[argument from immateriality]

The Necessary Existent is pure intellect, because He is an essence (dhāt) separate from matter in every respect. You already know that the reason a thing does not engage in intellection is matter and its attachments, not [the thing’s] existence. As for formal existence, this is intellectual existence: namely the existence such that, when it is realized in a thing, the thing thereby becomes intellect. [285] That which bears the possibility of attaining [intellectual existence] is potential intellect, while that which has attained it after being potential is actual intellect, in the sense that it has been perfected. But that which has [intellectual existence] as its essence is essentially an intellect. Likewise, He is a pure object of intellection, because that which prevents a thing from being an object of intellection is being in matter, and its attachments.

[argument from intention]

[125.2] For the Muslims, existence is confined to the temporally originated and the eternal, there being for them nothing eternal other than God and His attributes, whatever is other than Him having been originated from His direction through His will (irāda). Thus they arrived at a necessary premise regarding His knowledge: that which is willed must necessarily be known to the one who willed it. On this basis they inferred that everything is known to Him, because all things are willed by Him and originated by His will. Hence, there is no being that is not originated by His will, with the sole exception of Himself. And as long as it is established that He is one who wills, and knows what He wills, He is necessarily alive. But whatever is alive and knows another, even more (awlā) knows itself. Hence, for [the Muslims] everything is known to God; they came to this result in this way, once it was clear to them that He willed the temporal origination of the world. But as for you [philosophers], if you claim that the world is eternal, not originated through His will, how then do you know that He knows anything other than Himself? […]

[against the argument from immateriality]

[126.10] If your statement that the First does not exist in matter means that He is neither a body nor impressed in a body, but is instead self-subsistent, without occupying space or being specified with any position, then we agree. There remains your statement that whatever is like this is a pure intellect. But what do you mean by “intellect”? If you mean by it “that which intellectually grasps all other things,” this is just the sought conclusion, and the point at dispute. So how can you include it in the premises of the argument for [establishing] the sought conclusion? But if you mean by it something else—namely, that it intellectually grasps itself—then perhaps some of your philosopher (al-falāsifa) brethren will agree to this. But the gist of this just comes down to saying that whatever intellectually grasps itself grasps another [also]. In which case one might ask, “what leads you to make this claim, when it is not necessary?” This is something that distinguished Avicenna from the rest of the philosophers. So how do you claim it to be necessary? If you do so on the basis of inquiry, what demonstration is there for it? If it is said, “this is because what impedes the intellectual grasp of things is matter, but there is no matter [in God],” we reply: we concede that it is an impediment, but we do not concede that it is the only impediment.

[against argument from causation]

[127.15] The second sort of argument is [Avicenna’s] statement: “even though we did not say that the First wills origination, nor that the universe is temporally originated, we nonetheless say that it is His act, and has come to existence through Him. However He continues to have the attribute of those who are agents, so He never stops being active. We differ from others only thus far, and not over the basic issue of there being an act. But if the agent’s having knowledge of His act is necessary, as all agree, then the universe is, according to us, due to His act.”

The response has two aspects. [128] First, there are two kinds of action: voluntary, like the action of an animal or human, and natural, like the action of the sun in illuminating, of fire in heating, and of water in cooling. Knowledge of the act is only necessary in the voluntary act, like in the human arts. But not when it comes to natural action. Now, according to you [philosophers], God makes the world as a concomitant from His essence, by nature and compulsion, not by way of will and choice. Indeed, the universe proceeds from His essence in just the way that light proceeds from the sun. And just as the sun has no power to refraining from [making] light, or fire to refraining from heating, so the First has no power to refrain from His acts, may He be greatly exalted above what they say! This mode [of causation], even if may be called “action,” does not at all imply that the agent has knowledge.

[Aristotle’s argument from perfection]

[129.16] Moreover, one may say: on what basis would you refute those among the philosophers who say that [the effect’s having more knowledge than the cause] does not constitute greater nobility? For others [i.e. those who are not God] need knowledge only in order to acquire perfection, since in themselves they are deficient. The human is ennobled by the intelligibles, either in order to acquire knowledge of what benefits him in terms of consequences in this world or the next, or to perfect his dark and deficient essence. The same applies [130] to all other creatures. But God’s essence has no need to be perfected. On the contrary, if one were to suppose for Him knowledge through which He is perfected, then His essence, insofar as it His essence, would be deficient.

[design argument]

It is acknowledged that He knows that which is other than Himself, since that which is called “other” is his well-designed (al-mutqan) handiwork and His exquisite and well-ordered act; and this [100] proves the knowledge of the Maker as well as it proves His power, as previously explained. For if one saw well-arranged lines precisely set down by a scribe, and then doubted whether the scribe is knowledgeable concerning the art of writing, one would be foolish to have such doubts.

[if God emanates necessarily He does not need knowledge]

Know that [the philosophers (falāsifa)] have no way to understand how God could be knowledgeable about anything. This is clear, because the way to show this is that He, the exalted, has power and choice (mukhtār), and is the bestower of proper existence upon His acts. His acts may be arranged as He wishes, in a way fitting for the benefit of [His] servants. He makes some things prior and others posterior. He produces that which is fitting and corresponding to the benefit; and He leaves aside that which neither corresponds to nor suits wisdom and being beneficial. His precise acts indicate that He is knowledgeable about what must be prior and what posterior, and this is to be taken in the way we established earlier. But they say none of this. Instead, they say that His essence necessitates a single act, which is only the First Intellect, and then comes what originates after the Intellect, which is thus originated from something other [than God]. One may say to them: on what grounds do you deny that He necessitates the First Intellect without any knowledge, so that He would not be knowledgeable about it, nor about His own essence—may He exalted—just as happens with other [agents] of natural necessitation, according to you? For [those agents] necessitate their acts without any knowledge or life.

[knowledge vs. opinion in the design argument]

If someone says: why would you deny that one who has power could bring distinct acts into existence due to opinion (ẓann), so that bestowal of existence would not indicate being knowledgeable? One may respond to him: opinion has no purchase on the true realities of things, as one can have opinion neither about substance, black, motion, or any other true reality. Opinion has a purchase only on something’s having a certain attribute and feature, or not having them.⁸ That is why humans fail to connect their opinions to the very true realities of things.

But if someone is asked about the quiddity of something, and says “It seems to me (aẓunnuhu) that it is blackness, or such-and-such,” in truth this comes down to him having an opinion that something he already knows has a feature or an attribute. Like if one sees a person, for instance, and knows it is a person, and is asked then about him, then one might say, “It seems to me that it is Zayd,” in other words, “It seems to me that he has the shape of Zayd, his form, and other attributes of this sort.” Or one might see a color and knows it is a color, but not know [which color] exactly. Then when one is asked about it, one might say, “It seems to me that it is black.” All this is possible only after one knows what one sees, even if one does not know what exact [color it is], and subsequent to knowledge of that which seems to have a certain attribute or feature. So it is correct that opinion occurs only after [182] knowing the true reality of things.

[refutation of Aristotle’s argument from perfection]

Aristotle said that the True One, the exalted, knows only Himself. What he means by this, as far as it has come down to us, is the following: if God the exalted were an intellect and did not intellectually grasp anything, He would be ignorant. But if He grasps intellectually, then His intellection must perpetually be either about one thing, or about many, so that the object of His intellection would be something distinct from Him, and His perfection would thus consist not in His self-intellection, but in intellection of something else, whatever this might be. Yet it is an absurdity that His perfection should be due to intellection of something else. Hence, one needs to abandon this view. It should be argued that He, the exalted, knows Himself alone. […] [71.19] This is an invalid argument, since it based on the [assumption] that this [other] object of knowledge makes His essence perfect by necessitating that His essence becomes knowledgeable of it. But this is false. For His essence, may He be exalted, is that which necessitates His being knowledgeable about this object of knowledge. The object of knowledge functions merely as a condition for the fact that His essence necessitates His being knowledgeable. For knowledge can be conceptualized only with reference to the object of knowledge being just as it is. […] [72.3] His essence’s necessitating His being knowledgeable concerning objects of knowledge is an act belonging to His essence, but the agent is not rendered perfect by his act. For clearly, the perfection of His essence must precede His being active, in order that He can act. Don’t you see that on your view, the First Intellect is among the acts of the Creator, the exalted, yet He is not made more perfect by it, instead being perfect in His essence? And His essence is prior to the Intellect in terms of perfection.

[response to Aristotle’s argument from perfection]

Theoretical and demonstrative response: we say that it is not the case that His perfection is through His act [of intellection]. Rather His act [of intellection] is through His perfection, and due to His perfection. And His intellect is due to His act. Thus His intellect is due to His essential perfection, which can in no sense be conceived as involving a deficiency. […]

[75.8] If it is said: there is a deficiency conceptualized in relation to His essence, namely that He does not intellectually grasp such-and-such if there is no such-and-such object of intellection, or in other words “He does not intellectually grasp if there is nothing to grasp.” Then we say: the perfection that belongs to Him is not that He should intellectually grasp every existent. Rather it is His being such as to (bi-ḥaythu) intellectually grasp every existent. So if the object of intellection is existent, then He grasps it. But if it is posited not to exist, then it should be posited that He does not intellectually grasp it. Not because He [just] does not grasp it, that is, because He has no power to do so; rather the deficiency is on the side of the posited non-existence. Thus perfection and power belong to Him in Himself, and from both [the perfection and power] there follows whatever belongs to Him in relation to His existents. Not that He is perfected by bestowing existence upon His creations. Rather, they are brought into existence due to His perfection. This argument applies to us as well, not only to the First Principle. For we are not made perfect by each object of intellection. Rather our perfection is due precisely to our power to grasp it intellectually. We are perfected by actual (bi-al-fiʿl) grasping, only when we actually grasp objects of intellection that are nobler than we are.

[report of Theophrastus’ argument against God’s knowledge]

Then Theophrastus said, after laying down this foundation: the True—may He be far exalted beyond what the seekers say—is not described with any attribute which would be other than His essence in existence, regardless whether it is knowledge or whatever you might suppose. Otherwise, He would have it as an attribute, and this attribute would not be necessary in itself, given that there cannot be more than one necessary existent (this is one of his premises). So [the attribute] would be contingent, and when it is eliminated from the essence, the essence would no longer described with it in actuality. Hence, an aspect (jiha) belongs to that essence due to which it is considered (bi-iʿtibārihā) as contingent—this also is something implied by one of his premises. This aspect is distinct from the aspect in which that essence is necessary, since a single thing that is the same in all aspects cannot be described with the opposites: here, the opposites are the necessary existent in itself and the contingently existent in itself. There is, therefore, some multiplicity in the essence of the First. This multiplicity is either (a) negative, which need not imply any multiplicity in the essence, such as being not-a-stone [166] or not-a-horse, and the like, (b) or it is not⁹ negative. But we have already shown that when we say, “such-and-such is contingent,” this is not negative in meaning. So it belongs to it existentially (wujūdī), as we have already shown. This, however, is impossible for anybody who agrees that there is no multiplicity in the essence of the Necessary Existent. (c) Alternatively [one could hold] that the [multiplicity] is merely conceptual. Though even this implies existential multiplicity, too, since the aspect which the intellect judges to be described with intelligible contingency must be different from the aspect which the intellect judges not to be so described.

[the philosophers cannot use the design argument]

We demand from you a proof that the Creator, the exalted, is knowledgeable. How do you know this? No proof leads you to this, nor does any demonstration show it. For the mutakallimūn prove on the basis of the occurrence [224] of wisely chosen features and perfection (al-aḥkām wa-al-itqān) in acts that the Maker is knowledgeable. You, however, do not adopt this approach, nor could it rest upon your foundations. For according to you, knowledge does not connect with particulars, or it does connect but [only] in a universal way, so that it connects to universals [alone]. The wisely chosen features, however, are established only among sensible particulars, whereas intelligible universals, are supposed in the mind. […]

[“connection” version of the argument from immateriality]

[224.20] Avicenna said: the demonstration that everything separate from matter is [225] essentially an intellect, is on the basis of the proof that a quiddity that is separate from matter is, in respect of its essence, not hindered from being connected to another separate quiddity. Thus it can be grasped intellectually, that is, inscribed (murtasima) in another separate quiddity. Its being inscribed is its being connected. “Intellect” means simply that one separate quiddity is connected to another separate quiddity. If, therefore, a quiddity is inscribed in our intellective faculty, then its being inscribed in it is just the same as our awareness of [that quiddity], and its perception. This is intellect and intellection, since, if it required a disposition and form other than the inscribed form, then the argument would apply to this [second] form in just the same way it applies to that [first] form, leading to an infinite regress. If, however, that connection is nothing other than the intellect, then it follows that every separate quiddity is in itself not hindered from intellection.

[God transcends intellection]

Those companions deny that He is both subject and object of intellection. For intellection is the inscribing (irtisām) of intellect with the form of the object of intellection. But the True is exalted above having form and being the object of intellection, regardless whether the form is corporeal or an incorporeal quiddity. Also He is exalted above being the subject of intellection, such that there would be Him, and also a form. Rather, He is above knowing and being known!

[against the argument from immateriality]

And another thing: you undertook to establish that He engages in intellection, and you applied yourself to showing that it is not impossible for Him to be the object of intellection. But its being not impossible does not make it necessary for Him to be the object of intellection, in the absence of further proof. And even if it is necessary that He is the object of intellection, it would not follow from this that He is a subject of intellection. So another argument is needed. Yet we have heard no argument from you apart from your saying, “it happens only accidentally that something fails to be an object of intellection, whenever it is in matter.”

To this one may say: presence in matter isn’t the only thing that hinders this. Sometimes there may be another hindrance. For just as the sensible object is not inscribed in the intellect, insofar as [76] it is sensible, that is, insofar as it is in matter, so likewise the intelligible object is not inscribed in sense perception insofar as it is intelligible, that is, insofar as it is not in matter. Yet He Whose majesty is exalted above being inscribed in anything is also exalted above anything’s being inscribed in Him. And just as something may be unavailable to sensation because it is especially hidden, likewise it may be unavailable to sensation because it is especially manifest. So the hindrance is not matter, or the attachments of matter, and his statement proves false: “the nature of existence insofar as it is existent is not hindered from being an object of intellection.”

[response to T11 on the argument from immateriality; self-thinking]

As for [al-Shahrastānī’s] objection to the claim that intellect is that which is separate from matter, namely: how can you explain “intellect” in terms of separation from matter, given that there is no linguistic evidence for this, nor any intellectual proof? For not everyone who understands that he is separate from matter, understands that he is knowledgeable; nor does everyone who understands that he is knowledgeable understands that matter is removed from him.

[125r1] As for the demonstration that everything that is essentially separate from matter is essentially an intellect, it is as follows. Every quiddity that is separate from matter is not hindered, in respect of its essence, from being connected to another quiddity that is separate from matter. Proof: every separate quiddity can be an object of intellection, that is, inscribed in another separate quiddity. Its being inscribed is the same as its being connected. Then, “intellect” is just the connection between one separate quiddity and another, and means nothing else than this. Likewise, that connection just is the intellect. For, if a separate quiddity is inscribed in our intellectual faculty, then the inscribing of that quiddity in it is just the same its awareness, its perception, its intellection, its encompassing [125v], or however you want to classify it. It needs no further state for the intellectual faculty apart from the inscription of that quiddity in it. For, if it did need a further disposition, or any form other that inscribed form, then the argument concerning this second form would be the same as it was for first, yielding an infinite regress. But if that connection is just the same as the intellect, and the separate quiddity is not hindered in its essence from this connection, then it necessarily follows that no separate quiddity is hindered from intellection in its essence, that is, that it can grasp intellectually, insofar as one inquires into its essence.

Whatever intellectually grasps something grasps itself intellectually, through a connected capacity. Proof: if it can intellectually grasp something, it can intellectually grasp itself, and in this [126r1] lies its self-intellection. From this it follows that if something can think itself, and if it is such as (min shaʾnihi) to have something necessarily and essentially whenever it is such as to have it [at all], and it is such as to intellectually grasp itself, then it must intellectually grasp itself necessarily and essentially. The Creator, the exalted, must essentially have whatever He is such as to have, and whatever ought to belong to Him. […]

[126r7] From all these premises it follows that the Creator, the exalted, necessarily grasps Himself intellectually. This is the demonstration for His being knowledgeable, intellectual, and encompassing, whichever of these expressions you prefer.

[first problem for the design argument: animal design]

We do not concede that the precise (muḥkam) act indicates that the agent is knowledgeable. There are several ways to show this. First, humans are incapable of [building] beehives, which bees build without ruler or compass. Nor are humans capable of the webs which spiders spin out along those lines without instruments and tools. If this were an indication of the agent’s knowledge, then it would follow that these animals are more knowledgeable than humans, but this is known to be false.

[second problem for the design argument: formative faculty]

The philosophers (al-falāsifa) and the doctors commonly hold that the coming-to-be of animal organs and their arrangement depends on a corporeal power which lacks awareness and perception. They called it the “formative faculty (al-quwwa al-muṣawwira).” If the falsity of this were just obvious, then they could not have agreed on this. So the claim that [precise arrangement implies knowledge] is invalid.

[third problem for the design argument: unconscious action]

If someone who is proficient in writing started, while writing, to think about how every letter should be written, he’d get muddled up and would be incapable of writing well. But if he leaves off thinking and just lets his nature take the lead, then he can write as he ought to. […]

[fourth problem for the design argument: problem of evil]

Just as we see in this world precise, proficient, ordered, and arranged acts, which lead one to imagine that the governor of this world is knowledgeable and wise, so we also see that this world is full of disasters, dangers, and ugliness in the nature, as well as such loathsome states as deafness, chronic diseases, and acute poverty. We do see people who are perfect in both knowledge and deed, and reject worldly goods as despicable and worthless, being free from ignorance and vices. Yet we also see the worst among the people, such as the most vicious among youths and women, which wind up overcoming people who are interested in worldly issues, and gain supremacy over people. Such cases are not fitting for the Merciful, the Knowing, the Wise.

[fifth problem for the design argument: design could be due to mere opinion]

Let it not be said: the acts of someone who has mere opinion (al-ẓānn) are not always precise, but rather sometimes wrong and sometimes right. The acts of God the exalted, by contrast, are always precise. For we say: we do not concede that the acts of someone who has mere opinion cannot always be precise. For insofar as a mere opinion suffices for an act to be precise once, it should suffice for this in every case, since the judgment about one case will be the same as in another, similar case.

[more on the fifth problem]

If they say [to avoid ascribing mere belief to God] that whoever possesses mere belief may be wrong and make mistakes, and may not even have control over the outcome of his intentions, we say: there is no disputing that it is as you say. Yet we also see many sorts of deficiency, disaster, and great ugliness in the nature, which occur in the composed things of this world. Perhaps these cases arise precisely because their agent composed them on the basis of mere opinion and guess.

[argument from intention]

[God] acts voluntarily (bi-al-ikhtiyār). Whoever [acts] voluntarily intends to bestow existence on a certain type of thing (al-nawʿ al-muʿayyan). And the intention to bestow existence on a certain type of thing has as a condition that this quiddity has been conceptualized. So it is established that He, the exalted, conceptualizes certain quiddities. There can be no doubt that quiddities in themselves have as a concomitant the reality of some features, and the non-existence of others. And anyone who conceptualizes what has a concomitant conceptualizes a concomitant. So from the fact that He, the exalted, knows these quiddities, there follows His knowledge of their concomitants and effects. It is established, therefore, that He, the exalted, is knowledgeable.

[preponderation argument]

Demonstration [that God knows all objects of knowledge]: He, praised and exalted, is alive, and everything that is alive may know any given object of knowledge. Also, what necessitates this being knowledgeable (al-ʿālimiyya) is His essence. The relation of His essence to each [object] is equivalent, so it is not more fitting that His essence necessitates His being knowledgeable of certain things rather than His being knowledgeable about the rest. So, given that it necessitates His being knowledgeable about some of them, it necessitates His being knowledgeable about the rest. So, it has been established that He—may He be exalted—is knowledgeable about every object of knowledge.¹⁰

[multiplicity argument and solution]

They say: if [God] were knowledgeable, then His knowledge would be either (a) identical to His essence or (b) additional to it. Both options are false.

(a) His knowledge cannot be identical to His essence, for several reasons. (a1) Firstly, we perceive a difference between our saying “His essence is His essence” and our saying “His essence is His knowledge,” so this shows the two are distinct. (a2) Second, even once one knows that He is existent, and is the Necessary Existent in itself, we still require a separate proof to understand that He, the exalted, is knowledgeable. And what is known is distinct from what is unknown. (a3) Third, the true reality of knowledge is distinct from the true reality of power and the true reality of life. If they were expressions of the true reality of His essence, one would have to say that three true realities [191] are just one true reality, which is obviously false.

(b) Nor can His knowledge be additional to His essence, since if it were, then given that it would be an attribute subsistent in that essence, this knowledge would require that essence for its realization, since every attribute requires its subject of attribution. But whatever requires something else is in itself contingent, and requires a producer. And its producer could only be that essence. So, that essence would both have [knowledge] as an attribute and produce [knowledge], even though that essence is simple and free from composition in all respects. So the simple would be both receiving and acting (qābilan wa-fāʿilan), which is absurd. […]

[192.1] Answer to the first doubt: why can’t something simple indeed be both receiving and acting? They say: the distinction between two meanings indicates multiplicity in the essence. But we say: this is overthrown by [the idea of] unity. For it is half of two, and one third of three, and one fourth of four, and so on indefinitely, even though unity is the furthest of things from multiplicity. Likewise, a [center] point faces all the parts of a circle, despite receiving no division.

[perfection implies knowledge]

Why can’t one say: it is this essence’s being perfect that necessitates, as a concomitant, the occurrence of this knowledge. We do not say that the essence is deficient in itself and perfected through something else, but that its being perfect in itself has, as a concomitant, the occurrence of the attributes of perfection.

[argument from possibility; development of T9 and T12]

We say: God knows things other than Himself.

Proof: it is not impossible for us to know God’s essence together with any given object of knowledge. It has been established that the knowledge of something occurs only through the impression (inṭibāʿ) of a form of object of knowledge in the knower. If the knowledge of the essence of God the exalted occurs together with knowledge of about something else, then the two quiddities are present to the mind together. Furthermore, it is not impossible that there occurs a connection between the two quiddities. Now, the possibility of this connection either has as a condition that this form be present in the mind, or not. But the first is false. For the presence of this form in the mind is a connection between this quiddity and the mind. So, if the presence of this form in the mind were a condition for the possibility of this connection, then (since we have already proven that its presence to the mind is the connection between it and the mind), the possibility of this connection would have as a condition the occurrence of this connection. But the condition comes before that which has the condition. It follows that the occurrence (wuqūʿ) of something would come before the possibility of its own occurrence. But the possibility is prior to the occurrence, so that a vicious circle would follow, which is absurd. With this proof it is established that the possibility of that connection does not have as a condition the presence of this form in the mind.

This being so, regardless whether that quiddity is present in the mind or outside the mind, this connection must be possible for it. So, as we can connect the intelligible form of the essence of God the exalted to the forms [128] of all other intelligibles, it must be possible for the essence of God the exalted to be connected to the forms of all intelligibles while existing concretely. But we have already shown that “intellection” and “perception” mean nothing other than such a connection. So, given that the proof shows that this connection is possible for the essence of God the exalted it is necessarily certain that the essence of God the exalted may be knowledgeable concerning things. And having established this, we say that everything that is possible for the essence of God the exalted belongs to Him necessarily. […]

[problem that we have no conception of God’s essence]

[129.9] We do not concede that we can intellectually grasp the essence of God the exalted, never mind saying that we can intellectually grasp His essence together with all other essences. Determination of this claim: the doctrine of the philosophers (al-ḥukamāʾ) is that God in His core (kunh) is inconceivable for man. All that humans may know about God the exalted are negative and relational attributes. But the essence, specified insofar it is what it is, is not an object of human knowledge.

[problem for the argument from possibility]

However, the fact that one can make a judgment about a quiddity when it is in the mind does not imply that this same judgment about it is possible when it is extramental. For “human” in the mind inheres in a subject and so requires a substrate, whereas the extramental human cannot be like this. The extramental human is self-subsisting, has sense-perception, moves by will, and is perceptible to the five senses, whereas “human” in the mind is not like this. So we know that not everything which is possible for a quiddity when it is in the mind must be possible for it when it is extramentally. Therefore, from the possibility of connection between a mental quiddity and intelligible objects, there follows no possibility of connection between an extramental quiddity and those objects.

[against the argument from immateriality]

The first and most plausible among [the points against this argument] is that separation from matter is not specifically about one thing as opposed to another. One cannot say that a given thing is separate from matter “in relation to (bi-al-nisba)” this, rather than to that. By contrast one can say that a given thing intellectually grasps this rather than that. Therefore, separation from matter is not specified as being about one thing as opposed to another, whereas intellection is. Hence, being separate [from matter] is not intellection.

Second: our knowledge that something is separate from position and being indicated is not the same as our knowledge that this same thing is knowledgeable about things. Nor is the former included within the latter, as a constituent for it. Rather, after we learn that something is separate from matter, it still remains doubtful whether that separate thing is knowledgeable or not. Yet it is impossible that one and the same true realities should be both known and not known at the same time. Thus it is established that intellection is different from being separate.

[report of Avicenna’s a fortiori argument]

[Avicenna] said in The Procession and Return that the substance of the soul is engaged in intellection [only] potentially, until a separate form occurs in it. Once the separate form occurs in it, the soul thereby becomes actually engaged in intellection. But, since the substance of the soul becomes actually¹¹ engaged in intellection through the inherence of this form, if we were to suppose that this form is a self-subsistent substance, then it would be all the more plausible to say that it is actually engaged in intellection. It’s just like heat inhering in the substance of fire, so that the substance of fire becomes hot through heat’s inhering in it. If we were to suppose that heat itself was self-subsistent, then it would even more follow that it is hot. […]

[argument from perfection]

[137.7] The Creator, the exalted, is the most perfect among existents. The attribute of knowledge is an attribute of perfection, and its lack would be a deficiency. So one must conclude that He, the exalted, is described with this attribute. In this way one may show that God knows all objects of knowledge, in order to free Him from any ignorance.

[arguments against the argument from possibility]

This is not the right approach. Firstly, because the middle term in [the conclusion] “whatever can be intellectually grasped, does grasp intellectually” is “connection to a form.” Yet there can be no connection to a form for the Necessary Existent at all, as has been demonstrated. Hence, one cannot establish knowledge for the Necessary Existent in this way.

Secondly, the connection of two forms in the soul is nothing but their occurrence and impression in a single substance, or [it occurs] insofar as they are impressed in a single substance. In general, it doesn’t follow that whatever holds for the form in the mind also holds for the form outside the mind. Thus, while it does hold for the form impressed in the mind that it is impressed in a subject (in fact this holds necessarily), still that whose form it is, namely the substance outside the mind, is not impressed in anything in any way. Nor is it of any avail [477] when they give as an excuse by mentioning the “disposition” [for being connected to another form]. For one cannot say: “the form of the extramental substance, occurring in the mind after not having done so, has a disposition for occurrence in the mind. It has the disposition to be impressed not after it occurs [in the mind], but before it does so. So the disposition belongs to the quiddity taken absolutely.” [If this were correct], then an extramental, substantial essence that subsists by itself could be impressed in a subject of inherence, and so would become an accident. But it is an absurdity that substance could ever become an accident. Thus we have shown above that this approach is wrong. What applies to a nature insofar as it is in the mind should not just be transferred to the extramental.

[against the argument from immateriality]

Furthermore, they should consider that if His knowledge [just] means His essence along with His being separate from matter, and His not being hidden from Himself, but no more than this, then this negation cannot be knowledge about many different things other than Himself. For His knowledge of things necessarily requires relations to them, whereas neither the negation of matter from Him, nor the His not being hidden from Himself, imply relations to many things. The meaning (mafhūm) of “something’s being separate from matter” is not the same as the meaning of “being knowledgeable about many different things, which are concomitants of its essence.” Nor is the meaning of “not being hidden from Himself” the same as the meaning of “His being knowledgeable about many different things.” His being knowledgeable about many different things necessarily implies relations, whereas neither of the two negations does this.

[against the argument from immateriality]

If something’s being separate from matter (hayūlā) and barriers were sufficient to make it aware of itself, as is the teaching of the Peripatetics, then that matter whose existence they affirm would also be aware of itself. For it is not a state in something else but has its own quiddity and is separate from any further matter—there being no matter of matter.

[argument from perfection in terms of knowledge by presence]

It has already been shown that every absolute perfection that belongs to the existent as such is not impossible for the Necessary Existent. Therefore, it is necessary for Him. By saying “absolute perfection (kamāl muṭlaq)” we mean that it is not [489] perfection in one respect, deficiency in another, such that it would imply multiplicity, composition, corporeality, and so on. So, if illuminationist knowledge, with no form or trace, but simply the specific relation which is the illuminationist presence of something like the soul has, is true, then it is even more appropriate and complete in the Necessary Existent. He perceives Himself with nothing additional to Himself, as was true of soul, and He knows things through illuminationist, presential knowledge.

[against the argument from immateriality]

He claimed that existence, insofar as it is the nature of existence,¹² does not hinder being known and intellectually grasped. It winds up not being known and grasped only on account of something preventing and hindering this, namely its being in matter and connected to the attachments of matter. But every existence that is separate from matter and its attachments is not hindered from being known.

This is not correct, even if one might imagine otherwise. Regarding their statement that the nature of existence is not hindered from being grasped intellectually: [we respond] that the expression “existence” may be applied to the Necessary Existent and to everything else in an equivocal way only, not univocally. Otherwise He would participate in their nature, and it would follow that the Necessary Existent is contingent and requires an extrinsic preponderator, which is absurd.

[against the appeal to divine causation]

From the fact that he knows His essence, it does not follow that He knows whatever belongs to [His essence] in terms of attributes. Otherwise, everyone who knew something would also know whatever is concomitant to it. And from this it would follow that, when we know God the exalted, we would know everything that proceeds from Him and is concomitant to Him. Likewise, our knowledge about various created things would be tantamount to knowledge of all their attributes and principles, which is absurd.

[against the argument from possibility]

Even if we conceded this, we would still not concede that necessity follows from the privation of impossibility; it could instead be [merely] possible. This is not excluded for God, the exalted. For the [supposed] connection [between God and an object of knowledge] is an association (nisba), and a relation (iḍāfa) between two entities. And associations and relations are [merely] possible for God the exalted, without necessity.

[solution to the animal counterexample against the design argument at T13]

As for the objection based on the acts of animals, it may be refuted as follows. Those who concede that animals are agents do not deny that they are knowledgeable. But if one says that the acts of animals are not created by them, but by God the exalted, they must be known to God the exalted, without being known to animals, since the precise features and proficiency are not due to them.

[argument from intention]

As for His being knowledgeable about both universals and particulars, this is because, if He were not knowledgeable about all existents, then one of two things would follow. Either He would [cause other existents] by essentially necessitating them, or He would intend to bestow existence on something that is unknown to Him. Both options are unacceptable. So it follows that He is knowledgeable. The reason we say that one of these two would follow, is that He must either essentially necessitate them, or be a voluntary agent. If He essentially necessitates them, this is [the first] of the two options. But if He is a voluntary agent, then He must intend to bestow existence on something unknown to Him, and this is the second option. We said that both options are unacceptable, in the first case because of what has been said before [namely that God does not act of necessity], and in the case where he bestows existence on something unknown to Him, because this is just obviously false.¹³

[response to the argument from possibility]

We do not concede that the Necessary in Itself can be connected to the forms of the intelligibles. Rather, a mental form can be connected to the forms of intelligibles in the sense of a connection between two features in one subject. Why do you say that whatever is possible for a mental form is possible for the extramental quiddity? For the quiddity [in the mind] can inhere in a subject, whereas the extramental quiddity cannot. [92v] So not everything that is possible for the mental form is possible for the extramental.¹⁴

[solutions to the animal counterexample at T13]

As for the acts of intermediaries and of animals, they are [in fact] the acts of God the exalted, according to those who say that God alone is efficacious (muʾaththir). Those who think otherwise hold that God creates such animals, and that bestowing of existence upon them and giving them inspiration is wiser than the bestowal of existence upon such acts without their serving as an intermediary.

[God’s essence makes His knowledge perfect, not vice-versa]

Response [to the problem that God would be perfected by having knowledge]: deficient essences acquire perfection from the attributes of perfection. But in the case of perfect essences, it is rather that their attributes are perfect due to being the attributes of these essences. The perfection of knowledge is of this kind: the reason it is perfect is that it is among the attributes of God the exalted.

[rejection of al-Shahrastānī’s ineffability objection at T10]

As for his statement on their behalf that intellection is the inscription of an intelligible form in the intellect, [135] and the True is exalted above having any form such that He could be intellectually grasped: it is nothing. For “form” means concrete being (al-huwiyya) and true reality. If the True had no concrete being, then one could not apply the word “He” (or “it”: huwa) to Him anymore. And if He had no true reality, one could not apply “the True” to Him.

[on the argument from possibility]

For [this inference] it suffices to add another premise, namely that everything which is possible for the Necessary Existent is necessary. For the actualization of something possible is never absurd. But it is always some external influence that actualizes a potentiality, since nothing can come into actuality from potentiality by itself. But it is absurd that there be an influence on the Necessary from anything else.

[why the falāsifa can use the design argument, against T9]

[Al-Shahrastānī’s objection] shows that he has not understood Avicenna’s idea that [God] knows particulars universally in the way that I have indicated. Do you suppose that everything Aristotle discovered about precise features and proficiency that exist among concrete existent individuals, whether separated [from matter] or material, and the way in which well-directed things reach their goals, and the interpretation of the states of simple and composite bodies, and the specific properties of metals, the acts of plant and animal souls; and what Galen says in his books explaining the usefulness of animal organs; and what Ptolemy posited about the benefits of observing the higher bodies and their various movements; and other things whose explanation would be too involved, [all] indicate that the God and Creator of these things does not know them, or rather that He does? Isn’t all this an inference from precise features and proficiency to the knowledge of one who judges precisely and perfectly? Didn’t the theologians (al-mutakallimūn) take from [these examples] whatever they cite when explaining [152] the precise features and proficiency? So how can this man [al-Shahrastānī] think that the methods of the two groups [the falāsifa and the mutakallimūn] differ? Is it not due to his ignorance of their doctrine?

[the immaterial must have knowledge by presence]

Intellection, on the interpretation you have mentioned, can belong only to something that is realized in itself (mutaḥaṣṣil fī nafsihi), which is such as to receive whatever is present to it, or “not absent from it”—however you want to express this. For nothing can occur (yaḥṣula) to anything that is not realized in itself. For the occurring would not really (bi-al-ḥaqīqa) belong to it, but to that through which it occurs and is realized (ḥāṣil wa-mutaḥaṣṣil). This is why neither corporeal matter, nor the form that inheres in it, nor whatever is composed from these two, nor any accident, is capable of intellection. Also, if something cannot intellectually grasp something else, that which is present to it would not really be present to it. This is why soul is capable of intellection only insofar as it separates from that to which corporeal features attach. From this it is clear that everything simple and independent in existence is absolutely such as to intellectually grasp other things, if it is absolutely separate, or insofar as it is separate if it is [only] separate in certain respects, or with regard to its organs if [for instance] its receptivity of other things occurs only through the sense of touch. This is called “perception.”

[against the objection that God cannot be shown to be knowledgeable because He is unknowable]

If someone says that the Necessary Existent is separate and unconnected to matter, and unknowable, we say that nothing else but existence belongs to the quiddity of the Exalted; yet this can be known by demonstration.

[against the argument from possibility]

While conceding all this, we do not concede that everything that is possible for something separate [from matter] in respect of its quiddity must be connected to it. For it may be possible in terms of its quiddity, but impossible insofar as it is an extramentally existent individual.

[on a premise in the argument from possibility, cf. T26]

[Al-Suhrawardī] argues against this move as follows. If this were correct, then substance could become an accident, but this is not possible, so the move is not legitimate. The hypothetical [syllogism] is shown by applying the same reasoning, in order to infer that this possibility does follow, like this: the form of the extramental substance that occurs in the mind after not doing so, has a disposition to occur in the mind. This disposition cannot be due to its being impressed in the mind; rather the impression is due to the disposition. And [the disposition] was just the same before the impression as it is afterwards. So the disposition to occur in the mind and be impressed in it does belong to the quiddity absolutely, and it holds true for the extramental substantial essence that it can be impressed in a subject, which is the mind, after having been self-subsistent. Thus it would be possible that substantiality become accidentality, [which is absurd]. So the move is invalid.

[against the argument from possibility]

This argument shows only that the Necessary through itself grasps things intellectually through the occurrence of their forms in Himself. So it follows that He is the subject for intelligible forms that are connected to Him. But no connection to forms at all is possible for the Necessary Existent, as has been already demonstrated.

[God’s knowledge of other things is not included within His self-knowledge]

Among the issues that are mentioned in respect of this argument¹⁵ is their saying that His knowledge about multiple things, which are His concomitants, is included in His knowledge of Himself. But this claim is not true. For His knowledge [of Himself] is negative, according to [Avicenna], since it comes down to His being separate from matter, and a lack of hiddenness. But how can knowledge about multiple things, which require multiple relations, be subsumed under negation, to which no relation is attached at all? Furthermore, the capacity for laughter is something other than being human, and is its concomitant. And knowing it is something other than knowing humanity. In which case knowledge of the capacity for laughter is not included in the knowledge of humanity. For humanity refers to it only by concomitance, yet this is an extrinsic reference. Hence, the knowledge of both requires two distinct forms. This being so, given that the concomitants of the Necessary Existent are multiple, and His knowledge of Himself differs from the knowledge of these concomitants which follow on the essence, then His knowledge of them will follow on His knowledge of Himself. This would imply that there is numbering and multiplicity in His essence on account of the knowledge of multiple concomitants. Which is absurd, since as you have learned, He is one in all respects.

[nobility argument in terms of degrees of perfection]

Whenever something is more complete and more powerful in its separation from matter, its perception is more perfect and more excellent. Therefore, since intellect is more strongly separated than soul, the perception of intellect is more powerful and stronger than the perception of soul. Likewise the perception of souls differs in accordance with the difference in their separation, their inclination towards the corporeal faculties, their preoccupation with them, and the strength of their connection to body—or [on the other hand] their independence from [the body] and its powers, and their inclination upwards. […]

[498.20] Since self-perception corresponds to the extent of separation, whereas the perception of other things corresponds to the extent of presence and sovereignty, and the Necessary through Himself is stronger in separation than anything else that is separate from matter, and His sovereignty over things and rule over them is greater than any sovereignty, then He, the exalted, is strongest of all in [499] perception of both Himself and other things. Things are present to Him in a greater and stronger way than with any other presence. Since He is the principle of all things, He is sovereign over them with infinite power, which is stronger than all other sovereignty—indeed there is no comparison between His sovereignty and that wielded by any other—thus the principled relation which has sovereignty through an infinitely strong luminous power is what necessitates the presence of things to Him.