virtue of which it is what it is. Thus, the triangle has a true reality in that it is a triangle, and whiteness has a true reality in that it is whiteness. This is what we might call “proper existence” (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ), not intending by this the meaning given to affirmative existence (al-wujūd al-ithbātī); for the expression “existence” is also used to denote many meanings, one of which is the true reality in accordance with which it is the thing that it is. Thus, [the true reality] according to which it is the thing that it is, as it were, is its proper existence.
[T3] Avicenna, Dānishnāma, Ilāhiyyāt, 36.14–38.10
[existence and the categories: equivocity, univocity, or analogy?]
Those who lack exact insight supposed that the word “existence” (hastī) applies to the ten [categories] equivocally, [37] since each of them has one and the same name [namely “existent”], yet the meaning of that name is not the same [in each case]. This is incorrect.
[tautology argument]
For if this were so, then saying that substance exists would be the same as saying that it is a substance, so that the meaning of the existence of substance would not be different from the meaning of substancehood. Likewise, the meaning of the existence which is found in quality would not be different from the quality. Hence, if one said “a quality exists,” this would be the same as saying “a quality is a quality”; and when one said “a substance exists,” it would be the same as to say “a substance is a substance.”
[opposition argument: the meaning of “non-existence” is one]
Nor [on the view that existence is equivocal] would it be true that each thing either exists or does not exist. For existence would not have one meaning, but rather ten meanings, and non-existence too would have not one meaning, but rather ten. Therefore, there would not be a twofold division [into existence and non-existence]; there would be no shared meaning for this utterance [sc. “existence”].8 Yet all philosophers have acknowledged that, when we say that a substance exists and that an accident exists, we thereby intend one meaning, given that non-existence has [only] one meaning.
[specific and universal existence]
Of course, if one renders existence specific, then the existence of each thing is different. Just as the specific substance of each thing is different. This however does not prevent its being the case that there is a universal substancehood, in whose meaning all things agree (muttafaq), or that there is a universal (ʿāmm) existence [38] in whose meaning all things agree.
[from univocity to analogy]
Although this is so, still existence does not apply to the ten [categories] in the same way as animality applies to human and to horse, such that none is prior to any other. Nor does it apply like whiteness to snow and camphor, where neither is prior to any other, so that [existence] would be univocal (mutawāṭī), as those cases are called univocal, since they apply indifferently to many instances with the same meaning. Rather existence primarily (nukhust) pertains to substance and by means of substance to quantity, quality and relation, then by means of these to everything else. For the existence of the black, the white, the long and the broad is not like the existence of time or change. For the former persist (thabāt ast), whereas the latter do not. Thus, existence applies to these things in terms of priority and posteriority as well as in terms of more and less, even though it applies with the same meaning. This is what they call analogical (mushakkik).
[T4] Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Maqūlāt II.1, 59.10–62.11
[existence and the categories: equivocity, univocity, or analogy?]
A term may be multiplied in three ways: either by way of univocity (al-mutawāṭiʾ) among its subjects; or by way of pure coincidence, which includes both similarity and equivocity (al-ishtirāk); or by way of analogy (al-mushakkik). If someone refuses to acknowledge that “existent” has the same meaning in those ten [categories], they have already departed from natural insight (al-fiṭra). This is especially so if they try to prove that those ten differ in the meaning of existence on the basis that substance exists through itself, whereas accident exists through another; and that substance is an existent which does not require the existence of another for its own existence, whereas accident is an existent that does require this. For they already made these two cases share something, namely the expression “existent”, and only then distinguished them, on the basis of being through itself or being through another, and of requiring [something else] or not. […]
[opposition argument]
[60.7] The truth is that things share reality and existence by virtue of a concept that occurs to the mind.9 This is self-evident and cannot be shown. If someone denies it, they have already committed a mistake against themselves, by directing their thought away from the goal and towards something else. Otherwise, it would not be right [to say] that nothing can fall outside two contradicting extremes (ṭarafay al-naqīḍ) [i.e nothing can violate the law of the excluded middle]. For each of the two extremes would be many things and would not truly be just one extreme. In fact, existence is understood as having one and the same meaning (maʿnā wāḥid fī al-mafhūm) in all of them.
[from univocity to analogy]
If this is so, then “existence” does not apply to the ten categories as a coincidental name, nor yet does it apply as a univocal name. For the mode of existence in these ten is not the same, rather the existence of some of them is prior while the existence of others is posterior. You know that substance is prior to accident, and that the existence of some of them is truer while the existence of others is not. You know that the existent through itself is truer in terms of existence than the existent through another, and the existence of some of them is firmer whereas that of some of them is weaker. For the existence of the stable (al-qārr) ones among them, such as quantity and quality, is firmer than the existence [61] of that which lacks stability, such as time and being-acted-upon. Therefore, existence does not apply to [these accidents] with the same status, the way the natures of the genera apply to their species, which is purely univocal. Therefore [existence] is not a genus.
[existence is not a genus, because one can grasp the quiddity while doubting existence]
Even if it were univocal, it would not be a genus, since it signifies no meaning that would be intrinsic to the quiddities of things. Rather it is something concomitant to them. […] [61.7] In order to conceive of the quiddity of triangle you do not have to conceive that it is existent, as you would have to conceive that it is a plane figure. Plane figure belongs to triangle because it is triangle, and it is intrinsic to its constitution. Therefore [triangle] is constituted by [plane figure], extramentally, in the mind, and in every which way. By contrast the quiddity of triangle is not constituted by existence, which is why you can understand the quiddity of triangle while doubting its existence. […] [62.2] Genus is indeed among the notions (maʿānī) similar to plane figure, through which an entity becomes an entity and a quiddity becomes a quiddity. Existence, by contrast, is something that attaches to quiddity, sometimes in concrete individuals and sometimes in the mind. Hence, it is clear that the name “existent” does not apply to the ten categories univocally (bi-al-tawāṭuʿ), and that even if it did apply univocally it would not be among the items that constitute the quiddity [i.e. it would not be a genus]. Therefore, existence is not a genus.
[against an argument from differentia]
A well-known response would say, as a proof that existence is not a genus, that if it were, then its specific difference would be either existent or not existent. If existent, then the difference would take the place of the species, as the genus would be predicated of it. But if it is not existent, how then can it differentiate? This is an inadequate argument on this topic. For the specific differences of substances are substances, despite being differences.10
[T5] Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 281.10–21
[analogy (tashkīk)]
Know that existence is predicated of what falls under it analogically (ḥaml al-tashkīk), not univocally. This means that uncaused existence is prior in nature to caused existence. Likewise, the existence of substance is prior to the existence of accident. Also, some existences are stronger and others weaker. Clearly then it is incorrect to say that existence is common (ʿāmm) and is equally predicated of the existence of human, donkey, and celestial sphere, like yellowness and redness. You will learn that some bodies are prior to others, meaning that the existence of such bodies is prior to the existence of others, without [one] corporeity being prior to [another] corporeity. Likewise, if we say that cause is prior to effect, we mean that its existence is prior to the existence of the effect, and likewise if we say that two is prior to four, and so on. For if existence is left out of consideration, there is neither priority nor posteriority. Priority and posteriority, just like being stronger or weaker, are something like constituents for existences, that is, for existents.11
[T6] Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 637.3–21
[univocity of existence as an argument for aḥwāl]
A reliable basis for establishing the aḥwāl is to say: if two different things occur to a person with understanding (al-ʿāqil), and he knows the difference between them, then unavoidably, either they differ for him through their existences, or through a ḥāl that is additional to them. But that they differ through their existences is absurd for several reasons. First, the true reality of existence does not differ in intellectual judgment, since existence is reality (thubūt), and blackness does not differ from whiteness in respect of the attribute of reality. If two different items did differ in terms of existence, then [even] two similar things would differ. Thus positing their difference entails an attribute that is additional to existence.
If someone says: how would you respond to somebody who claims that their difference goes back to their existences? For in respect of its existence, blackness is different from whiteness. They [further] say: it would not follow for [someone who holds this] that whiteness is different from whiteness. For we do not say that blackness differs from whiteness through existence taken absolutely, so that we could be forced to concede the existence of two similar items [as a counterargument]. Rather we say that blackness differs from whiteness through its existence. This does not eliminate either of them; nor is the term “existence” here used as a common one, so that we could be forced to concede [that existence is the same] for similar things, as well as for different things [as a counterargument]. They verify this by saying that, if we proceed on the basis (aṣl) that blackness’s being blackness is identical to its existence, and is not an attribute additional to existence, then, so long as blackness differs from whiteness by being blackness, [blackness] will differ from [whiteness] through its existence. This is tantamount to saying that this existence differs from that existence.
[response: one can doubt essence while knowing existence]
So far their argument, but it does not allow them to escape from what I want for them. For we know that the true reality of the existence of blackness is its reality, and the true reality of its existence does not imply its being blackness. This is evident from the fact that one can know its existence without knowing that it is blackness. When the true reality of existence is realized in the soul, it is not associated with blackness’s being blackness, or whiteness’s being whiteness. Hence, it has been shown that the difference does not arise through pure existence. This proof is convincing, when taken together with the previous one.12
[T7] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 158.2–6
[equivocity of existence in traditional Ashʿarism]
Those who deny [the reality of aḥwāl] respond: the existence of something, its concrete reality (ʿayn), its essence, and its being an atom or an accident, according to us all express the same thing (ʿibārāt ʿan muʿabbar wāḥid). That which the Bestower of Existence renders existent is the essence of something, and [His creative] power is connected with the essence of thing in just the same way as it is connected with its existence. He affects its being an atom in just the same way as He affects its occurrence or its origination. The distinction between existence and thingness (al-shayʾiyya) is not a matter of different meanings, but of different words (ilā maʿnā wa-maʿnā bal ilā lafẓ wa-lafẓ).
[T8] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 63.14–17; 63.22–64.5
[against the division argument]
The philosophers (falāsifa) offered proofs for their statement that existence is accidental to quiddities, and is something additional for them.13 They said: division applies to existence, and it is said that existence is either necessary or contingent. Yet division (al-qisma) cannot apply to equivocal names (al-asmāʾ al-mushtarika), as when we say that ʿayn is used equivocally of the organ of sight [sc. the eye], the disc of the sun (ʿayn al-shams), the tilt of the scales (ʿayn al-mīzān), and a wellspring. […]
[63.22] The answer is: what you have said does not show that existence is something additional to the concrete being (ʿayn) of something, or to its quiddity. Division applies to existence (so that one can say that it is necessary and contingent) only insofar as the name (ism) applies to each concrete being. Furthermore, different concrete beings can be divided [into classes], for some are concrete beings through themselves, not due to any power or necessitation, like the essence of the Creator, may He be exalted. Others are [64] contingent, like the concrete beings which are the acts of God, may He be exalted, for instance bodies and so on. That is why division is rightly applied to existence. In the same way, we call specific things concrete beings. For we say that “concrete being” applies to each of them, even though they are different from one another. Thus, a division of this kind may rightly be applied to our notion “concrete being,” so that one may rightly say that “concrete beings” are divided into that which must be a concrete being and that which can be. Yet the application of this division to “concrete being” does not imply that something’s being a concrete being is something additional to its essence and true reality.
[T9] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 233.15–17
[rejection of al-Juwaynī’s participation argument]
One may say to them: don’t you say that different essences share in being an essence? Why do you deny that the aspect you find to be shared between them goes back to their being essence (kawn dhātan), and not to existence?
[T10] Al-Khayyām, Jawāb ʿan thalāth masāʾil, 165.3–16
[“existence” is analogical in extramental and mental existence]
Existence is something merely conceptual, and is applied14 to [its] referents analogically, neither purely univocally nor purely equivocally. The difference between the three terms is evident according to logical principles.
The two meanings [of existence] are [firstly] being in concrete individuals, which is the [meaning] of the term “existence” truer to common usage (ʿinda al-jumhūr); the second is existence in the soul, for instance things conceived (taṣawwurāt) by sense-perception, imagination, the estimative faculty, and the intellect. But this second meaning is [actually] the same as the first meaning. For entities (maʿānī), insofar as they are perceived and conceptualized, are existent in concrete individuals, since the perceiver is a concrete individual and what exists in some concrete individual is [itself] existent among concrete individuals. Yet the thing whose representation (mithāl), figure (rasm), and image (naqsh) is perceived and conceptualized may, in some cases, be non-existent in concrete individuals. For instance, we intellectually grasp15 Adam. What we intellectually grasp concerning Adam is an entity that is existent in the soul and in concrete individuals, since soul is a concrete individual. Yet Adam, whose representation and image is the entity existent in the soul, is not existent in concrete individuals [that is, because he is no longer alive]. This is the difference between the two kinds of existence. Clearly the difference between them is a matter of being truer and more appropriate, and being prior and posterior, which is called an “analogical” meaning (maʿnā), not the meaning known as “equivocation.”
[T11] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 145.10–16
[accepting the univocity of existence for worldly things]
Know that essences are distinguished from one another only generically and specifically (jinsiyyan nawʿiyyan), not through the most common of their attributes, like existence, but rather through their most specific attributes, on the condition that [these attributes] are universal and common. If substance were distinguished from accident through its existence, just as it is [distinguished] by occupying space, then one would judge that the accident too occupies space, and of substance that it stands in need of something that occupies space. For existence and the occupying of space would be one and the same. Hence, that through which they are distinguished would be the same as that which they share, and what makes them similar would be the same as what makes them different. Thus the very idea of similarity, difference, and opposition would be eliminated.
[T12] Abū al-Barākāt, Muʿtabar, vol. 3, 21.18–22.9
[analogy of extramental and mental existence]
“Existent,” as it is said, is used in two ways: first the existent in concrete individuals, second the existent in minds. The existent in concrete individuals is understood by perception (bi-al-idrāk), and some perceivers can refer and direct other perceivers’ [attention] to it, so that they share it in perceiving it. It is one and the same (wāḥid bi-ʿaynihi), commonly shared by many perceivers, for instance the sun, which people and others see as one and the same, without its being multiplied by their perception of it.
The existent in the minds is not like this. For each human individuates (yanfaridu … khāṣṣatan) by his perception that which is in his mind. No other human shares it with him, or if someone does share it with him, then this is only insofar as he has in his mind something similar (mithl) to that which the first person has in his mind, without their [sc. the existents in both minds] being identical (huwa huwa). If one of us imagines [22] a form of Zayd, then he has imagined a form in his mind and perceived it with his mind. If anybody else refers to [this form] with a verbal expression, then the conceptualization in the mind of this other person would [merely] be something similar (mithl) to [that form in the first person’s mind], not identical to it. Each of them would, through their perception of that which is in his mind, individuate it apart from what the other [has in his mind], unlike the case of the sun, which is one and the same even as many share in its perception.
Nevertheless, existents in minds do exist in concrete individuals, by virtue of existing in something that exists in concrete individuals, namely the mind or the soul, in which is conceptualized whatever is conceptualized about this [sc. the real existent]. Hereby existents in concrete individuals differ from existents in minds, according to anyone who investigates and verifies the upshot of his investigation. But what exists in the existent is also existent.
Hence, existence is in some respect and from a certain point of view (min jiha wa-bi-iʿtibār) equivocal, and refers to various meanings (mafhumayn); yet in another respect it is univocal and refers to one and the same meaning in all cases, even if its belonging to one of these two [existences] is more appropriate and primary than to the other.16
[T13] Al-Suhrawardī, Talwīḥāt, 188.5–11
[analogy of existence]
You know that existence and accidenthood are not essential for quiddities. Existence applies analogically: to the necessary more appropriately and primarily, then to substance, and then to the [accident] which is stable in essence; among [such accidents] the non-relative is more perfect.
There are quantities that do not precede any quality, since instances of knowing (ʿulūm) arise from qualities.
“True reality” is a mental concept that is predicated of something after existence [is predicated], even if the meaning (mafhūmuhu) of [the true reality] is grasped intellectually before either of them.17
[T14] Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, vol. 1, 291.16–24
[three arguments for the univocity of existence: from opposition, division, and belief]
First: the intellect judges as evident that nothing other than non-existence is opposed to existence, and that nothing other than existence is opposed to non-existence. Hence, existence must be one and the same concept (mafhūm), just as non-existence is one and the same concept, such that it is right that there be this opposition between the two.
Second: existence may rightly be divided into necessary and contingent, and also into substance and accident. The source of a division is shared by each member of the division.
Third: the belief that [something] is existent is not incompatible with the belief that it is necessary or contingent, or substance or accident. Therefore, the concept of being existent needs a certain measure (qadr) of commonality in all [cases].
[T15] Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 54.4–55.3
[responses to these three arguments]
Many philosophers (al-falāsifa) and Muʿtazilites, as well as a group among us [the Ashʿarites], believed that existence is a description shared [univocally] by existent things. But it is more plausible to say that this is not so. We may say that, if it were so, existence would be distinct from quiddity and existence would subsist in something that is [itself] non-existent. If one allows this, it leads to a doubt as to whether bodies even exist.
They argued that (1) the opposite of negation is one; otherwise, intellectual reckoning (ḥaṣr) would be invalid. Hence affirmation (ithbāt), which is the opposite of negation, must be one. (2) Also, because the existent can be divided into the necessary and the contingent, but the source of a division is shared by each member of the division. (3) Also, because when we know that something exists, this belief does not change when the belief that it is substance or accident changes. This implies that existence is something shared between the two [substance and accident].
The answer to (1): eliminating the opposite of each quiddity yields that quiddity, and there is no intermediary between these two options; does this then indicate the reality of something common [i.e. of a common notion of quiddity]? [55] The answer to (2): the source of the division in terms of necessity and contingency is quiddity. What it means [when we say that the existent can be divided into the necessary and the contingent] is that the persistence (baqāʾ) of that quiddity is either necessary or contingent. The answer to (3): this would entail that there is another existence for existence, so that an infinite regress would follow.18
[T16] Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, vol. 3, 53.9–55.10
[analogy]
The Shaykh said: “existent” is predicated analogically of what exists not in a subject and of what exists in a subject.
Commentary: an analogical term is one that refers to a single meaning shared by many particulars, on the condition that this meaning occurs to some of these particulars more appropriately than it does to others. If we say that the term “existence” behaves like this, we have to show two things: (1) that what one understands by something’s being existent is the same for all existents. (2) that this concept belongs to substance more appropriately than to accident.
Regarding (1), you should know that some people said that the word “existent” applies to the necessary and to the contingent, to substance and to each kind of accident, only equivocally, so that there is nothing here understood univocally. Yet the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) agreed that the word “existence” refers to a single meaning for all types of existents. […] [55.6] Regarding (2), which was to show that the necessary-in-itself is more appropriate for “being existent (al-wujūdiyya)” than the contingent-in-itself, and substance more appropriate for “being existent” than accident: by “more appropriate” is meant the number of concomitants and effects (al-lawāzim wa-al-āthār). Once you know that this is what “more appropriate” means, you inevitably know that it is more appropriate for the necessary-in-itself to “exist” than for the contingent, and more appropriate for substance than for accident.
[T17] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 1, 108.9–11
[argument for univocity from primacy of conception]
[Existence is univocal because] existence is conceptualized primarily, and if it were not univocal this would not be the case. For, if the existence of every thing is identical to its true reality, whereas this true reality is not conceptualized primarily, how then can existence be conceptualized primarily?
[T18] Al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, vol. 1, 346.15–347.3
[argument from poetry]
The knowledge that existence is shared by existent things is necessary and obvious. Some of the excellent poets have clearly and elegantly shown this in their art [347], saying: if a poet recites a qaṣīda and makes all verses rhyme on the word “existence” or what is synonymous to it, any reasonable person will think that this is a repetitive rhyme (al-qāfiya al-mukarrira). Yet if they made the bayts rhyme on the same equivocal name, one used with a different meaning in each verse, nobody would say that this is a repetitive rhyme.
[T19] Al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, vol. 1, 347.5–348.15
[if existence is univocal, it is not part of essence; existence is not a genus]
Since it is established that existence is univocal, it must be additional to quiddities. For different quiddities differ in themselves and share their existences, and that which is shared is not the same as that which differentiates. Therefore, their existence must be additional to their quiddity.
Let it not be asked: why can’t existence be a generic part of quiddities? For we say: this is wrong and even if we granted it, it would do nothing to undermine our position. It is wrong for several reasons: (1) If existence were the genus of quiddities, one could not grasp them intellectually without knowing whether they exist. For it is impossible to grasp something intellectually without knowing its parts. [348] (2) If existence were the genus of quiddities, then the Creator—may He exalted—would fall under [this genus]. Hence the Creator—may He be exalted—would be composed from genus and differentia, and would thus be contingent, since every composite thing needs each of its parts. (3) Genus cannot be without a specific difference which renders its existence subsistent. So if existence were a genus, it would have a specific difference that renders its existence subsistent, and another [second-order] existence would belong to the [first-order existence]. But this is absurd. (4) Existence either needs a subject of inherence by its very nature, or it does not. If the former is the case, and [existence] is a part of substance, but that whose part requires a subject of inherence requires subject of inherence [as a whole], then every substance would require a subject of inherence, which is absurd. If however the second is the case, and [existence] is a part of accident, but that whose part does not require a subject of inherence does not require it either—for if it inhered in a subject of inherence its part would inhere in it too—then the accident would have to be a substance [i.e. because what needs no subject is a substance]. But this is absurd. (5) Existence belongs more appropriately to the necessary than to the contingent, and among contingent things it belongs more appropriately to substance than to accident. Yet there can be no variation (tafāwut) in a part of quiddity. For if the extent (qadr) of the variation were [a condition] for the realization of quiddity, then quiddity could not be realized without it. But if it is not posited for it, it is not a part of quiddity.19
[T20] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 1, 118.1–7
[argument from specific differences]
If existence were a genus, then different things that fall under it would be distinguished from one another by constituent specific differences. Necessarily, the aspect that is shared has to be different from the aspect that is distinct, and that through which the distinction obtains has to be existent, since what is not existent cannot distinguish one existent from another. Hence, the specific difference would share the quiddity of the genus with the species and there would have to be a further specific difference. But the same argument will apply to it, so that each difference would require another difference and so on to infinity.
[T21] Al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 253.15–254.9
[equivocity of ‘being an essence’]
Among the theologians (mutakallimūn), some said that there can be distinction due to a specific description only if essences share in that which is named (musammā) “essence” and “true reality.” This is not so. Rather the Necessary Existent differs from other essences through His essence and His true reality. He shares nothing with them apart from having a name (al-tasmiya). […]
[254.6] Accordingly, the source of the division into the necessary and the contingent is not what is named by “essence,” but rather the name “essence” [itself]. Nor do we concede that what is named by “essence” does not differ, whereas beliefs about the meaning of substance and accident, necessary and contingent, do differ. Rather that which does not differ is only the name (al-ism), not what is named (al-musammā).
[T22] Al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 260.9–11
[if God’s essence is existence, existence is equivocal]
Those who say that [existence] differs [in meaning] argue that the existence of the Necessary Existent is the same as His essence, and His essence is different from other essences—as has been shown by the preceding demonstrative proofs of both premises. Therefore, what is named by “existence” is different.
[T23] Al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 261.8–22
[an argument for univocity of existence, with refutation]
The fourth argument [for the univocity of existence] is: when one says that what is named by “existence” (musammā al-wujūd) is not shared by quiddities, one means by it either absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) or specific existence (al-khāṣṣ). If one means specific existence, there is no quarrel about it and there is no need to reject something that is agreed upon. If however one means absolute existence, then the [very] judgment (ḥukm) that “there is no sharing in absolute existence” amounts to admitting absolute existence. For assent follows upon conceptualization, so that the statement would be self-contradictory: being shared is applicable to absolute existence, so to say that it cannot be shared is self-contradictory. […]
[261.19] Regarding the fourth argument, when we say that essences do not share in what is named by “existence,” we mean that the name “existence” has no referent (musammā) that would be shared by the essences. Thus, one does not predicate “non-existence of sharing” of a genuinely named thing (musammā mutaḥaqqiq), regardless whether it is absolute or specific. There is a clear difference between the two ways of putting it.
[T24] Al-Āmidī, Kashf al-tamwīhāt, 59.23–60.17
[rejecting al-Rāzī’s arguments for univocity]
As for [al-Rāzī’s] statement that existence is commonly shared, it is conceded, if he thereby means the name (ism) of existence. If, however, he means the meaning (maʿnā) of existence, it is not conceded.
(1) When he says that only a single thing is opposed to negation, which is affirmation, this is not so. For the negation of each thing is opposed by the affirmation of this thing. If the affirmation of something is identical to its essence, then that which is opposed to the negation of each thing will be different from that which is opposed to the negation of something else. [60] (2) As for his statement that the source of division by contingency and necessity is commonly shared, we say: only in word, not in meaning. The former is conceded, the latter is not. (3) As for his statement that if different things were understood by existence, it would follow that one of them is to be understood as necessary, the other as contingent; our Master [sc. al-Āmidī], may God support him, said: what is absurd in saying that the name of existence is common, yet understood in different ways, one as necessary, the other as contingent? Granted, this would be impossible if what unified [the two cases] were the meaning of existence, rather than just the name “existence,” but this is not the case. (4) As for his statement that existence is evidently conceptualized as different from the specificity of quiddities, this is based on the unity and commonality of existence, and on its being distinct from quiddities; yet this is far from being settled. (5) As for his statement that, when someone says that existence is not shared, they have already made a judgment in common about all existence, but this can be done only if existence is shared: this is wrong. For when one says that existence is not shared, one means only that what is named by “existence” is not a unified [thing] belonging to [different] essences. This holds true together with the difference [in the meaning of “existence,”] as when one says “what is named by ‘concrete thing (ʿayn)’ is not shared.” (6) As for his statement that we first know the existence of something, and only then know whether it is substance or accident, our Master [sc. al-Āmidī] said: this does nothing to show that existence is distinct from quiddity. For the opponent can say: the first knowledge is simply knowledge about essence in general, whereas the second knowledge is about it distinctively (tafṣīlan).
[T25] Al-Āmidī, al-Nūr al-bāhir, vol. 5, 7.17–8.9
[here he instead accepts univocal existence, as distinguished from specific existence]
By the expression “existence” we only mean here affirmative existence (al-wujūd al-ithbātī) which is shared by all true realities, not specific existence (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ), by which one expresses the specific true reality of each existent thing individually, such as the true reality [8] of whiteness, blackness, human, and so on. If the name “existence” is used in application to whatever is similar to these specific true realities, for each existent thing individually, then it does not mean the same as that existence which is synonymous with “reality (ithbāt).” Hence, if someone hears the notion “existence” as synonymous to “reality”, he forms in his mind a meaning that is shared by specific true realities, despite the fact that they differ. One may [also] predicate affirmative existence of a specific true reality, as when we predicate of a true reality which is specific for human that it is existent: this predication would impart a meaning (mufīd maʿnā) which obtains in itself. If however the referent of the notion “existence” were [the true reality itself],20 then the meaning would not obtain; rather it would be as if one said that the true reality of human is the true reality of human.
[T26] Al-Abharī, Muntahā al-afkār, 279.15–280.7 [trans. Eichner 2012, mod.]
[rejection of the Rāzian arguments for the univocity of existence]
(1) We do not concede that the intellect divides existence into necessary and contingent. Rather, the intellect passes a judgement that every existing quiddity is either necessary in itself or contingent in itself. But this does not indicate that existence is common between the two things (al-amrayn). (2) We do not concede that non-existence insofar as it is nonexistence has one meaning. Whoever believes that the existence of every thing is identical to its quiddity believes that non-existence has various meanings. Even if we were to concede this, it is not possible that the elimination of nonexistence as such (nafsuhu) is existence as such. Otherwise, all existents would be realized when there is one existence. This would be necessary because existence as such, which is the negation (rafʿ) of non-existence as such, is realized and necessitates (mustalzim) the realization of all existents. (3) We do not concede that, if existence were not common, then belief in all existences would cease if belief in the specific cases were to cease. [280] This would only follow if predicating existence of the existents were not equivocal (ishtirāk lafẓī). If it were like this, then the belief in one of the meanings of existence would remain whereas the belief in the specific cases would cease. Hence it does not follow that the belief in existence ceases just because the belief in the specific cases ceases.
The truth is that in concrete individuals, existence is not one nature commonly shared by the necessary and the contingent. Otherwise, it would either be necessary in itself or contingent in itself. The first is absurd, because—if its concrete being (huwiyyatuhu) were in virtue of its quiddity—it would be one of a kind, and it would impossible that it is commonly shared. If however it were in virtue of something else (ghayr), then it would need it, and what needs something else is contingent in itself. [So] the second [option] is absurd, [since] otherwise each individual instantiation (fard) of [existence] would be contingent in itself because it needs something contingent. Therefore, the existence of the Necessary in Itsef would be contingent in itself. This is self-contradiction.21
[T27] Al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, 75.10–27
[responses to Rāzian counter-arguments against univocity in T15]
I say: (1) [al-Rāzī’s] response to the first [i.e. the opposition argument], namely that the elimination (irtifāʿ) of any quiddity is opposed [only] to its own realization (taḥaqquqahā), is no answer [at all], because it does not contradict it. This is proven as follows: the elimination of A is opposed to the realization of A and the elimination of B is opposed to the realization of B. But absolute (muṭlaq) elimination, which is predicated of both [the elimination of A and of B] and of other things besides, is something univocal; and the realization that is opposed to it is something univocal, which can rightly be predicated of each of these two specific realizations [of A and of B], and others besides. By univocity of existence we mean precisely this absolute realization (al-taḥaqquq al-muṭlaq), not this or that realization.
(2) His response to the second [i.e. the division argument] is no answer to what he has said [in the division argument], namely that existence is divided into the necessary and contingent. For that which he uses to explain the source of this division—that the persistence (baqāʾ) of a given quiddity is either necessary or is not—just is existence! For persistence is continued existence (istimrār al-wujūd). So this like saying that the continued existence of that quiddity is such-and-such [i.e. the source of division]. If continued existence were not univocal for both the necessary and other things, then it would not be right to make this division.
(3) What he says in response to the third [i.e. the belief argument] is no answer either. For there is no conceptualization of a second-order existence shared between both [first-order] existence and the substance that [in itself] lacks existence and non-existence, such that if one of them were to alter in conceptualization and change into the other [i.e. if substance became first-order existence], then the univocal [second-order] existence would remain the same, implying that another [third-order] existence belongs to that [second-order] existence.
[T28] Al-Kātibī, Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, 2.13–13.13
[arguments for univocity and replies]
[Existence] is univocal (mushtarik). (1) Otherwise belief concerning existence would perish along with beliefs about specific cases (khuṣūṣiyyāt). (2) Also, the opposition between existent and non-existent would be invalid: instead what would be opposed to non-existence would need to be some specific existence. (3) Also, it would not be right to divide [existence] into necessary and contingent. [All three] consequences are wrong.
[3] (1) The first, because if we believe that the contingently existent has a ground that is [likewise] contingently existent, we assume that the ground exists. But if we come to believe that this ground is necessarily existent, our belief that it is contingently existent perishes, yet the belief in its existence does not. (2)–(3) The two other [points] are obvious.
[Against (1)] But the first conditional is impossible. For it cannot be that the existence of every contingent quiddity is additional to it, since in some instances it can subsist by itself—namely the Necessary Existent. So belief in His existence cannot perish along with beliefs about [His] specific nature. [Against (2)] Likewise, the second [argument is invalid], because the specific existence of every quiddity is opposed to its non-existence. [Against (3)] What was said about the absurd [third] consequence is feeble. For the participation can be merely nominal (lafẓī). It is for this reason that belief in existence does not perish when the belief about the specific nature perishes. This reveals the feebleness of the absurdity that is supposed to follow from the third conditional.
Still, it is more appropriate to say that existence is something’s being among concrete individuals; and there is no doubting that all existents share this meaning.
[T29] Al-Kātibī, Asʾila ʿan al-Maʿālim, 25.18–26.4
[response to the division argument]
We say: we do not concede that the source of a division (al-taqsīm) has a meaning that is univocal with the divisions (ishtirākan maʿnawiyyan). This would follow only if the possibility of dividing into two items depended on [univocal meaning], but this is wrong. For according to us the possibility of dividing may depend on [26] either one of two things: equivocity or univocity. How else? For one may rightly say that ʿayn is either the seeing ʿayn, or the ʿayn of a fountain, or ʿayn gold, or other things one might understand by ʿayn, even though ʿayn is not applied univocally to these divisions.
[T30] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 80.13–81.6
[analogy]
Existence is not predicated of what falls under it univocally, but rather analogically. For the existence of the cause is stronger than the existence of the effect, likewise the existence of the substance in relation to the existence of the accident; the existence of a stable accident is [also] stronger than the existence of unstable accident, while the relational is weaker than the non-relational.
[against outright equivocity]
Yet if existence did not have a single meaning (mafhūm), we would not be able to judge that it is true of every existent, nor would we judge that when it is wrong [to ascribe] non-existence to something, it is true [to ascribe] existence to it, since both might be false. [81] The fact that there is existence is conceptualized as obvious, and the fact that existence has a single meaning, but is predicated analogically, is not something that calls for a demonstration. What we have mentioned in order to show this was [only] a reminder (tanbīh), not a demonstrative proof.
[universal existence is only in the mind]
The commonality (ʿumūmiyya) of [existence] is that of a necessary concomitant, not that of genus, nor of any essential constituent whatsoever. If existence is common, it must exist in the soul. For existence exists in the soul through [another] existence, because it is like other meanings that are conceptualized in the mind.22
[T31] Al-Nasafī, Sharḥ Asās al-kiyāsa, 266.3–9
[an original argument for univocity]
Existence is a univocal description for existents according to most philosophers (falāsifa), Muʿtazilites and others. There are several proofs for this. The first is that even if existence were not shared, there would [still] have to be something among existing things (amr mā min al-umūr al-wujūdiyya) that is univocal to them. But that yields an absurdity, because this item could not be univocal without existence being univocal, given that this item includes existence. Alternatively, there is nothing [at all that is shared], but this too is absurd. For the individuals that belong to a single species, whichever species it may be, share univocally in the nature of that species. Thus animals for instance share the nature of animality. And that [nature] necessarily has to be something existing (wujūdiyya).
[T32] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 214.20–215.18
[existence is additional to essence and is univocal]
Some theologians (mutakallimūn), who are in reality just laypeople (ʿawwām al-nās), came up with the idea that [existence] is not additional to quiddities, whether concretely or mentally. This is wrong. For if this were the case, then our saying [215] “human is existent” would amount to saying “human is human,” and “existent is existent.” Similarly, when we said that void does not exist, it would be as if we said that void is not void.
Furthermore, that existence is additional to quiddities is proven by the fact that existence is univocal for existents, whereas none of the specific features of quiddities are themselves univocal for the existents. Therefore, no existence is among the specific features of quiddities themselves. Rather existence is additional to them.
As for the fact that existence is univocal, it can be shown in several ways: (1) We conceptualize existence and then predicate it as holding true of every existent. If existence were not univocal for all existents, one could not predicate it as holding true of them. (2) We understand the meaning of existence and non-existence, and judge that if one of them is false then the other is true, and vice-versa. If existence were not univocal for all existents, this wouldn’t need to be so, since they could obtain at the same time. (3) When we judge that something is among the concrete individuals, we cannot but judge that it is existent. If existence were not univocal, then judging that existence is true for something would not follow from judging that it is among the concrete individuals, since it would be possible that other ideas [which make up the concept of “existence”] do not hold of it, albeit we judge that it is in concrete individuals. Therefore, existence holds univocally of all existents.
[T33] Al-Samarqandī, Maʿārif al-Ṣaḥāʾif, fol. 8r4–16
[univocal and equivocal meaning of existence]
People of sound mind differed concerning the question whether or not existence has a single meaning (mafhūm) that is shared by all existents. Those who gave it proper thought (muḥaqqiqūn) said yes, but the philosophers (falāsifa), al-Ashʿarī and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed with them. The philosophers claimed that existence as such is a merely conceptual attribute that is shared by all existents, but only analogically (ʿalā sabīl al-tashkīk). For, they said, the existence of the necessary self-subsistent is different from any other existence. Al-Ashʿarī and Abū al-Ḥusayn said that the existence of each true reality is identical to it, whereas sharing (al-ishtirāk) obtains equivocally, like sharing in the word ʿayn.
Clarification of this issue: existence applies in language to two meanings: essence (dhāt) and being (kawn). Al-Ashʿarī and Abū al-Ḥusayn believed in the former, and we have no real dispute with this view. Yet it holds only if they also make existence, so understood, opposed to non-existence, about which the consensus says that it is negation. Those who said that [existence] has a single meaning, which is shared by all existents, believed in the second [interpretation of existence]. On this basis the imprecision of the philosophers becomes clear. Once this is understood, we say that evidently, if [by “existence”] one intends “being,” then it is a single shared meaning, but if one intends “essence,” then not. So perhaps this dispute arose simply for lack of disambiguating the question. Otherwise, [why did] none of the people of sound mind say that existence is identical to essence, meaning by [“existence”] “being”? The truth regarding this topic [lies in] the disambiguation of the question.
[T34] Al-Ḥillī, Taslīk al-nafs, 30.2–5
[existence is neither identical to essence nor a generic part of the essence]
Since it is established that existence is univocal, it is established that it is additional to quiddities. It cannot be identical to them, for otherwise different true realities would share the same entire quiddity. Nor can it be a part of [quiddities], for otherwise it would be a genus, given that it is most common among the shared parts, so it would require a specific difference; yet the differentia of existence would be existent, so that genus would belong to the specific difference, and so on to infinity.
[T35] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 414.15–415.4
[against equivocity of existence]
Existence is univocal. For belief in the specific features perishes even as belief in [existence] remains, as has been said. Also, [because] existence may be divided into substance and accident. Also, because we can specify that something is either existent or non-existent.
Counter-argument: the opposition between reality (al-thubūt) and non-existence means an opposition between the realization (taḥaqquq) of a quiddity and its non-realization.
Response: we say “something is either existent or non-existent” in order to verify one of these two contraries by a demonstration. If this meant, for instance, that blackness must either be blackness or not, then the fact that the truth is true and that the falsehood is false would be obvious.
[415] Counter-argument: if reality is something additional to quiddity and is not univocal, the division still holds good, because in that case it means that a quiddity is either real in its specific reality or is negated.
Response: Why do you say that our disjunctive statement that a quiddity is either real in its reality or is negated holds? For a quiddity can be real through the reality of another quiddity.
See further F. Benevich, “The Metaphysics of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī (d. 1153): Aḥwāl and Universals,” in A. al Ghouz (ed.), Islamic Philosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century (Bonn: 2018), 323–353; and F. Benevich, “The Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd): from Avicenna to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” in A. Shihadeh and J. Thiele (eds), Philosophical Theology in Islam. Later Ashʿarism East and West (Leiden: 2020), 123–155.
Other ways of translating the notion of tashkīk include “modulation,” “ambiguity,” “modulated univocity,” “modulated homonymy/univocity.” By choosing “analogy,” we are not suggesting by any means that the other possible translations are incorrect; we are just choosing the notion that is least interpretative.
On analogy of existence in Avicenna and post-Avicennian tradition see further A. Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (taškīk al-wujūd, analogia entis) and its Greek and Arabic Sources,” in F. Opwis, and D.C. Reisman (eds), Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas (Leiden: 2012), 327–363; D. De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing,” Review of Metaphysics 69 (2014), 261–286; T.-A. Druart, “Ibn Sina and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity,” in M.A. Mensia (ed.), Views on the Philosophy of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra Shirazi (Carthage: 2014), 15–24; D. Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity (Berlin: 2020), 424–489; D. Janos, “Tashkīk al-wujūd and the lawāzim in Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” in D. De Smet and M. Sebti (eds), Penser avec Avicenne. De l’héritage grec à la réception latine, en hommage à Jules Janssens (Leiden: 2022), 91–147; D. Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation: A Reconsideration of the asmāʾ mushakkika (and tashkīk al-wujūd),” Oriens 50 (2022): 1–62; F. Zamboni, “Is Existence One or Manifold? Avicenna and His Early Interpreters on the Modulation of Existence (taškīk al-wuǧūd),” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 31 (2020), 121–149.
See al-Rāzī, Risāla fī ʿilm al-kalām, 76.7–8.
For more on aḥwāl see the chapter on Universals below.
W.V.O. Quine, “On What There Is,” in W.V.O. Quine, From the Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1961), 1–19.
This position forms an important part of the debate about the status of mental object in post-Avicennian philosophy. See further F. Benevich, “Representational Beings: Suhrawardī (d. 1191) and Avicenna’s Mental Existence,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 87 (2020), 289–317.
M. Achena and H. Massé translate this last sentence as “mais, de plus, ce discours n’aurait aucun sens” (Avicenne, Le Livre de Science, Paris, Société d’édition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1955, p. 115), which is also a possible alternative translation.
This statement is a possible source for Bahmanyār’s position in T6 from our chapter on the Essence-Existence Distinction.
Cf. al-Āmidī, al-Nūr al-bāhir vol. 5, 15.3–9.
For more of Bahmanyār’s discussion of existence see the chapters on the Essence-Existence Distinction and on God and Existence.
The back reference is to 635.19–22: “What shows [that knowing existence of something is different from knowing its aḥwāl] is that, among the attributes which we supposed to be the aḥwāl of the existent, there are some that are not affirmed necessarily. Rather they are affirmed after investigation and inference. Existence, by contrast, is known necessarily. If knowing [the aḥwāl] were identical to knowing existence, the result would be that one and the same object of knowledge would be affirmed both necessarily and by inference. And this is absurd.”
Though Ibn al-Malāḥimī thinks that this argument shows that existence is additional to essence, it is actually an argument against equivocity of existence.
Reading yunṭaliqu with MSS S and Ṭ.
Reading taʿaqqalna for taʿallaqna.
For other aspects of Abū al-Barakāt’s contribution to the theory of analogy, see the chapter on God and Existence.
Al-Suhrawardī’s criticism of the equivocity of existence is a part his criticism of the identity of essence and existence; see further [T35, T40] in the chapter on the Essence-Existence Distinction.
Al-Rāzī accepts the equivocity of existence also in Risāla fī ʿilm al-kalām. See [T30] in the chapter on God and Existence.
For similar arguments see al-Āmidī, al-Nūr al-bāhir, vol. 5, 15–16.
The text is damaged here.
Note that in the passages quoted in the chapter on the Essence-Existence Distinction, al-Abharī accepts the univocity of existence.
Cf. [T6] in the chapter on the Essence-Existence Distinction.