[God’s existence is specific to Him and is His oneness]

If then the First is indivisible with regard to its substance, the existence it has, by which it is distinguished from all other existents, cannot be any other than that by which it exists in itself. Therefore its distinction from all the others is due to a oneness which is its essence. For one of the meanings of oneness is the particular existence by which each existent is distinguished from all others; on the strength of this meaning of oneness each existent is called “one” inasmuch as it has its own particular existence. This meaning of the term “one” goes necessarily with “existence.” Thus the First is one in this respect as well, and deserves more than any other one the name and the meaning (of the “one”).

[causation argument]

If [God] has a true reality which is other than that quiddity [i.e. any quiddity] then—if that necessity, with respect to existence, must be connected with that quiddity and would not be necessary without it—the meaning (maʿnā) of the Necessary Existent inasmuch as it is the Necessary Existent would come to be through something that is not itself. Hence it would not be the Necessary Existent inasmuch as it is the Necessary Existent. […]

[275.15] It thus remains that the Necessary Existent in itself is unqualified and realized inasmuch as it is a necessary existent in itself as a necessary existent without that quiddity. Therefore, that quiddity would occur accidentally (if this were possible) to the Necessary Existent that realizes its subsistence (al-qiwām) in itself. The Necessary Existent would thus be indicated in itself by the mind (fa-wājib al-wujūd mushār ilayhi bi-al-ʿaql fī dhātihi) and the Necessary Existent would be realized even if that occurring quiddity did not exist. Hence that quiddity would not be a quiddity of that thing indicated by the mind as being a necessary existent, but would be the quiddity of something that attaches to it. But it was [276] postulated as the quiddity of that thing and not another. This is a contradiction. Hence, there is no quiddity for the Necessary Existent other than its being the Necessary Existent. And this is [its] “thatness” (al-anniyya).

[priority argument]

Hence, either [existence] would be a necessary concomitant of the quiddity because it is that quiddity, or it would be its necessary concomitant because of something [else]. Now, when we say “necessary concomitance (luzūm)” we mean following in respect of existence (ittibāʿ al-wujūd). An existent cannot follow anything but an existent. So if “thatness” (anniyya) follows quiddity and is in itself a necessary concomitant for it, then, in its existence, “thatness” would follow an existence. But for everything that in its existence follows an existence, that which it follows in itself exists prior to it. Thus the quiddity would have existed in itself prior to its existence, which is contradictory. It remains that it has existence due to a cause. Hence, everything that has a quiddity is caused [in respect of existence].

[differentiating between two kinds of saying “existence”]

Thus the First has no quiddity. Those things possessing quiddities have existence emanate on them from Him. He is pure existence with the condition of negating privation (mujarrad al-wujūd bi-sharṭ salb al-ʿadam) and all other descriptions of Him. Furthermore, the rest of the things possessing quiddities are contingent, coming into existence through Him. The meaning of my statement “He is pure existence with the condition of negating all other additional [attributes] of Him,” is not that He is the absolute existence in which other things may participate (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq al-mushtarak fīhi). If there is an existent with this attribute, it would not be the pure existent with the condition of negation, but rather the existent without the condition of positive affirmation. I mean, regarding the First, that He is the existent with the condition that there is no additional composition (bi-sharṭ lā ziyādat tarkīb), whereas this other is the existent without the condition of this addition. For this reason the universal is predicated of every thing, whereas [pure existence] is not predicated of anything that has addition; everything other than Him has addition.

[existence in an absolute sense is a necessary concomitant of God, but actual existence is not]

Existence in the case of the Necessary Existent is among His necessary concomitants, and He is that which necessitates it (al-mūjib). His essence is “being necessary” (al-wājibiyya) and the necessitation of existence (ījāb al-wujūd). He is the cause of existence. The existence of anything other than Him is not intrinsic to its quiddity. Rather it occurs to [the quiddity] extrinsically (min khārij). Nor is [existence] among the necessary concomitants of [the worldly quiddity]. However, His Essence is “being necessary” or existence in actuality, not existence in an absolute sense; the latter is instead among His necessary concomitants. […] [181.8] Existence in actuality is intrinsic for the true reality of the Necessary Existent, since it is the necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujud); [existence in actuality] is not a necessary concomitant of His true reality.

[God’s essence is “being necessary” which is non-participated existence]

Perhaps the solution to the preceding is that the existence that is the quiddity of the First is “being necessary.” “Being necessary” is not “existence¹⁰ that cannot be impossible” (wujūd lā yumkinu an yastaḥīla), but rather is “that whose existence is necessary” (huwa alladhī yajibu wujūduhu). For if “being necessary” were existence that cannot be impossible, the Truth [i.e. God] would have to be [either] that existence for which “not being impossible” would be a necessary concomitant, so that this [characteristic] would be a necessary concomitant of every existence; or [God] would be composed of existence and what is attached to it, and would be composite in terms of quiddity [which is absurd]. So He is that whose existence is necessary, and hence “being necessary” is His quiddity.

If you mean by existence that abstract thing (al-mujarrad) [i.e. “that the existence of which is necessary”], then there is no participation (mushārika) in it. If however you mean by it [141] that which is opposite to non-existence, then there is participation in it and it is among the necessary concomitants of His “being necessary.” So His quiddity is such that existence is necessary for it, meaning that existence in which there is participation, so that this existence, as such, is among the necessary concomitants of His quiddity. How could it be otherwise? We say that existence is necessary for [His quiddity] just as having angles equal to [two right angles] is necessary for triangle.

Furthermore, that quiddity is not like humanity and other [species], so that somebody could say that the existence of its necessary concomitant is possible only after its [coming into] existence, since a necessary concomitant (as opposed to a constituent) is caused by the quiddity, and so long as the cause does not exist neither does the effect.

Furthermore, how can existence pertain to human, for example, prior to existence, so that through that existence it could be a cause for an effect which is this existence? Yet this is impossible only in the case of the quiddities that lack necessity, and for which existence is only a necessary concomitant.

As for the quiddity “being necessary,” whose meaning is precisely that existence is necessary for it due to itself (min dhātihā), it is either existence itself along with a further condition (if such a thing were possible), or it is something that has no name, for which this participated existence is a necessary concomitant. As for what this might be, it has no name but is recognized (yuʿrafu) only through that which is its necessary concomitant, like a power. Indeed its concrete being (huwiyyatuhu), namely “that its existence is necessary,” is like the concrete being of powers, insofar as they necessarily give rise to their activities.

Let no one ask: does the quiddity of the First Truth exist in order that its necessary concomitant exists, so as to be the cause of its own necessary concomitant, when it already existed in a moment [142] before its existence? To this one may respond: [God’s quiddity] is either (a) an existent that is not through existence which is attached to it—it is not like humanity, which is existent through the fact that existence pertains to it, rather it is existence itself (nafs al-wujūd),¹¹ without an existence that overlays it, and there is no participation in this thing; it is “being necessary” itself and is a simple entity, even though one explains it with a complex verbal expression—or (b) existence pertains to it and this is its necessary concomitant, so that one may say “this is necessary for it,” or that the existent exists in the general sense (bi-al-maʿnā al-ʿāmm) and this is its necessary concomitant which cannot be eliminated from it. In fact [existence in the general sense] belongs to Him through an existence that attaches to Him through the fact of His being existent, since it makes Him existent in the first place. So when someone poses the tricky question whether He possesses existence or not, one should either concede that existence does belong to Him, having in mind the general meaning, given that it is a necessary concomitant; or one should disagree and respond that He is not an existent through any existence that would be an attribute of something in Him.¹²

[existence as analogical]

As for the application of existence to the First [Principle] and to what is posterior to it, this is not an equivocal term, but an analogical expression (min al-asmāʾ al-mushakkika), and the referents (musammiyyāt) of an analogical name may fall under a single science.

[analogy]

Thus it is clear that existence is something common which is not predicated of what falls under it univocally (bi-al-tawāṭūʾ), but analogically (bi-al-tashkīk). Therefore it is predicated of what falls under it as a necessary concomitant, not as a constituent, and it is not common in the same sense as genus is common. If existence were predicated of what falls under it univocally, that is, as a constitutive predicate, then it would have to be predicated of the Existent that is necessary in itself and of other existents as a constituent. Then the Existent that is necessary in itself would have to be distinguished from everything else through a differentia, but this is absurd.

[the causation problem]

We say that He has a true reality and a quiddity. This true reality exists, that is, it is neither non-existent nor negated, and its existence is added (muḍāf) to it. If [the philosophers] want to call this existence “consequent (tābiʿ)” and a “necessary concomitant (lāzim),” then let there be no quarrel about names, so long as it is acknowledged that there is no agent for [His] existence, but rather this existence has always been eternal without having an efficient cause. If however they mean by “consequent” and “effect” that it has an efficient cause, this is not so. If they mean something else, this is conceded and it involves nothing impossible, since [117] the proof [i.e. Avicenna’s proof of God’s existence] has only shown that the regress of causes comes to an end. Its ending in an existing true reality and a real quiddity is possible, so there is no need in this for the negation of quiddity (ilā salb al-māhiyya).

If it is said: the quiddity then becomes a cause of the existence that is consequent on Him, so that existence is caused and brought about, we say: the quiddity in created things is not a cause of existence. How then could it be so in the case of the eternal, assuming they mean by “cause” that which brings it about? If they mean by [quiddity’s being a cause] some other aspect, namely that [existence] presupposes it (lā yastaghnī ʿanhu), let this be so, since that involves no impossibility. The impossibility lies only with the regress of causes.

[in general, essences do not cause attributes]

If you mean by its being consequent to the essence and the essence being a cause for it that the essence is an efficient cause for it and that it is brought about by the essence, this is not so. For this does not follow necessarily in the case of our knowledge in relation to our essence, since our essences are not an efficient cause for our knowledge. If you mean that the essence is a subject of inherence (maḥall) and that the attribute does not subsist by itself without such a subject, this is conceded; what is to prevent it? For it to be referred to as “consequent,” as “accidental,” as an “effect,” or however one wishes to express oneself, does not change [100] the meaning, given that the meaning is simply its subsisting in the essence, in the way that attributes subsist in their bearers. There is nothing absurd in its being in an essence and still being eternal and having no agent.

[Avicenna’s position is purely negative]

In general, their proof on this point goes back to their proof denying [God’s] attributes and their denial of any distinction of genus or species [in His case], except that it is even more obscure and less convincing. For this multiplicity comes down to sheer verbal utterance (mujarrad al-lafẓ). In any case reason may accept the supposition of an existing quiddity that is one, whereas [the philosophers] say that every existing quiddity is rendered multiple, since it includes both quiddity and existence. But this is the height of waywardness. For it is in any case intelligible for an existent to be one, but there is never an existent without a true reality, and the existence of a true reality does not undermine unity. […]

[118.11] They thought they were elevating [God above all similitudes to His creation] in what they say, but the end result of their account is pure negation (al-nafy al-mujarrad). For the denial of a quiddity is the denial of a true reality. Nothing remains with the denial of a true reality save the verbal utterance “existence” (lafẓ al-wujūd), which has no referent (musammā) at all so long as it is not related to a quiddity. If it is said, “His true reality consists in His being necessary (annahu wājib), and this is [His] quiddity,” we say that there is no meaning for [His being] necessary other than the denial (nafy) of a cause. But that is a negation (salb), through which the true reality of an essence is not constituted (yataqawwamu). Denying a cause for His true reality is a necessary concomitant (lāzim) of this true reality. So let the true reality be understood in such a way that it is described as having no cause, and as something whose non-existence is inconceivable, since “necessity” means nothing but this. Yet if necessity is additional to existence, this would yield multiplicity; but if it is not additional, how can it be the quiddity given that existence is not a quiddity? The same goes for anything that is not additional to existence.

[composition problem]

Similarly, if existence were something additional to the essence of the existent, which would become existent through it, then God’s existence would also be additional to His essence, I mean this existence [64] that is opposed to non-existence, which is under discussion here. Hence God’s essence would not be one but rendered multiple, which is absurd.

[composition problem and “being necessary”]

Look at what the eminent later scholar—let his tomb rest in peace and his soul be sanctified—said in a passage from his Mubāḥathāt: perhaps the existence that is the quiddity of the First Truth is “being necessary” (al-wājibiyya). He said this just because there is no share at all in “being necessary” taken absolutely. Then he said that the existence that is opposed to non-existence and is said of all things is among the necessary concomitants of that quiddity. If this entity (maʿnā) were a thing in its own right, then the essence of God would thereby be rendered multiple—may He be exalted by far above what the benighted ones say!

[composition problem]

We ask them: when you attribute to God the exalted that He is existent just as you attribute it to other concrete individuals, you must either (a) want to convey in saying that He is existent the same as when you say of concrete individuals that they are existent, or (b) want to convey something different.

(a) If you convey the same meaning for all things—both in God Himself and in other things themselves—then you are using “existent” as one of the univocal names (al-asmāʾ al-mutawāṭiʾa). According to them, univocal names are those that convey an identical (muttafiqan) meaning for different things, like “animality” for different living creatures and animals. Accordingly you are forced to admit that existence is a genus for the existent, and there is no escape from saying that God the exalted is differentiated from existents by a differentia (faṣl). For the true reality of His “self” (ḥaqīqat dhātihi) cannot be like [the existence that is] an attribute of the existent thing. When however you say that he is differentiated by a differentia, you must admit that He is composed (murakkaban) out of a genus and a differentia. This would amount to a multiplicity (kathra) within the essence of the exalted.

(b) If, however, by saying that he is existent you want to convey a different meaning from the one you convey when you describe other things as existent, then your saying “existent” becomes equivocal (min al-asmāʾ al-mushtarika), since you thereby render two different meanings. And this is our view.

[rejection of analogy]

They say: our saying “existent” cannot be among the equivocal names, given what we mentioned about the correctness of the division (al-qisma) of existence, which is not possible in the equivocal names. Nor can it be among the univocal names, since existence is affirmed for some things more appropriately and primarily (awlā wa-awwalan) than in others, for instance for body (al-jism) [as opposed to] accident (al-ʿaraḍ). For the “existence” of the Necessary Existent is one of the “coinciding names” (al-asmāʾ al-muttafiqa); this is what they mean by coinciding names, that is, they are affirmed for some things more appropriately and primarily and in others not.

To this it may be said: the fact that an attribute is more appropriately and primarily in some things and in others not, [still] entails that they all share this attribute, and [only] thereafter is it affirmed for some of them in a stronger and more preponderated (arjaḥ) way than in others. For preponderation with respect to an attribute [66] entails some sharing in the basic principle (aṣl) of that attribute. This is what is actually meant by sharing in the attribute of existence. Don’t you see that “animality”—just as you say—is more appropriate and primary for some living creatures [than for others], for instance, when you speak of the intellects and spheres as “living” or when you say about God the exalted that He is alive? Furthermore you allow that life perishes in living beings other than Him, on the supposition that their cause is absent, and in the case of the human when the cause perishes he dies, whereas this sort of thing is impossible with the essence of Him, the exalted. So they [would have to] say that animality is among the coinciding names and not among the univocal ones. [As for their argument against existence being equivocal], we already replied to their statement that there is division for the attribute of existence.¹³

[univocity and analogy]

This existent, whose existence and true reality are identical (ʿayn al-wujūd wa-ḥaqīqatuhu), is the Necessary Existent through Itself, through whom the existence of other things is necessitated. His quiddity is not rendered multiple by any verbal reference or mental conception¹⁴ which happens prior to careful examination and perfect understanding. The Necessary Existent is necessary existence and the necessarily existent through himself, the existence of every existent being through Him.

Someone may ask: is the existence that is the attribute of every one of the many existents, both eternal and perishing, the same as this simple existence that is necessary through itself or not? If it is the same, how then can the abstract existent which is eternal and necessary by itself be an attribute for other existent things, whether they are necessary of existence or not, eternal or not? If however it is not the same as the existence of other existing things, then other existing things are not existent and there is no existent apart from [65] this one [i.e. God]. But how can existing things be non-existent, that is, not described with existence, and how can this account can be accurate, and this meaning verified?

The answer to this, providing verification, is: the expression “existence” and “existent” is predicated equivocally (bi-al-ishtirāk) of this first existence, which is simple in meaning and concrete being (al-huwiyya), and of that existence where there is a quiddity to which existence is attributed. In the former true sense there is no existent apart from Him. As for the existent whose existence is an attribute that occurs to its quiddity through something else, for it the meaning of existence is its being connected to that Existent, its relation to Him, its togetherness and association (iḍāfatuhu) to that First. The former kind of oneness [of “existence” and “existent”] can be grasped intellectually for no particular being other than that One, which is the First Existent and the First Principle, and is affirmed only in His case. The existence that is attributed to caused existents and through which one says that they are existent is not the same as that self-subsistent existence, in which the meaning of the attribute and the subject of attribution, that is “existence” and “existent,” are one and the same. The expressions “existence” and “existent” are said of the two cases equivocally, in an extended use (al-naql) and by way of likening, considering priority and posteriority, the second borrowing from the first and following it.

Collorary: we call the first simple existence that is necessary by itself “existent” and also call His effects, whose existence is concomitant on His existence and follows upon it, “existents,” in the same way we say that each sailor, the ship, and the passenger on the ship are “moving.” It is the passenger who is “moving” primarily and in himself (bi-al-dhāt) in terms of the goal and aim (al-ghāya wa-al-qaṣd) for the sake of which there is the ship, while the sailor is for the ship. Yet what is “moving” in terms of activity and initiation (al-fiʿl wa-al-bidāya) is the sailor, with the ship following upon his setting it in motion, while the passenger in his motion follows upon the ship’s motion. The sailor is the agent mover in himself, whereas the ship moves accidentally and the passenger moves accidentally to an accident. That which is truly a mover in itself is the sailor, so it is more appropriate to say that he is “moving,” while this is said of the ship secondarily and of the passenger thirdly. If one verifies this account, [one realizes that] the passenger is not actively moving (ghayr mutaḥarrik) [properly speaking].

In the same way, one says “existent” of the First Existent in the true sense, says it of His proximate effects on account of Him and secondarily, and of later effects in a still more remote way. [66] The truly existent is the First, just as the truly moving was the sailor. The last [effect in the chain of creation] is the one more remote from the [proper] application of the meaning of existence, even though it is existent, just as the passenger is more remote from the meaning of “moving”, even though he is moving, and only because he is [moving] by following, and accidentally. The First is first in Himself. Thus for Him the meaning of “existence” is truly different in suitability and appropriateness, priority and posteriority. The only existent, in the sense of “existence” said truly in this intellectually grasped way, is this One Existent. In this sense there is no existent other than Him. That meaning which is the true meaning intended by the expression “existence” is the one said of the cause. Hence the caused existent is existent through existence (bi-wujūd), whereas the First Existent is the true reality of existence (ḥaqīqat al-wujūd), and He is not existent through existence. The existence of the caused is an attribute that belongs to it (ṣifa lahu), namely to the caused existent. Its meaning is not the same as the existence that is the essence of the First Existent. Thus the “caused existent” is said to be existent through its existence, and “existence” is said of its existence accidentally, as borrowing from and following upon the existence of the First. It is an existent through an existence that is dependent on [another] existence, whereas the First Existence is followed, and is both attribute and subject of attribution, that is, both existence and existent.

[composition problem]

Rebuttal of the statement of al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs Abū ʿAlī [Ibn Sīnā] made in al-Najāt,¹⁵ when he said: there cannot be any principles (mabādin) for the essence of the Necessary Existent in itself, which would be brought together so that the Necessary Existent would be constituted from them. Nor can there be quantitative parts nor parts of definition, whether they are like matter and form or in another way, so as to be parts of an utterance that explains (al-qawl al-shāriḥ) the meaning of His name, and each of [the parts of the utterance] would refer to things in existence that essentially distinct from one another.

Shaykh Muḥammad [al-Shahrastānī] said:¹⁶ I say that, as for the impossibility of the first two kinds of division [100r] for the Necessary Existent, this is admitted and there need be no argument about it. But the third kind of division requires investigation. For the parts of an explanatory utterance may be either like genus and differentia, like common and specific, or like one concept (iʿtibār) and another concept. Commonality and specificity would be like existence and necessity; one concept and another concept would be like “principle” and “intellect.” It is acknowledged that there is a difference between our saying “principle” and saying “intellect,” insofar as neither of the two meanings (mafhūmayn) enters into the other, nor does it constitute (yuqawwimuhu) it or necessarily follow upon it (yalzamuhu). After all the meaning of “principle” is “something whose existence is completed through itself, and then the existence of something else is constituted through it,” whereas when we say “intellect by itself” we mean “an existence that is essentially abstracted [100v] from matter.” If both notions (mafhūmāni) are predicated of a single subject, their intellectually grasped true realities do not perish. Rather [this predication] implies numerically distinct concepts (taʿaddud al-iʿtibār) and diversity in respect of “how” [the thing is], so that somebody could know one of them without knowing the other and one of them could be primary (awwaliyyan) and the other acquired (muktasaban). Hence one of the kinds of multiplicity (al-kathra) is forced upon [Avicenna], and this is an absurd result.¹⁷

[composition problem in terms of genus and differentia]

As for the rebuttal of [Avicenna’s] arguments and remarks, we say: in your statement “we do not doubt that there is existence, and either it is necessary in itself or it is contingent in itself,” you have made a counterpart (qasīman) for the Necessary of Existence, namely the contingent in itself. This implies that existence includes two divisions which are equal in respect of ‘being existence,’ which thus has the status of a genus, or a concomitant tantamount to a genus. And one of the divisions is distinguished by a meaning which has the status of a differentia or is tantamount to a differentia. Thus the essence of the Necessary of Existence is compounded (tatarakkabu) of a genus and a differentia, or what is tantamount to them by way of concomitants. That contradicts [God’s] unity and contradicts absolute self-sufficiency. For whatever is compounded from two meanings (maʿnayayn) or [31] from two concepts (iʿtibārayn), one general and one specific, is deficient, in need firstly of its constituents for its true reality to be realized, and secondly of the thing which compounds it so as to bestow existence upon its quiddity.

[rejection of the conceptualist solution and of the analogy of existence]

As for his statement that the distinction between existence and necessity in terms of commonality and specificity is something conceptual (iʿtibārī) in the mind, and is not in existence, it obviously has to be admitted. For the distinction between the meanings of genera and differentiae is in the mind only, and there is no [36] “animal” in existence that would be a genus, nor any “rational” that would be a differentia. Rather both of them are mere concepts (iʿtibārāni) in the mind, and are not in extramental reality. How can anything universal occur in existence, given that the universal is only in the mind? And you know that “being a color” and “whiteness” are intellectually grasped concepts (iʿtibārāni ʿaqliyyāni) in the mind, and are not in extramental reality. Otherwise there would be “being color” of white in existence that would be distinct (ghayr) from its “whiteness.” […]

[37.1] What I say is that the meanings (al-mafhūmāt) of the generic and specific expressions (al-alfāẓ) are not generic and specific in the mind due to their relation to linguistic expressions. The meanings in the mind are true (ṣaḥīḥa) precisely because of their correspondence (muṭābiqatihā) to what is outside the mind. By “correspondence” I do not mean that the universal in the mind corresponds to the universal outside in extramental reality, since there is no universal in concrete individuals. Rather the universal in the mind corresponds to each particular in extramental reality just as the common humanity in the mind corresponds to each individual, whether existent or not. Furthermore, the distinction between different species is due to essential specific differentiae, while the distinction between individuals is due to accidental concomitants.

Now that this has been verified, it is clear that common existence somehow includes the necessary and the contingent. If it includes [them] equally (bi-al-sawiya), it has the status of a genus and there is surely an essential differentia, so that the essence would be compounded of genus and differentia. If it not shared equally [that is, if there is analogy of existence], still this implies commonality and inclusion, so that there would surely be an essential or non-essential differentia [38] and the essence would be compounded of the general and specific. If the generality [of existence] were the same as its specificity, and its specificity were the same as generality, there would be neither generality nor specificity at all. So your statement “we do not doubt that there is existence, and it is divided into necessary or contingent” is false. False too is your positing absolute existence as a subject of metaphysics. And what you mentioned about the concomitants of existence as such in the books you wrote is false, as is your enumeration of the necessary concomitants of [existence] insofar as it is necessary, not insofar as it is existence. Do you not say that non-existence (al-ʿadam) or not-existence (al-lā-wujūd) are opposed to [existence] insofar as it is existence, whereas contingency is opposed to it insofar as it is necessary, yet not insofar as it is existent? Its being one is its necessary concomitant insofar as it is necessary, and likewise for the fact that it does not require anything, being sanctified above the designations of temporary origination, as well as for the fact that it is the principle of everything that comes to be.

His statement that the multiplicity of negations and relations (al-sulūb wa-al-iḍāfāt) does not entail multiplicity in essence was commonly accepted [39] by [Avicenna’s] adherents, however it is neither certain (yaqīniyya) nor self-evident, nor is there any proof for it apart from the example of the [notions] “near” and “far”. Why does he say though that all relations behave in the same way as “near” and “far”? Even if we admit this, among relations there are some that entail the multiplicity of accidents (al-aʿrāḍ) and some that entail the multiplicity of conceptions (al-iʿtibārāt). Isn’t the situation where a man becomes father, when he has a son, and uncle, when his brother has a son, and agent, when an act arises from him, different from the situation of “near” and “far”? The same holds of negation, since the negation of cutting by the sword is different from the negation of cutting of the wool. Thus, there are different sorts of negations and relations. How then can one and the same judgment hold true for all of them? Rather the very distinction between relational and negational meanings entails a multiplicity of conceptions in the essence. For you say that this relational meaning of the [Necessary Existent] is not [40] negative, and this negative is not relational, and you say that this relational has to do with this aspect and that relational has to do with that aspect. All this is an intellectually grasped multiplicity of conceptions, and one understands from each of them something different from what one understands from another, and each notion refers to something different from the other, so that your saying that there is no multiplicity in the Necessary Existent by Himself through the negations and relations fails.¹⁸

[defense of pure equivocity]

These inconsistencies and problems only faced Avicenna and his associates in philosophy (al-ḥikma) because they made existence general, with the generality of genus or the generality of concomitants, and assumed that since they placed it among the analogical (al-mushakkika) and removed it from the univocal they escaped safely from these absurd consequences. However, nothing will rescue them except treating existence and every attribute and expression that they apply to Him, may He be exalted and sanctified, such as “unity,” “one,” “truth,” “good,” “intellect, intellecting, and intellected,” and so on, by way of equivocity (bi-al-ishtirāk), not univocity nor analogy. They agreed indeed that the application of “unity” and “one” to Him, may He be exalted, and to things other than Him is by way of pure equivocity. The same goes for “truth” and “good,” for He is truth in the sense that He makes the truth true and He makes the false false, and is necessary in His existence in the sense that He necessitates the existence of things other than Himself, and renders them non-existent; and He is living in the sense that He gives life and death.

Contraries are litigants and variant things are legal appellants, and their judge is not numbered amongst either of his two appellants, the two litigants before him. Instead, the truth is applied to the judge in the sense that he manifests the truth and establishes it, not in the sense that he disputes with one of the two litigants such that [the judge] would sometimes be equal to him and at others at variance with him. So existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency, unity and multiplicity, knowledge and ignorance, life and death, right and wrong, good and bad, power and impotence, are contraries. Exalted be God above contraries and rivals!

[defense of Avicenna’s view that divine attributes are relational or negative]

Those many attributes, some of which I singled out among those that he [i.e. al-Shahrastānī] uses in reference to [God],¹⁹ are either relative or negative (iḍāfiyya aw salbiyya). None of them refers to an entity (maʿnā) in existence that would be additional to the essence. […] [199v8] If he [i.e. al-Shahrastānī] accepts that these attributes are relative or negative and that essence is not rendered multiple by relation or negation, he must give up on resisting [120r] the claim established by [Avicenna’s] argument in light of these attributes. For [Avicenna’s] claim consisted in denying any existing multiplicity (al-kathra al-wujūdiyya), and there is no existing multiplicity in these attributes. Unless, that is, [al-Shahrastānī] denies one of the two premises: on the one hand that these attributes are indeed relative or negative—but there is no way for him to do this, given the convincing explanation that the proponent of this claim [i.e. Avicenna] provided in his books—or he denies the premise that relations and negations do not indicate multiplicity in existence. The proof for this, which I have promised him, is that the question is clear in the case of negation, and needs only a reminder (tanbīh), namely that one thing’s failing to exist in another does not by itself establish anything existing (amran wujūdiyyan), since it is just the non-existence of that thing, for example matter’s being negated from something: [120v] its failing to exist for that thing is not in itself anything that occurs as existing. This item and [supposed] “existent” is the non-existence of matter for that thing. Otherwise non-existence would be identical to existence, which is absurd. As for the case of relation, if it were something existing, then an infinite number of relations would accumulate as existing entities for one and the same thing. But it is absurd that there be an ordered infinity in existence, and so the [initial] premise, namely that relation is something existing, is likewise absurd. The proof that an infinite number of entities will arise from making relation something existing is this: if relation is an existing entity, it must be an accident that subsists in a subject. Hence it would have a relation to that subject, so that each relation would have [another] relation. Then the second-order relation would be [121r] existing too and would need subsistence in a subject, and so it too would have a relation and so on to infinity, which is absurd.

[existence is a mere concept, so God cannot be existence; refutation of Avicenna’s argument]

There is no existence for existence except in the mind. If this is correct, then one may refute the philosophers’ (al-falāsifa) statement that the true reality of the Creator is existence—may He be exalted above their statements! And it becomes clear that [their statement] amounts to a denial of the Creator, not [just] a denial of worldly attributes [from God] (tanzīh). For if existence is a merely conceptual entity (maʿnan iʿtibāriyyan) that exists only in the mind, then His true reality—may He be exalted—would be existent only in the mind, and there would be no Creator in extramental reality. They claim that this is a denial of worldly attributes from Him (tanzīh)—may He be exalted—may God give refuge from that sort of denial of attributes!

On [the same] basis one may deal with a specious argument on which they based this claim, namely that existence is either (a) intrinsic to His true reality or (b) not. If it is intrinsic, than it is either (a1) the true reality itself, or (a2) its part. (b) It cannot be extrinsic to His true reality. For if He has an existence that is not intrinsic to His true reality, then it is either a concomitant or an accident of [the true reality]. It cannot be a concomitant, because His true reality would then be the cause of His existence and it would be prior to it in existence (takūnu mutaqaddimatan ʿalayhi bi-al- wujūd), yet nothing is prior in existence to existence. (a2) Nor can it be a part of His true reality. For it would follow that His essence is compounded (murakkaban) out of two or more things. He would then be necessary through both or all of them, and would not be necessarily existent through Himself, but this is absurd. (a1) Thus, the only option remaining is that existence is identical to His true reality.

The response to this specious argument is: existence is neither intrinsic to His true reality nor extrinsic, because, if it is not anything existing (amran wujūdiyyan), it is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic. Rather His essence and true reality are existent through themselves and His essence is His existence and [His] existence is His essence. If someone mentally predicates of His essence an existence that is univocal for [all] existents, then this existence exists [only] in the mind and it entails no multiplicity in His essence, nor does it imply that [77] it is an accident or a concomitant of His essence.

The aforementioned argument is one of the difficulties that led the philosophers (al-falāsifa) into confusion. And their claim [that God has no essence besides sheer existence] gives rise to some further difficulties which they cannot get out of. Among them is that if His essence, which is existence, is existent, it follows that existence belongs to it as it does to other existents; otherwise it would be existent without existence. But then [the second-order existence] has to be either a concomitant or an accident. And there is no need for us to mention further problems. […]

[univocity and equivocity of existence]

[77.8] They may say: the existence that is the true reality of His essence—may He be exalted—is different from univocal existence, and His existence does not exist only in the mind.

We reply: is His existence different from univocal existence (a) in meaning and true reality, or (b) through the fact that His existence is necessary and has no cause, His existence being neither contingent nor an effect? (b) If you have in mind a difference apart from meaning and true reality, we say: if His existence, which is His true reality, agrees in meaning with a univocal existence, it does not exist in concrete individuals and it is neither necessary nor contingent, because they are among the attributes that exist in concrete individuals. Furthermore, [even] if it were correct to describe the existence of [God] as necessary, since the meaning of necessary existence is only “existent without having a cause” or “guaranteed (mutaʾakkid) existence, which perishes neither through itself nor through anything else,” neither of these two judgments implies any existence in concrete individuals corresponding to a mental notion, because both of them are negative (nafy). The existence that has no existence in concrete individuals does not become existent in concrete individuals just by lacking a cause or by never perishing. For cause and perishing both belong to that which exists among concrete individuals. (a) If however you mean by saying “His existence is different from univocal existence” that it is different in meaning, we say: if you mean by the word “existence” something other than the commonsense notion (al-maʿnā al-mutaʿārif), the difficulty is merely verbal. Still, in reality there is no difficulty at all. But we confront you with just the thing you wanted to avoid, asking whether the existence which is His essence is existent through existence or not, and so on as we have mentioned above.

[rejection of causation problem and univocity problem]

As for [the fact] that, if something is necessary in itself then one cannot rationally inquire into its cause, since the necessary in itself cannot be caused: why do you say that if the necessity of existence were a necessary concomitant of this concrete individual (al-muʿayyin), then it would be caused? What is impossible in the concrete individual’s essence being existent, with existence being additional to its true reality as its necessary concomitant? There would be no cause for this existence and concomitance, so that this essence would be the Necessary Existent, that is, its existence would be one that was not acquired (mustafād) from any cause or reason, and there would be no cause of its existence nor for its not having a cause of its existence.

If this is rejected and the essence of the Necessary Existent is nothing more than the true reality of uncaused existence, then there would be just this true reality alone [in the Necessary Existent] and it would subsist by itself without residing in anything. However, it is evident that the true reality of existence is an accident that is not self-subsistent, like the true reality of black or white. Yet the meaning (mafhūm) of existence is one true reality and one true reality cannot be divided into [a case where it is] substance and [another case where it is] accident, I mean, into that which subsists [257] by itself and cannot subsist through another, and that which subsists through another and cannot subsist by itself.

If they say: necessary existence is different from contingent existence. Contingent existence is an accident that does not subsist by itself, whereas necessary existence is not an accident, but subsists by itself. We say: we have already mentioned that necessary existence has no meaning other than uncaused existence (wujūd lā ʿilla lahu). And the expression “without a cause” is nothing really present (amran muḥaṣṣilan thābitan) to [necessary] existence so as to render it different from the existence which does have a cause. Furthermore, existence is a single nature, and the meaning of its true reality remains the same, namely just “being in concrete individuals.” In its essence, this [sc. “being in concrete individuals”] does not vary, whether it does or does not have a cause. Thus, you have to decide between two options. (a) Either you say that the meaning of the true reality of existence of the Necessary Existent is different from the meaning of the true reality of the existence of other existent things. (b) Or [you say] that it is not different. By this, I do not mean the difference (al-mughāyara) in terms of whether one requires a cause whereas the other does not, because this difference comes down not to the meaning of existence itself, but rather to something extrinsic to the true reality of its meaning. So if you say (a) that the meaning of the true reality of the existence of the Necessary Existent is different from the meaning of the true reality of the existence of other things, you have thereby denied the true reality of existence in His case, namely being among concrete individuals. You are thus forced to say that He is non-existent. For when being in concrete individuals is eliminated, non-existence comes in its place. But if you say (b) that there is no difference between the two meanings, but His existence shares the true reality of existence with the existence of other things, then you have admitted that one and the same nature is divided into what cannot subsist through another and what cannot subsist by itself. This is like saying that color [258] is divided into what subsists by itself without a subject of inherence in which it resides, and into what cannot subsist by itself. The falsehood of this statement is obvious.²⁰

[three options]

It was already mentioned that the existence of the Necessary Existent is either equivalent (musāwiyan) to the existence of the contingent existent in respect of the meaning “existence” (mafhūm al-wujūd), or not. In the first case such an existence is either attached (muqārinan) to another quiddity in what holds true (ḥaqq) of the Necessary Existent, or not. There is no further option beyond these three.

[438] The first option is that existence is predicated of the necessary and contingent equivocally (bi-ishtirāk al-ism). This is the doctrine of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and their followers. The second option is that existence is predicated of the necessary and contingent univocally (bi-al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī), this univocal [existence] being attached to the quiddity and distinct from it in the case of the Necessary Existent. This is the doctrine of Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbāʾī] and his followers. The third option is that univocal [existence] is not attached to another quiddity in what holds true of the Necessary Existent. Rather the true reality of the Necessary Existent is existence itself, and that existence is distinguished from every other existence through a negative condition (bi-qayd salbī), namely its being separate (mujarradan) from any quiddity and not attached to any of them. This is the doctrine of the philosophers (al-falāsifa).

[univocity problem]

You should know that among the three options, the most obviously wrong is this third one. This is proven by the fact that, if existence is a single true reality in the necessary and the contingent, then existence as such (li-mā huwa huwa) either (a) entails that it is an accident of quiddity, or (b) entails that it is not, or (c) entails neither of these two options: neither that it is an accident nor that it is not.

(a) If the first is the case, then every existence must be an accident of quiddity, since whatever is entailed by a quiddity occurs whenever this quiddity is realized. Hence the existence of the Creator, may He be Exalted, is attached to a quiddity which is other than it. This however is different from what was supposed. [439] (b) If the second is the case, then no existence²¹ attaches to any quiddity. Hence contingent objects are either not existent or exist through an existence that is identical to their quiddities, so that the predication of existence of contingent quiddities would be equivocal. Again, this renders the doctrine invalid. (c) If the third is the case, then existence is sometimes an accident and at other times not. [Accidentality and non-accidentality] would be among the concepts (al-iʿtibārāt) that are different from the quiddity of existence, and could be realized only through a distinct reason (li-sabab munfaṣil). Thus the fact that existence is not an accident of any quiddity in what holds true of the Necessary Existent would have to obtain through a distinct cause, so that the existence of the Necessary Existent would be caused by a distinct cause, which is absurd.

Since these three sub-options are wrong, it is wrong to say as they did that the existence of God the exalted and the existence of contingent things share (mushārik) being existence, though His existence is necessarily separate from any quiddity whereas the existence of the contingent has to be attached to a quiddity.

Since then this option appears to be wrong, the first two options remain. The first was that existence is predicated of the necessary and contingent equivocally, as in the doctrine of al-Ashʿarī; [440] the second that the existence of the exalted is attached to a quiddity distinct [from it], as in the doctrine of Abū Hāshim.

[Avicenna’s indecision]

Some people, including the Second Teacher [al-Fārābī], they say, came to the idea that the true reality of the necessary and contingent are different, and the existence of the necessary being [insofar as it is] necessary differs from the existence of the contingent insofar as it is contingent, so that the term “existence” applies to the necessary and the contingent only equivocally. This statement is in error, for several reasons. […] [45.23] The Shaykh [Avicenna] said in the Ishārāt that [God’s] existence is identical to His true reality, but in the Mubāḥathāt he hesitates. According to us, the correct [view] is that the existence of the necessary is distinct from its true reality, and we have clear demonstrative proofs for this.

[principle problem]

If the quiddity and true reality of the Creator, may He be Exalted, were nothing but existence with the negative condition (bi-qayd salbī) that it is not an accident of any quiddity, then the principle of the existence of contingent things would be this existence, either without including this negation, or including it. If the principle were this existence without including the negation, then even the vilest of existents would need to share the status of being a principle with the essence of the True—may He be praised and exalted! If however “being a principle” does include the negation, then a negation would be a part of the principle of affirmation (al-thubūt), which is absurd. […]

[145.16] If it is said: why couldn’t this separate (al-mujarrad) existence entail some attribute, the principle of the contingent being existence together with this attribute? We say: the abovementioned dilemma would arise again [when we ask] how existence entails this attribute: the originator (al-muʾaththir) of the entailment would be existence, either including that negation or not.²²

[epistemic problem]

The philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) agreed that the core quiddity (kunh al-māhiyya) of the True—may He be praised—is beyond the intellectual grasp of humans. There are intellectual demonstrations for this. If however existence is conceptually known (maʿlūm al-taṣawwur), whereas the true reality of the True [146]—may He be praised and exalted—is not conceptually known, then the true reality of the True—may He be praised—must be distinct from existence.

If it is said: why can’t that which is unknown about the true reality of the True be His negative conditions (quyūduhu al-salbiyya)? We say: this is wrong, because the negative conditions are known. That is why we can intellectually grasp that His existence is not an accident for any quiddity at all. Moreover the philosophers (al-falāsifa) agreed that what is known about the true reality of the True—may He be praised—are negations and relations.

[two-place predication problem]

It was established in the science of logic that necessity, impossibility, and contingency are modalities (kayfiyyāt) of the relation between predicates and subjects. For instance when we say “Human must be animal,” “human” is the subject and “animal” the predicate, while affirming “animal” of “human” is a relation which is called the copula (al-rābiṭa). Furthermore, necessity is ascribed to this relation, necessity being a modality (kayfiyya) for this relation. This is true and intelligible.

Now that you know this, we say: when we say “The Creator, may He be exalted, must be existent,” “The Creator” is the subject and “existent” is the predicate, while the predication (isnād) of “existent” of this true reality is the copula and necessity is the modality of this relation and copula. This being the case, it makes no sense to affirm the necessity of existence of God, may He be exalted, unless we say that His true reality is distinct from His existence.

[conceivability problem]

The sound intellect testifies that positing something which has no true reality other than pure presence in concrete individuals (mujarrad al-ḥuṣūl fī al-aʿyān) is absurd. Rather the intellect must posit some quiddity and true reality, and then judge that it is present in concrete individuals. But the intellect can on no account accept an existent that has no quiddity or true reality apart from pure presence in concrete individuals.

A further point confirms this better. On the topic of existence the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) raised the following issue: existence is being in concrete individuals itself, not that through which being in concrete individuals occurs. They went on at length trying to confirm and clarify this idea. Hence, if it is affirmed that existence has no true reality apart from pure presence in concrete individuals, whereas presence in concrete individuals can be realized in intellect only once the intellect has posited some quiddity, which it judges to be present in concrete individuals—if this is so, then we have our admission that existence cannot be realized without quiddity. […] [300.17] What gives this [argument] even more strength is the fact that the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) agreed that the nature of existence cannot be grasped intellectually on its own. Rather intellect cannot perceive the meaning of presence in concrete individuals until it posits something that it can judge to be present in concrete individuals.

[priority problem and qua-itself-solution]

The existence of the Necessary Existent is not additional to His quiddity. For if that existence is independent from that quiddity, it is not its attribute. If however it is not independent, than it is contingent in itself requiring what affects [it] (muʾaththir). If the affecting is other than that quiddity, the necessary in itself is necessary through another. If however it is that quiddity, than when necessitating that existence²³ it is either existent or non-existent. (a) The first is absurd, because if it is existent through this existence, than one and the same existence is a condition for itself. If however it is existent thorough another [existence], than the quiddity is existent twice. Moreover, the inquiry about this existence is the same as the one about the former, which yields infinite regress. (b) If however it is not existent, that is also absurd, because if we allow that the non-existent can affect the existent, than we cannot infer from the activity (fāʿiliyya) of God the exalted that He exists, and also because the non-existence’s affecting the existent is clearly wrong.

Response: Why is it impossible that the affecting is the quiddity without the condition of existence (lā bi-sharṭ al-wujūd)? Omitting existence on the level of the concept (ʿan darajat al-iʿtibār) does not entail the occurrence of non-existence in it, since quiddity as such is neither existent, nor non-existent (al-māhiyya min ḥaythu hiya hiya lā mawjūda wa-lā maʿdūma). This is precisely as they say concerning the contingent, that its quiddity is receptive (qābila) of existence without the condition of other existence, otherwise infinite regress would obtain. It does not follow either that the object which receives existence is non-existent, otherwise it would follow that one and the same thing is both existent and non-existent at the same time.

What further indicates that the existence of the Necessary Existent is additional to His quiddity, is the fact that His existence is known, yet His quiddity is unknown, whereas the known is different from the unknown.

[Avicenna’s arguments in support of the Ashʿarite position]

We say: the existence of the Creator, the exalted, cannot be different from His true reality. Otherwise [76] a second-order [existence] that occurs to that true reality would render it [sc. the first-order existence] subsistent. Yet everything which subsists through something else is contingent in itself. Hence the existence of the Creator, the exalted, would be contingent with regard to what it is (li-mā huwa huwa). But everything contingent has a cause, so there would be a cause for the existence of God the exalted, and this cause would be His true reality, which is absurd. Therefore, the existence of God and His true reality are one and the same. For we have already shown that all contingents go back to it. But nothing can make anything else necessary without existing: so [if God’s essence caused His existence] the existence of [His] true reality would precede His necessitation of His own existence, and then His existence would be prior to His existence.

In fact His true reality is distinct from the true reality of the contingent. For, if He shared [His true reality with the contingent], it would be contingent. Similarly, His existence is distinct from the existence of the created in all respects. When one says that the Creator shares existence with the contingent, you should know that He shares only the name [of existence]. [77] This is the teaching of our master Abū Ḥasan [al-Ashʿarī], which arises from the rejection of [the theory of] states (aḥwāl). The fact that the exalted can be seen arises, in turn, from the fact that He is existent.

[solutions to the causation problem]

Why can’t one say that this existence [sc. God’s] is independent from that quiddity? [308] [Avicenna’s] answer is, “if it were independent from it, it would subsist in itself and would not be an attribute of that quiddity.” We say: don’t you claim that the form is the cause for the existence of matter, even though form inheres in matter? That which is a cause for the existence of something is independent from the effect in its existence. Hence form is independent in its existence from matter, even though form inheres in matter. So why can’t one say that that existence is independent from that quiddity, and that, despite being independent from it, it inheres in it?

This idea can be confirmed in two ways. First, one might say that even if existence in itself is independent from that quiddity, nonetheless it [i.e. the existence] is still the cause for its being inherent in that quiddity. On this assumption, existence would inhere in quiddity despite being independent from it. Or one might say that that quiddity renders it necessary that that existence is inherent in that quiddity. Both options are possible. Neither undermines existence’s being inherent in the quiddity while also being independent from it. In these two ways we allowed that the form is the cause for the existence of matter, even though the form is inherent in matter. A second possible response would be to concede that, on the assumption that the occurrence of that existence in that quiddity is necessary, existence would have to be dependent on that quiddity. And it would follow from existence’s being dependent on the quiddity that the existence is contingent.

We say, however, that there is a proof against attributing contingency to existence. It amounts to saying: the contingent existent is that whose true reality is not prevented from occurring together with existence sometimes, and with non-existence at other times. But the intellect cannot apply this idea to what holds true of existence. For if we said that the quiddity of existence sometimes occurs with existence and sometimes with non-existence, it would follow that on one assumption a further existence would be attributed to [existence], and on the other assumption that non-existence would be attributed to it. All this is absurd, in the first case because it would imply the gathering of two existences for one and the same thing—and also, neither of them [309] would be more apt to be the subject of attribution while the other is the attribute, instead of the other way around. The second case entails a combination of existence and non-existence, and this is absurd. Thus it is established that it is absurd to describe existence as being contingently either existent or non-existent.

[rejection of increase and diminution in existence]

That existence does not admit of intensification and diminution (al-ishtidād wa-al-tanaqquṣ) in [its] true reality: for after intensification either something originates or not. If the first is the case, the one that originates now is other than the one that was present [80r] before, so it is not the intensification of one and the same existence. Rather what results from this is that another thing alongside [the first one] has originated. If the second is the case, then it does not intensify either, but rather remains as it was. The same goes for diminution. Nonetheless someone might still imagine intensification and diminution, the reason for which will be mentioned—if God wills—in the chapter on motion.

[analogy of existence accepted]

Existence is unequally predicated of what falls under it, since the necessary is more appropriate in terms of existence than the contingent, and among contingent things substance is more appropriate in terms of existence than accident. Yet nothing that is predicated of what falls under it unequally is a genus for what falls under it, because there cannot be any disparity (al-tafāwut) in the quiddity or its constituents.

[the problem of two aspects]

One might say on their behalf that, if His existence were an effect of His quiddity and His quiddity were the agent cause for that existence, it would follow that something simple is both passive and active (qābilan wa-fāʿilan), but this is absurd.

Response: all this is shown to be false by the [case] of the necessary concomitants of quiddity. For quiddities entail them and are the subjects described by them. Moreover, their proof is invalid on their own principles, [since they hold] that God the exalted knows the objects of knowledge. For according to them, knowledge comes down to the presence of the form of that which is intellectually grasped in the one who does the grasping. Hence, the intellectual grasp of [the objects of knowledge] entails the presence of their forms in His essence. Therefore, His essence both receives such forms and is their agent [cause]. In any case, we will demonstrate later that one and the same thing can be both receptive and efficient.

[Avicenna’s argument accepted]

Nor is [existence] among the accidents that are necessitated by the quiddity itself, like the angles of triangle. For cause precedes effect in existence, and if the quiddity were in itself the cause of existence, then it would have an existence before existence, [221] which is absurd. Hence, the existence of the necessary existent is always identical to its quiddity. As for the bodies and their accidents, their existence is distinct from their quiddity, so that they are contingent and require a preponderator (murajjiḥ). Furthermore, if the Necessary Existent is pure existence, then there is nothing necessary other than Him, given that one of them would have to be existence plus something additional in order that they might be distinguished, but then it would be the effect of the distinguishing feature.²⁴

[Avicenna’s argument rejected]

In other books [cf. T35], we pursued the path of certain great [thinkers], holding that the existence of the Necessary Existent cannot be other than His quiddity. For the quiddity can be the cause of some of its own attributes just as triangle is for its angles. However, it cannot be the cause of its own existence [205] such that it would exist before existence, and the existence that would be the attribute of the quiddity would not be necessary, since it is clear that everything accidental is contingent. Thus anything whose existence is distinct from its quiddity is contingent.

Criticism: this is sheer dialectic (iqnāʿī). For one can say that in the same way, the existence that is predicated of quiddities is accidental. The existence of everything accidental is posterior to the existence of quiddity, and likewise the attribute (al-ṣifa). Hence, the quiddity has to be existent before existence, but this is absurd. The adjudication (al-qusṭās) has established that existence is not additional to the existent in concrete individuals, so that both foundations of the argument are destroyed.

[contingency of individuation argument]

I say, as from the throne: if one distinguishes His existence from His quiddity in the mind, then nothing of the quiddity will ever exist, so long as its existence is impossible in virtue of itself (li-ʿaynihi). But if something of it does come to exist, then [the following problem will arise:] any universal has other particular instances that are grasped in the mind, and that are not ruled out as impossible by their quiddity but only by some hindrance (li-māniʿ), and they will be contingent and form an infinite set. You have learned that whenever there arise particulars that belong to a universal, there still remains some contingency. Hence, if what arises is the Necessary Existent, and it has an existence beyond [its] quiddity, and if [the quiddity] is taken as a universal, then the existence of other particular instances for it would be intrinsically (li-dhātihā) possible. For if [their] existence were excluded due to the quiddity, then what was posited as necessary would be impossible, which is absurd. The height of absurdity (ghāya mā) would be the case where they are excluded by something other than the quiddity itself, so that [the Necessary Existent] would become contingent in itself.

Question: Or perhaps it is necessary [that He be this particular]? Response: The particular instances of a universal quiddity, in addition to those that have occurred, are contingent, as stated before. Hence they are not necessary. If something is contingent with respect to its quiddity, then the Necessary Existent becomes contingent too in respect of His quiddity, which is absurd. Thus, if there is something necessary in existence, then it possesses no quiddity [206] apart from existence such that the mind could distinguish between two items [i.e. quiddity and existence]. It is pure, unadulterated existence (al-wujūd al-ṣarf al-baḥt), with no admixture of specificity or commonality. Everything other than it is its shining (lamʿa) or the shining of its shining. [The Necessary Existent] is distinguished only by Its perfection (bi-kamālihi), since all of it is existence and it is all existence (kullahu al-wujūd wa-kull al-wujūd).

Question: Universal existence [also] includes contingent particulars; doesn’t it [also] need to be completed in the way just described? Answer: Whenever you postulate pure existence, than which nothing is more complete, you see upon reflection that it is just itself (fa-huwa huwa), since there is no distinguishing feature in a pure thing. What has an admixture to [pure existence] is not necessary in the aforementioned way, since that which the mind can analyze into existence and quiddity is not among the things that rules out anything accidental, and that excludes any participation (al-sharika). How else given that [the composite of essence and existence] necessarily fall under one of the categories (al-maqūlāt)? These are inspired teachings of the throne. Thus the Necessary Existent is not rendered multiple in any way, and there are not two necessary existents.

[Avicenna’s argument rejected and the contingency of individuation argument]

This [Avicenna’s argument] goes through only if is established that existence is additional to quiddities and has a form in concrete individuals (ṣūra fī al-aʿyān), in order that [Avicenna’s] argument may be based on [this premise]: “If [existence] is additional, it is not necessary [391] in itself. Otherwise, it would not subsist through another. But quiddity cannot entail its own existence.” However, if one takes existence as something merely conceptual (amran iʿtibāriyyan), then it has no concrete being (huwiyya) in concrete individuals, nor any cause among them. Then this way of arguing will not stand. Furthermore, concerning his statement that if an accidental (ʿaraḍī) existence were necessary in itself, it would not come to (ʿaraḍa) the quiddity, one may ask “why did you say that it would not come to the quiddity?” He will respond, “because if it comes to it, it will subsist through (bi-) the quiddity,” and what he would mean by “it will subsist through the quiddity” is that existence would exist in the quiddity. And we would even acknowledge that the existence would be subsistent, that is, would exist, which would lead to an impossible infinite regress.

But if someone wants to make it more plausible that this way of arguing stands, maybe they ought to say that if existence is additional to the quiddity, then the quiddity would fall under a category, according to the classification given above. […] [391.12] All the accidental categories have subsistence through another, while substances require specifying factors (al-mukhaṣṣiṣāt), or at least some of them do.²⁵ But if contingency is rightly applied to what falls under a given genus, it applies to that genus in its nature. For if the nature of the genus excluded contingency, then given that whatever is impossible for the nature of genus is impossible for the nature of the species [that falls under the genus], it could not be conceived as applying contingently to that species. This is so even if one takes the nature of genus to be merely conceptual. For [392] insofar as “being a stone” is impossible for animality—even for someone who takes the latter to be merely conceptual—it is impossible for the species that fall under it. So what is impossible for the genus is also considered so for the species, and likewise for the necessary, if [the necessity] is by the nature [of the genus] and does not occur [to the genus] because it is in the mind. If the accidental categories and the species that fall under the category of substance depend on other things, then contingency must belong to at least some [species] that fall under substance and to all the remaining categories. Hence, if the Necessary Existent fell under any category, some sort of contingency in respect of genus would befall Him, so that He would not be necessary but would rather be contingent, which is absurd. Given however that He does not fall under any category, He cannot have both a quiddity and existence. Rather His existence must be His quiddity. This is not so for any bodies or forms of bodies (hayʾātuhā). For their existence is additional to the quiddity, even if it is taken as merely conceptual. Therefore, these quiddities, which are additional to existence (whether or not existence is merely conceptual), are contingent due to the contingency that applies to the genus of any category, at least according to the classification mentioned above, so that they require a preponderator (murajjiḥ). As for the quiddity of the Necessary Existent, according to the approach famously adopted by the Peripatetics, it is existence. What is an attribute (whether conceptual or not) in other things is in His case His quiddity in Himself. In no other case apart from Him is existence identical to concrete being (wujūd ʿayn al-huwiyya), no matter whether existence is merely conceptual or not. According to the people who have a theory of merely conceptual attributes (aṣḥāb al-iʿtibārāt), however, there is no existence in concrete individuals other than Him.²⁶

[all attributes are relational or negational; the problem of two aspects]

The Necessary Existent is described by no attribute. For no attribute can be necessarily existent, since it subsists in its subject of inherence. Furthermore, how could the attribute and its possessor both be necessarily existent, given that as we have shown, there are no two necessary beings in existence. Nor can He possess an attribute that is contingent, since it would require a preponderator. If His essence were its preponderator, than it would in itself be both active and passive (yafʿalu wa-yaqbalu), and would thus have two aspects, activity and passivity. Yet the aspect of being active is distinct from the aspect of [60] being passive. [For instance] if one of us washes his head, then he performs an act by virtue of himself and the motion of his hand, while his head is passive. However, from what has preceded it is ruled out that the Necessary Existent is composed out of two aspects, passive and active. Hence He possesses no attribute, apart from negations like holiness, unity and being peace. For these attributes come down to the negation of the attributes of deficiency and incompleteness and to the negation of division. He also possesses relative attributes like being a principle and being Creator.²⁷

[analysis of Avicenna’s position in Mubāḥathāt]

We have to explain the statement of the one among the recent thinkers (mutaʾakhkhirīn) that the quiddity of the First is transcendent above (aʿlā) the necessity of existence. Rather it is a quiddity with no name (lā ism lahā). If [that quiddity] is grasped intellectually, then the fact that it is necessarily existent necessarily follows it in the intellect. The meaning of his statement that “it is transcendent above the necessity of existence [394] but this follows it necessarily in the intellect” is that we cannot conceptualize the necessity of existence without composition (tarkīb), so that existence would have one meaning (mafhūm) and necessity another. As for existence, whose necessity is the perfection of its existence, it is simple and we have no name to refer to anything that might suit its perfection and simplicity. This composition that arises in respect of the meaning of this composite notion [sc. “necessary existent”] is just one of its necessary concomitants. If the interpretation [of what he said] is not like this, he will have no argument for the unity of the necessary existent, neither the one based on the fact that if something’s being (anniyya) is identical to its quiddity, then it cannot be enumerated; nor this other argument that has just been mentioned. For if one makes necessity of existence a necessary concomitant, and there can be participation in it, while it is an intellectually grasped necessary concomitant, then one and the same necessary concomitant can belong to different objects, as explained above, especially if it is an intellectually grasped concomitant.

[perfection pertains to God without a cause]

One should not posit, between two necessary existents that agree in quiddity, a difference in respect of perfection and deficiency (li-kamāliyya wa-naqṣ), in the way mentioned above. For if perfection belongs to a common quiddity without any cause, still the occurrence of deficiency must require a cause, which would be classified as efficient, receptive, or individuating. Hence there is no necessary existent other than the perfect, and everything else is contingent.

[God’s existence is distinct from other kinds of existence in terms of perfection]

The doubt whose solution led them into confusion is this: the Necessary Existent shares the meaning of existence with the existence of [contingent] quiddities. Hence there must be something which distinguishes Him from the existence [of these quiddities], but then His essence is an effect of the distinguishing factor. The issue here is simple, once one understands the guidelines set out above. But they give an incorrect response, saying that His necessity is only a negation (salb) of His having a cause, so that His being necessary existent just means that He has no cause. For one thing, the fact that He has no cause is in fact consequent (tābiʿ) upon the necessity of existence rather than being the same as the necessity of existence. Furthermore, one can ask: insofar as the existence of the Necessary Existent shares the meaning of existence with the existence of quiddities, is the fact that He has no cause due to the meaning of existence in itself, or due to something additional [397] to it? If it is due to the meaning of existence in itself, then no existence should have a cause! If however it is due to something additional to it (no matter whether this additional feature is “necessity” or anything else), then multiplicity necessarily arises in His essence, which is absurd.

The only answer here, and the only way to solve the doubt at all, is to acknowledge that there can be a distinction between two things in respect of perfection and deficiency (al-kamāliyya wa-al-naqṣ), as mentioned above. In concrete individuals, perfection is nothing additional to the thing. The meaning of the necessity of existence is nothing but the perfection of existence. Even someone who says that existence does not differ in terms of strength and weakness (bi-al-shadda wa-al-ḍuʿf), but only in one of three ways—in terms of necessity and contingency, priority and posteriority, or being cause and being effect—still cannot deny what we have mentioned, namely the inevitability of a difference (ikhtilāf) in respect of perfection, through which we established the distinction between things. Indeed, if he investigates the meaning of necessity in the Necessary Existent this is precisely what he will find.²⁸

[God is the “living”; rejection of Avicenna’s position based on the doubt argument]

Question: did not you say that He is the pure existence itself?

Answer: by this we meant only “the existent for itself” (mawjūd ʿinda nafsihi), which is “the living” (al-ḥayy), since this is among the proper characteristics of the “living.” Nothing exists for the “non-living,” whether it is itself or something else. Unless something is “living” there is no realization of the meaning of “existence itself.”

As for existence being a concrete quiddity (māhiyyatan ʿayniyyatan), this is not so. When you understand what a concrete quiddity of existence (ʿayn māhiyyat al-wujūd) is, you remain in doubt whether it is realized as concrete and exists; hence, an additional existence belongs to it, and this yields an infinite regress. To know that something is a necessary existent does not amount to the same thing as knowing that it is existence itself.²⁹

[causation problem and the problem of two aspects]

This argument [sc. Avicenna’s argument for the identity of God’s essence and existence] is weak, because one can ask: what is there to prevent the existence which is additional to the quiddity to be necessary in itself?

You say: because [existence] would stand in need of the quiddity, and that which stands in need of something else is not necessary in itself. We however do not concede that the necessary in itself stands in need of nothing else. Rather it is that which stands in no need of a productive efficient cause (muʾaththir fāʿil). Nothing is to prevent its necessitating itself (mūjiban li-nafsihi), even if it does stand in need of something receptive (al-qābil). For in the case of that which is an efficient cause and necessitates through itself, its productivity (taʾthīr) may depend on something receptive—regardless of whether it is to entail itself or something extrinsic to it through itself. This is like what the philosopher (al-faylasūf) says about the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl): through itself it necessitates substantial forms and humans souls, even though what it entails through itself depends on the existence of receptive matter.

Even if we concede that it must be contingent, we have not yet conceded that the true reality of the contingent is standing in need of something productive. Rather the contingent is that which stands in need of something else. Needing something else is more general than needing something productive, since the former might obtain in the case of needing a receptive essence (al-dhāt al-qābila).

Even if we concede that there must be something productive, how do you rule out that it is [God’s] essence itself that produces [His existence]? They say that it would be both receptive and active. True, but why do you rule this out in the case of something that is simple and one? For “reception” and “act” fall under relations or associations, and nothing prevents various relations being ascribed to something simple and one. For instance one may describe unity (al-waḥda), which is the principle of the number, as half of two, as a third of three, as a fourth of four, etc.

[257] One could ask the philosopher (al-faylasūf) in particular: why can’t being receptive and being active be understood as two attributes (bi-iʿtibār ṣifāt) that would imply neither numerical plurality or multiplicity in the essence of the simple and one, nor any infinite regress? Just as you say about the coming forth (ṣudūr) of multiplicity from the first effect of the essence of the Necessary Existent. For you say that what comes forth from it is an intellect, a soul, and a body, namely the body of the outmost sphere. [These come forth] only through the numerically plural conceptual features (bi-iʿtibārāt), since according to you only one can come forth from one. If however these conceptual features are existing attributes and truly real, then you have abandoned your doctrine that only one comes forth from one. If on the other hand these conceptual features are not existing attributes, they will imply neither multiplicity nor an infinite regress. Why then cannot one and the same essence be both receptive and active, as with these conceptual features?

[priority problem]

As for the second aspect of the proof that essence cannot be productive, there is no way out of it. Otherwise, one would allow that a [causal] chain of temporally originated things goes back to something that is neither existent nor non-existent (laysa bi- mawjūd wa-lā maʿdūm). Hence the statement that the Necessary Existent is existent³⁰ would be invalid.

The only way to deal with this argument is to limit the discussion to the aforementioned difficulties.

If someone says: just as you denied that essence can produce existence, because of the problem that existence would stand in need of another existence, so you [must] deny that essence receives existence, because that which receives existence must be existent, so here too another existence would be needed for its existence. We say: we do not concede the inference from “the efficient cause of existence must exist” to “that which receives existence exists.” Rather, the condition is that it be metaphysically real (thābit), where “metaphysically real” is more general than “existent.”³¹

[The Knower is identical to His existence]

By the notion “the knower through himself” we mean something whose being knowledgeable, essence, and its existence are all one and the same.³²

[all intellect is one]

However, the soul that has an intellect in act (ʿāqil bi-fiʿl) is one, and there is no plurality and multiplicity within it. If we posit a hundred or more particular, human individuals, all of whom are called “knowing”—in the sense that each of them can be considered to have a complete portion of the intelligibles of certainty (yaqīnī), not the objects of imagination and estimation—then these individuals will all be one through intellect, no matter how many they may be. No difference or distinction can enter into that which is certain.

Since we are no longer in any doubt that the intellect’s unity is not nullified by the existence of a multiplicity of individuals, surely the nullification of the individuals’ multiplicity cannot necessitate the nullification of the intellect’s unity. The fact that the intellect is one, even though those with intellect can be many, has been explained in the treatise The Rungs (Madārij).

[intellect is existence]

The intellect has no essence distinct from its existence, such that we might say, “the intellect is an existent.” Rather, the intellect is itself existence. When we say that the intellect is an existent, this is like saying “existence is an existent.” In addition, intellect’s existence is its knowing and awareness. This is not like the existence of human individuals, for the existence of human individuals is not the individuals’ knowing. Rather, human individuals may exist without knowing, but intellect’s existence is knowing itself.

[God as universal essence]

The “universal meaning (maʿnā-yi kullī)” encompasses all meanings, the “universal essence (dhāt-i kullī)” encompasses all essences, and the “universal reality (ḥaqīqat-i kullī)” encompasses all realities. So the meanings, essences, and realities are the meaning, essence, and reality of existence, and this is existence through self (wujūd bi-khūd). The knower of this existence is none other than the universal meaning, essence, and reality. It knows through itself, its existence is from its own existence, and its existence is its knowledge of self.

[an original argument against equating God with existence]

The existence of the Necessary in itself is additional to Its quiddity too. For otherwise, the Necessary in itself would be either (a) a concrete existence (al-wujūd al-muʿayyin), that is, a species and a specificity (al-khāṣṣiyya), or (b) existence qua existence. (a) The first is wrong. For concrete existence is compounded out of univocal existence and concretization (al-taʿayyun). Hence it would be composite (murakkab) and would require parts that are not identical to it; but that which requires something else is contingent in itself. (b) The second is wrong too. For if existence were necessary in itself, it would not in itself require anything else. If this were the case, then it would not inhere in the quiddity of blackness and whiteness. […]

[accepting al-Rāzī’s solution to the priority problem]

[34r24] If someone says: if existence were additional to the quiddity, then existence would somehow require something else, otherwise it would not inhere in it. Yet in this case it would be contingent in itself and there would be a cause for it. If this cause is identical to the quiddity, it follows that it is prior to existence in existence, but if the cause is not identical to it, then the Necessary in itself would require something else in its existence, which is absurd. We say: we do not concede the implication that [God’s quiddity] has to be prior in existence (bi-al-wujūd). Why can’t it be prior in its essence (bi-dhātihā), but not in existence? Existence would then be necessary through [that] essence. If someone says: the cause that produces (muʾaththira) existence must be prior in existence, we say: we do not admit this. Rather, the cause that produces the existence of something that does not exist in itself but rather through another, has to be prior to it in existence. But as for the quiddity the existence of which pertains to it in itself, and which entails existence, why cannot it be prior to existence, [34v] but not [prior] in existence?

[solution to al-Rāzī’s arguments against the equivalence of God and existence]

The famous doctrine of the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) is that the existence of the Necessary in itself is identical to His quiddity (despite the participation of all existents in existence), and is different from other [cases of existence] by a negative condition (bi-qayd salbī), namely “not belonging (ʿāriḍ) to any quiddity.” The Imām [al-Rāzī]—may God have mercy upon him—disproved this in several ways. […]

[34v.32] As for the first [the univocity problem, see T23], we do not concede that if existence entails neither feature [that is, in itself needs neither to be separate from quiddity nor to be together with quiddity], then one of the two features is attached to it through a cause. This would follow only if “being separate” (al-tajarrud) required a cause. For being separate just means not belonging (ʿadam al-ʿurūḍ) to quiddity, [35r] and this happens in His case simply because there is no cause for belonging. […]

[35r.2] As for the third [the two-place prediction problem, see T27] we say: we do not concede that the necessity of existence is the modality (kayfiyya) of the relation between existence and His essence. Rather the necessity of existence is identical to His essence in our theory.

As for the fourth [the principle problem, see T25], we say: why could the productive [principle] not be existence under the condition that it does not belong to quiddity (bi-sharṭ ʿadam ʿurūḍihi li-al-māhiyya), so that this “not [belonging]” would be a part of the complete cause (al-ʿilla al-tāmma)? There is nothing to prevent this.

As for the fifth [another version of the univocity problem], we say: we do not concede that if the existence [of the Necessary] were self-sufficient in itself, then each existence would share with the Necessary Existent the fact that it is self-sufficient. For it is possible that existence is self-sufficient in itself, even though a concrete existence is in need of something, where this need arises due to the concrete insofar as it is concrete, not due to the nature of existence.

What invalidates their doctrine is the argument that we mentioned: that if the Necessary in itself were concrete, then given that the concrete is compounded out of what is shared and what is different, It would be compounded and [therefore] contingent in itself.

[against modulation of existence]

Some of them claimed that existence is subject to intensification and diminution (al-ishtidād wa-al-tanaqquṣ) and that the Necessary in itself is the utmost (aqwā) among existents. This is wrong, since [in that case] the Necessary in itself would be compounded out of a univocal measure (al-qadr al-mushtarak) along with some addition (al-ziyāda), so that He would be compounded out of two things and would therefore be contingent in Himself …

[against the Suhrawardian theory that God is existence]

[35r.32] As for [al-Suhrawardī’s] claim that the existence shared in common is among the merely intellectually grasped concepts, whereas the existence of the Necessary in itself is identical to His quiddity [see T37], this entails that common existence does not belong to that one existent which is necessary in itself. It follows then [35v] that there is an instance of existence that is not included within the nature of existence, which is absurd. […]

[35v.4] [As for his argument from the contingency of particular instances, see T37], we say: we do not concede to this, because the relation [of the divine quiddity] to [one] extramental [particular] can be more appropriate (awlā) [than to imaginable particulars]. Even if we accept that [God’s essence] cannot be analyzed in the mind into quiddity and existence, still, why does it follow from this that His existence is identical to His quiddity? For His existence might be additional to His quiddity, even though the mind cannot analyze it into quiddity and existence, because [God’s] quiddity cannot be grasped intellectually at all. On what basis do you deny this?³³

[analogy of existence as a solution to the univocity problem]

Existence applies to the necessary and contingent analogically (bi-al-tashkīk). For it is predicated of both of them in the sense that it is opposed to non-existence, and non-existence always means the same thing, so that what opposes it always means the same thing too. Otherwise it would be a false dichotomy when we say that a thing is either existent or non-existent. Hence, if [existence] is predicated with this single meaning, yet belongs above all (awlā) to the necessary, it applies analogically.

If you say: if existence were predicated of both of them with one and the same meaning, then if common existence (al-wujūd al-ʿāmm) needs to be specified as necessary existence, all existence would be like this; if on the other hand it does not need to be thus specified, the necessity of existence would be due to a cause. We say: common existence does not obtain in concrete individuals, only in the mind.

If you say: if being separate (al-tajarrud) [from any quiddity] is necessary for the nature of existence, then every existence is separate. Otherwise, the fact that the necessary existent is separate is due to an extrinsic cause, which is absurd. We say: no, rather it is separate due to the specificity of the essence of existence (khuṣūṣiyyat dhāt al-wujūd) through which it differs from other existences. Besides, existence is a concept (iʿtibār) different from the concept [42r] of the existent, precisely as the concept of non-existence is different from the concept of the non-existent.

[Does God’s quiddity have a concrete being distinct from existence?]

The existence of everything that is necessary in itself is identical to its quiddity. For if its existence were distinct from its quiddity, the existence either must either be (a) realized through the quiddity, or (b) through something else. (a) If it is realized through the quiddity, then a distinct concrete being (huwiyya) would belong to the quiddity, through which the existence would be necessitated. But every concrete being through which something else is necessitated possesses a distinct existence. Hence the quiddity would possess an existence distinct from its own existence, which is a contradiction. (b) If however [existence] is realized through something other than [the quiddity], than the necessary in itself would require something else for its existence, which is absurd. Hence, the existence of what is necessary in itself is identical to its quiddity. […]

[solving the univocity problem [T23] with the difference between two kinds of existence]

[151v.4] We say: we do not concede that if both options [i.e. being separate from any quiddity or not being separate] were through a cause, then the separation of the Necessary Existent would be through something else. Rather it is the separation of existence [from any quiddity] that is through something else, so that existence as such requires something else in order to be separated [from any quiddity]. However, the fact that existence requires something else in order to be separated does not imply that the Necessary Existent requires something else in order to be separated. For that which is necessary in itself is not just existence [as such]. Rather it is just a concrete individual existence (wujūd muʿayyin shakhṣī), which is distinct from existence itself. Thus, [in the case of God] the separation of the existence itself [from any quiddity] would be due to this concrete existence; there is nothing to prevent this.

If it is said: if the existence of what is necessary in itself were identical to the quiddity, but existence is connected to contingent quiddities, then the quiddity of what is necessary in itself would be connected to the contingent, which is a contradiction. We say: we do not concede that the quiddity of what is necessary in itself would be connected to the contingent, because its quiddity is the separate existence (al-wujūd al-mujarrad), and that existence by itself (wujūd bi-ʿaynihi) is not connected to the contingent quiddities. Rather the existence that is connected to the contingent quiddities is specific existences (wujūdāt khāṣṣiyya). They are distinct from separate existence while sharing existence itself (nafs al-wujūd) with it, in the sense that whenever you take the quiddity [of existence] as such [from] whichever individual instance of existence, the result in the mind will be one and the same thing.

[God’s perfect existence; cf. T41]

If it is said: if the existence of what is necessary in itself were identical to its quiddity, then the necessary in itself would share its quiddity with other existences and differ from them through a specifying feature (bi-khuṣūṣiyya). But that which gives rise to sharing is distinct from that which gives rise to differentiation, so that a composition in its quiddity would necessarily follow. Hence, the necessary in itself would be necessary through another. We say: we do not concede that any composition in its essence follows. It would follow only if existence did not accept [152r] perfection and weakness (qābilan li-al-kamāl wa-al-ḍuʿf). If it does accept perfection and weakness, then [the necessary existence] differs from another through the fact that it is the most perfect existence. The most perfect existence does not include any specific feature whose quiddity would be different from the quiddity of existence. Hence, existence is predicated of a more perfect and a weaker, even though, when the intellect grasps existence as such, the result in the intellect is just one thing.

If it is said: the fact that the necessary in itself is distinct from another cannot obtain due to perfection of existence, for if it were distinct from another through the perfection of existence, the perfection of existence would be either through existence itself or through something else. If it were through existence itself, then every existence would be perfect. If it were through something else, then the necessary in itself would require something else for the perfection of existence. We say: we do not concede that if [the perfection] were through something else, then the Necessary in itself would require something else for the perfection of existence. Rather existence itself (nafs al-wujūd) requires something else for its perfection, namely the non-existence of any reason for weakness (ʿadam sabab al-ḍuʿf). For a weaker existence arises through some reason, whereas the existence that has no reason is the most perfect of existences.³⁴

[rejection of Rāzī’s solution to the priority problem]

If [the cause of God’s existence] were that quiddity itself, then it would be prior in existence to existence, since a cause that produces something (al-ʿilla al-muʾaththira fī al-shayʾ) must be prior to it in existence. […] [282.5] If it is said: we do not concede that a cause that produces something must be prior in existence to [its] product (athar). Why can’t that quiddity produce existence insofar as it is quiddity (min ḥaythu hiya hiya)? […] [282.19] We say: because existence comes forth (yaṣdiru) from that which makes existence (al-mūjid li-al-wujūd), and that from which existence comes forth is doubtless existent before its existence [sc. the existence it produces].

[another solution to the univocity problem]

We do not concede that there must be some [further] reason (sabab) for that through which there is a distinction [between the existence of God and other cases of existence]. This would only be so if it were something existing (amran wujūdiyyan). But in fact necessary existence differs from any other existence through a negative condition (bi-qayd salbī), namely “its not being accidental to any quiddity.” […]

[283.9] [The univocity problem would only follow] if [God] were “existence itself.” But in fact the necessary in itself is an individual existence, with the condition (al-wujūd al-shakhṣī al-muqayyad) that it is not accidental for any quiddity.³⁵

[analogy as a solution to the composition problem in al-Shahrastanī]

The upshot of [al-Shahrastānī’s] argument is that existence entails a composition of its divisions, [even] on the assumption that it is analogical (mushakkikan). […] [63.14] The truth is that, if he understood the meaning of analogy, he would realize that the referents of analogical [predication] fall under the class of accidents. Hence, when an [analogical term] includes divisions, it does not imply the composition of [its] divisions, because simple things need not be composed just on the basis that they share accidents.

[two kinds of existence]

According to Avicenna, the shared existence that is divided into necessary and contingent is not identical to the existence of the necessary in itself. Yet the former [i.e. shared existence] is an accident of the latter [i.e. necessary existence] and of other existents as well. The shared [existence] that applies to the necessary does differ from that which applies to other things, because unlike in other cases, it is not accidental for [His] quiddity. In saying that “the common existence and the specific are one and the same in the reality of God,” Avicenna intends that the portion (ḥiṣṣa) of shared [existence] that is specific to Him differs from the nature of existence only through the privation (ʿadam) of being accidental to another. Its common [aspect], that is, the nature of existence as such insofar as the notion of commonality can apply³⁶ to it, and the portion specific to the necessary, are one and the same in reality, because what is added to that nature is something non-existent (amr ʿadamī).

[against multiplicity in relational attributes]

He [sc. al-Shahrastānī] thinks that if different respects (ḥaythiyyāt) pertain to a single thing due to its relation to different things that are distinct from it, then this thing is comprised from many [items]. This is wrong. [72] For a point has aspects (jihāt) in relation to the whole infinite number of points that are other than it in existence. Yet it does not follow from this that it contains an infinite number of items.

[response to T29: receiving and producing existence are not parallel]

This objection [i.e. that there is a parallel between two kinds of priority of essence over existence: as producing and as receiving] is a teaching of [al-Rāzī’s] which he also proclaims in his other books. [Indeed] there is no doubt that quiddity as such (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) is neither existent nor non-existent. Indeed, it as such can even be the cause of an attribute intellectually ascribed to it, as the quiddity of two is the cause of being even. Yet, as for the notion that it as such is the cause of existence or of an existent, this is absurd. For the intellect clearly judges [98] that the cause of existence has to be existent. But it is not like this in the case of receiving existence (qubūl al-wujūd). For what receives existence cannot be existent. Otherwise that which is [already] arising for it would arise for it [again].³⁷

[against knowability argument]

As for his argument to the effect that [God’s] existence is additional to His quiddity on the basis that His existence is known, whereas His quiddity is unknown, this is incorrect. For the existence that is known is the one that He shares with other things. It is something grasped intellectually that applies to Him and to other things analogically. By contrast, that which is unknown is His extramental existence which is specific for Him, subsists by itself, and cannot be predicated of anything else.

[the modulation theory]

The origin of this mistake is [al-Rāzī’s] ignorance of what it means to apply analogically. Applying to different things analogically is not applying to them equivocally (bi-al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī), the way the word ʿayn applies to the different things it can mean. Rather it applies to all with a single meaning. Nor however does it apply in an equal way, as “human” to its individual instances. Rather it applies differently, either in terms of priority and posteriority, as “continuous” is applied to magnitude and to body possessing magnitude; or in terms of appropriateness (awlawiyya) and the lack thereof, as “one” is applied to what cannot be divided at all, and to that which can be divided in some respect apart from the respect in which it is one; or in terms of intensity and weakness (al-shadda wa-al-ḍuʿf), as “whiteness” applies to snow and ivory.

Existence encompasses all these kinds of difference. For it applies to cause and effect in terms of priority and posteriority; to substance and accident in terms of appropriateness and the lack thereof; and to that which is stable (qārr) and that which is not (for instance blackness or motion) in terms of intensity and weakness. Furthermore it applies to the necessary and the contingent in all three ways.

When one and the same meaning is unequally predicated of different things, it cannot be the quiddity or a part of the quiddity of these things. For the quiddity cannot be different, nor can its parts. Rather [a analogical term] is an extrinsic accident, but may be either concomitant or separable. For instance, whiteness is unequally predicated of white snow and white ivory. Yet it is neither quiddity for them nor a part of their quiddities. Rather it is an extrinsic necessary concomitant. For there are a potentially infinite number of species of a color between its two opposed extremes, which have no [573] distinct name, though to each group [of shades] applies one name analogically, like whiteness, redness, and blackness. This meaning applies to that group not as a constituent (muqawwim) but as a necessary concomitant (lāzim).

In the same way existence applies to the existence of the necessary and to the existence of contingent things which differ in their concrete being (al-huwiyyāt), and for which no distinct names obtain. I do not say [that existence applies analogically] to the contingent quiddities, but rather to the existences of those quiddities, that is, it applies to them too as an extrinsic necessary concomitant and not as a constituent.

Once this is ascertained (taqarrara), all of the difficulties of that excellent man [i.e. al-Rāzī] are already solved. For existence applies to what falls under it with the same meaning, as the philosophers taught. This does not however imply the equality the subjects of concomitance, namely the existence of the Necessary and the existences of the contingent, in their true reality. For different true realities can share the same necessary concomitant.

[solving al-Rāzī’s arguments against the identification of God with existence]

Now, I will present the various problems he posed, and indicate the ways of solving them. […]

[574.1] [On the univocity problem; see [T23] above] the answer is what you have learned above. Consider light, which is shared and applies unequally to different lights, given that sunlight enables a [formerly] unseeing person to see, unlike other lights; or similarly heat, which is common yet in some cases entails aptness for life or aptness for a change of specific form, unlike other cases of heat. This is because the subjects that have fire and heat as concomitants are different in quiddity.

Moreover even if existence were [predicated] equally, as he thinks, then [the existence] that is in need of a cause to entail its accidental occurrence would be contingent. The necessary would need no [cause] because the non-existence of its accidental occurrence (ʿadam al-ʿurūḍ) does not require the existence of a cause. Rather it is enough that no cause exists for its being accidental, even though the [response] that we mentioned first is the right one. […]

[574.15] [On the knowability argument; see [T26] above] the answer is that the true reality that is not perceived by the intellect is His specific existence (wujūduhu al-khāṣṣ), which is different in concrete being (huwiyya) from other existences, and is the first principle for everything. The perceived existence is [575] absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), which is the necessary concomitant of that existence as well as of other contingent beings, and which is conceptualized primarily. Perceiving the necessary concomitant does not entail that one perceives the true reality of the subject of concomitance. Otherwise, [just] from the perception of existence there would follow perception of all specific existences. The fact that His true reality, may He be exalted, is not perceived, whereas His existence is perceived, simply entails that the true reality of Him, the exalted, is different from the absolute existence which is perceived, not different from His specific existence. […]

[575.10] [On the principle argument; see T25] the answer is the true reality of the necessary is not general existence. Rather, it is solely His specific existence that is different from other existences, by subsisting in itself.³⁸

[only existence as a mental concept is applicable to both God and contingents]

There is a great mystery here: the existence whose concept (mafhūm) applies to the necessary and the contingent in an analogous way is [merely] something intellectual (amr ʿaqlī). For existence in concrete individuals cannot be applied to things that share it. This [notion in the intellect] is said of both necessary existence, which subsists through itself and is not an accident of any quiddity, and of other existents. If its existence is considered in the intellect, it is contingent, not necessary. The “name” existence applies to it and to the necessary in the same way as “Zayd” applies to [Zayd’s] concrete existence and his name. This existence is a notion grasped by the intellect (amr maʿqūl), whereas necessary existence is unknowable in its core (al-kunh) and true reality. The only thing that one can intellectually grasp concerning it is intelligible existence, negatively qualified [as not belonging to any quiddity].

[against Rāzī’s priority solution]

To whoever says it cannot be that [God’s quiddity] must be prior [to God’s existence] in existence, because the quiddity as such (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) can be the cause [of existence], regardless of [the quiddity’s] existence or non-existence, just like that which receives [existence], we say: one necessarily knows the premise just mentioned, [5] because that which renders (al-mufīd) existence cannot help possessing existence, unlike that which receives [existence], because it acquires existence, and that which acquires (al-mustafīd) existence cannot [already] be existent.

[on the univocity problem]

Reminder: whoever claims that existence is univocal for the necessary and contingent is committed either to accept that the separation (tajarrud) of the existence of the Necessary [from any quiddity] is due to a distinct cause, or to accept that not every cause is prior to its effect in existence. The Shaykh avoided this in the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ [by claiming] that existence is not univocal. Hence it would not follow that separation [from any quiddity] would be due to a distinct cause. Rather this existence [i.e. of God] would rule out any attachment [to a quiddity] due to its quiddity.³⁹

[rejection of Avicenna’s argument, with huwiyya terminology]

[Al-Suhrawardī] mentions in the book [al-Talwīḥāt] that there is some criticism of [Avicenna’s] method of arguing [that God’s essence is existence only] and that it is sheer dialectic. He declares it false in two ways, first by way of refutation, showing that [Avicenna] himself accepts the conclusion (muʿāraḍa), then by way of solution.

Refutation: What you mentioned regarding the impossibility of the priority of quiddity over existence [170] in existence is inescapable, regardless whether the existence of the Necessary is the same as His quiddity or not. For the existence of contingent things, like bodies, is additional to their quiddities, so their existence is predicated of their quiddities. The existence predicated of quiddities is accidental for them, as you know, and the existence of everything accidental is posterior to the existence of the quiddity for which this existence is accidental. The same goes for every attribute, whether it is predicated or not, since either way its existence is posterior to the existence of the subject of attribution. Hence, if the attribute were existence itself, it would follow that another existence should belong to the subject of attribution. For insofar as the extramental quiddity is the subject of inherence for existence in concrete individuals, there are two [different] concrete beings (huwiyyatāni) for existence and quiddity, with one inhering in the other. Thus one concrete being would need the other, and the needed concrete being would have to be prior in existence to the concrete being that inheres [in it], so that the quiddity would have an existence other than the existence inhering [in it]. On this basis it is clear that one was right in refuting [Avicenna] with the contingent quiddity that is receptive of existence. For quiddity must be existent before its existence in each case. But if this does not follow in the case of the contingent, neither does it in the case of the necessary.

Solution: It has been already established in the treatment of mental concepts that existence is not additional to existent quiddity in concrete individuals. Rather it is added to it in the mind alone, and is only a mental concept. If it has no concrete being (huwiyya ʿayniyya), it has neither a cause, nor a quiddity, nor anything else. Rather, that which is from a cause is the quiddities themselves. Nor is any other existence prior to it in the case of the contingent quiddities which receive it. Thus are destroyed both of the foundations that were laid down concerning the necessary and contingent, since neither of the arguments about them succeed, assuming, that is, that existence is merely conceptual, as has been shown. […]

[al-Suhrawardī’s argument from the contingency of the instantiation of a universal]

[171.19] After [al-Suhrawardī] declared this method false he mentioned a further approach, which he himself devised, to establish that the mind cannot analyze (yufaṣṣiluhu) the Necessary Existent into quiddity and existence, as it can do with contingent quiddities. For when they occur in the intellect, the intellect can analyze them into quiddity and general existence (wujūd ʿāmm), whereas the quiddity of the Necessary in the intellect is nothing but [172] individualized existence (al-wujūd al-mushakhkhaṣ). Thereby he proves that He is not rendered multiple in any way, and that there is no second for Him in existence.

The upshot of this approach is, in brief, that if the Necessary Existent were divided in the mind into quiddity and existence, then He would have a universal quiddity. Yet no universal quiddity in itself excludes that an infinite number of particulars might belong to it. So the existence of none of these particulars would be necessary due to the quiddity itself, since preponderation without preponderator is impossible. If however none of them were necessarily existent due to the quiddity itself, the Necessary in itself would not be necessary due to His quiddity itself, and this is wrong. […]

[God’s existence is distinct through its perfection]

[173.21] In saying “He is distinguished only though His perfection” [al-Suhrawardī] means that the necessary existence is distinguished from the existences [174] of contingent things through perfection and deficiency. For [His existence] needs no quiddity through which it might subsist, due to its perfection, whereas [contingent existence] cannot do without this, due to its deficiency. Furthermore [His existence] is not merely conceptual, due to its perfection, whereas [the contingent] is merely conceptual, due to its deficiency. Hence the only existence that is not merely conceptual is His existence. […]

[174.17] He answered this objection [that a universal quiddity of existence can have indefinitely many particulars] by saying that one cannot conceptualize in the mind [many] particulars for necessary existence, whereas one can do this with the quiddity which is accidentally joined to existence in the mind. As for the first point, this is because the particulars of a certain quiddity become multiple only due to the addition of accidental features, which entail multiplicity (takaththur) in [those particulars], or due to their differing in respect of perfection and deficiency. But no distinguishing factor (mumayyiz) that might entail a multiplicity of particulars can be added to necessary existence, which is pure existence, unmixed with anything else. Nor is there anything more complete (atamm) than it, so that one of them could be distinguished from the other in respect of perfection and deficiency. For [the Necessary Existent] is at the highest rank of perfection, whereas what is more deficient than it is [175] contingent, not necessary, existence (the same goes for whatever is mixed with something else). Hence, if one supposes that there is another particular falling under the species of necessary existence and investigates this supposed particular, one will discover that it is not a second alongside the first. Rather it is the same as the first, given the lack of any distinguishing factor in pure existence, than which nothing is more perfect. The same holds for everything pure in which there is no differentiation in respect of strength and weakness.

[analogy of existence as a solution to the univocity problem]

Existence (īṯūṯā) is the same as the quiddity of the Necessary Existent (manyūth ālṣāy īthūthā) …

[124.17] [Against the univocity argument] we say: the fact that the existence of the exalted is not conjoined (lā naqqīpūṯ īthūtheh) to a quiddity that is different from it is something privative (laytūthnīthā, cf. Arabic ʿadamī), and it requires no cause.

[125.2] Existence is predicated of the Necessary Existent and of other existents, which are contingent, not univocally (ʿamm shmāhāʾīth) like a genus, but rather in the “ambiguous” way of an analogical name (ba-znnā purrāthākhāyā da-shqīqāth šmmā). For [existence] applies to the Necessary in a primary and more appropriate way, but to the contingent in a posterior and borrowed way. […]

[125.7] [Al-Rāzī’s priority theory is false], because neither of the two [i.e. neither necessary nor contingent existents] receive the meaning (sukkālā) of [existence] as such (hū kadh hū), but rather only in respect of actual existence (ba-znnā d-shkhīḥūṯā suʿrnāyāthā), as we said.

[establishing the Christian Trinity in Avicennian terms]

We say: the demonstration that has established the unity of the Creator for us does not suffice to establish that He is wise and living. Otherwise, we would have needed no other demonstrations to establish that He is wise and living. From this it is known that the consideration (sukhleh, cf. Arabic iʿtibār) of the nature (kyāna) of the Necessary Existent (ālṣāy īthūthā) is different from [His] consideration as the wise and the living. […]

[114.19] We say that the wisdom and the life of the Creator are either substances (ūsīyā) or accidents (gedhshā). They cannot be accidents. Otherwise the Creator would be a subject for accidents, and changes and passions would apply to Him, which is absurd. So it remains only that they are substances. Nor can they be universal substances. Otherwise wisdom would be predicated of the Creator in the same way as it is predicated of creatures, and life likewise. So it remains only that they are particular substances. From this it is clear that they are nothing else but hypostases (qnūmā). Therefore, the Wisdom of the Creator is a subsistent hypostasis, and His Life likewise. As the consideration of the one who is wise and living is different from wisdom and life, as we said, also He is a subsistent hypostasis. Wisdom and Life belong to Him. Hence we are luminously illuminated by the shining of the Trinity of hypostases of one divine nature. […]

[116.5] We say that there are among divine names the essential (ūsyāyē), the relational (aḥyānyāyē), and the negative (apūfāṭīkhāyē). The essential ones are Wisdom and Life, since they are not said in relation to anything else, nor do they signify the negation of anything. That is why they are truly declared as subsistent hypostases by Christians, and they [really] are.

[compatibility of the Necessary Existent with the Trinity]

They say: if more than one hypostasis belonged to the nature of the Necessary Existent, then these hypostases would be either (a) necessary or (b) contingent. (a) The first option is incorrect, for two reasons. (a1) First, it has been established by way of a demonstration that there is only one Necessary Existent. (a2) Second, these hypostases are subsistent in virtue of the [divine] nature, and everything that is made subsistent by something else is contingent, not necessary. (b) But neither is the second option correct, since contingent hypostases need a cause. There is no other cause than the nature of the Necessary Existent itself. It is however impossible that it be the cause of the existence of the hypostases by itself, since it would simultaneously be productive (maʿbdhānā) in itself and receptive (mqabhlānā) in itself, which is absurd. For that which receives must be different from that which produces it. Therefore, as those hypostases of which you speak are neither necessary nor contingent, they do not exist at all, since whatever exists is either necessary or contingent. […]

[140.6] We say: it would only be impossible for one and the same thing to be both productive and receptive if two effects could not be from one and the same cause. But this is not impossible.

[statement of Illuminationist position]

The Necessary Existent is pure existence, without any admixture, whether specific or common. Anything other than Him has its existence from Him, whether this be through an intermediary or not. Everything that is rendered multiple in the ranks (marātib) of existents by descending (bi-al-nuzūl) grows weaker in their existence. It is like the sun, from which a powerful light falls upon what receives it, and then [the light] grows weaker with the multiplication of ranks of things that resist it, until ending at a rank that lacks light entirely. In the same way the ranks of existence descending from the Necessary end at a rank from which no existence can arise. The Necessary Existent differs from the other, contingent existents in terms of perfection and deficiency (bi-al-kamāl wa-al-naqṣ) due to His utter perfection and the power of His luminosity and splendor. Perfection belongs to His essence, whereas deficiency belongs to things other than Him. Due to His perfection, His existence needs no quiddity in which it might subsist. By contrast, the existence of the contingent quiddities cannot do without quiddities in which they subsist, due to their deficiency. Since Necessary Existence in the power of its perfection is identical to its essence (ʿayn dhātihi), it cannot be something merely conceptual. By contrast, the existence of the contingent quiddities is something merely conceptual, which does not exist in concrete individuals, due to their deficiency and weakness. That is why the [255] Necessary Existent is wholly existence (kull al-wujūd), by contrast to the contingent quiddities, which the intellect can analyze into quiddity and existence, so that they are not wholly existence. Rather they are distinct from existence. The existence that is brought into relation with them is not the same as their essence as it was in the case of the Necessary, nor is it intrinsic for them. Rather it is something that accidentally occurs to them from the perspective of the mind (bi-ḥasab iʿtibār al-dhihn). There is no perfect existence other than Him—may His affairs be exalted and His names sanctified! Other contingent existents that exist through the emanation of His existence and perfection are deficient in their rank of existence.⁴⁰

[God as the “living”; commentary on T42]

A subtle point, which the divine master [i.e. al-Suhrawardī]—may God sanctify his soul—mentioned in the treatise al-Muqāwwamāt and which is among [his] gems of insight (nafāʾis) is the following. Since a proof has been given that existence is something conceptual, one cannot say that the Necessary Existence is existence itself, because it would be conceptual. But how can one conceive that the Essence of essences and the Principle of existence is a merely conceptual thing?

Then he said: by “existence” we mean “the existent for itself (ʿinda nafsihi),” which is the “living.” For the fact that something is existent for itself can be grounded only in life. “The existent for itself” is [258] proper only to the “living”. For nothing—neither it itself nor anything else—can exist for anything that is not “living.” If He were not “living” the meaning of “existence itself” would not be realized. The meaning of “living” is different from the meaning of “existence” which is merely conceptual. The substance of the perceiving (jawhar al-mudrik) must be none other than life. For what is not living need not be noticed, even when there is perception of “I-ness” (idrāk al-anāniyya). From this perspective we see that existence cannot be a concrete quiddity. If the Necessary in itself were the same as existence, then, since we would understand existence to be the concrete instantiation of its quiddity, but might still doubt whether it has any realized existence among concrete individuals, there would have to be a further existence added to it, and in the same way a [third order] existence for the [second order] one, and so on without limit, which is absurd.

Let it not be said: if the Necessary in itself possessed any meaning other than existence [like “living”], then it would fall under the category of substance, and then it would have to have particulars, which would imply its contingency, as you learned [above]. For we say: substancehood just means the perfection of the quiddity’s subsistence, and it too is merely conceptual. Participation in merely conceptual things does not undermine the meaning of oneness (mafhūm al-waḥda), since participation in such things is inevitable. Just as “not being a stone” is necessary for animality, but not the same as its meaning, so “not having matter” is necessary for the living being that has perception of itself (al-ḥayy al-mudrik li-dhātihi), without being the same as its meaning. The living being that has perception is manifest to itself (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi) and is the separate, holy luminosity (al-nūriyya al-mujarrada al-muqaddisa). Furthermore, it necessarily follows for it that it does not subsist in another, unlike the luminosity of bodies. For they are not manifest to themselves, but to something else. The light that subsists in bodies is an image (mithāl) of the Light which subsists through itself and is its shadow (ẓill): the weak belongs to the weak, whereas the powerful and belongs to the powerful. The light of the sun, which overpowers (al-qāhir) sight, albeit it is the strongest among the bodily lights and [259] the most powerful, still is the image of the highest Necessary Light which overpowers all the intellectual lights, and is its shadow.

[argument from the contingency of particulars; reply to the final argument of T47]

None of the infinite number of particulars can be necessitated to exist by the universal quiddity itself, because all of them relate (nisba) to it in the same way. […]

[253.22] [Al-Abharī, arguing against al-Suhrawardī] said: we deny that the relation you have mentioned is the same. This would only follow if [254] the relation of the quiddity to the extramental individual were the same as its relation to intellectually grasped particulars. On what basis do you say this? It should be proved.⁴¹

[Al-Shahrazūrī:] the proof is that if a definition, a description, a name, or any other notion is true of a universal true reality, regardless whether it is a species or something else, than it is true of each of its particular instances, regardless whether they are extramental or grasped intellectually. If the true reality were not one and the same, this would not be true.

[the continuous motion of existence; commentary on T56]

In the case of colors, a name applies with varying intensity in meaning between two opposite extremities (ṭarafay)—like blackness and whiteness which share a generic meaning, namely color, in this example—by way of a continuous extension (imtidādan ittiṣāliyyan). For one can move from the extremity (ġāya) of whiteness towards the final extremity of blackness with a continuous motion (ḥarakatan muttaṣilatan), just like being at [various] locations while walking. Within this range one can find a potentially infinite number of species of color, because there are an infinite number of places to stop (maqāṭiʿ) along this continuous distance.

Being existent is such a generic meaning. One can find an infinite number of other species [of existence] between the two extremes, though they do not have distinct names at each stop, and each of them would be subsumed under that genus [of existence]. Hence, every species among them bears a relation of being closer to, or more remote from, each of the extremities, while to each group applies a motion [directed] from it in terms of this meaning, whose name applies in analogical way, relative to its proximity or distance from each of the limits (al-ḥaddayn).

[being is extrinsic to God’s essence]

The truth is that His existence, may He be exalted, is additional [to His essence], since His existence is either “being” (kawn) as it is in other existents, or something else. If it were “being” and if separateness were understood to be together with [being] in the true reality of the Necessary, then the Necessary would be composite—otherwise [being] would be multiplied and attached to all existents, standing in need of them. If on the other hand [82] it is something else, then being must either occur (ḥāṣilan) here [in God], or not. If it does not occur, then neither will existence occur, because existence without being is absurd. If however [being] does occur [in God], it will not be intrinsic, due to the impossibility of composition. Thus it is an attribute additional to the quiddity of the Necessary.⁴²

[discussing T38 from the chapter on Essence and Existence]

Thereby [al-Suhrawardī] proves that there is nothing in existence such that its existence and quiddity is identical, like the Necessary in itself according to the teaching of the Peripatetics. For once we have understood His meaning as “that in which existence and quiddity are identical”, we may still doubt whether or not it has existence, that is, extramental occurrence. Given that, we say: the existence that is put in doubt must be either identical to the known concept or distinct from it. Both options fail. If it is identical to it, then what is doubted is identical to what is known, which is obviously wrong, hence [al-Suhrawardī] does not [bother to] object to it. If however it is distinct from it, then there is an existence additional to the existence of the First, which is [His] quiddity itself, and this yields an infinite regress, as was explained at another occasion, and this is absurd. Precisely this follows from positing something whose existence is identical to its quiddity. Hence there is nothing like this in existence.

[doubts about analogical terms]

I say that this calls for further inquiry: if the name “whiteness” designates the meaning of most [white], or least [white], or middling [white], then it can only refer to the other two in a metaphorical way. If however it belongs to the meaning that is shared by [all three], then it is univocal, and the difference between these particular cases is no greater than the difference between the species that fall under a single genus.

Let it not be said: “heat” is a name designating a quality from which proceed certain sensible effects; so when that quality has a stronger effect in certain particular cases, then it is more appropriately called by the name “heat.” The same goes for whiteness and the like. This is just what it means to be an analogical term. For we say: the same would also apply to “substance.”

In general, I have arguments against analogical terms, but this is not the place to go into it in detail.