[essence is neutral with respect to universality]

So the universal, as a universal, is one thing, but insofar as it is something to which universality attaches, it is something else. The universal as such is that which is indicated by one of these definitions.¹⁵ If that [indicated thing] is “human” or “horse,” then something (maʿnā) else is there apart from the meaning of universality, namely [in the latter case] “horseness.” For the definition of “horseness” is not the definition of universality, nor is universality included in the definition of “horseness.” For “horseness” has its own definition, which does not need the definition of universality; rather, universality occurs to it accidentally. For in itself, it is nothing at all except “horseness”; in itself, it is neither one nor many, and exists neither among concrete particulars nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in actuality, such that [these] would be included in “horseness.” Rather, just as such, it is only “horseness.”

[essence is neutral with respect to one and many]

If we pose a question whose subject is the being (huwiyya) of humanity, taken as such and as one thing, and ask which of two contradictory terms [apply to it]: “is it one or many?” no answer need be given. For the being of humanity taken as such is something that is neither of these two, as nothing exists in the definition of this thing apart from humanity alone.

[more on the neutrality of essence as such]

It is possible to consider (iʿtibār) animal in itself, even though it [exists] together with something else, because [animal] itself [remains] itself even while it is with something else (li-anna dhātahu maʿa ghayrihi dhātuhu). So it itself belongs to [itself] in virtue of itself, whereas its being with something else is either something accidental to it, or a necessary concomitant to its nature, as [is the case with] animality and humanity. Considered in this way, it is prior in existence to the animal that is particular together with its accidents, or it is universal, whether existing or in the mind, by the priority of the simple to the complex and the part to the whole. In this [mode of] existence, it is neither genus nor species, neither individual, one, nor many. Rather, in this [mode of] existence it is only animal and only human.

[part-whole argument for the extramental existence of essence]

The fact that animal existing in the individual is a certain animal (ḥayawānan mā) does not prevent animal as such (that is, not considered as being animal in a certain state) from existing in it. For, if this individual is a certain animal, and a certain animal exists, then animal [as such], which is part of a certain animal, exists [as well].

[contradiction argument against the extramental existence of universals]

It is impossible for one and the same entity (maʿnā) to exist in many things. For, if the humanity in ʿAmr—taken as the same object (bi-dhātihi), not in the sense of a definition—exists in Zayd, then whatever holds accidentally of this humanity in Zayd would have to hold of it when it is in ʿAmr, apart from the accidents whose quiddity is predicated [only] with respect to Zayd. As for that which is established in the essence of the human, its being so established does not require that it should become [159] relative, for example, to become white, black, or knowing. For [in the latter case] when [the human] knows, [the human] is related only to the object of knowledge. From [the supposition that one and the same entity exists in many], it would thus follow that contraries would be combined in a single object (dhāt), especially if genus relates to the species the way species relates to its individuals. Thus one object would be described as being both rational and not rational. No one of sound mind can think that one and the same humanity is enclosed by the accidents of ʿAmr and that this very same [humanity] (bi-ʿaynihā) is enclosed by the accidents of Zayd. But if you consider humanity with no other condition (bi-lā sharṭ ākhar), then pay no mind to these relations, for these are as we have taught you.

[universals as particular thoughts in the soul]

Insofar as this [universal] form is a disposition in a particular soul, it is an individual case of knowledge or conception. And just as something can be either a genus or a species under different considerations, likewise, under different considerations, it can be universal or particular. So insofar as this form is one of the forms in the soul, it is a particular, but insofar as many share it in common, in one of the three ways explained above,¹⁶ it is a universal.

[essences have existence outside the mind, universals do not]

If we then say that the universal nature exists in concrete individuals, we do not mean that it does so insofar as it is universal (in this sense of universality). Rather, we mean that the nature to which universality occurs exists in concrete individuals. So insofar as it is a nature it is one thing; insofar as it such that a universal form can be apprehended from it by the intellect, it is something else. Again, insofar as it is actually intellectually apprehended in this way, it is one thing; but it is something else insofar as it is true to say of it that, were it not connected to this matter and to these accidents, but to that other matter and those other accidents, then it would be this other individual. This nature exists in concrete individuals when considered in the first way, but [when considered like this] universality is not in concrete individuals as well, [unlike when] it is considered in the second, third, or fourth ways. If one takes this way of considering it to be the meaning of “universal,” then this nature is in concrete individuals together with universality. But the universality we have been discussing exists only in the soul.

[univocity argument for the extramental existence of essences]

Some people may be overcome by the supposition that the existent is sensible, that it is impossible for anything to exist whose substance is not available to sensation, and that whatever is not essentially specified with a place or a position, like the body, or by reason of that in which it resides, like the states of the body, can have no existence at all. You may learn that what these people say is wrong by reflecting on sensible objects themselves. For you, and anyone who deserves to be included in this conversation, realize that a single term (ism) may apply to these sensible objects, not in a purely equivocal way, but with a single meaning, for instance the term “human.” Neither you nor he doubts that [“human”] applies to both Zayd and ʿAmr with the same existing meaning. Now, this existing meaning is either such that it is available to sensation, or not. If it is remote from being available to sensation, then scrutiny has extracted something non-sensible from sensible things, which is hard to believe. But if it is sensible, then inevitably it has position, a “where,” and a determinate magnitude and determinate quality. It can only [264] be sensed, or even imagined, like this, since every sensible or imagined object is inevitably specified by one of these states. This being so, it will not be such as to lack such a state [sc. a location, etc.], and so it will not be predicable of many things that differ in this respect. Therefore “human” insofar as it is one in true reality, or rather insofar as its true, original (aṣliyya) nature is not differentiated by multiplicity, is not an object of sensation, but solely an object of intellect. And likewise for every universal.

[distinction between primary and secondary intelligibles]

[Previous scholars] found existents of two kinds: either the existence of things is extramental, or their existence is in the mind. They have put investigation of the existence that is extramental into the art, or arts, of philosophy. But how can the investigation of existence in the mind be conceived as belonging to an art, or part of an art, without having made distinctions so as to understand that the items in the mind are either items conceptualized in the mind, having been acquired from extramental reality, or are [secondary] items that occur to [these primary conceptualized items], in that they are in the mind, but with no correlate to them in extramental reality?

[the philosophers’ account of how universals are perceived]

The rational faculty perceives general intellectual universals, which the theologians (al-mutakallimūn) term “states (aḥwāl).” Upon observation of a determinate human individual by sensation, it thus perceives “human” taken absolutely (al-insān al-muṭlaq), this being something else than the perceived individual. For the observed [human] is in a specified place, and has a specified color, magnitude, and position, whereas the intellectually apprehended, absolute human is separated from these things. Still, it includes everything to which the name “human” applies, even though it lacks the color, magnitude, position, and place of the observed [individual]. Indeed, [absolute human] even includes that which is only possibly existent in the future; in fact, even if there were no humans, the true reality of human would remain in the mind, separated from these specific properties. The same goes for all that the senses observe as individual. From [the individual], there arises for the mind the true reality of that individual as a universal separated from instances of matter and from positions. […]

[response: universals are perceived only in connection with sensibles]

[199.2] We do not concede the universal meaning that you [philosophers] have posited as inhering in the intellect. Rather, only that which inheres in sensation inheres in the intellect, except that it inheres in sensation as an aggregate which sensation cannot take apart (tafṣīl) but which the intellect can. […] [200.4] This, then, is the meaning of “universal” with respect to both the intellect and the senses. For once the mind has perceived the form of body on the basis of an animal, it does not acquire a new form of corporeality on the basis of a tree the same way the imagination does when it perceives the form of two instances of water at two [different] times, and likewise for any two similar things. This does not allow for the affirmation of a universal that has no position at all.

[real and merely conceptual attributes]

There are two types of attributes (awṣāf): one is called “essential (dhātī),” the other “accidental (ʿaraḍī).” Among accidental attributes, some are necessarily concomitant for the subject of attribution, others not. Instead, the latter can [102] be separated from [the subject] in imagination (wahm) alone, or in both imagination and reality. Furthermore, both types, essential and accidental, can be subdivided into two: one is called conceptual (iʿtibārī), the other existing (wujūdī).

The type “existing” is, for instance, ascribing to a body the attribute of blackness, when it is black. For blackness is an existing attribute; that is, an entity additional to the black [body] itself, and it is existent in concrete individuals. And if blackness is an existing attribute (ṣifa), “the black” is an existing attribution (waṣf). There is no need to establish this division, the “existing,” with a demonstration, since it is obvious to the intellect, indeed even to imagination and sensation.

The type “conceptual accidental” is, for instance, attributing to two that it is “half of four.” For if two’s being half of four were an item additional to [two] itself [in reality, and not just at the conceptual level], then there would belong to two, in addition to itself, entities that are infinite [103] in number, but we have a demonstration that this is impossible.

The type “conceptual essential” is, for instance, attributing to blackness that it is a color, since its being a color is an essential attribution of it. The demonstration that being a color is not an attribute additional to the blackness itself in concrete individuals is that, if it were an additional attribute, it would have to be accidental. But blackness is already an accident. How then can an accident be the subject for another accident? Besides, if the subject of blackness were the same as the subject for being a color, then being a color would be an attribute of the subject of blackness, not of blackness, so that being a color would be existent in concrete individuals, and it would follow as something extrinsic to itself that [color] is blackness, but this is absurd.

When we say “conceptual attribution,” we mean that if the intellect grasps some meaning, it intellectually distinguishes this intelligible, and considers its states (aḥwāl). If this meaning happens to be simple, not multiple—like¹⁷ all accidents that exist in concrete individuals—and if it happens that it has some attributes, then one knows that these attributes belong to it only in terms of conceptual consideration, not in terms of existence in concrete individuals. For [one] realizes that something simple that exists in concrete individuals [104] cannot have [anything further] that exists in it, since [otherwise the simple] would have multiple parts in concrete individuals; and because one realizes that no accident can be a subject for another accident; and because one realizes that the subject of that accident cannot be the subject of this attribute that was attributed to that accident. […]

[against neutrality of states with respect to existence]

[104.6] Those who investigate this subject without understanding these merely conceptual descriptions fall into ridiculous errors. For instance, some recent, rather arbitrary thinkers made being-a-color, existence, and other such states to be “secondary states, to which one attributes neither existence nor non-existence.” The problem that besets them, having made this crass mistake, has to do with the most important and most obvious primary rule that there is no middle between negation and affirmation. [This] is so obvious that there is no need for us to mention it, nor to refute [their position], nor to analyze it, because it is nonsense.

[conceptualist solution]

[105] If they had just thought about conceptual attributes, they would not have fallen into this enormous misconception. Instead, they would have said: being a color does not exist in concrete individuals as something distinct from blackness. It is only an attribution of the mind, which arises in the soul when the intellect realizes blackness itself and inquires into its states, and the fact that it shares some states in common with whiteness. The same goes for existence and unity.

[definition of dhāt]

As for our term dhāt, our companions have already explained that it is used linguistically only in relation to something else, such as when we say “whatever has property (dhāt māl)” and “whatever has beauty.” It is not used by itself. The theologians (al-mutakallimūn), however, used it by itself. The Master Abū al-Ḥusayn defined it in the Taṣaffuḥ as “that to which knowledge can be connected.” By “connection of knowledge” he meant that [knowledge] connects to it concretely (bi-ʿaynihi), since according to him, knowledge of conceptions is “unconnected” knowledge, that is, knowledge with no concrete object of knowledge (maʿlūm muʿayyan). The theologians widened the application of the term “connection” in the case of knowledge, and applied it also to that which is not in itself concrete. […] [268.21] This misleading [terminology] needs to be cleared up.

So we say: dhāt [“object” or “a thing itself”] is whatever can be known concretely on its own, or just by itself. We say “concretely” so as to distinguish it from what is conceived and supposed, since that would not be concrete. And we say “on its own, or just [269] by itself” in order to distinguish it from “states,” since knowledge does not connect to them on their own, but only connects to them as following on an object (dhāt).

[definition of ḥāl]

[270.18] They ought to say: “state (ḥāl)” is every real item that cannot be grasped intellectually without the object (dhāt) [i.e. what has the state], where what is so grasped considers nothing but that object. This is what is implied by their arguments for the reality of states.

But we say: the state, according to those who affirm them, cannot be intellectually grasped without the object [that has the state], since knowledge cannot be connected to [states] on their own, nor can any ascription (ḥukm) be applied to them on their own. This is why they say that [states] are included within the knowledge of the object [that has the state]. Do you not see them saying, “the object is according to a state (dhāt ʿalā ḥāla)”? This is built upon their belief that state is included within the knowledge of the object, and the word “according” presupposes this. When we say, “what is so grasped considers nothing but [that object],” this distinguishes [state] from “ascription (ḥukm).” For “ascription” is an item that [likewise] cannot be intellectually grasped without the object, and is also included in the knowledge of the object; however, in grasping it intellectually one does consider something other than that object. Take for instance the possibility of acting for someone capable [of acting]. For they say that in the case of [this] ascription [sc. “capable”], when it is intellectually grasped [271] one does consider something other than the very object that is capable (dhāt al-qādir), namely the act of which it is capable. This is why ascription is defined as an item that is additional to the object itself, is included in the knowledge of the object, and is in consideration of something other than the object.

[states (aḥwāl) vs. ascriptions (aḥkām)]

First comprehensive approach to establish states: we know [God] the Exalted Himself. Furthermore we know that He is powerful and knowledgeable. None of these cases of knowledge are tantamount to another; rather they differ. Now, if these items of knowledge were connected only to Himself, then the knowledge of Him would be tantamount to the knowledge of His attributes. But, given that there is a difference between the cases of knowledge for His [various] attributes, there must be something additional that is contained in the knowledge of each one of His attributes. And we have already refuted the doctrine of “meanings (maʿānī),”¹⁸ so there remain only “states.”

Response: indeed, there must be something additional that is contained in the knowledge of Him Himself. But why have you said that this additional [item] is a state belonging to Him Himself? One what basis do you deny that this item would be [among] the ascriptions (aḥkām) that are necessitated by [121] Himself, the exalted? It would be the capacity for acting that is contained in the knowledge that He is powerful. Also, His being clear about an object of knowledge and His connection to it is contained in the knowledge that He is knowledgeable. The same goes for His other attributes, since inevitably something amounting to an affirmation or negation (or the affirmation or negation of an action, in the case of the attributes of action) must be contained in the knowledge of each of His attributes.

[realism and nominalism concerning states (aḥwāl)]

[States] are divided into the caused and the uncaused. Those that are caused are features (aḥkām) that subsist in objects (dhawāt) due to [additional] entities (maʿānī), whereas those that are uncaused are attributes (ṣifāt) that are not features due to [additional] entities. […]

[132.10] According to the Qāḍī [al-Bāqillānī], may God have mercy upon him, any attribute that belongs to the existent, but does not itself have existence as an attribute, is a “state.” It makes no difference whether the necessitated entity has life as a condition or not; an example would be a living thing’s being alive, knowing, or powerful, but also a moving thing’s being in motion or the resting thing at rest, as well as [being] black, white, and so on. […]

[132.18] As for the second category [i.e. the uncaused states], this includes every attribute established for an object with no cause additional to the object, such as space-occupation for an atom, or its being existent, or the accident’s being [133] an accident, color, and blackness. The idea is that every existent has specificity (khāṣṣiyya), through which it is distinguished from others. It is distinguished only by specificity, which is a state. And that by virtue of which similar things are similar, and that in respect of which different things are different, is a state. It is these [states] that are called the attributes of genus and species.

According to those that affirm them, states are neither existent nor non-existent. Nor are they things, nor can any attribute be ascribed to them. According to [Abū Hāshim] b. al-Jubbāʾī, they cannot be known in their own right. Rather they are known only together with an object. But for those who deny states, things are different and similar just as concrete objects, while the common application of the names of genera and species goes back to the utterances (alfāẓ) that signify them, nothing more. The same goes for their being specific. Something may be known in one respect (min wajh) and unknown in another. The “respects” are mere considerations (iʿtibārāt), which do not go back to attributes, that is, states that are specific to objects.

[against nominalism: animal example]

If words were eliminated from the explanation, intellectual judgments (al-qaḍāyā al-ʿaqliyya) would not thereby be eliminated. For [even] beasts (bahāʾim), which lack speech (nuṭq) and intellect, do not lack this [kind of] guidance. After all they know by instinct (fiṭra) which kind of grass is healthy for them, and eat it. Then if they see some other grass similar to the first, they do not hesitate over whether it is edible, like the first. So if they could not form in their imagination (takhayyalat) the same judgment (ʿayn ḥukm) about the second as they did about the first, namely its being edible (kawn maʾkūlan), then they would not eat. But in fact they do know the genus of [healthy grass] and prefer it, and they know its opposite and are repelled by it. […]

[the universal is in the mind, not a verbal expression]

[144.11] I say: you cannot help but ascribe the function (bāb) of cognition (idrāk) to intellects, and the function of speech (kalām) to the languages. For the intellect cognizes humanity as a universal, which is common to the whole species of human and is something different from a concrete particular individual (al-shakhṣ al-muʿayyan al-mushār ilayhi). In the same way [the intellect conceives of] accidentality (al-ʿaraḍiyya) as a universal that is common to the whole species of accidents, paying no mind to “being color,” or “blackness,” or “this concrete black.” Necessarily, this subject of cognition is intellect. It is the sense of the expression (mafhūm al-ʿibāra) which is conceived in the intellect, not the expression itself. For the expression designates the meaning (maʿnā) that is realized in the mind (dhihn), and it [sc. this meaning] is what is designated (madlūl) by the expression. As concerns what is [verbally] expressed, if the expression changed—it might be in Arabic, Persian, Indian, or Roman [i.e. Byzantine Greek]—the meaning of the designated would not change.

[against states]

We say: everything you proponents [of states] affirm as real in existence is a “state,” according to you. Show us any existent, whether observed or hidden, that would not be a state, to which neither existence nor non-existence is ascribed as an attribute. For existence [itself], which is maximally general and is common to both the eternal and originated, is a state according to you. “Being an atom,” “space-occupation,” and [the atom’s] “receiving an accident”: all of them are states. So your teaching implies that there is nothing in existence which would not be a state. Even if you affirm anything as real and say it is not a state, this thing would [still] involve both commonality and specificity, and according to you, the specific and common are states. So it will turn out that everything is nothing (lā shayʾa illā lā shayʾ) and every existence is non-existence (lā wujūda illā lā wujūd), which is about the most absurd idea anyone could think up.

[the philosophers’ “essences” as an alternative to “states”]

Everyone [should] wonder at the proponents of real states for making species—like [162] substantiality, corporeality, accidentality, and “being color”—something real even while these are non-existent (ashyāʾ thābita fī al-ʿadam). For, [these proponents reasoned,] knowledge is connected to them and whatever is known has to be a thing, in order that knowledge can depend upon (yatawakkaʾu) it. Furthermore, the same objects, that is, substantiality, accidentality, “being color,” and “blackness” are states in existence that cannot be known in their own right, and are never existent by themselves. What could this be, which is known while non-existent such that knowledge depends on it, but is not known when it is in existence?¹⁹

If they had traveled the well-trodden path of intellects in their conception of things along with their genera and species, they [sc. the proponents of states] would know that the conceptions of intellects are the quiddities of things along with their genera and species, which do not call for realized existence (mawjūda muḥaqqiqa) or being postulated as real, extramental things (ashyāʾ thābita khārija ʿan al-ʿuqūl). And²⁰ what belongs to them in themselves and in respect of their genera and species in the mind (fī al-dhihn), in terms of essential constituents (al-muqawwimāt al-dhātiyya), by which their selves are realized, does not depend on the act of any agent. So it is possible for them to be known while disregarding the question whether they exist. For the grounds (asbāb) of existence are different from those of quiddity.²¹ And [the proponents of states] would know that sensory perceptions are the concrete things themselves. The way we become acquainted with them calls for their realized existence, and their being acknowledged as real things outside of sensation (ashyāʾ thābita khārija ʿan al-khawāṣṣ). And what belongs to them in themselves as concrete beings and the way we become acquainted with them through sensation, in terms of accidental specifiers (al-mukhaṣṣiṣāt al-ʿaraḍiyya), by which their concrete selves are realized, does depend on the act of an agent. So they cannot exist deprived of these specifiers. [Again,] the grounds of existence are different from those of quiddity.

When the Muʿtazilites heard the philosophers (al-falāsifa) drawing a distinction between the two cases, they thought [163] that conceptions in minds are real things among concrete beings (al-mutaṣawwarāt fī al-adhhān hiya ashyāʾ thābita fī al-aʿyān), and concluded that the non-existent is a thing (shayʾ). And they thought that the genera and species existing in the mind are states that are real among concrete beings.

[conceptualism as a middle path]

The truth on this question, then, is that the human finds in his soul the conception of universal, common, absolute things paying no mind to verbal utterances or concrete individuals. He finds in his soul mental concepts (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya) that pertain to a single thing. They can go back either to verbal utterances—but we have already shown this is wrong—or to concrete, individual existents—and this too we have declared false. All that remains is to say that they are only meanings (maʿān) [148] that are existent (mawjūda) as realized in the human mind (dhihn) and intellect (ʿaql), which is what cognizes them. Insofar as they are universal and common, they have no existence among concrete individuals (lā wujūd lahā fī al-aʿyān). So there is no absolute “existent” among concrete individuals, nor absolute “accident” or “color.” Rather, these are concrete individuals insofar as the intellect conceptualizes a universal, common meaning on the basis of them. Then an expression (ʿibāra) is formed for it, which corresponds to it and refers to it, and from them [sc. the concrete individuals] the intellect derives a meaning (maʿnā) and aspect (wajh). The expression is formed for it in such a way that, if the expressions were to perish or change, the meaning established in the mind would not be nullified, being [still] conceptualized in the intellect.

The opponents of “states” were wrong when they equated [universals] with mere expressions (al-ʿibārāt al-mujarrada). But they were right to say that whatever is really a concrete existent cannot have commonality or [any generic] consideration. The proponents of “states,” meanwhile, were wrong when they equated them with attributes (ṣifāt) in concrete beings. But they were right to say that [states] are intelligible meanings, above and beyond [mere] expressions. What they ought to say is that [states] exist as conceptualized in intellects, instead of saying that they are neither existent, nor non-existent. These meanings are something that no reasonable person would deny [as being] in his soul. Some, though, spoke of them in terms of “conceptualization in the mind,” others spoke of “supposition in the intellect” (bi-l-taqdīr fī al-ʿaql), while others called them “true realities” (al-ḥaqāʾiq) and “meanings” (al-maʿānī), which are designated (madlūlāt) by expressions and words. Still others called them “attributes of genera and species.” So long as it is comprehensible and clear to the intellect, let them use whatever language is easiest.

[specification and metaphysical identity]

The [first] way to show the error of those who affirm the reality of states: they affirmed for the concrete, particular existent, attributes that are specific to it, as well as attributes that are shared in common with other existents. This is a great absurdity. For what is specific to a concrete thing, and what is shared in common with others is one in relation to this concrete particular. So the existence of a concrete accident, its accidentality, its being color, and its blackness are expressions (ʿibārāt) of that [same] concrete particular. For when existence is specified (takhaṣṣaṣa) with accidentality, it is identical (bi-ʿaynihi) to the accident, and when the accidentality is specified with being color, it is identical to color;likewise, being color [is specified] with blackness, and blackness with “this particular black.”²²

[universals exist in the mind alone]

I say: [Avicenna] wanted to show that there are, among existents, those that are not apprehended by sensation. Instead it is intellect that apprehends and cognizes them. He infers this on the basis of universals, such as universal man. But this does not prove his point. For universals do not exist among concrete individuals. Rather, according to him, they are known to the soul when grasped intellectually. Saying that [universals] “exist in the mind” is a commonly accepted and widely held claim. But upon investigation, we discover that it does not mean the same as real (ḥaqīqa) existence. When something is existent in the mind, this means only that it is known, grasped intellectually, perceived by the intellect. Whereas real existence it is that through which the true realities of quiddities occur among concrete individuals. This is the only way to understand existence. But to be existent in the mind means something other [247] than this, namely its being known by the intellect. The purpose of this section [in Avicenna’s Pointers] was to establish that there are, among concrete existents, some that are not perceived by senses. But what he mentioned, namely universals, are not existent in concrete individuals. So, the purpose of this section has not been achieved by what he said. But God knows best.

[against the extramental existence of universals: they would lack “identity”]

It is commonly accepted that the intelligible universal is a mental form. They say: this is because whatever is described as universal is existent, since sheer non-existence cannot be shared in common by many things. Now, whatever exists does so either in extramental reality, or in the mind. The first is absurd [in the case of universals], since whatever exists extramentally is a concrete individual that is distinct from everything else. Something of this kind cannot be shared by many things, so it will not be universal. And once it is established that the universal does not exist in extramental reality, it remains only that it does so in the mind.

[against merely mental existence of universals: correspondence problem]

When we say, “the effect upon the soul made by each of those individuals is the same,” we mean: we conceptualize a “range (qadr)” that is commonly shared by those individuals. But if conceptualizing the range that is shared in common is independent of the realization of this shared range, then its mental conceptualization lacks correspondence to what is the case (amr) extramentally, and is therefore ignorance. If, on the other hand, it does correspond, the shared range must occur factually (fī nafs al-amr). In this case, that shared item is the real universal, while the mental form would be called “universal” only in a metaphorical sense, thanks to its being knowledge that is connected to the [real] universal item.

[essences are neutral with regard to one and many]

Everything has a true reality (ḥaqīqa) through which it is what it is. [This true reality] is distinct from everything else, regardless whether the latter be a necessary concomitant for [the true reality], or separable. Horseness, as such, is neither one nor not one, in such a way that either of these two [sc. unity or the lack thereof] would enter into its meaning (mafhūm). Instead, unity is an attribute that is added to [the true reality] and horseness becomes one together with it. Lack of unity is also something additional to it and horseness together with it, becomes not-one. Horseness as such, though, is nothing but horseness. If someone asks, “is horse one thousand, or not?” we will say, “it is not the case that horse as such is one thousand,” but we will not say: “horse as such is not one thousand.” And if someone says the humanity in Zayd is no different from the humanity that is in ʿAmr, just insofar as it is humanity, this does not force us to say that this [humanity] and that [humanity] are therefore one and the same (wāḥida bi-al-ʿadad). For we said that, insofar as it is humanity, all other considerations (iʿtibārāt) are omitted from it. Unity is one such additional consideration, so it must be left out.

[application of the bi-sharṭ lā formula]

You should know: it is true that animal without the condition that there is something else [attached to it] (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ) [81v] does exist, since it is a part of that which exists extramentally, so it exists extramentally too. On the other hand, it is not true that animal on the condition that there is nothing else [attached to it] (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ) exists. As for the fact that [it does not exist] among concrete individuals, this is obvious. As for the fact that [it does not exist] in the mind, this is because we do not accept [mental existence]. Even if we did, [animal] would not be separate [from all attachments in the mind], since its being in the mind is itself an attachment. In fact, its being separate from all attachments is [an attachment too], since, when what is separate is taken together with the qualification of being separate, it is no longer separate from all attachments [that is, because this qualification is itself an attachment]. So no quiddity ever exists as entirely separate. Thus, given that the consideration of a quiddity as such differs from a consideration of its qualifications, it emerges that the commonly accepted assumption that quiddity becomes separate in the intellect is in fact false.

[the parts of a quiddity may be distinct only in the mind]

The parts of quiddities may sometimes be distinct in extramental reality, like soul and body, which are parts of human; or they may be distinct only in the mind, like [the parts of] blackness. For its genus is not distinct from its specific difference in extramental reality at all. Otherwise, (a) if [neither the genus nor specific difference of blackness, which are its “parts”] are not perceptible to sensation on their own, then—(a1) assuming no [new] sensible form originates when they are joined—blackness will not be perceptible to sensation at all, which is a contradiction. Or (a2) a [sensible form] does originate [from genus and specific difference being conjoined]. That form will be an effect of their conjunction, and will be extrinsic to them. But by blackness we mean nothing but that form itself. So in this case, the extramental composition [of genus and specific difference] will be in whatever receives or produces blackness, and not in [blackness] itself. (b) But if either or both of [the parts] are perceived by sensation, then, (b1) assuming it is similar to blackness, [blackness] will not be constituted by it. (b2) Or [a sensible part] may be different from [blackness]. In that case, once the specific difference of blackness is added to it, then (b2a) it may be the case that no [new] form originates. But in this case, what is perceptible to sense would be “being a color” taken absolutely, and sensible blackness would be the same as “being a color” absolutely, and then the nature of a genus would be the same as the nature of its species, which is a contradiction. Or (b2b) a new form does originate. In this case, however, the sensation of blackness would amount to perceiving not one and the same sensible, but two sensibles, which is a contradiction.

So it has been established that the genus of blackness is not distinct from its specific difference in extramental reality at all. Rather, it can be distinguished from it only in the mind. This calls for a distinction between their quiddities. Otherwise, the mind’s judging that there is a distinction where in fact there is none, would be ignorance. Thus they are distinct in quiddity and in mental existence, but not in extramental existence.

[the parts of a quiddity may be distinct only in the mind and “as such”]

It has been thus established that, as we said, one part of blackness cannot be distinguished from the other in extramental existence. Rather this distinction holds only in the mind.

Clarification: “being a color,” as such (min ḥaythu hiya hiya), is different from “contracting [vision]” [i.e. the specific difference added to “color” to get blackness] as such. They are different quiddities. Were this not the case, then neither could be distinguished from the other in the mind. For, if the mind judged that there is composition where there is none, this would be ignorance. Thus they are distinct in [their] true reality (fī al-ḥaqīqa). As for extramental existence, they cannot be distinct in [this sort of] existence (fī al-wujūd). But in mental existence, it is not impossible for the distinction to arise.

[genus and species are distinct in quiddity but one in existence]

Let it not be said: if we say of human that he is animal, intending by this that the meaning of human is the same as the meaning of animal, we are wrong; but if we intend that animal is attributed to the quiddity of human, we are wrong again, since, as long as animal is a constitutive part of the quiddity of human it cannot be his attribute, given that a part is prior, whereas an attribute is posterior. But if we intend some third meaning, this should be stated.

For we say: we do explain the identity (al-huwa huwa) in a third way. Namely that, even though human and animal are distinct in quiddity, they are one in existence. The former is obvious. As for the latter, the reason [they are one in existence] is that animal taken absolutely, and as such, enters into existence only once it has become qualified, either by negation or by something existing. For example, until animal becomes either rational or irrational, it cannot enter into existence. This being so, existence can only occur to the composite animal, given that animal becomes existent only once it becomes rational or irrational. So, rational animal is composite in quiddity, but its existence is identical to the existence of the animal. So what we said concerning distinction in quiddity and unity in existence has been established.

Still one can say: if [a single] existence can occur to two different quiddities, why can’t one and the same accident subsist in two subjects of inherence? In fact, why couldn’t a single body occur in two different places? Even if we granted this, [one might still object] that a privative qualification cannot be a part of a quiddity that can receive an existing attribute. So irrationality cannot be a part of whatever receives existence in the irrational animal. Furthermore, even if we granted this, [one might still object] that animal, insofar as it takes on a part [namely a specific difference, already] has existence; so if another existence were to occur to it when it is taken together with rationality, two existences would co-occur in it, which is absurd.

Rather the correct [view] is that the meaning of “predication of a thing” is that it has an attribute;²⁴ but this does not apply to the parts of quiddity.

[two types of compounds: extramentally distinct and not, with criticism]

The logicians agreed that this composition [of genus and specific difference] may exist extramentally, and may not. (a) The former would be for instance humanity, which is composed from animal and rational. Each of these two parts does have extramental existence. [83] (b) The latter would be, for instance, blackness. For it falls under the genus of color, and has a specific difference; but its genus is not distinct from its specific difference in extramental existence.

It might be said: each of the two options is problematic.

(a) The former because, if the generic part has extramental existence of its own, and the differentiating part has a further existence of its own, (a1) has yet another existence occurred for their conjunction when they were brought together, (a2) or not? (a1a) If so, then each of the two has an existence specific to it, and each of them [also] has an existence shared in common between it and the other. So each of them would have two existences. This implies the conjoining of two indistinguishable things,²⁵ which is absurd. (a1b) Also, if the second [shared] existence inheres in both of them at the same time, then one and the same item would inhere in two subjects of inherence, which is absurd. (a2) Or, no unified existence occurs to the conjunction [of genus and specific difference]. But in this case, no unified existent would result from them, but instead they would remain two different existents. This would imply that no composite quiddity turns out to be in existence.

(b) As for the latter option, namely that the quiddity is composed out of a genus and a specific difference which are not distinct from each other in extramental reality, we say: on this assumption, no extramental existence occurs to either of the two parts on its own. (b1) Now if no extramental existence occurs to their conjunction either, then it must not be existent extramentally at all. (b2) On the other hand, if extramental existence does occur to their conjunction, then that existence would be a single accident subsisting in two subjects of inherence, which is absurd.

[Avicenna’s argument from contradiction from T5, with objection and reply]

It might be said: if human that is shared in common is one and the same individual among concrete entities, then one and the same individual would have to be both knowing and ignorant. But this would be a co-occurrence of contradictories.

It is objected: it is indeed one and the same item, but when that individual [sc. universal human] is taken together with specific accidents and attachments, the expression “ʿAmr” will be one conjunction which is distinct from others. So there will be no co-occurrence of opposites from the fact that knowledge subsists in one of the conjunctions, and ignorance in another.

Response: it is not disputed that, if a single object (dhāt) is taken first with one attribute, and then taken with another attribute, then one of these compositions will be distinct from the other. But we would still say that this sort of distinction does not exclude that the opposites are incompatible and distinct. Don’t you see that if whiteness and blackness subsist in one and the same object, then that object taken together with blackness is distinct from that object taken together with whiteness?²⁶ If this kind of distinction excluded the incompatibility of opposites, then no incompatibility could ever occur between opposites. In fact, though, we know that this kind of distinction does not exclude the incompatibility of opposites, and that if there is a single subject of inherence then the incompatibility of opposites holds. So on this assumption, the objection is rebutted.

[against the existence of universals even in the mind]

First argument: This universal is either (a) existent or (b) non-existent, but both options are false, so it is false to speak of the universal [at all].

We say: (a) [the universal] cannot be existent, because everything that is existent has concretization (taʿayyun) and individuation (tashakhkhuṣ). Nothing like this can be universal. Let it not be asked: why do you say that the existent in the mind would have concretization and individuation? For we say: we have already mentioned that the existent in the mind is existent among concrete individuals, since the existent in the mind is some particular form inhering in a particular, individual soul. So it counts as one of the existents among concrete individuals. For the argument just given, it makes no difference whether you call it “existent in the mind” or “existent in concrete individuals.” (b) And we said [the universal] cannot be non-existent, because the non-existent is pure negation and sheer non-existence, so it cannot be a part of an existent quiddity, or be one of its attributes.

Second argument: the universal would be existent either (a) among concrete individuals, or (b) in the mind. But both options are false. (a) The first, because of what has been established in the previous section [namely the argument from non-contradiction: see T28]. (b) The second, because whatever is existent in the mind is an individual form that subsists in an individual soul. Existents among concrete individuals may be existent before the origination of this form²⁷ in this soul, and they remain existent even after this form perishes from this soul. Whatever is like this cannot be a constituent for a quiddity of such individuals that exist in extramental reality, as is known necessarily.

Third argument: if humanity were universal then concretization would be additional to the quiddity. But that would be absurd, since concretization as such is also an attribute with a universal quiddity, and it would therefore require another concretization, yielding an infinite regress.

[against Avicenna’s claim that universals correspond to individuals]

Firstly, by saying that this form is universal, [Avicenna] meant that it corresponds (muṭābiqa) to all [its] individuals. Here “correspondence” means that, if this very same form were in any matter whatever, it would be that part [of the individual].

To which one may say that there several ways to raise problems for this [account].

First: this form which inheres in the particular soul is a concrete accident, inhering in a concrete soul. It is however absurd that this very same accident should occur in extramental reality, as connected to particular instances of matter. For no accident can possibly be transferred [from one subject to another]. Thus it is established that the spiritual form clearly cannot exist in extramental reality. Nor can this concrete form be a universal that is shared in common by individuals. This being established, we come back to the aforementioned objection, namely that if what you have described as “universal” is existent among concrete individuals, then it will be a concrete individual, not a universal. But if it is existent in the mind, then again it is a concrete, individual accident, and hence not universal. Where then is the universal?

Second: these individuals were existent among concrete individuals before the origination of this form [in the mind] and will still remain existent among concrete individuals after its perishing. If something is like this, how can you say that it is a part of the quiddity of these concrete existents? Let it not be said: we do not claim that this very same form exists in concrete individuals, but rather that if we eliminate from this individual form its accidents and individuating [features] so that only a quiddity, as such, remains, then this quiddity will be the universal. For we will respond: if you’re happy with this move, why not just say that the individual existing among concrete individual is universal? In the sense that, if one eliminates from it its accidents and individuating [features], then what remains would be universal.

A second way [for an Avicennan] to explain how this form is universal is to say that, if any individual whatever, which exists among concrete individuals, were to present itself to the intellect, so that the mind would thereby receive the meaning of humanity, the result would be this effect which is present in the soul. To which it may be said: this account would be right only if the resulting [effect] in the soul were the quiddity of human alone. But that would be absurd, because whatever arises in the soul is some individual accident and state in the individual soul. This accident has multiple attachments. [102] If one takes this accident as such, it is not shared in common by extramentally real individuals. But if one takes this accident on the condition that its accidents and individuating [features] are eliminated from it, then why not think the same about the extramentally real individual, and say that the universal is [after all] extramentally existent?

So it has been established that what [Avicenna] said [on this issue] is problematic.

[division argument for the existence of essences]

The best one can offer on this issue is the following: body can be divided into celestial and elemental, and into gross and subtle. Whatever is subject to division must be something the divisions share in common. So “being a body” is a “range (qadr)” shared in common by the gross and the subtle, the celestial and the elemental, the hot and the cold. What produces distinction in it is the attributes of body. So it is established that bodies are equivalent in their essences and true realities, and the differences between them consist in their attributes and accidents alone.

[argument that states (aḥwāl) are neither existent nor non-existing, using the example of existence itself]

We have already shown that existence is a description that is shared in common by existents. There is no doubt that existents are distinct in respect of their quiddities, and what is shared in common is different from that through which there is distinction. Therefore the existence of things is different from their quiddities. Furthermore, this existence is either (a) non-existent, (b) existent, or (c) neither existent nor non-existent. (a) The first option is absurd, since “being existent” is the opposite of “being non-existent,” and nothing can be the same as its opposite. (b) The second option is absurd [too], since if existence were existent, it would be equivalent to existent quiddities in terms of “being existent,”²⁸ but doubtless also differ from them in some respect. Now, that which is shared in common is different from that through which there is distinction. So “being existent,” which is shared in common by existence and by the existent quiddities, is distinct from whatever is specific to the quiddity of existence, through which the distinction arises. So there will be another existence for existence, yielding an infinite regress, which is absurd. So it has been established that (c) existence is neither existent nor non-existent. […]

[response: existence is the same as “being existent”]

[62.9] Response to the first argument: we have already discussed whether existence is a univocal concept or not.²⁹ Let us now grant that it is, and say: why can’t existence be existent? Their argument is that, if it were existent, then it would be equivalent to existent quiddities in terms of “being existent,” but different from them in respect of what is specific to them. To this we respond: an infinite regress would only follow if it shared in some positive respect and differed in some other positive respect. But if the difference lies in something privative, an infinite regress will not follow. To explain: existence shares “being existent” with the existent quiddities, and differs from them [only] through a privative qualification. So even though existence taken alone is existent, there is nothing else alongside it. By contrast, when an existent quiddity is existent, it has something else alongside the fact that it is said to “be existent,” namely the quiddity. This being so, it does not follow that existence is existent through another existence. Rather, its being existent is identical to its quiddity. On this assumption the infinite regress is blocked.³⁰

[arguments for the doctrine of states]

Species quiddities share genera in common, which entails the doctrine of states.

The first approach for proving this can be put in several ways, of which the first is as follows. Blackness and whiteness share “being a color” in common. This sharing is not only of the name, since if we called blackness and motion by the same name, and did not use the same name for blackness and whiteness, we would still know by necessity that blackness and whiteness have a genus in common whereas blackness and motion do not. That is why verbal expressions are not shared in common consistently in all languages. This kind of sharing is known to all reasonable people. [62] And the second way is as follows: items of knowledge that are connected to different objects of knowledge are themselves different. Now, we give one and the same definition for knowledge, and subdivide it into knowledge of that which is eternal, knowledge of that which is originated, knowledge of substances, and knowledge of accidents. What is being defined [here] is not the verbal expression, but the meaning. So, we know that “being knowledge” is shared in common by these different quiddities. […]

[62.6] Second approach to prove this: once it has been established that these quiddities share one aspect in common, but differ in another, the two aspects will be either (a) existent, (b) non-existent, or (c) neither existent nor non-existent. (a) The first is false. Otherwise an accident would have to subsist in an accident. (b) The second is false too, since one knows necessarily that these items are not sheer non-existence. (c) So only the third remains, which was the conclusion sought. […]

[debate over whether states involve an infinite regress]

[62.18] But the opponents [of states] said: we notice that the gist of the various arguments offered to establish states comes down to a single point (ḥarf), namely that true realities differ in terms of their specific features, and share their common features; and that through which there is sharing is not the same as that through which there is difference. Then they argued that this is neither existent nor non-existent, so as to establish the reality of something in the middle. [The opponents] went on: but this implies that a state would have another state, and so on to infinity. For doubtless these states for which you offered proof are [likewise] different in their specific features, but equivalent in that they all have in common that they are each a state. And that through which there is sharing is different from that through which there is distinction; so it follows that each state has another state, and so on to infinity.

The proponents of states responded in two ways. (a) First—and this is the one that most of them (al-jumhūr) rely on—by saying that neither similarity nor difference may be attributed to a state. Second, by just accepting the infinite regress.

But the opponents said: (a) the first response is very unconvincing, since whenever the intellect indicates two different things, whatever is conceptualized from one of them is either the same as whatever is conceptualized from the other, or not. In the first case it is similar, in the latter case different. So, we know it is ignorant to argue for the reality of something to which neither similarity nor difference is attributed. (b) As for the second response, which is just to accept the infinite regress, this is false. For, if we granted this, we could not deem it false that the chain of originated things has no beginning, or establish the eternal Creator. All of this is sheer ignorance.

This is the gist of what both parties said. [63] But I say that these implications cannot be forced upon the proponents of states. For we have shown that blackness and whiteness, for instance, share “being existent” in common, but differ in respect of “being blackness” and “being whiteness.” And we know that that through which there is sharing and that through which there is distinction cannot be negative. So we cannot avoid affirming two items: one of them is [blackness’s] being blackness, the other is its existence. As for “being existent” and “being blackness,” they differ in their true realities, but share “being a state” in common. However, “being a state” is not an affirmative attribute, since by “state” we mean simply something that is neither existent nor non-existent. So, if sharing occurs thanks to negative attributes, the state need not be an attribute that subsists in existence; thus, no further state need belong to the state. […]

[63.8] Response to the second argument: why could that through which there is sharing, and that through which there is distinction, not be existent? Their argument was that, in that case, an accident would subsist in another accident. But we say: this would be more plausible to the intellect than affirming a middle between existent and non-existent.

[quiddities are neutral with respect to one and many]

It is known that a quiddity, such as humanity in itself, is neither one nor many, and neither common nor specific, in order that all of [these] considerations (iʿtibārāt) may be predicated of it.

There is a proof ascribed to certain ancients: if humanity does not entail unity, then it entails non-unity, which is multiplicity; so the existence of human could never be one. On the other hand, if it is not right that [humanity] entails non-unity, then it is right that it entails unity.

But [this proof] is wrong. For the contradictory of “entailment of X” is not “entailment of non-X,” but rather “no entailment of X.” If animality entailed rationality, nothing irrational could ever be animal. But the fact that rationality is not an entailment of [animality] does not imply that it entails irrationality, but just that it does not entail rationality. You should know that, whenever they say “when a universal occurs in concrete individuals, etc.,” they mean by this the nature (ṭabīʿa) to which universality can accidentally occur. [Strictly speaking] the universal does not occur in concrete individuals, since otherwise it would have a concrete being (huwiyya) that cannot be shared in common.

[natures in concrete reality and universals in the mind]

The relation between a universal meaning (maʿnā) and its particulars is not like that of a father and several children, all of whom are related to him. Rather, the [same] entity (al-maʿnā) which comes to be universal in the mind exists in each of [the particulars]. It is not the case that each of [the particular humans] is a human just by its relation to a humanity that has been postulated as being independent and isolated from all [of them]. Rather, each of them has a humanity numerically different from that of any other. As for the meaning that is shared in common, it is only in the mind, nowhere else. The universal taken in the sense that it allows things to share it in common, or does not rule out such sharing, cannot occur among concrete individuals. If it [331] were to occur among concrete individuals, it would have an individuated concrete being (huwiyya mutashakhkhiṣa) that is not some representation. [That kind of concrete being] is specified in itself and cannot be shared.

[objection that the nature in the mind is also a particular, with response]

You may ask: the nature that exists in the mind has a concrete being too, since it is one of the things that exist. And it also has specification due to several factors; for instance, it is impressed in the mind, cannot be indicated, cannot be divided, and does not exist by itself in many. So it is not shared in common by many things, by considering its existence to be in them. Sharing simply means correspondence (al-muṭābaqa). But if the universality of what is in the mind is only in consideration of correspondence, and if particulars correspond to each other, then particulars must be universals as well. Now, you may say that particulars’ being individuated prevents them from corresponding to many things. But the quiddity in the mind is impressed [in the mind], and is specified by being impressed in the mind and by being separate from specific quantity and position, since, just as humanity does not entail specific quantity or specific position, so it does not entail being separate from them. Otherwise humanity could never exist as connected to these extraneous accidents.

To which we say: the concrete being of an extramental item is not the same as the concrete being that occurs in someone’s perception. Admittedly, the form in the mind does have concrete being insofar as it is concretized in the mind, and insofar as it is an individuated accident that is distinct from other forms of the same species, whether in this mind or in other minds, so it is indeed among particulars. Nevertheless, it is a representational object (dhāt mithāliyya), not foundational in existence (mutaʾaṣṣila fī al-wujūd) in such a way that it would be foundational in itself; instead it is representational. [332] And not just any kind of representation, but a cognitive representation of that which has occurred, or will occur. Insofar as it is a perceptual representation of something extramental, or of something that is about to occur, whether in all respects or only one, it can correspond to many things, and so is called “universal.” It occurs as an object (dhātuhā ḥaṣalat) only because of its correspondence to many things, and because it is representational. By contrast, the extramental is not an object by being a representation of anything else.

[terminology of essences]

You should know that, when you say “essence (dhāt) of a thing,” or “its true reality (ḥaqīqa),” or “its quiddity (māhiyya),” what is to be understood by “quiddity,” or “true reality,” or “essence,” taken as such and not insofar as they are human or horse, are, again, merely mental considerations and secondary intelligibles.

As stated above, “true reality (ḥaqīqa)” is said of something on the condition that it exists. “True reality” has been defined as “the specificity of existence established for a thing,” albeit that “ḥaqīqa” can [also] be used for a verbal expression’s being used in its [proper] meaning [362] for that to which it is applied; the opposite of “ḥaqīqa” in this sense is “figurative.” Also “ḥaqīqa” can be used in place of “correctness of a statement,” that is, correspondence to the fact of the matter (amr fī nafsihi).

“Quiddity (māhiyya)” is defined as “that through which something is what it is.” It can be used as a synonym of the term “true reality.” Sometimes it is used in a more specific sense, for what is other than the existence of things that have existence accidentally. It is in this sense that one says “the First Principle has no quiddity.” But in the first sense, He does have a quiddity. In fact, the very existence that is ascribed to quiddities itself has a quiddity too.

As for dhāt [essence, self, object], sometimes it is used to mean a quiddity that occurs among concrete individuals; so that with this usage, whatever is in the mind is not called “dhāt,” even though it is called “quiddity.” And given its occurrence in concrete individuals, that which is in the mind is also called “true reality.” Whereas “dhāt” is said only of that which is among concrete individuals. Sometimes, one means by “dhāt” something that does not subsist in a subject of inherence. So one might say, “dhāt and its attributes.” With this usage, attributes are not a “dhāt.” But with the previous usage, one may say that attributes too have a “dhāt.” Sometimes “dhāt” is used as a synonym of “quiddity,” and it is in this sense that things intrinsic to the quiddity are called “essential (dhātī).”

[mental distinction vs extramental unity]

Let us take for instance a concretely existing extension of length, determined at three cubits. We shall call it, and whatever is equal to it, “C”: so this will be the name for everything of similar length. [And take] another extension, and call it and whatever is equal to it “B”. We have taken the form of C as a universal in the mind, which univocally applies to its particular [instances], and the same goes for B. Furthermore, we have taken in the mind “extension” in the absolute sense, which is predicated of C, of B, and of other [extensions]. Absolute extension corresponds to the concrete particular instances of C and of B, while C corresponds [only] to its particular instances, and B to its instances. I say then: the particular instances of C among concrete individuals do not have two aspects, so that they would correspond to [absolute] extension with one aspect, and to “being C” with another aspect. Rather it is one and the same extension in concrete individuals, for instance of three cubits. It corresponds to “being an extension” through itself, and also to “being C.” In the concrete individuals, it has nothing that [both] corresponds to “being an extension” and is distinct from that which corresponds to “being C.”

Problem: [Why not say that] there is in it “being an extension” plus something additional?

Response: If [being an extension] were in concrete individuals, and the additional thing were an extension too, then I should like to know how much [of it] is the basic (aṣl) [extension] and how much the addition! And the argument can be posed again for each of them.

But in the mind, the sense (mafhūm) of “being C” is not one and the same as that of “being an extension.” Otherwise, since “being an extension” is predicated of B, C would need to be [predicable of B] as well, but this is not the case. Rather, every particular instance of C [193] is a single extension, a single C, and a single individual; and the same goes for B.

Thus are two points settled. First, concrete distinction need not follow from mental distinction. Second, the distinction between B and C is not through anything other than extension. Rather, it is through a perfection and deficiency they have in themselves. If a universal applies analogically (bi-al-tashkīk), the distinction between its individual existing instances need not be through something other than the quiddity, as with a long and a short interval. We have mentioned them since they are of this kind: the length is nothing apart from “being an interval,” which distinguishes it from other [intervals]. The same goes for the case where one thing is more white, another less: certainly, there may be further distinguishing factors, but my point is that they are not necessarily present alongside the disparity [in length].³¹

[generic notions are merely conceptual]

The essential [attributes] in simple species, like “being a color” in blackness, where one cannot say “color was made, then blackness was made,” or “blackness was made, then color was made,” are different from those essential [attributes] where one can indeed say, for instance, “body was made, [195] then animal was made.” The former [type of attribute] has no existence distinct from the existence of another essential [attribute]. If “being a color” had an existence distinct from the existence of whatever specifies [color as] blackness, and did not demand it due to its quiddity (for otherwise [blackness] would be a necessary concomitant [of color]), then blackness’ “being a color” could remain even while its specificity perished, and it could be connected to the specificity of whiteness, in the same way as prime matter remains even as its form perishes, being changed by us. But as there are not two acts of making, or two existences, it is one and the same thing.

If genus had an existence in concrete individuals other than that of [its] specific difference, then the substantiality that is predicated of prime matter, and of the form that exists in prime matter, would have another existing specific difference [i.e. to differentiate the substance that is matter from the substance that is form]. But its specific difference is in turn a substance too, since substance can only be constituted by substances. Furthermore, whatever is added to substantiality to produce the specific difference must have a further existence in concrete individuals, and it must have substantiality too. So an ordered infinite regress will follow, insofar as there occurs in prime matter a composition of something receptive and something formal.

Problem: but don’t you also have to admit such an infinite regress in the mind?

Response: thoughts in the mind do not necessarily have any limit.

Problem: then do you not [thereby] disagree with the First Teacher [Aristotle]?

Response: this in itself is something he could agree with, since it was in this way that he distinguished genus from matter, that is, on the basis of two acts of making.³²

Blackness is perceived by the senses as a whole (bi-kulliyyatihi), as is whiteness. There is nothing at all in either of them themselves that would correspond to something in the other in sensation, but only in the intellect—unlike the relation between one body and another, for example animal and plant.³³

[genus and specific difference are not two “things,” nor are they essential constituents outside the mind]

If the blackness in concrete individuals had two “things” in it, a portion (ḥiṣṣa) of “being a color” and a portion of “being a specific difference,” then these would be two existents. So they would need to be two features (hayʾatayn), given that each of them would need to have a subject of inherence, leading to the aforementioned absurdities. As for what was mentioned in your objection, as concerns the issue of correspondence [that is, how two ideas can correspond to one and the same concrete form], this too was right. Still, not everything that is predicted of a thing is predicated of it in virtue of correspondence to a concrete form (ṣura ʿayniyya). Particularity for instance is predicated of Zayd, as is the meaning (mafhūm) of the true reality as such, yet neither is a form of [Zayd] himself nor of any of his attributes. Rather these are attributes that occur only in the mind. The correspondence happens only in cases when attributes have existence both in the mind and also in concrete reality, such as in the case of blackness and whiteness. In fact, “being a color” is a merely conceptual consideration, and the same goes for genera and specific differences. Blackness is thus a single true reality (ḥaqīqa) whose existence in the soul is the same as its existence in concrete individuals. It has no essential [constituent] in any way, that is, it has no parts.

[genus, species, and specific difference are conceptual; natures are real]

Genus is a broad consideration that can be predicated of things in such a way that it is a quiddity that they share in common. Species is a resulting quiddity that (with the exception of relations) is specified only by items that, even if they are imagined as changing, will let the natural concrete beings (al-huwiyyāt al-ṭabīʿiyya) remain without them. The specific difference is a consideration that is specific to the substance of a thing, and distinguishes it in intellection. It is not attached to [the substance of the thing] due to any extrinsic attribute, as when the ability to laugh or write are attached in consideration of external motions. Nor is [the specific difference] itself a concrete extrinsic attribute. Instead, it is a consideration that the mind considers as if it belonged to the substance of the thing. In general, genus is the closest to the substance of the thing among the common considerations, while specific difference is the closest to the substance of the thing among the distinguishing considerations.

By contrast, the nature to which “being a species” applies is not merely conceptual; that is, it is something that belongs among the extramental individuals. If we put extrinsic relations aside, the [mere] considerations are species corresponding to [the natures], but they are [merely] intelligible, and have no individual in concrete reality. You should understand [this], because many mistakes have arisen from the failure to understand [mere] considerations, taking them instead to be concrete. (We have added the caveat “with the exception of relations” regarding species, since one cannot imagine that the simple accidents change while the relations retain the same concrete being.)

[conceptual and non-conceptual attributes]

Therefore, all attributes may be divided into two classes. First, the concrete attribute, which also has a form in the intellect. For example blackness, whiteness, and motion. Second, the attribute whose only concrete existence is its existence in the mind and which has no existence at all except in the mind. For example contingency, substantiality, being a color, existence, and other such things we have mentioned. Thus, the being that it has in the mind is of the same rank as the being that other things have in concrete reality. If a thing has existence outside the mind, then what is in the mind ought to correspond to it. However, that which is solely in the mind has no existence outside the mind to which the mental should correspond. Predicates, as such, are mental; but blackness is concrete. Since “being black (al-aswadiyya)” expresses something by which blackness (al-sawād) subsists, corporeality and substantiality do not enter into it. Rather, if blackness were to subsist in something other than a body, one would say that this [other thing] was black. So if there is something that somehow enters into “being black,” it could only be something intellectual, nothing more, even though blackness does have existence in concrete individuals. However, when the intellectual attributes are derived and come to be predicated,³⁴ as when we say “every C is contingent,” then both “being contingent” and contingency are just intellectual, nothing more, in contrast to “being black.” For, while [“being black”] is an intellectual predicate, blackness is concrete, [although] blackness by itself is not predicated of a substance. If we say “C is impossible in concrete reality,” this does not mean that impossibility occurs in concrete reality. Rather, [impossibility] is an intellectual item that we attach sometimes to what is in the mind, and sometimes to what is in concrete reality. The same goes for other things of this sort. In such cases, error arises from taking mental things as occurring independently in concrete reality. Once you know that things like those [51] just mentioned, such as contingency, being a color, and substantiality, are intellectual predicates, [you will understand why] they are not parts of the concrete quiddities. This does not mean that we can take a mental predicate (like a genus predicated of a thing, for example), attach it in the mind to any arbitrary quiddity, and still speak truly. Rather, the predicate must be applied to that to which it specifically belongs. The same goes for existence and all the other [merely] conceptual [attributes].

[rejection of states as neither existent nor non-existent]

There is no middle ground between existence and non-existence. Some people took the predicates of true realities, such as “being a color” for its species [e.g. black, white, etc.], [176] to be neither existent nor non-existent. They called them “states.” They were misled by universals that are neither non-existent in the mind, nor existent among concrete individuals.

It may be said to them: if blackness is non-existent, then its “being a color” is non-existent too, since if blackness is not existent, its “being a color” is not realized. If blackness is brought into existence, while “being a color” remains in non-existence, then something existent has a non-existent attribute ascribed to it, which is absurd. If [blackness] is brought into existence, then [being a color] occurs.

But they say that existence is of this kind, and that things are distinguished through states. It’s amazing how [on their view] there is nothing in existence apart from that which is shared in common, or that which gives rise to distinction, so that for them everything is neither existent nor non-existent, and there is nothing existent in existence. But so long as you understand that an attribute of something is either occurring (ḥāṣila) to it, in which case it is existent (since occurrence just is existence), or not occurring, in which case it is non-existent, then let there be no quarreling over words. What they call “real” is what we call “existent,” while what they call “unreal,” we call “non-existent.”

[against aḥwāl as the features of commonality and difference]

They say: obviously blackness and whiteness agree in being a color but differ in being blackness and whiteness. That through which there is agreement is other than that through which there is difference. Otherwise both would be one and the same thing. Hence [being blackness and being a color] are different, which was the conclusion sought.

But this too is wrong. By their statement that blackness and whiteness share in being a color, they either mean (a) that they are both named (tasmiya) “color”—that is, one applies “color” to each of them as a verbal expression—or (b) that both [share in] what is named.

(a) The former would be in contradiction to the doctrine of the proponents of states. Besides, namings are not the attributes of objects: states are. (b) But if the second is the case, whatever is designated by “being a color” must be divided into the universal—that is, that whose meaning can be shared by many—and the individuated, which cannot be shared by many. The former is like “being a color” taken in the mind. This cannot be realized in concrete individuals. The second is like this or that color. [417] In light of which, if they mean “being a color” as individuated, they should either say that whatever is affirmed for blackness in terms of being a color is affirmed for whiteness as well, or that whatever is specific for each of them is other than [that which is specified for the other]. But the first option can be ruled out. Otherwise, it would follow that what is numerically multiplied is one, and vice-versa, which is absurd. If, however, one adopts the second option, then [being a color] would be a state for blackness and whiteness only if it were additional to the meaning of blackness and whiteness. But this is not admissable. Rather, [being a color] is intrinsic to the meaning of each of them, and constituent of their true realities. That is why whoever wants to grasp intellectually the meaning of blackness and whiteness cannot do it without having first understood the meaning of being a color. How can that which constitutes an existent and is intrinsic to its true reality be a state, [that is,] something additional to it? How can it be neither existent nor non-existent, given that it is a constituent of an existent?

If, however, they mean by [being a color] “being a color” without qualification, then this cannot be conceived as an attribute for the individualization of objects. To say that it is “shared” just means that the meaning of “being a color” that arises in the mind corresponds in definition and true reality to whatever occurs that has this meaning, whichever individual this may be. Conversely, a state must be an attribute of an existent object. Besides, how can the universal meaning of color be said to be neither existent nor non-existent? Rather, it is existent in the mind and non-existent in concrete individuals.

[difference is through things themselves, not through “states”]

If the difference is due to that very thing that is designated by the expressions “being blackness” and “being whiteness” [and the difference is not merely nominal], then this is either (a) identical to the object distinguished, or (b) occurs in it, or (c) occurs to it extrinsically. (a) Regarding the first option, the distinction between objects is due only to themselves, not to items that are additional to them. (b) The same goes for the second option, too. (c) As for the third option, how can one say that whatever accounts for the distinction between two objects is additional to them, and extrinsic to them? Sound³⁵ reasoning judges that the difference between objects may be due to items such that the objects can be grasped intellectually only once these items have been grasped; [items, for example,] through which there is difference between human and horse, or between substance and accident, or other cases of different species and genera. In these cases, what accounts for the difference is neither extrinsic nor an additional state.

[against nominalism]

Do not let the opponents of states say: blackness and whiteness share nothing in common apart from mere naming (tasmiyya). For we perceive that there is common sharing in a class, even without considering namings and expressions. And we are aware that things share something in common, even if [naming] conventions and appellations perish. [Our awareness of shared features] arises only by looking at intellectual judgment and meaningful form. How could this not be so, given that we can intellectually grasp the true reality of human [both] absolutely and as individual? Grasping it intellectually as a universal is not the same as grasping it as an individual. This is why, even if all individual instances of human existing among concrete individuals should perish, the absolute true reality existing in the minds would not vanish.

[al-Rāzī’s position: essences as such are extramentally real]

We have shown previously that the “range (qadr)” of human, which is shared in common by extramental individuals, exists extramentally. For “this human” is an expression for the human that is qualified by being this. And whenever a composite is existent, so are the simple [parts]. So human as such, [213] taken without the condition of anything (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ), is existent. However, human taken without the condition of anything is not perceptible to the senses, since so long as it is not qualified as a particular and individual, it does not become sensible. Thus it has been established that something non-sensible exists. […]

[al-Āmidī’s response: only individuals exist extramentally]

[213.9] Our master [al-Āmidī] said: his first response is not correct. The “range” of human that is shared in common by individuals cannot exist among concrete individuals. When we consider the humanity that is specific to Zayd, it cannot exist in ʿAmr, and vice-versa. The humanity that is specific to each individual is not shared in common by them. By contrast, when we consider humanity as such, separate from attachments and accidents that are specific to each individual, it cannot exist in concrete individuals. Upon excluding accidents and attachments from consideration, [humanity] is just one.

Moreover, if [humanity as such] did exist in concrete individuals, then either (a) what exists in Zayd would be the same as that which exists in ʿAmr, or (b) not. (a) The former is absurd, since from this would follow either that what is one is numerically multiple, or that the numerically multiplied is one. (b) But the second is absurd too, since we have assumed that we are leaving out of consideration the accidents that necessitate numerical multiplicity, since that would be absurd.

When he says, “for ‘this man’ is an expression for the human that is qualified by being this. And whenever a composite is existent, so are the simple [parts],” this would follow only if the simple [part] of our expression “this human” were human taken absolutely. But this is not the case, since the absolute cannot be indicated; rather [what is indicated] is only the qualified and individuated human, who is qualified as “this.”

[universals do exist, but only in the mind]

On the basis of what we have verified concerning the meaning of the universal, [it is clear] that it cannot exist in individuals. Otherwise that which may be shared in common would be limited by something³⁶ that does not allow being shared in common, which is absurd. Still, it is not as the Cynics (al-kalbiyyīn)³⁷ thought: that the universal is imaginary or fabricated, and not subsistent or existent. For, even though [the universal] does not possess existence among concrete entities or individuals, still it is existent in the intellect. For any reasonable person finds from himself and within [18r] himself the existence of meanings that, if he were to relate them to individual entities, would correspond to them, in the way one forms representations of the meanings of man, horse, and so on. How could it be otherwise? For we know that the individuals belonging to the species of human, for instance, either agree in all respects, or differ in all respects, or agree in certain respects and differ in others. If they agreed in all respects, then they would not be numerically multiple; but in fact they are. If they differed in all respects, and if one of them is human, then no other individual could be human, which is a contradiction. So it remains only that they agree in certain respects and differ in others. In light of this, it is obviously possible to leave aside whatever is different, and conceptualize that in which they agree. And what is thus conceptualized just is the universal meaning.

[not all existents are individuals]

We say: when you claim that everything extramentally existent is individuated, if you mean by this that every single individual that may truly be called “existent” is individuated, then from this one may conclude that none of these single [beings] is universal. But why draw from this the inference that no existent is a universal? If, on the other hand, you mean that every existent entity is individuated, then this is false, since animal as such (min ḥaythu huwa huwa) is an existent entity, but cannot truly be said to be individuated, since it does not exclude being said truly of many things.

[quiddity is not itself individual]

When you claim that everything extramentally existent is individuated, if you mean by this that nothing existent among concrete individuals can be [29] shared in common, then this cannot be right. For animal as such does exist extramentally, but does not exclude being shared in common. But if you mean that everything that exists in concrete individuals either excludes being shared in common, or has individuation occur to it accidentally, then we do not concede that, when individuation occurs to a thing accidentally, it is no longer universal. This is because individuation requires that a composite, made up out of quiddity and individuation, excludes sharing in common. But why do you say that this requires that the quiddity [on its own] excludes being shared in common? This would need to be shown.

[the three kinds of universality, and their ontological status]

When we say that something is universal, we may [mean] three different things: a quiddity as such; the consideration of its being universal; or the composition of these two. The first is called “natural universal (kullī ṭabīʿī),” the second “logical universal (kullī manṭiqī),” the third “intelligible universal (kullī ʿaqlī).”

The natural universal is extramentally existent, since animal as such is a part of this animal; the latter exists; a part of the existent is itself existent; so therefore animal as such exists.

The intelligible universal exists only in the mind, not extramentally. For it is either absolutely non-existent, or exists in one of the two modes of existence. The first option is false, since one cannot truly say of something absolutely non-existent that it is universal. So it exists in one of the two modes of existence. It does not have extramental existence, since everything that exists extramentally is individuated, and no individuated thing is such that [526] “universal” enters into its meaning (mafhūm). So nothing extramentally existent is such that “universal” may enter into its meaning; nor is anything that has “universal” enter into its meaning extramentally existent. Therefore, the intelligible universal does not exist extramentally.

[first objection: are there not real entities that lack individuation?]

Let it not be said: we do not concede that everything extramentally existent is individuated. For animal as such exists extramentally, but is not individuated.

For we say: when we claim that everything extramentally existent is individuated, we mean that everything extramentally existent may truly be said to have a concrete being (huwiyya muʿayyina) in extramental reality. And one can truly say of animal as such that it has a concrete being in extramental reality, so it is true to say that of it that it is individuated, as an accidental predication.

The logical universal does not exist extramentally either, since otherwise the composite [universal] would exist extramentally, and we have already refuted this.

[second objection: the universal in the mind is particular]

Let it not be said: the universal exists neither in the mind nor extramentally. Not extramentally, for the reason already given. And not in the mind, because everything that exists in the mind has an individual form in an individual soul. Nothing of this kind is such as to be universal. Therefore, nothing universal exists in the mind.

For we say: we do not concede that nothing of this kind is such as to be universal. For whatever is composed from a quiddity and a qualification of being universal does have an individual form in an individual soul, but still one can truly say about it that it is universal, given that “universal” necessarily enters into its meaning.

[three arguments for the extramental being of universals]

Let it not be said: the intelligible universal is extramentally existent, by the following arguments.

First, the universal exists either in the mind or in extramental reality. The first option is false, since the form of man in the intellect originates only after the origination of the individual, so it is posterior to him. And everything posterior is accidental. So the mental form is accidental. And nothing accidental can be divided into essential and accidental, so the mental form cannot be divided into these two. Yet the universal is thus divided. So the universal is not a mental form, nor is it existent in the mind. Therefore it exists extramentally.

Second, whenever the form occurs in the intellect, a conceptualization arises for us that may be shared in common among individuals. From [the form’s] occurrence in [the intellect] follows an intellectual judgment that there is a “range” which those individuals share. This judgment either corresponds [to reality] or does not. The latter option is false, since otherwise [this judgment] would be ignorance. So the first option is right: the shared range does exist in extramental reality. Hence, the universal is extramentally existent.

Third, we know necessarily that the individual instances of one and the same species share the nature of that species in common, but differ from one another in virtue of their specifying features. That through which there is sharing is not that through which there is distinction. This being so, the participated range exists extramentally. So the intelligible universal exists extramentally.

[responses: the essence is neutral]

For we say: as for the first, we do not concede that the intelligible universal is divided into essential and accidental. Rather it is the quiddity as such that is thus divided; and it is the natural universal. As for the second and the third [arguments], they refer to the realization of the shared range in extramental reality. But why should it [527] follow from this that the intelligible universal exists extramentally? For the shared range is the quiddity as such. It differs from the intelligible universal as part differs from whole.

So it has been explained that the intelligible universal does not exist extramentally.

[a universal in the mind is itself an individual form, but corresponds to many things]

The universal is a meaning that does not exclude being predicated of many things. It does not exist in concrete individuals, because everything that exists in concrete individuals has a concrete being (huwiyya) [114v] which nothing else can share in common. Nothing of this kind is universal, so the universal does not exist extramentally. Rather [the universal] exists in the mind. It is an intelligible form which corresponds to that which has occurred, or will occur, as concrete particular instantiations. When we say this form is universal (kullī), we do not mean that this form itself exists in the whole (al-kull) [set of particulars]. For it is an individual form in an individual soul, so it cannot itself be existent in something else. Rather, by its being “universal” we mean that it corresponds to the whole, in the sense that, whichever of the individuals presents itself to the soul first, when the soul takes that quiddity as separate from all extrinsic attachments, there will be one and the same result for the intellect. This is the meaning of its being “shared in common.”

[contradiction argument]

The universal human is not one and the same entity (maʿnā) as that which itself exists in particulars. For one and the same thing cannot be conceived as existing in multiple subjects of inherence. Also, if humanity were one and the same in all people, then the humanity that exists in Zayd would be the same as the humanity that exists in ʿAmr. But one of these two is white and knowing, while the other is black and ignorant. So one and the same thing would be Zayd and ʿAmr, knowing and ignorant, white and black, which is absurd.

[the universal is not divided among individuals; it is in the mind]

Nor can it be the case that there is in each of them some [part] of humanity. Otherwise, whenever an individual perishes, it would follow that one of the parts that make up humanity would need to perish. Rather, in each human there is a complete humanity that is distinct from what is in someone else. The universal humanity is a form that is taken from Zayd, and which corresponds to Zayd and to other individual humans. Its existence is in the mind; it does not occur in concrete individuals. Otherwise it would [42v] have an individuated concrete being that would exclude [its] being shared in common.

[objection that the universal in the mind is an individual, with correspondence solution]

You may say: the nature in the mind is an individual form in an individual soul, so it is not universal. We say: even though the mental form has concrete being and is distinct from other forms that belong to the same species in virtue of becoming concrete in the mind, nonetheless it is a perceptual representation (mithāl idrākī) of that which has occurred or will occur. So, insofar as it is a perceptual representation of that which has occurred or will occur, and truly corresponds to many things, it is universal. The correspondence can be explained as follows: when we see Zayd and the form of humanity arises in our mind as a result, and when we see ʿAmr and conceptualize a form [on that basis], the result in both cases will be one and the same thing.

[quiddity “on the condition of nothing else” has no existence]

Humanity “on the condition that nothing else [is added]” exists neither extramentally nor in the mind. For mental existence is also an attachment, so [quiddity in the mind] is not separate from all attachments either. As for the humanity that is separate from all extramental attachments, this does exist in the mind.

[the parts of the quiddity are extramentally distinct, but individuated only in the mind]

The philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) said: the parts of the quiddity may be distinct in extramental reality, like body and soul, which are two parts of the human, or they may be distinct in the mind only, like blackness. For its genus is not distinct from its specific difference in extramental reality. So what is meant by this is not that [263] the extramental blackness is something simple in itself, and that from this simple thing two forms arise in the intellect, one of the two being the form of the genus, the other the form of the specific difference, with both corresponding to that simple thing, but blackness not including both concepts in extramental reality. For two distinct forms cannot correspond to a simple quiddity. Instead, what is meant is that blackness in concrete individuals does not have one individuation for its genus, and another for its specific difference. Rather, one and the same individuation occurs to blackness insofar as it is blackness. For we know necessarily that the object (al-dhāt) which is blackness is identical to color. Yet when each of the two parts are represented in the mind, a [distinct] individuation in the mind does occur to each of them.

Let it not be said: the existence of the part is distinct from the existence of the whole, because it is prior to it. This being so, the existence of the part and its individuation comes before the existence of the whole and its individuation, and the individuation of the whole is not the same as the individuation of the part.

For we say: we do not concede that the individuation of the part is not³⁸ the individuation of the whole. Why can’t one say that the existence of the specific difference is individuated through its being added to the quiddity of the specific difference, and the existence of genus is individuated through its being added to the quiddity of the genus, as connected to the quiddity of the specific difference? Then the individuation of the composite quiddity would be the same as the individuation the two meanings that are intrinsic to it. Nothing rules this out.

[merely conceptual and real quiddities]

If quiddity is an occurring species, it is called “true quiddity (al-māhiyya al-ḥaqīqiyya)”; but if it occurs only in intellectual consideration (bi-iʿtibār ʿaqlī), it is called “merely conceptual quiddity (al-māhiyya al-iʿtibāriyya),” for instance, “white animal.” The part of a true quiddity must be existent, since no part of an existent thing can be non-existent. As for the merely conceptual quiddity, it can be composed from the existent and the non-existent, for instance the ignorant, the non-existent, and the blind.

[al-Rāzī’s argument from sensation, with refutation]

It has been said: a composite quiddity may sometimes be composite extramentally, as human is composed from body and rational soul, or it may be composite [only] in the mind, like blackness: its genus is not distinct from its specific difference in extramental reality. For if [the genus] were distinct from [the specific difference], then each of them would be perceived by the senses individually, and then the sense perception of blackness would be the sense perception of two things, which is a contradiction; or only one of the two [genus or specific difference] would be individually perceived by the senses. If this were genus, then the sense perception of blackness would be the sense perception of “being a color” without qualification, which is absurd. But if [what was sensed] were the specific difference, then sensible blackness would be just the specific difference. Color, though, is a constituent of the quiddity of sensible blackness. So then genus would enter into the nature [37v] of the specific difference, which is a contradiction. On the other hand, if neither of them were perceived by the senses, then if no sensible form occurs in virtue of their conjunction, then blackness would not be sensible [at all]. If however [such a sensible form] does occur, then it would be extrinsic to them, so neither of them would be a part of blackness.

We say: We do not concede that [the sensible form] would not be a part of blackness. This would follow only if whatever occurs [in virtue of the conjunction of the genus and the specific difference] were something beyond the conjunction. Why can’t that which arises be the conjunction [itself], so that it would be perceived by the senses, whereas neither [genus nor specific difference] are perceived by the senses when taken individually?

[distinctions in the mind may have no extramental correspondence; cf. T37]

Some things have an existence distinct from the existence of the quiddity, both in the mind and in concrete reality; others are distinct in the mind, but not in concrete reality. For instance, we might take an isosceles triangle that exists concretely; call it “triangle C.” And take [also] the form of the universal in the mind, which corresponds to the particular instantiations [of triangles C]. Finally, take the absolute triangle in the mind, which corresponds to the particular instantiations of the form which corresponds to triangle C and other [particular triangles]. Now, triangle C does not have aspects that are distinct among the concrete individuals, such that it could correspond to the universal form of the triangle C under one aspect, and to the universal form of the absolute triangle in another aspect. Rather, among the concrete individuals, there is just one and the same triangle. So it is clear that distinction in mental existence does not imply distinction in concrete existence.

[the unity of extramental quiddity]

The essential [constituent] of a simple species, like “being a color” for blackness, has no existence distinct from the existence of another essential [constituent of this species]. For, if “being a color” had an existence distinct from the existence of whatever specifies blackness, then we could retain blackness’s “being a color” even as whatever specifies [blackness] vanishes, and attach to it whatever specifies [43v] whiteness. Thus the simple species in concrete individuals is one single thing (shayʾ wāḥid). Furthermore, if genus had an existence within the simple species other than the existence of the specific difference, then the substantiality that is predicated of prime matter (hayūlā) would have existence in prime matter, and it would have a further specific difference; then there would be another prime matter for the prime matter, and so on to infinity. Also, if substantiality had existence in the form, then it would have a specific difference, and that would be a substance [as well]. So it would have another specific difference, and so on to infinity. Thus, the essential [constituents] of simple species have no existence other than the existence of other essential [constituents of that species]. So it is clear that composite quiddities may in some cases be composed only in the mind, but may in other cases be composed both in the mind and in concrete reality.

[terminology of essence and the universal as essence “without condition of anything”]

[The term for quiddity, māhiyya] is derived from “what it is (mā huwa),” and is what must be [stated in response] to the question “what is it?” It is predominantly applied to intelligible items, whereas “essence (dhāt)” and “true reality (ḥaqīqa)” are used when existence is also taken into consideration (maʿa iʿtibār al-wujūd). All of them are secondary intelligibles.

The true reality of each thing is distinct from whatever occurs to it regarding aspects of consideration (min al-iʿtibārāt). Otherwise, one could never truly predicate it of whatever is opposed to [these aspects]. It is the quiddity together with each accident that may be opposed to [the same quiddity] together with the contrary of [that accident]; but [the quiddity] as such is nothing but what it is. If someone asks which side of the opposition applies to it [that is, as having a given accident or as having the contrary of that accident], the answer will be to deny everything of it before it is taken as such [i.e. as having the accident, or its contrary], but not thereafter. And quiddity may be also taken in isolation from whatever is other than it, so that if anything were joined to it, this would be something additional to it, and [the quiddity] would not be predicated of the combination. It is this that is quiddity “on the condition [74] that nothing else” [is attached to it]. It exists only in the mind. And it may also be taken “without the condition of anything,” which is the natural universal (kullī ṭabīʿī) that exists extramentally. It is a part of the individuals, and can be truly applied to the combination that arises from it and whatever is joined to it. The universality that is accidental to quiddity is called the “logical universal (kullī manṭiqī),” while the composite is the “intelligible [universal].” Both are [only] in the mind. These three ways of considering a quiddity are inevitably realized for every intelligible quiddity.

[clarification of the doctrine of states]

I say: everything the intellect can indicate is divided into that which has realization (taḥaqquq), and that which does not: this is the same as the division between the affirmed and the denied. [The proponents of states] do not disagree with this, nor do they affirm a middle ground between affirmation and negation. What they claim is rather that existence is more specific than reality (thubūt). The existent is any object that has the attribute of existence, and “non-existent” is said of any object that lacks this attribute. But an attribute is itself not an object, so it must be neither existent nor non-existent. This is what led them to claim that there is a middle ground [between existence and non-existence]. For by “object (dhāt)” and “thing,” they meant whatever is known, and whatever one can speak about informatively, independent [from anything else]. By “attribute (ṣifa)” they meant whatever is known only because it follows something else. [On their view] every object is either existent or non-existent: “non-existent” is said of any object that lacks the attribute of existence, but it can have other attributes, like the attributes of genera, according to those who affirm these of non-existent things. [86] According to them, this is compatible with the definition that has been given. Really, the disagreement over this issue comes down to clarifying what the terminology means.

[response to T33: refutation of argument concerning accidents of accidents]

I say: the attributes that are shared in common must either be positive (thubūtiyya) or not. Those that are positive must either be included within the meanings (mafhūmāt) of those things that share them in common, or not. Those that are included are, for instance, color, which is shared by blackness and whiteness. [Attributes like color] are a part of the meaning of “being blackness” and “being whiteness.” Now, a part is not an accident subsisting in the composite. So the fact that different things are described by [these attributes] does not imply the subsistence of one accident in another. The [attributes] that are not included, meanwhile, are for instance the accident attributed to blackness, or motion. The accident occurs to them accidentally, and is not included within their meanings. But even the accidental occurrence of one thing for another does not involve the subsistence of one accident in another. So, from the fact that an attribute is shared accidentally by different things, it does not follow that it subsists in them, unless some separate proof is given for this. As for negative attributes, since they are not positive, the fact that they are attributed to [different things] does not imply that an accident subsists in an accident [either].

[on the infinite regress of states]

As for [al-Rāzī’s] spurious discussion of the claim made by the proponents [of states] that the state is described neither as similar nor different, this has no force against them. For they would say: two similar things are two objects from which one may understand one and the same meaning, while two different things [90] are those from which one cannot do this. But a state is not an “object (dhāt),” nor is it the object of an object. So it is described as neither similar nor different. This is shown by the fact that an object is whatever is perceived in isolation, and a state cannot be perceived in isolation. How can what is perceived concerning one state be the same as what is perceived concerning another state, given that every state is [only ever] perceived together with something else? Whatever is shared in common [by different states] cannot be perceived in isolation, such that one could judge that what is perceived concerning one of them is the same as what is perceived concerning another. On the other hand, don’t you say that whenever the intellect indicates two different things, whatever is perceived concerning them is either one and the same, or not? But a state is not something the intellect can indicate without simultaneously indicating something else.

[need for something extramental to correspond to universals]

I say: genera and specific differences are not assents, but rather single conceptualizations. And whatever is formulated while making no judgment as to correspondence with extramental reality need not correspond [to it]. Otherwise it would be composite ignorance. For composite ignorance is a judgment that something occurs, without its in fact occurring. In a single conceptualization, though, one considers neither correspondence nor deviation from [correspondence]. Of course, one may consider that which has genera and specific differences to have certain modes (ḥaythiyyāt) in respect of them, such that intellects may grasp the genera and specific differences from [those modes]. This is why both are rejected in the case of the Necessary Existent, since in Him there are no modes. “Sharing in common,” though, means precisely that whatever is intellectually grasped from one thing that shares is the same as whatever is grasped from another, in regard to that which both share. [Its meaning] is not that one and the same thing would exist in two extramentally existing things simultaneously; nor that a half of it would be in each of the two; or be outside both of them while being attributed to them.

[what corresponds to a mental concept is not something concrete, but a form in the Active Intellect]

We say: there is no dependence [of the conceptualized universal on what is in concrete particulars]. He [sc. al-Rāzī] argues that in that case, the mental conceptualization would not correspond to any extramental item. But we say: we do not concede this. That would follow only if the correspondence of the mental conceptualization to an extramental item came down to the correspondence of that which is in the mind to concrete, self-subsisting things. But this is not the case. Rather, we mean correspondence to whatever is inscribed in the Active Intellect. Why don’t you just say that this shared “range” is inscribed in the Active Intellect?

[isn’t the extramental quiddity also universal?]

If the universality of the single true realities that arises in the soul were due not to its being in the soul, but to its being related to individuals in one and the same way, then the quiddity of every individual in extramental reality would be universal, on the condition of eliminating individualizing features from it. [The quiddity would be universal] not because it exists in extramental reality, but because it is related to its individuals in one and the same way. In general, what is the difference between two cases? […]

[response]

[14r15] The first approach is obviously false, since the conditional mentioned in it must be rejected. For it is absurd to relate the quiddity to its instances when it is just extramentally real. This relation is possible only when [the quiddity] occurs in the mind. Thus universality occurs to what is in the mind and not to what is in extramental reality.

[essence is universal only in the mind: bi-sharṭ lā formula in Syriac]

The true reality (ḥathīthawt) of a thing insofar as it is what it is, is its quiddity. The intellect separates it from everything changeable that belongs to it. […] [131.2] The quiddity that is not qualified (lā methḥamṯā ʿamm meddem) by anything else exists in actuality, since it is a part of an individual, and [the individual] exists in actuality. Still, the quiddity that is qualified in such a way that there is nothing else (methḥamṯā ʿamm lā meddem) with it does not exist extramentally.

[Suhrawardian representationalist solution to the problem that the mental universal is a particular]

It should be known that: the nature that is in the mind has a concrete being as well, since it is among [91] the existents, and is specified by certain features, such as “occurring in the mind,” “lacking indication,” and being indivisible and without position. Its being universal does not just come down to its corresponding to many things, since otherwise particulars would be like this too, given that they correspond to one another. Nor is [its being universal] due to this plus its being unspecified, since as we have just explained, it is specified by a number of features. Rather [its being universal consists in] its being a representational object (dhāt mithāliyya) which is not something fundamental in respect of existence (mutaʾaṣṣila fī al-wujūd). A quiddity in itself is fundamental, whereas [a universal in the mind] is a representation: not just any representation, but a perceptual representation of whatever has occurred or will occur.

[secondary intelligibles]

When you say “the essence (dhāt) of something,” or “its true reality,” or “its quiddity,” the senses of these [expressions]—not insofar as they are human, horse, or whatever—are merely mental considerations, and among the secondary intelligibles. The same is not said of the common nature (which has no existence among concrete individuals) as it is said of the [nature] which does have existence among concrete individuals, insofar as, if its specification to one particular has become necessary, then it does not exist for any other [particular]. If [its specification] is merely contingent, though, its attachment [to this particular] is due to some cause. This is like number, which is specified in its species: one cannot say that it must be specified as one of [the numbers], like four, and does not exist for three. And if [being a number] does not require this, then its attachment to three is through some cause. The reason is that number, as you will learn, is among the things that do not exist in concrete individuals, just insofar as it is “being number.” So its attachment [to any specific number] is neither necessary nor contingent, insofar as it is in concrete existence.

[genus is not distinct from species in extramental reality]

Also, if “being a color” had independent existence, then it would either be a feature (hayʾa) in blackness, and then blackness [could] exist without it; or it would be in the subject of inherence [of blackness]. But then blackness would be two accidents, not one: color and its specific difference. So whoever makes color is the same as the one who creates blackness.

[not everything in the mind has extramental correspondence]

The fact that genus and specific difference are predicated of species, and are among its constituents in the mind, does not show that [this species] is composite in extramental reality. For what is in the mind need not correspond to that which is in concrete reality, unless extramental things are predicated of extramental items. Not everything that is predicated of something is predicated of it in virtue of its correspondence to the concrete form. For instance, particularity is predicated of Zayd, and so is the true reality as such. Yet neither are forms of him in himself, nor are they among his attributes. Rather they are attributes of him that exist only in the mind. The same goes for genus and specific difference.

[why division can be infinite in the mind]

There need be no limit to thoughts in the mind. Verification: we do not understand this in the sense that the infinite occurs in the mind all together, but in the sense that the mind does not stop at any limit. For instance, one is half of two, third of three, and so on. For whatever continuously occurs in our minds from among them is finite, unlike how they would be in extramental existence. In the latter case, their existence is not dependent on thoughts about them, so that if they were without limit they would all be together [at once]. This is clear from the issue we [previously discussed], namely the species in which there are substances in an infinite ordered series: when each of them has an existence in extramental reality that is distinct from the existence of another, then it is known [114] as a matter of certainty that on this assumption, they must exist all together in extramental reality. But if their existences are not distinct in extramental reality, but instead they are distinct from one another only in terms of mental consideration (al-iʿtibār al-dhihnī), then none of them need be distinguished in the mind apart from the one that is just being thought about, without the ones that are not being thought about. Their being infinite in the mind means that thinking about them does not arrive at any end, so that [the mind] would be unable to think about anything else. If something is infinite in this sense, it is not rendered impossible by the aforementioned rule as to when there must be a limit, and when not.

[did Aristotle and al-Suhrawardī disagree about unity of genus and specific difference outside the mind?]

Second question: the First Teacher Aristotle, from whom the recent thinkers took this science [sc. metaphysics], held that the existence of genus is distinct from the existence of specific difference. So to hold that they are one in existence is to disagree with him.

Response: even if we admitted that the Teacher disagreed with this, that would not undermine its correctness. For in the true sciences, one should only rely on demonstration, not uncritical acceptance of authority (al-taqlīd). But since the author of this book [al-Suhrawardī] did not in fact disagree with the First Teacher on this topic of inquiry, he had no need to mention this point in response. Instead, he showed that Aristotle too held [the unity of genus and specific difference], when he drew a contrast between genus and matter, on the grounds that there is no act of making for a genus distinct from the act of making a specific difference, whereas there is an act of making matter distinct from that of making form. The unity of the acts of making is the unity of the existences. He held that the existence of genus is distinct from the existence of specific difference, but only in terms of mental consideration.

[sensation argument]

Detailed clarification of this demonstration: if there were a genus whose [115] existence was distinct from that of the specific difference,³⁹ then in concrete individuals blackness would be composed from color, which is its genus, and something else, which is its specific difference. The same goes for whiteness and other colors.

(a) If neither of the two [parts of blackness] taken by itself—supposing that it could be by itself—is perceptible to the senses, and (a1) if no [new] sensible form occurs when they are conjoined, then blackness would not be perceptible to the senses [at all]. But (a2) if [a new form] does occur, then it will be additional to the genus and the specific difference, so they will not be its constituents.

(b) If, on the other hand, this were not so, and just one of the two were perceptible to the senses, but (b1) another sensible form arose whenever something else were joined to it, then perception [of blackness] would be a perception of two sensible objects, which is a contradiction. But (b2) if [no new form were to occur] then only the genus or the specific difference would be perceptible to the senses, so a part would be [equal] to the whole, which is absurd.

(c) And if, finally, each of them by itself were perceptible to the senses, and (c1) they remained like this after being conjoined, then we should perceive two objects of sensation. (c2) If however they did not remain like this, so that only one of them were perceived and not the other, then the absurdity [of option (b)] would arise again. Otherwise, (c3) if no [new] sensible form were to occur, blackness would not be perceptible to the senses [at all]. But (c4) if [a new form] did occur, this would not be identical to the conjunction itself, since the conjunction would be [just] the genus and the specific difference. So if neither of them wereperceptible to the senses, the conjunction would not be perceptible to the senses either, and [blackness] would be something beyond the composite of the two parts; so they would not be its constituents, which is a contradiction.

[only particulars exist extramentally]

This calls for further inquiry [sc. whether the natural universal exists extramentally]. For animal as such is universal animal, and nothing universal is individuated; but everything that is existent is individuated. Therefore nothing universal is existent. The minor [premise] is obvious. As for the major [premise], the reason is that, so long as the object (dhāt) and concrete being (huwiyya) of any existent is not concretized, it will not become existent. But as soon as the object is concretized, one can indicate it. Now, if animal as such were part of this [concrete animal], it would have to be concretized and individuated, in which case it would not be universal. For the very conceptualization of its meaning excludes that [multiple things] share in it. This and other such cases are mental considerations, and no concrete being ever occurs for them.

[Illuminationist account of mere concepts]

Given that human perfections arise only from the intellectual knowledge, which takes its origin from sensible things; and that it is a habit of divine mercy and of lordly providence not to withhold anything that is necessarily required by individuals, nor does He refrain from bestowing whatever enters into the well-being of species, rather He is “the One who gives each thing its form and then guides it” [Qurʾān 20:50]; therefore, out of elemental roots and using intellectual mediators as means, God the exalted surely erects for human souls temples built perfectly upon strong foundations, in the most complete way required and the most excellent way possible, that [these temples] might serve as places of respite and relief for souls. And He opens diverse doors into these temples. Some of them lead up to the world of sense, such as the external senses, while some lead up to the world of suspended images, these being the internal senses. The rational soul too has a door and a wellspring in itself, which leads up to the angelic world (ʿālam al-malakūt). [211] For every door, [God] made a power, through whose use and employment the soul may perceive a certain species of wonders that exist in this world that has been specified. If the soul acquires the principle for its items of knowledge from these powers, by way of abstracting the universals from the particulars, then it relies upon them and combines them as definitions, descriptions, and syllogisms. In this way and in this fashion, [the soul] arrives at the perception of unknown conceptions and assents. This is attained completely only through the consideration of things considered by the substance of soul, without concrete being in extramental reality. [The soul] needs these for positing and predicating. For example, existence, necessity, contingency, impossibility, substantiality, accidentality, and other considerations (al-iʿtibārāt), which will be discussed below in detail. Because of its consideration of these things, the soul comes to understand how predicates relate to their subjects, as conclusions from true syllogisms. Were this not so, it would be difficult for [the soul] to grasp the majority of true realities. For whenever we judge that one thing holds of another and that this judgment arises from a syllogism, as when we ascribe existence or necessity to God the exalted, or contingency to the world, or impossibility to a second God, or substantiality to the separate [intellects] and the bodies, or accidentality to colors, and so on, and we do not know whether these predicates have true realities extramentally or are purely mental considerations, then our goal has not been attained completely, nor is our aim in verifying the items of knowledge and disclosing them achieved. Rather, the items of knowledge remain hidden and turbid in our souls, and we go on having doubts and uncertainties. This is common to all particular items of knowledge.

Given these considerations, it behooves us to undertake a verification of their states and to remove the veil of uncertainty that has arisen from posing doubts about them, and to relate what all the schools have claimed with respect to them. For all those who rushed to make claims about items of knowledge, without first becoming versed in them, [212] claimed that they do have concrete beings (huwiyyāt) in extramental reality. It is for this reason that there is such great difficulty and copious doubt concerning the items of knowledge, which [difficulty and doubt] have not ceased as the ages have gone by. These mere considerations are, for instance, existence, necessity, contingency, impossibility, unity, multiplicity, numbers, substantiality, accidentality, “being a color,” universality, particularity, object, true reality, quiddity, thingness, and the ten categories insofar as they are categories and predicates. And likewise all universal predicates, be they genera, specific differences, properties, species: all of them are mental considerations. Also all privations in which contingency is taken as a condition, such as rest, blindness, and darkness: these too are mental considerations.

[neutrality of essence]

Then it was said: animal as such does not exist in individuals, since if it did exist in this given individual, and if it were specific to [that individual], it would not be animal as such that is existent in it. [5r] If on the other hand it were not specific to it, it would be common, and it would be a single thing existing in many, which is absurd. The Master [Avicenna] responded that animal as such is not common and not specific, but neither is it something third. Rather, it is just animal, even though it must be one or the other.

[real distinction between the parts of a quiddity]

The parts of a quiddity might not be distinct in extramental existence, like blackness, which is composed from its genus and its specific difference.

If what is meant by this is that sensation does not distinguish between its generic and its differentiating part in existence, this is true. [The distinction] is secured by the intellect, which grasps that in this case there is a species, a genus, and a specific difference: each of them is existent, despite sensation’s not distinguishing between their existences. But if what is meant is that these three entities exist through a single existence, so that a single accident subsists in a subject of inherence, this is not true.

[different kinds of composition and unity: conceptual and real]

A quiddity is either simple (i.e., it has no parts) or composite. Either kind may be either real (ḥaqīqiyya) or merely conceptual (iʿtibāriyya), and the merely conceptual may be either existing (wujūdiyya) or privative (ʿadamiyya). So, there are six kinds. The real is that which corresponds to the bare fact (nafs al-amr), whereas the conceptual is that which is posited by the intellect. The existing is that in whose meaning (mafhūm) there is no negation, as has been explained, whereas in the privative there is [negation].

(a) The real simple is, for instance, the Necessary [Existent], or the point. (b) The merely conceptual [simple] it is like the existence of existence. When the intellect finds that many things have an existence that is different from them, it leaps to the conclusion that everything is like this. But after careful consideration [the intellect] claims that the existence [of existence] is identical to [existence], since that whose true reality (ḥaqīqa) is the same as its realization (taḥqīq) needs no [further] realization to be added after the occurrence of the quiddity; and because [otherwise] an infinite regress would follow. The same goes for any attribute whose meaning is the same as the meaning of what is attributed to it, such as the occurrence of occurrence, the concomitance of concomitants, the unity of unity, the priority of priority, and so on. (c) The real composite is for instance body, which is composed from the elements, or house, which is composed from parts. (d) The merely conceptual [composite] is for instance that which is composed from genus and specific difference: the intellect arrives at the idea that genus and specific difference are two existents, from which the species is assembled, but this is not so in extramental reality. Otherwise [100] neither could be truly predicated of the species. Another example is when one considers the quiddity made up of both an attribute and its subject, such as “white animal,” or two distinct things [together], like Zayd and ʿAmr.

[response to the correspondence problem]

I say: for some true realities, realization with respect to the bare facts (fī nafs al-amr) specifically belongs to the interior faculties, for instance universals, non-existents, and the relations among these. If by their “conceptualization” and “consideration” one intends that they are like this in these faculties, then these [considerations] are true and correspond to whatever is in the bare facts. For instance when we say “genus is a universal,” in the sense that whatever is genus in the mind is also universal in [the mind]. But if one intends that they are like this in extramental reality, then we do not allow that without correspondence with extramental reality they are true in the bare facts.

[how essences are extramentally real: “divine existence”]

Animal as such must exist, given that animal exists as qualified, and the existence of the composite calls for the existence of its parts. The fact that the existence of one thing is inseparable from that of another does not rule out that the former thing exists. So even though animal as such does not exist without the qualification of being individuated, it is still existent; like whiteness, which exists only together with a subject of inherence, and like many things subject to concomitance.

The truth is that animal as such does not need to have either commonality or specificity predicated of it; nonetheless it is not true that animal as such needs to have neither of these two predicated of it. “Animal, when taken together with its accidents, is something ‘natural’ (al-shayʾ al-ṭabīʿī). When taken by itself, though, it is a nature whose existence is prior to natural existence, in the way that the simple is prior to the composite. This is what is referred to specifically as ‘divine existence’, since the cause of its existence, insofar as it is animal, is the providence of God the exalted.”⁴⁰

[universality in the mind]

The universality of the intelligible universal cannot hold by being considered true of extramental particulars. Rather, if it holds [because of any relation to particulars], then it is with respect to particulars in the mind. These particulars are not the ones acquired from extramental reality, since Zayd is not universal man, whether he is outside of the mind or in it. Rather the particulars that are acquired from mental existents belong to the species of the intelligible universal.

It has been said: the intelligible form is universal due to its relating to extramental items, in such a way that [regardless which of] these extramental things arrives at the mind first, one and the same form will arise in [the mind] from them. Once one of them has arrived, the soul has recieved this attribute from it, and it will receive nothing further from anything else.

But we say: if the one who says this means by “intelligible form” the natural universal, then it is true. But if they mean by it the intelligible [universal], we have already explained our view on this. As for the universal in the soul as it relates to these forms that are in the soul, this consideration belongs [the universal] in relation to whichever of these forms of the soul arrived at the soul first. Furthermore, this form is particular in the way we have said. Also, it is within the soul’s power to grasp [it] intellectually, and to grasp that it grasps [it], and so on indefinitely, with the relations heaped upon each other; so these intelligible forms can continue with no need for any limit, but only potentially, not actually.

[correspondence problem for genus and specific difference]

Question: we have distinguished two parts of blackness in the mind. If each of them corresponds to the same extramental blackness, then there is no difference between either of them and the form of blackness in the intellect. Then “being a color”⁴¹ corresponds to blackness and, while being one and the same [intellectual form], also to whiteness. On the other hand, if both [parts of blackness] correspond to something in extramental blackness, then there are two things in it: one will be a generic entity, the other a differentiating entity.

Response: blackness in extramental reality has no genus (namely “being a color”) to which a specific difference would be added. Concrete existence is considered to involve correspondence [only] when the correspondence is taken [as involving] a relation [to concrete existence].

[correspondence problem solved with appeal to nafs al-amr]

So it has been established that one part of blackness cannot be [extramentally] distinct from the other. Rather this distinction is only in the mind and in the bare facts (nafs al-amr), since, if the genus were not different from the specific difference in the bare facts, [176] and they were not distinct, then the mind would predicate composition of something in which there is no composition, which would be ignorance.