Avicenna was notorious for several theses put forward in his philosophy: his endorsement of the eternity of the world, his denial of bodily resurrection, his naturalist accounts of prophecy and miracles. But no one thesis was more notorious, or more associated with Avicenna in particular, than his claim that God knows particulars only “in a universal way.”1 With his other disputed claims, Avicenna was in the good company of other well-known Aristotelian philosophers, such as Aristotle himself in the case of the world’s eternity, or al-Fārābī in the case of his account of prophecy. Here however he seemed to stand alone.2 Why had he gone out of his way to make this provocative, and at the same time rather obscure, claim about God’s knowledge?
His rationale for denying that God knows particulars as such is set out in [T1], a famous passage from the metaphysical section of his Shifāʾ. It comes down to the idea that there is a mismatch between the way particular things exist and the way God’s thought must be. Whereas the particulars are multiple and changing, God’s knowledge is simple and cannot change. As a pure, immaterial mind God lacks the organs and faculties by which we humans grasp particulars as such, for instance when we use eyesight to watch them move or memory to recall them after they have ceased to exist. Thus His access to them is entirely like the best kind of cognition that humans have, which is to say, knowledge at a universal level.3
It is here that the obscurity in his view comes in. Avicenna argues that God’s knowledge, despite being universal, does somehow give Him access to particulars. God grasps Himself as the remote cause of all particular things and thereby grasps them as His effects [T1, T4]; this idea is also explained by his student Bahmanyār [T6] on the basis of the Avicennian notion of “productive knowledge,” and by al-Khayyām on the grounds that God knows the necessary concomitants of His essence [T16]. In a lengthy passage not quoted below, but which follows directly after [T1], Avicenna gives the famous example of an eclipse. The main idea of this example was helpfully summarized later by al-Abharī [T51]: if God knows all universal truths that apply to the heavenly bodies involved in an eclipse, then He will know the eclipse as a bundle of descriptions that apply to it. And God will indeed know these universal truths, because He is the cause of the eclipse in question. Al-Abharī’s presentation of Avicenna’s doctrine largely agrees with that of al-Ṭūsī [T59]. This solution makes the most sense if all things—not just heavenly bodies and celestial intellects but non-eternal things down here in the sublunary world—are the inevitable result of God’s causation. Even the smallest details of particular events in the world need to be necessitated ultimately by God, if He is to know them as their cause. In other words, as al-Rāzī critically notes [T26], Avicenna would need to be a determinist, as indeed is suggested at [T4].
This may still seem to call for the presence of many objects of thought in God’s mind, as he would be thinking about you, me, and every other particular in the world, past present and future, all as His effects. But Avicenna holds that God grasps them all at once, in a single act of understanding that includes all individual objects of knowledge [T2–3]. In what follows, we will call this the “inclusive knowledge theory.” It is standardly illustrated with the case of a person who knows (“in a flash” as it were) how to answer a question or rebut an argument, but would still need to spell it out one step at a time if actually explaining this answer, thus dividing up what had been grasped inclusively [T11, T34]. Ibn Kammūna adds another nice example [T66]: one might know a whole poem through a single act of the mind, without going mentally or verbally through each word or verse. (Compare the example of having the contents of a whole book present to oneself [T61].)
Furthermore, God does not need to change to know the things He ultimately causes. This too is illustrated in the Shifāʾ with the eclipse example: if you know about the eclipse’s occurrence on the basis of your astronomical expertise, your knowledge will not change simply because the eclipse is at first in the future, then now in the present, and then in the past. If you know something “in a universal way” your knowledge will never change: you can always know that there will be a lunar eclipse on a certain day. If by contrast you know the lunar eclipse by observing it with sense-perception, your knowledge will change as soon as the eclipse is over [T51, T63].
As al-Ghazālī briefly notes [T8] and as is explained in detail elsewhere [T7, T10, T17, T23], there was an ongoing dispute within kalām that resonated strongly with the problem Avicenna was raising, even if his own answer to the question was both innovative and problematic. The kalām dispute likewise concerned the question of whether God changes as He knows changing things: the standard example is that Zayd will arrive tomorrow. Notorious was the view of the early mutakallim Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, who admitted that there is change in God’s knowledge so that He would first know that Zayd will be arriving in the future, then that Zayd is arriving, then that He has already arrived; for interesting discussions of this example see [T24, T77]. Even more daring is the view ascribed to al-Fuwaṭī, namely that God cannot know things before they happen, since there is literally “no thing” to know [T10].
It was, then, against both Avicenna and certain mutakallimūn that authors of our period exerted themselves to show how God can indeed know particulars. After all the Qurʾān seems to teach that He does (as at verse 34:3, cited by Avicenna himself at [T1] and also mentioned at [T18, T39, T53]), and we find that people spontaneously pray to God for help, which would be pointless if He did not know about them as individuals [T28]. Besides, God wills to create all things that exist, and surely He knows the objects of His own will [T65] (we have seen this kind of argumentation in the previous chapter). A fairly simple explanation of how this is possible is offered by ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī: since created things are not causes for God, but rather vice-versa, God’s knowledge cannot be made to change by their changing [T9]. This sounds plausible enough, but does not explain how exactly God can both avoid changing and have His knowledge “track” things that are changing. Perhaps through Avicenna’s idea of inclusive knowledge? Ibn al-Malāḥimī thinks not, and argues that the example of knowing how to answer a question or give a proof, but without having yet spelled it out, is unpersuasive. It is only once one spells it out in detail that one actually knows it as opposed to having an unrealized capacity or potentiality to know it [T11, cf. T34, T35, T37]. Al-Abharī however contends that the example does work [T49]. If we imagine someone who already knows how to give a three-step proof, going on to articulate the steps independently of one another would involve three further, separate acts of knowledge. A position akin to the inclusive knowledge theory can also be found in Bābā Afḍal, for whom God’s perfect self-knowledge encompasses all objects of knowledge, so that He is the “universal of universals” [T47–48].
As this suggests, not all authors of the period shied away from the notion that God’s knowledge is indeed universal in nature. As one might expect, al-Ṭūsī defends Avicenna on this score, adding that God can timelessly know things that are in time, in a mode different to that of temporal knowers [T59–61]. Ibn Kammūna and Bar Hebraeus also rehearse the Avicennan position [T70–71]. But a good deal of criticism was aimed at Avicenna’s theory, too. Al-Shahrastānī observes that, since there are many universals to know, universal knowledge would still imply multiplicity in the knower and does not rule out temporality [T18–19].
Al-Rāzī continues this sort of “internal critique” of the Avicennan account, arguing that if God knew things as a cause as Avicenna claims, He would have to know the grounds on which they become individuals too.4 Thus He would know them in a particular, not a universal, way [T27, T29, T31], which should be possible since there is really no good reason to deny that immaterial knowers can know material things [T21]. Conversely, Avicennists would argue that universal knowledge through causes could never provide an understanding of a given particular, since any combination of universals no matter how detailed could at least in theory be instantiated by some other particular [T30, T67, T71]. Avicenna would, however, need to admit that God knows at least one particular as such, namely His first effect among the celestial intellects, since this is something He causes directly [T36]; al-Ṭūsī suggests that this might be unproblematic since the first intellect does not change [T58]. Finally, paradoxes arise if we suppose with Avicenna that knowing a cause implies knowing all of that cause’s effects [T32–33]. A solution to the paradoxes was provided by al-Kātibī and al-Ḥillī, by distinguishing different levels of knowledge [T62, T79].
If Avicenna’s proposal of inclusive and universal knowledge in God is rejected, how can the original problem be resolved? Other solutions involve accepting that there is something in, or belonging to, God that allows Him to track multiple, changing things without Himself being multiple or changing. Ibn al-Malāḥimī proposes that God may have “acts” of knowledge that are distinct from His essence [T12, T14]. This would explain how God knows everything, as indeed He must if He knows anything at all, since there is no principled reason for saying that He knows certain things rather than others [T13]. Bar Hebraeus rejects Avicenna’s claim that God’s knowledge is “universal,” arguing that He need not change to know about changing things because He has already known in advance what will happen [T72], mirroring the Ashʿarite position in the aforementioned kalām debate [T7, T8].
Another view posits multiple “relations” in God, which again would leave His essence to be one. This position was developed in two steps. First, once again, one position within the aforementioned kalām debate was that God’s knowledge is in itself an unchanging attribute, which however has changing relations to changing particulars. Al-Ghazālī and his fellow student al-Anṣārī would argue that knowledge of what changes implies no real change in the knower but only what modern-day philosophers sometimes call “Cambridge change,” that is, change only in respect of extrinsic accidents [T7 and T8]. A famous example, given by Avicenna in [T5], is that I can stand still while you go around me, so that without really changing I am at first on your right and then on your left.5 Avicenna himself rejects this as a way of thinking about knowledge, and claims that on the contrary, change in the known does imply real change in the knower. This was generally accepted in our period. Thus al-Sāwī argues: the knowledge that Zayd will be born must, at Zayd’s birth, vanish and be replaced by knowledge that Zayd has been born; otherwise what was knowledge will become a false belief [T20]. (Compare the “dark house” thought experiment discussed by al-Rāzī at [T24].) Al-Kātibī argues that knowledge must change because it corresponds to the known. If the known is subject to change, the corresponding knowledge is so as well [T63]. Al-Ḥillī similarly argues that knowledge of the future must be different from knowledge of the present because it is possible to be in doubt about one but not the other [T78]. The only explicit proponent of al-Ghazālī’s and al-Anṣārī’s position is al-Āmidī [T44, T46]: the attribute of God’s knowledge is unchanging but may be differently related to perishing things through direct observation.
A second step in the development of the “relational” solution was made by Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī [T15] and taken up by al-Rāzī [T22, T25]. It drops al-Ghazālī’s claim that God’s knowledge never changes, but retains the idea that His knowledge is relational: in fact knowledge is nothing but a relation between the knower and the knower, not a real attribute.6 But against this and in defense of al-Ghazālī’s and al-Anṣārī’s position, al-Āmidī argued that eternal knowledge cannot consist in a relation to a temporally bounded thing [T43, T45].
In developing his theory of knowledge as a relation, Abū al-Barakāt states that some items of knowledge may be directly known with no need for a representation of them in the mind or sense-organ [T15] (see also [T72]). This idea becomes central for al-Suhrawardī’s analysis of God’s knowledge. He starts from the worry that God cannot know things through representations residing in Him, since this would mean that God receives an influence from what He creates, so as to be both passively affected by things and actively productive of them [T38]. (Al-Abharī and al-Ṭūsī sometimes dismiss this problem, as at [T50, T55].) Suhrawardī’s solution is to say that God knows everything by “presence.” In other words, things just present themselves to God, who knows them in themselves with no need for representations [T39–42]. He avoids change in God in much the way we have found in Abū al-Barakāt and al-Rāzī: if knowledge is by presence, change in knowledge will mean only relational change [T39, T73].7
The theory of knowledge by presence was widely accepted in the 13th century: by al-Abharī [T52–53], al-Nakhjawānī [T54] (ascribed to Avicenna himself!), al-Kātibī [T64], al-Ṭūsī [T56–57], and unsurprisingly al-Suhrawardī’s faithful adherent al-Shahrazūrī [T73]. There was however a debate within this tradition: does God’s knowledge by presence mean that God knows everything, including sublunary individuals, directly? Al-Shahrazūrī argues for this reading of al-Suhrawardī and opposes it to al-Ṭūsī’s interpretation [T75], which states that God knows sublunary individuals through the mediation of celestial intellects. Their representations reside in those intellects and God knows them, since celestial intellects are direct effects of God’s creation [T56–57] (cf. al-Suhrawardī’s remarks in [T39]). Al-Shahrazūrī compares al-Ṭūsī’s idea to an otherwise unknown testimony of the early philosopher al-Kindī [T74]. Ibn Kammūna inclines towards the idea of mediation through celestial intellects [T68], saying that this is the only way to explain how God can know non-existent things, like future things that do not yet exist [T69]. This meets an objection from al-Tustarī: he does not understand how God can know non-existent things through knowledge by presence, ascribing that view to al-Ṭūsī and Bahmanyār [T76]. Al-Ḥillī also objects that mediation through the celestial spheres would make them like organs for God [T82]. Against al-Ṭūsī’s account of God’s knowledge of His effects by their presence, al-Ḥillī argues that we may fail to know what proceeds from us [T80]; conversely, sheer existence of the effects cannot be equated with God’s knowing them [T81].
Texts from: Avicenna, Bahmanyār, al-Ghazālī, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, ʿUmar al-Khayyām, al-Shahrastānī, al-Sāwī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī, al-Āmidī, Bābā Afḍal, al-Abharī, al-Nakhjawānī, al-Ṭūsī, al-Kātibī, al-Samarqandī, Ibn Kammūna, Bar Hebraeus, al-Shahrazūrī, al-Tustarī, al-Urmawī, al-Ḥillī.
God’s Knowledge of Particulars
[T1] Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.6, 287.3–290.17 [trans. Marmura, mod.]
[God knows things only by being their principle]
The Necessary Existent cannot intellectually grasp things from the things [themselves]. For if He did, either His essence would be constituted by whatever He grasps [of them], and then He would be constituted through the things; or it would accidentally occur to [the essence] that He grasps8 [them], in which case [the essence] would not be a necessary existent in every respect, which is absurd. Also, He would be such that He would not be in some state if some external items were absent, but then He would have a state that is not implied by His own essence but by another, so that this other thing would have an effect on Him. The foregoing principles rule this out, and rule out any such thing. Because He is the principle of all existence, He intellectually grasps from His essence that of which He is a principle. He is the principle of both those existents that are complete as concrete objects, and of those existents that are subject to generation and corruption, firstly with respect to their species and then, through these as an intermediary, with respect to their individual instances.
[God cannot change so as to know changing things as such]
Another point is that He cannot intellectually grasp these changing things while they are changing and insofar as they are changing, in a temporal and individualized way; He can do so only in another way, which we will explain. For it is impossible that He first intellectually grasps in time that they exist, rather than being non-existent, and then grasps in time that they are non-existent, rather than existing. For in that case, there would be a distinct intellectual form for each of these two situations, neither of which would persist together with the other, and then the Necessary Existent would be subject to change in its essence.
[God cannot know material things as such]
Moreover, when corruptible things are intellectually grasped through an immaterial quiddity and through something that attaches to it that is not individualized, they are not intellectually grasped insofar as they are corruptible. If they are perceived insofar as they are connected to matter, and to the accidents of matter, at a [particular] time and with individuation, then they are not grasped intellectually, but are objects of sensation or imagination. We have shown in other books that every sensory and imaginative form is, as such, perceived by an organ that is divisible. And just as [288] affirming a multiplicity of acts for the Necessary Existent is to ascribe deficiency to Him, so too with the affirmation of many intellections.
[He knows particulars in a universal way]
Rather, the Necessary Existent intellectually grasps all things in a universal way. Yet, despite this, no individual thing escapes His knowledge; “not even the weight of a speck of dust upon the earth or in the heavens” (Qurʾān 34:3). This is among the wonders whose conception requires ingenious subtlety. As for how this happens, it is because, when He intellectually grasps His own essence and grasps that He is the principle of every existent, He grasps the principles of the existents [that proceed] from Him and whatever is generated by them. Nothing exists that is not somehow necessitated by Him as a cause, as we have shown. The coming together of these causes results in the existence of particular things. The First knows the causes and what corresponds to them. He thus necessarily knows to what these lead, the times between them, and their recurrences. For He cannot know those [the principles] without knowing this. Thus he will perceive particular items insofar as they are universal, I mean, insofar as they have attributes. If these [particulars] become specified with these [attributes] individually, this takes place in relation to an individuated time or circumstance. If this circumstance were also taken along with their attributes, it too would be in the same position as [the particulars]. But insofar as [these attributes] depend on principles all of which are one of a kind, they depend on individual items. We have said that this sort of dependence may give these individuals a description and a characterization, unique to [each of] them. If a given individual is something that is individual for the intellect too, then the intellect will have a way to get at this [individual] so described. This is the case of an individual which is unique in its species and has no comparable instance (naẓīr), for example the sphere of the sun or Jupiter. If, however, the species is spread out across individuals, the intellect will have no way to get at that thing’s description, except once this [individual] is directly indicated, as you have learned.
[T2] Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.7, 291.6–11 [trans. Marmura, mod.]
[the simplicity of God’s knowledge]
Furthermore, one should know that when the First is called “intellect,” this is said with the simple meaning you learned in the Psychology, namely that in Him there is no variety of forms arranged and differing, such as there is in the [human] soul, in the sense previously [discussed] in the Psychology. For this reason He intellectually grasps things all at once, without being rendered multiple by them in His substance, or conceiving their forms in the true reality of His essence. Rather, their forms emanate from Him as intelligibles. He has a better claim to being “intellect” than these forms that emanate from His intellectual nature (ʿan ʿaqliyyatihi). For He intellectually grasps His own essence, and grasps that He is the principle of all things, so that He intellectually grasps all things from His essence.
[T3] Avicenna, Dānishnāma, Ilāhiyyāt, 87.6–88.6
[inclusive knowledge theory as applied to God]
When an intelligent person has a debate or discussion with someone, and is confronted with many statements all of which need answering, then a single thought comes to exist in his soul, such that he is sure he can respond to all of them with that one thought, even though the forms of the answers do not arise separately in his soul. Then, once he starts to reflect and express himself, different forms occur in his soul from that one thought in sequential arrangement, the soul observes one form after another, one bit of knowledge after another occurs to him in actuality, and the language conveys each form as it occurs. Both kinds of knowledge arise in actuality, since the person who has the initial thought is already sure of all his responses, but the second [state] is also knowledge in actuality. The first is knowledge because, it is the principle and cause for the discovery of intellectual forms, and so is actual knowledge; while that other [state] is knowledge because it takes on [88] many intellectual forms. This latter knowledge is passive (infiʿālī). Here there are many forms in the knower, which implies multiplicity. In the case of the former, by contrast, there is [only] a relation to many forms from one and the same thing, which necessitates no multiplicity. Thus it has become clear how one may know many things without multiplicity; the way the Necessary Existent knows all things is the same as the way that a single thought knew many things.
[T4] Avicenna, Dānishnāma, Ilāhiyyāt, 89.1–90.2
[knowing the contingent through its causes]
Nevertheless everything that is contingent in itself is necessary in respect of existence and non-existence through a cause. Hence, when one knows it with respect to the cause, one knows it from the perspective of necessity. So the contingent can be known from that perspective from which it is necessary. For instance, when one says that somebody will find treasure tomorrow, you cannot know whether or not he will find treasure tomorrow, since this is contingent in itself. If, however, you know that there happens to be a cause for him resolving to go somewhere, and a cause for him going along a certain path, and a cause for him placing his foot in a certain spot, and you know that his tread is heavy enough to open the storage place [of the treasure], then you thereby know with certainty that he will reach the treasure. Hence one can know the contingent by considering it from the perspective of its necessity. But you have already learned that nothing is until it becomes necessary. Hence each thing has a cause, even though the causes of things are not completely known to us, so that their necessity is not known to us either. If we know [only] some causes, then mere belief prevails and there is no certainty, since we know that those causes about which we are knowledgeable do not render it necessary that the contingent exist. For instance, some other cause may occur, or some hindrance may arise. If not for this “it could be,” we ourselves would know with certainty. But given that each thing that exists goes back to the Necessary Existent, from which [90] it must necessarily come to be—so that all things have a necessary relation to the Necessary Existent, since they become necessary through Him—all things are therefore known to Him.
[T5] Avicenna, Dānishnāma, Ilāhiyyāt, 90.8–91.6
[knowledge needs to imply change]
Whoever knows something possesses an attribute which is in his soul and is distinct from his being related to that thing, and from the fact that that thing is. It’s not like when one thing is to the right of another, and there is nothing apart from a relation between it and that thing, so that if that thing which was to its right becomes non-existent and is no longer to its right, it will undergo no change. Rather, its connection and relation to the other thing is no longer there, but its essence remains just as it was. On the contrary, knowledge is something such that, when someone is knowing, at the time when the essence of the known is there, [he knows] that it is there. The moment that it is no longer there, [he knows] that the essence of the known [91] is not there, and it is not only the essence of the known that is not there. Rather the [prior] fact of being a knower, which was an entity (maʿnā) and attribute in the essence of [the knower], is not there either. For one equally knows something when there is something else in addition to himself, and when that thing is absent. [So] there needs to be something specific in his essence, namely that fact of being a knower. Either there is a specific state for every specific object of knowledge, or one and the same specific state in him is connected to all objects of knowledge, such that if even a single object of knowledge were lacking, that specific state would no longer be there.
[T6] Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 574.3–11
[on productive knowledge]
Since He intellectually grasps Himself (dhātahu), He also grasps the necessary concomitants of His essence (dhāt); otherwise He would not intellectually grasp Himself completely. Although the necessary concomitants that are His intelligibles are accidents existing in Him, He is neither described with them nor is He acted upon by them. For His being the Necessary Existent through Himself is the same as His being the principle for His necessary concomitants—that is, His intelligibles. Rather, whatever proceeds from Him does so only after He already exists completely. Indeed, his essence cannot be a subject of inherence for accidents in virtue of which He is acted upon, perfected, or described. Rather, His perfection lies in their proceeding from Him, not in His being their subject of inherence. The necessary concomitants of His essence are the forms of His intelligibles, not in such a way that these forms proceed from Him and He then intellectually grasps them. Rather these very forms—because they are separate from matter—emanate from Him while they are intelligible to Him. Their very existence from Him is the same as their intelligibility. Hence His intelligibles are active, not passive.
[T7] Al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, vol. 1, 545.10–13; 545.20–546.2; 547.4–6; 547.13–17
[Response to Jahm ibn Ṣafwān on change in God as knower]
[545.10] We say to Jahm: if God, may He be praised, is eternally knowing about what will be, He can know it only as it is, so He must [already] do so sufficiently when He creates. For there is no further help from the origination of knowledge about [created things] in addition to eternal knowledge. But He knows about them by means of supposition (taqdīr), and once they come to exist, that which was supposed becomes realized. Supposition and realization (taḥqīq) belong to the object of knowledge, not to the eternal attribute [of knowledge]. […]
[545.20] If someone says: the Creator knew in His eternity about the non-existence of the world, not about its existence. But once the world was originated, one of the two must be the case: either He does not know about this, which is absurd, or He does know about it, and then a feature arises newly for Him that was not there [before], so that there is no escape from [accepting] the new arising of knowledge. [546] Moreover, one cannot say that originated knowledge inheres in His essence, nor is there any way to say that He would have known from eternity about [the world’s] existence before it existed, since this would be ignorance and not knowledge. […]
[547.4] Supposing that originated knowledge persists, [let us] imagine the knowledge connected to the [fact] that Zayd will arrive tomorrow, whereupon he arrives. The knowledge that his arrival will occur should persist until the time of his arrival. Then, when he does arrive, there is no need for any new knowledge about the occurrence of his arrival, as one already had the knowledge about his arrival at a certain time.
[547.13] If someone says: one still finds in one’s soul a difference between knowing that [Zayd] will come and knowing [that he is coming] at the time of his coming. We say: knowing that [Zayd] will arrive tomorrow is knowing about his arrival at a certain time. Hence, what corresponds (mutaʿallaq) to [this] knowledge is his arrival at that time. From this knowledge follows knowledge of the non-existence of his arrival before the appointed time. If however one posits that there is a newly arising state or some change in the soul, then this just has to do with the sense-perception of the arrival and observing it to happen. But the one who reports (mukhbir) is not like the one who observers (muʿāyin), nor does supposition (taqdīr) behave like realization (taḥqīq) in the case of originated things.
[T8] Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 138.14–139.8; 140.12–15 [trans. Marmura, mod.]
[God’s changing knowledge is not real change]
[138.14] On what basis do you refute someone who says that God the exalted has one knowledge of the existence of, for example, the eclipse at a specific time, and that this knowledge before [the eclipse] happens is knowledge that it will be, but it is identical with the knowledge of its occurrence when it is happening, and with the knowledge of its having passed once it is over; and that these differences reduce to relations that necessitate no change in the essence of knowledge, and hence necessitate no change in the essence of the knower; and that [these differences] have the status of a pure relation? For one individual may first be on your right, then move to be in front of you, then move to your left. The relations thus succeed each other for you, but it is this individual who is undergoing change, not you. This is how [142] one must understand the situation with God’s knowledge. For we admit that He knows things by one knowledge in the eternal past and future, [His] state never changing. Their purpose was to deny change [in God], and this is agreed. But as for their claim that there must be change if knowledge is affirmed first for something happening now and then later for its having passed, this is not agreed. How do they know this? For if God creates for us knowledge of the arrival of Zayd tomorrow at sunrise [and] preserves this knowledge, creating neither another knowledge for us nor a lapse in this knowledge, then at the time of the sunrise we would know he is arriving now just by the previous knowledge; and, would know later that he had arrived earlier. This one persisting knowledge would be sufficient to include all three states.
[comparison between Avicenna and earlier theologians]
[140.12] According to your principles, what prevents Him from knowing particular items even if [it means that] He undergoes change? Why couldn’t you say that this kind of change is not impossible for him, just as Jahm [ibn Ṣafwān], among the Muʿtazilites, did? He claimed that that [God’s] cognitions of temporally originated things are [themselves] temporally originated. [Or why couldn’t you say that] He is a subject for temporally originated things, just as some of the later Karramiyya believed?
[T9] ʿAyn al-Quḍāt, Zubdat al-ḥaqāʾiq, 22.4–23.3; 25.1–11 [trans. Jah, mod.]
[God’s knowledge need not change with the change of the known]
Someone who says that God does not know particulars (may God be greatly exalted above what they say!) probably reached this conclusion insofar as he sees these particulars as falling under past or future. So he thought that their change would necessitate that the knowledge of them changes along with them. This is madness, according to those who have undertaken verification, because time is a part of existent things. For it is just the measure of motion, and motion is among the proper attributes of bodies. It is acknowledged that the bodies are the lowest category that exists from the eternal knowledge. All existent things, whether noble or base, are acquired from it [sc. divine knowledge], whereas the existence of the eternal knowledge is not dependent on the existence of anything. Rather the existence of each thing depends on its existence. If time is a part of the existent things, as already explained, how can one say that a change that occurs to any existent things would imply a change in His knowledge? This would be true only if His knowledge were dependent on the existent things, as is the case with the knowledge of humankind (al-khulq). Since His knowledge is not like this, the change of existent things does not imply a change in His knowledge, which comprehends them. […]
[sun comparison]
[22.17] Someone who supposes that a change in the rays [of the sun] due to a veil (like a cloud, for instance) that prevents the Earth from being able to receive them would imply a change in the attribute which is the source of the rays, has fallen into great error. Upon my life! The sun could change, and consequently the rays would change; but our supposition here [23] is that the change in the rays is caused by a veil which prevents the Earth from receiving the light of the sun. I do not mean that it prevents the emanation of the sun, since the sun is as it was, with its attributes. Nothing changes in it due to this veil. Rather it is the veil that prevents the Earth from receiving the emanation of the sunlight. […]
[the inconceivability of God’s knowledge]
[25.1] May God Almighty increase their understanding of the incapacity of their own intellects to perceive divine matters! Anyone who desires to comprehend by his intellect and knowledge the true reality of a knowledge that already existed before creation (al-kawn) and before even [any] “before,” and which is the cause of the existence of all existing things, and which comprehends everything to an extent that no comprehension beyond it can be conceived, has sought the vulture’s egg,9 desired to reach the stars, and truly divested himself of his inborn intellect. The superior ones (ahl al-faḍl) may rightly count such people as insane. Our intellects are many times less capable of perceiving eternal knowledge than an ant, or even an inanimate object, would be of comprehending our knowledge.
[yet at least disanalogy is clear]
The relation of His knowledge to ours is like the relation of His power to our power. Just as it is impossible for our power to create (ikhtirāʿ) a thing, that is, make it exist from nothing, but this is not impossible for His eternal power, because He is the originator of the heavens and the Earth (that is, He is the one who made them exist and created them from nothing)—so in the same way, it is also impossible for our knowledge to be such that an object of knowledge changes without implying a change in our knowledge of it, because our knowledge is acquired from the object of knowledge. Yet this is not impossible for the knowledge of God, on which the existence of all existent things is based.
[T10] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 352.2–9
[doxographical account of Muʿtazilite views]
The majority of Muslims believed that God the exalted is eternally knowledgeable. Yet the master Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī reports that Jahm b. Ṣafwān argued that knowing about the non-existent is impossible, and said that God the exalted knows things only when they exist (fī ḥāl wujūdihi). The same is ascribed to the Rāfiḍīs. It is also reported about Hishām b. al-Ḥakam that he would say: if God had eternal knowledge, then He would know that bodies are in motion and that the heavens are existent [eternally]. The doctrine of Hishām b. al-Ḥakam was apparently that the Exalted does not know things before they exist. It is also reported about Hishām b. ʿAmr al-Fuwaṭī that for him, one could not say that God the exalted knows about things eternally, since this would entail that they are “things” despite being non-existent, but on his view the non-existent is not a thing. Yet he did not exclude that God the exalted is eternally knowledgeable, only that one may describe the object of knowledge as a “thing.”
[T11] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 78.22–79.10; 84.15–85.9
[ascription of inclusive knowledge theory to the philosophers]
Then they said, just as God the exalted knows Himself, He also knows all species and genera of existents. Then they asked themselves: many objects of knowledge call for many items of knowledge, since it is absurd that one and the same knowledge be about differentiated (mufaṣṣala) objects of knowledge. So when you say that He knows the genera of the objects of knowledge, this implies a multiplicity [79] in His knowledge and likewise a multiplicity in His essence. The response to this is that [His knowing genera and species] does not result in multiplicity. For we say that He, may He be exalted, knows genera and individual particulars in a universal way, which results in no multiplicity. This is shown by the fact that humans have three states of knowledge. First, when one distinguishes in one’s soul the forms of the objects of knowledge, and mutually arranges them. Second, when one acquires for one’s soul a state and disposition, which is the principle for the emanation of an infinite number of forms. For instance one may acquire the science of mathematics, this being a simple state in which nothing is distinguished, but which has a relation to an infinite number of forms. The third is a state in between these two, as when a person hears an objection in a dispute and can work out how to solve it. He knows that his response is present to him, even as he intends to make a detailed and lengthy [account of his response], so that he finds in his soul that he comprehends the response and is ready to proceed with it, so that differentiated forms will keep arising anew in him, and one expression after another, until he exhausts that which is in his soul. This state is the principle of differentiation, and its creator. The knowledge of God the exalted must be of this third kind. […]
[critical response]
[84.15] As for the comparisons he gave to one of us having knowledge, and the way He, may He be exalted, having knowledge in the third way, the response is as follows. The second comparison is not a case where someone knowledgeable knows anything at all. For someone who knows the foundations of mathematics and is indeed able to derive [the solutions to] certain problems from them, does not know the derivation [of those solutions] to the given problems at that moment. He knows only the premises for these problems, which he arranges in his soul. Only once he finds an arrangement, does he thereby know the correspondence of this problem to the foundations he has confirmed for himself, which are premises of knowledge of this problem. But being able to know something is not the same as knowing this thing. Rather [actual knowledge of something arises] by arranging knowledge with respect to the thing.
As for the third comparison, where one of us knows the response to an objection, it is along the same lines as knowing about the foundation of mathematics. For someone who is proficient in a science finds the premises of knowledge of a given problem and derives [a solution]. Afterwards, he expresses what he found in his soul in terms of premises, in order to display how that problem may be derived, in correspondence to the foundations. Likewise someone who knows the response to an objection finds within his soul, upon hearing [the objection], the invalidity of the syllogism on the basis of which the objection was based, or that its premises are false. Then he expresses what he has come to know about the invalidity [of the syllogism] or the falsehood of that premises. This, however, [happens only] once [85] they are realized in his soul. If they are not present, he needs to take up an investigation and syllogistic argument in order to know the response to the objection. So if their statement, “this state is the principle of differentiation in matters of knowledge (tafṣīl al-ʿulūm),” means that one arranges the premises of the response to the objection in one’s soul, but without taking up a syllogistic [argument], then this would amount to a co-occurrence of multiple items of knowledge (ʿulūm) about things at one and the same moment in the soul, once one responds to the objection. And they ruled out this co-occurrence of different items of knowledge in the soul, saying that it would imply multiplicity in the knower, but they say that the multiplicity of the known is impossible in God the exalted. So they are wrong to say that God is knowledgeable in the third way. Or they might mean by this statement that one is disposed to acquiring knowledge about the response to the problem, since it is easy to form a syllogism through which one knows the response in detail (ʿalā al-tafṣīl). And once one starts to respond to it, at the very moment of intending the premises of the response, one acquires the items of knowledge, insofar as each premise contributes to an exhaustive response to the objection. Yet this state in no way amounts to the knower actually knowing things. Rather, one knows about [the things] potentially. But this is not what they want in the case of God the exalted being knowledgeable.
[T12] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 81.19–22; 89.17–90.2; 90.12–15
[critical response to Avicenna]
As for your statement, “He knows that He is the principle of existents, so that His knowledge of Himself encompasses knowledge of them,” we say to you: aren’t existing bodies and accidents particular individuals? So if His knowledge of Himself encompasses knowledge of them, then it encompasses particular things. So you [must] say that He knows them in a particular way, since it is in this way that His essence is their principle. […]
[89.17] As for the example [Avicenna] provided for [God’s] knowing particulars in a universal way, namely that He would know that if the sun and moon are in a given position, then an eclipse will happen over a given region (iqlīm), and this is true, regardless whether the eclipse is [just now] occurring or not, one may respond to him as follows. Mustn’t anyone who knows these states of the sun and the moon and the resulting eclipse know the sun, moon, and positions themselves, in order to know about the occurrence of the eclipse? Or is it that He knows that, if there were a sun in a celestial sphere, and a moon in [another] sphere, and if they were to move in position, so that the sun is present at a specific position—if, that is, it were to have any specific position—then the eclipse would happen? If [Avicenna] says the first, then he has described [God] as knowing particulars, since the sun and the moon as concrete objects (bi-ʿaynihimā) are parts of the world. But if he says the second, then it may be said to him that these items of knowledge involve no knowledge of the particulars, since each of them is knowledge of something universal. Likewise the knowledge of the quiddity of human [90] is not knowledge about some particular human, but rather knowledge of a universal. Don’t you see that these items of knowledge—that is, that if there were sun, moon, position, and region, and if there were then motions, then there would be an eclipse—is like knowing that if there were human and horse, then they would be distinguished by a specific difference? If knowledge of this sort were knowledge of particulars, then there would be no difference between the universal and the particular. […]
[90.12] It may be said to him: what do you mean by saying that His perception would change as time changes? Do you mean that the essence of the perceiver would change through the changing in His perception of the changing objects of perception? Or do you mean that the acts of the perceiver would change, that is, his perceptions? If the former, then one may say to him that the essence of the agent does not change through the change of his acts. If the latter, then one may ask him what prevents the acts of the agent from being multiple.
[T13] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 87.5–17
[specification argument: if God knows anything, He knows everything]
We say: they [i.e. the mutakallimūn] would say that [God]—may He be exalted—knows about all objects of knowledge in all respects, in both a universal and particular way; not even a speck of dust escapes His knowledge, either in the heavens or on the earth. They proved this on the grounds that the Exalted knows some objects of knowledge through Himself, not through anything additional to Himself, so that He must know all that He can possibly know, in every way He can possibly know it. The proof that the Exalted knows some things through Himself, has already been indicated above, and the philosophers (al-falāsifa) admit it. We only need it to be the case that, if He knows some objects of knowledge through Himself, then He knows all of them. For if He knows some of them without any factor to specify Him as knowing some rather than others, and if it is not impossible for every living being that it know all things, then it must know all of them, since none [of the objects of knowledge] is more appropriate in this respect [that is, to be known] than others; then, He either knows everything or knows nothing at all. Since it is false that He knows no object of knowledge, He must know them all. Our saying “it is not impossible for every living being to know all things” is a primarily evident judgment. Therefore, if reasonable people learn that there is a living being who knows in this way, they would not deem it impossible [that it knows every object of knowledge], but would accept this. The only reason it would know some things but not others would be its not knowing what it knows through itself, but instead through something additional to it: a capacity for doing so, an investigation, or a proof. In that case, when it knew certain things this would not imply its knowing everything. It would only imply that knowing everything is not impossible for it due to its being a living thing, but it would [actually] know only those objects it has a means to know, nothing else.
[T14] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 88.1–7; 88.23–89.1; 89.3–6
[his own position: knowledge as God’s act]
We have shown that the true reality of knowledge is not what they suppose it to be. The mutakallimūn of Islam posited that God the exalted is knowledgeable only because this is necessitated by His essence, and posited the objects of [His] knowledge as a condition, or as connected to [God’s being knowledgeable]. Someone who thinks that the Exalted knows that things will be, but He cannot know them as existent before they exist, so that He knows them as existent only once they exist, argues as follows: His essence, may He be exalted, necessitates that that existent is evident (tabayyunahu) to Him, and that He is connected to it. Not that that existent affects His essence; [rather] God is knowledgeable in the same way that the other effects of His essence come about, such as the possibility that action [proceeds] from His essence and has its existence from Him, or the fact that He sees existing things and hears sounds. The fact that His essence necessitates that these features apply [to Him] when conditions for them arise anew implies no change in His essence. […]
[88.23] The truth, according to those who among them who have engaged in verification, is that God’s being knowledgeable is not a state (ḥāla) in Him, but rather a feature (ḥukm) that proceeds from His essence; and that the connection between knower and known, as well as the latter’s being evident to the former, is something between the essence of the knower and the essence of the known. It cannot be grasped intellectually without both of them, just like fatherhood for the father and sonhood for son. Though the features of the essence may be multiple, [89] that which necessitates them is not multiple. […]
[89.3] Furthermore, he is also wrong to say that [God’s] being knowledgeable cannot be an accident of His essence, since He cannot have a state which does not follow from His essence but follows from something else. For we have shown that nothing follows for Him from something else; rather it follows from His essence. One does not thereby affirm any state for His essence. Rather, as they would put it, one affirms His “act,” or as we would put it, a “feature” that is necessitated by Him.
[T15] Abū al-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, vol. 3, 76.21–77.1; 77.7–12; 81.10–12; 82.12–24; 83.3–5; 88.11–89.3
[response to Avicenna’s multiplicity and change arguments]
As for the claim that there must be distinction in Him through the perception of distinct objects, and multiplicity through the multiplicity of the perceptions, the verified response is as follows. He is not multiplied through this multiplicity in respect of His essence, but only in respect of His relations and associations. This [multiplicity] entails no multiplicity in His concrete being, His essence, or His unity, which necessarily pertains to Him due to the necessity of His existence in Himself. Yet His being the First Principle, through which we came to know Him, and on account of which we have made certain affirmations and negations regarding Him, [77] is [not]10 a unity of His perceptions, associations, and relations; rather it is only the unity of His true reality, essence, and concrete being. […]
[77.7] How can [Avicenna] say that the perception of things that are changing entails change in [God’s] essence, given that he himself said in the Categories that one and the same belief is the subject for truth and falsehood, not due to any change in itself, but insofar as the objects of belief change how they are, from corresponding with [the belief] to conflicting with it. For that change does not belong to the belief in itself but rather to the object of belief, insofar as it corresponded with it at first but then changed and conflicted with it. How could it be that in this case belief, conviction, and knowledge do not change, but in that case [i.e. God’s case] knowledge does change, leading to a change in the knower? […]
[81.10] He grasps the eternal eternally, and those things that arise anew as an intellect that is eternal and perpetual, insofar as they are perpetual in species and materially, and also with regard to the efficient and final causes. So He also grasps them intellectually as they change, in correspondence to their change. This change is not in Him, but in them. […]
[reply to Avicenna’s argument that God’s knowledge would be either a constituent or an accident for Him]
[82.12] Regarding constitution, the response is that the presupposition is false. For someone who intellectually grasps something is not constituted by that which he grasps, since intellection is an act, and acts are posterior to existence precisely in terms of essential posteriority. How could existence be constituted by something that is essentially posterior to existence? As for His intellection being an accident for [his essence], what [Avicenna] infers from this, namely that He would not be necessary existent in all His aspects, is like poetic acclaim, or like a rhetorical speech of praise using images as verbal adornments. Otherwise, what is the meaning of “in all His aspects”? For whatever applies [to His intellection] applies to the fact that He is the first principle, or indeed a principle in general: either He is constituted by being the first principle, or this is an accident for Him. So He is not necessary in all His aspects. For instance, He is not the necessary existent in respect of being the first principle of Zayd, ʿAmr, or other existents. What [Avicenna’s] demonstration [of God’s existence] proved to us is that He is the necessary existent in Himself; as for “all His aspects,” if they are aspects of His existence, then this is right [sc. the aspects are necessary]. But when it comes to His relations and associations, then no: given what has been said, this is wrong. Either He is not the first principle, or He is not the necessary existent in all His aspects, that is, with respect to His relations to that whose existence is essentially posterior to His existence. […]
[83.3] As for [Avicenna’s] claim that [God] would possess a state that is not entailed by His essence but by something else, this is wrong. For knowledge is a relation entailed by His essence in association with created things, and created things are entailed by His essence; but what is entailed by something entailed by His essence, is entailed by His essence, not by anything else. […]
[God’s knowledge by presence]
[88.11] We have already said that the objects of perception are of two kinds: those that are real (wujūdiyya) and are observed in concrete individuals, and those that are mental and are apprehended by minds. The real ones are, for instance, visible objects: when we perceive them with our senses, our perception of them does not occur through any transfer of their forms into the organs of sense, as supposed by those who speak of an impression of the form of the visible object in the eye, or in the spirit where the two [optic] nerves meet. It has been clearly and sufficiently shown that we perceive them as distant when they are far away, and as near when they are close at hand, and at their position to the right or left, above or below. This is how our perception of existing things grasped by the senses is: we are led to perceive them by means of organs that were created for us. We believe much the same about spiritually existing things that we do not perceive with our sense-organs, but through knowledge and understanding of them by way of inference (istidlāl). If our souls were brought to them as they are brought by the eye to things that are seen, so that we could “converse” with them themselves (dhawātihā) one by one, there would be the same kind of perceptions of them too. There is no obstacle or proof to prevent our saying that God the exalted perceives other existents like this too, given that no veil hides any of them from Him. Nothing limits His scope for perceiving everything, just as nothing limits His power from bringing them all into existence. His perception of them is the same as our souls’ perception of what we see, in that no object of perception inheres in the perceiver, as opposed to what is claimed by those who say there is such an inherence. Nor is any shape realized in a body, as claimed by the materialists. Rather [God knows] in the [89] same way as our souls perceive things as far away, nearby, small, or big, especially in the case of visible objects of seeing, though I have shown and explained that the same applies to other sense objects.
[T16] Al-Khayyām, Risāla fī al-wujūd, 112.11–12
[God’s] knowledge is perhaps something existing (wujūdī), namely the occurrence of forms of the intelligibles in His essence; other than that they all are contingently existent and are necessarily concomitant to Him.
[T17] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 215.2–11; 217.2–10; 217.18–218.2; 218.13–219.11; 220.18–221.13
[history of the problem in previous authors]
[215.2] On eternal knowledge specifically: that it is a single eternal [knowledge] connected to all objects of knowledge in a differentiated way, regardless whether they are universal or particular.
Jahm ibn Ṣafwān and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam argued that the originated items of knowledge are affirmed for God the exalted, according to the number of the objects of knowledge that newly arise, and none of which are in a subject of inherence. This after having agreed that [God] has always known what will be, and knowledge about that which will be is different from knowledge about that which is.
The ancient philosophers (al-falāsifa) believed that [God] only knows Himself. Also, existents necessarily follow from His self-knowledge, without their being known to Him. In other words, there is no form of them in Him, either in a differentiated or undifferentiated way. Some of them believed that He does know universals, but not particulars.
[217.2] Hishām [ibn al-Ḥakam] said: proof has already been given to show that the Creator, may He be praised and exalted, knows from eternity whatever will be in the world. But once the world comes to exist, does His knowledge remain knowledge of that which will be, or not? If it is no longer knowledge about what will be, then some feature or knowledge has newly arisen [in Him]. This newly arisen [knowledge] must originate either in Himself, in a subject of inherence, or neither in Himself nor in a subject of inherence. It cannot originate in Himself, given that, as we have already seen, He cannot possibly be a subject of inherence for originated things. Nor can it be in a subject of inherence, since if an entity subsists in a subject, then the corresponding predicate applies to [this subject, not to God]. It remains only that it has originated, but not in a subject. But if, on the other hand, His knowledge of what will be does remain as it was when first connected [to its object], then it becomes ignorance, not knowledge. […]
[217.18] We are in no doubt that our knowledge of Zayd’s arriving tomorrow is not the same as our knowledge that He is arriving [now]. Rather our knowledge that he will arrive is one thing, and our knowledge that he is arriving is something else. Every human [218] necessarily distinguishes between these two states of his knowledge. This difference comes down to the fact that knowledge newly arises once [Zayd] arrives, not having been there before.
[218.13] The master Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (may God have mercy upon Him) said that according to his teaching, no feature arises newly for God the exalted, nor is there any succession of states in Him, nor do any of His attributes newly arise. Rather He, the exalted, is described with one and the same eternal knowledge, which is connected to what has always been and always will be. It encompasses all objects of knowledge in all their differentiation, without any aspect, connection, or state of knowledge newly arising, because it [sc. God’s knowledge] is eternal, and the eternal does not change nor does any state newly arise for it. The relation of eternal knowledge to that which comes to be is [itself] eternal, just like the relation of the eternal existence to that which comes to be and occurs at various moments. Just as His essence does not change even as [219] times change, His knowledge does not change even as the objects of knowledge change. For it belongs to the true reality of knowledge that it follows the object of knowledge insofar as it corresponds to it (ʿalā mā huwa bihi), but without acquiring any attribute from it, or giving any attribute to it. Even though the objects of knowledge differ and are countably many, they still share in being known. They differ not in being connected to the knowledge, but in themselves. Their being known is nothing other than the fact that knowledge is connected to them, and in this they do not differ. The same goes for the connections of all eternal attributes: we do not say that some state in [the attributes] arises newly when some state newly arises in that which is connected [to them]. Thus we do not say that God the exalted knows existence and non-existence together at the same moment; that would be absurd. Rather He knows non-existence at the moment of non-existence and existence at the moment of existence. [His] knowledge about what will be is one and the same as [His] knowledge that it is at the moment when it is. But necessarily, knowledge of the existence [of something] at the moment it exists, is the same as knowledge of [its] non-existence before it exists, and one refers to it as “knowledge of what will be.” […]
[220.18] The Muʿtazila, following their own approach, said that the Creator—may He be exalted—eternally knows through Himself what will be. [221] The relation between Himself, or the aspect of his being knowledgeable, and the future object of His knowledge is the same as the relation to the presently existing object of knowledge. If one of us knows what will happen in the future, then he knows by way of supposing existence (ʿalā al-taqdīr al-wujūd), whereas someone who knows what is happening presently knows by way of confirming existence (ʿalā al-taḥqīq al-wujūd). The objects of knowledge [are known] through one and the same knowledge, whether by supposition or confirmation. They [sc. the Muʿtazila] allowed that knowledge remains, and allowed for the connection of one single knowledge to two objects of knowledge. They ruled this out neither for the evident nor for the hidden. Furthermore, some of them said that the difference between the two states [sc. knowledge of future and present] is just a difference between the connections, not the connected items, whereas al-Ashʿarī said that the difference does have to do with the connected but not the connecting [i.e. the object, not the subject, of knowledge], nor the connection [itself]. Some of them, however, said that the difference between both states goes back to both states.
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī inclined to the doctrine of Hishām, arguing that the states of the Creator—may He be exalted—do newly arise along with the new arising of that which comes to be, even though he was among the opponents of [the theory] of states (aḥwāl). Nonetheless He made the aspects of connections “states” that are related to the essence of the knower. In all of his statements, he adopted the methods of the philosophers (al-falāsifa), defaming and refuting his own masters among the Muʿtazila as he critically examined their arguments (bi-taṣaffuḥ adillatihim).
[T18] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 222.4–14; 231.14–232.9
[his understanding of Avicenna’s position]
[God] intellectually grasps everything only in a universal way, actively and not passively. Still, no individual thing escapes Him, “Not even the weight of a speck of dust upon the earth or in the heavens” [Q 34:3]. As for how this happens, it is because, when He intellectually grasps His essence and grasps that it is the principle of every existent, He grasps the principles of existents and whatever is engendered from them. Nothing exists without becoming known insofar as it is necessitated through Him as a cause (bi-sababihi). So the causes (asbāb), through their productivity, result in particular things existing from them. The First knows the causes and what corresponds to them, and knows their results, the intervening times and the cyclical effects. Thus He perceives particular items insofar as they are universal, in other words insofar as they have attributes, and states through which they are disposed for being universal. If they are specified, this occurs only in relation to time, place, and individual state. […]
[objection: universal knowledge still implies multiplicity]
[231.14] When one of them says that [God] knows things in a universal way, so that He undergoes no change, we say: every individual existing in this world calls for a universal that is specific to it. For the universality of a human individual, namely his being a human, is not the same as the universality of some other animal individual. Rather, universals are multiplied along with the multiplication of the individuals. Hence, even if He knows particulars only in respect of their universality, so that the universal knowledge does not change due to [their] universality, the way knowledge would change due to [their] particularity, still His knowledge will be multiplied according to their universality, just as it [232] is multiplied according to their particularity. But if all universals (kulliyyāt) are brought together as one single universal,11 then it follows that the only thing known is that one universal. Furthermore, that one universal is His necessary concomitant for Him in His existence, so [His] knowing it is a necessary concomitant to knowing Himself. This, however, amounts simply to the teaching of someone who says that [God] knows Himself alone. So what does then this person [sc. Avicenna] add to this teaching, apart from just the term “universality,” which is known as concomitant, just as particulars are known as concomitant? This adds nothing worthwhile: whoever knows the principles of existents knows what results from them and what arises from them, inquiring from cause to effect. And someone who knows the most specific attribute of existents will know the most general, inquiring from what has a concomitant to the concomitant. But there is a huge gap between the two approaches.
[T19] Al-Shahrastānī, Muṣāraʿa, 76.8–77.5; 86.1–87.4; 90.3–91.3 [trans. Mayer, mod.]
[the manner of God’s knowledge in respect of universality and time]
Perhaps these people will persist, saying: if He had knowledge, it would have to be either universal or particular. If it were universal, it could not be conceived to [77] function as an efficient cause (an yakūna fiʿliyyan), for whatever is brought about by the universal must be universal, just as whatever is brought about by particular knowledge must be particular. Yet there are no concrete things that are universal. So what is originated by it would not fit the manner (wajh) of its origination, and what originates it would not fit the manner in which it originates. If His knowledge were particular, it would have to be changed by the change in the object of knowledge; for the knowledge that Zayd will arrive does not remain alongside the knowledge that he has arrived. […]
[86.1] As for Avicenna’s statement, “It cannot be that He knows things through the things themselves, or else His knowledge would be passive,” I say: this issue is between them and the theologians (al-mutakallimūn), as to whether He knows things before they happen, as they happen, or afterwards; and whether the knowledge follows upon the object of knowledge, so that it discovers the object of knowledge as it is, or whether the object of knowledge instead follows upon the knowledge; and whether the nonexistent must be a thing, so that it may be known and communicated, or rather cannot be a thing? According to that man’s teaching, the knowledge of the Necessary of Existence is an active knowledge, meaning that it is the cause of the existence of the object of knowledge. This implies that He does not know the object of knowledge before it comes to be nor after it comes to be; rather His knowing it is His bringing it to be. According to this, it follows that He will not know Himself, since He does not generate Himself! [87] Or alternatively, it follows that His knowledge in relation to [created] things is an active knowledge, whereas His knowledge of Himself is a passive knowledge. In that case His knowledge of Himself is not the same as He Himself, nor is His knowledge of Himself the same as His knowledge of things. What a calamity is this confusion heaped upon confusion! “He for whom God makes no light, is without light” (Qurʾān 24.40). […]
[90.3] One is not forced to say that He knows things “before” they come to be or “after” they come to be. For “before,” “after,” and “simultaneous with” are temporal ascriptions (aḥkām zamāniyya), but His knowledge—may He be exalted—is not temporal. Rather, [all] times are equal in relation to it. If [Avicenna] supposes it is universal, it does not depart from being temporal, as he supposed regarding the eclipse. Instead, temporal knowledge changes as time changes, whereas atemporal knowledge does not change at all as time changes. It is entirely possible that [knowledge] be universal, yet also in time. But instead, the universal cannot conceivably be applied to the way that He truly is, [91] may He be exalted. This goes, for instance, for the categorical and conditional propositions he applied in the case of the eclipse, that is, “if it is so and so, then it is such and such.” The knowledge of the Creator—may He be exalted—is higher than this, so as not to be conditioned by “if it is so and so, then it is such and such.”
[T20] Al-Sāwī, Nahj al-taqdīs,, 123.1–124.2; 125.4–126.12; 133.13, 134.13–135.4
[change in knowledge is real change, with responses to Abū al-Barakāt]
[God] cannot intellectually grasp temporal things in a temporal way, since temporal knowledge about temporal things happens only at the times of their existence, neither beforehand nor afterwards. So knowledge of the origination of the concrete individual Zayd at this specific time, after not having been, can happen only at this time [sc. when he does originate]. Likewise one knows, in the temporal sense just mentioned, that [Zayd] fails to exist only at the time of his non-existence. For, if it occurred beforehand or afterwards, it would be ignorance. It is absurd to believe, before Zayd as a concrete [individual] is originated, that he is originated even as Zayd has not yet originated, rather than believing that he will be originated. Doubtless such a belief would be ignorance. Knowledge [in this case] would consist only in knowing the non-existence [of Zayd], not his existence, since he is non-existent, not existent. But then, once he is originated, knowledge of his non-existence cannot remain, that is, knowledge in the temporal sense just mentioned. Otherwise one would believe that Zayd is non-existent at this time, even though he has become existent. For if it remained, it would be ignorance, not knowledge. If, however, that knowledge does not remain, and another knowledge is originated, which is knowledge of his existence now, then change has occurred. For knowledge is not one of those abstract relations (iḍāfāt) that are not grounded in any attribute or disposition in the essence [of the knower], like being to the right or to the left. Rather it is an attribute or disposition that has a relation to something extramental. If [one] knowledge perishes and another originates, then this is not merely relational change; rather it is a change in an attribute of the knower’s essence. It cannot be accepted in the case of the one for whom no change is possible.
[arguments from Abū al-Barakāt with replies]
Opponents argue against this in several ways. [124] The first is to say: His knowledge is the cause of contingent existence. But causes are not changed through change in their effects, so His knowledge would not be changed through change in the effects. […]
[125.4] The response is that it is in itself true when he says that [God’s] knowledge is the cause of contingent existence. But the knowledge that is the cause is nothing but His knowledge of Himself, which is the principle of all existence, and is His knowledge of the principles and causes according to their arrangement in existence. As for temporal knowledge, which we deny of Him, it cannot be a cause at all, neither in His case nor in ours. For instance, if one of us who is an artisan conceptualizes a shape and then brings it into existence, then the cause of the shape’s existence is universal knowledge that originally occurred to him in the first place, like when he forms a shape of a sphere that encloses a dodecahedron with pentagonal sides. [The cause] is not particular temporal knowledge of this concrete shape, since that knowledge occurs only once the shape exists. So we have shown that temporal knowledge about something that is temporal and particular occurs only at the time when its object of knowledge exists, following upon the latter’s becoming in itself individual and concrete. The cause is prior to the effect as a condition, and that which occurs only after something else exists is not prior to that thing, so cannot be its cause. [126] It is likewise in the case of the Creator, may His name be exalted. If one did affirm this [temporal] knowledge of Him as a supposition, [this knowledge] would not be a cause, since its occurrence is conceivable only once its effect exists. [Otherwise] it would be ignorance, as we have shown. But if [the knowledge] does not occur before [the effect], then it is not its cause. It is established, then, that the cause is universal knowledge that encompasses all existents, both the principles and originated things among them, temporally and non-temporally.
If knowledge is the cause, then this knowledge does not change through change in the effects or in the objects of knowledge, as would follow from his syllogism. Nor can the primary objects of this sort of knowledge change, insofar as they are objects of knowledge. How can he say that [knowledge] would not change through change in [the objects of knowledge], since the latter are not changing in themselves? For they are universal, insofar as they are objects of this [sort of] knowledge.
The object of universal knowledge is not particular as such. For if one knows that human is an animal, then this knowledge does not extend to Zayd insofar as he is Zayd. Rather [he is included] only insofar as he is human, and is subsumed under the universal judgment. If however the object [of divine knowledge] is known insofar as it is universal, then insofar as it is universal it does not change. So it does not follow from his syllogism that [God] has temporal knowledge of temporal things and yet He does not change through their change. Rather, what follows is that He is the cause of the effects and does not change through their change; this is the truth, as we have shown. […]
[133.13] [His] second objection is to say: if He changed through the change of the effect, He would also be multiplied through their multiplicity. […]
[134.13] The response is that the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge implies multiplicity for that in which [the objects] reside, only if they have different, distinct, and discrete forms that occur simultaneously. But since there is no difference of forms in the knowledge, but instead it occurs including all [of them] without any need for an ordering or distinguishing of the objects of knowledge, or any distinction of one form from another, there is no implication of multiplicity in [the knower]. [135] The knowledge of the Creator—may He be exalted—is like this. Since He is separate from matter He knows Himself, because nothing separate from matter is hidden from itself. He only knows Himself as what He is, and He is the principle of all existents after Him, so that He knows His essence as the principle of existents. Existents are subsumed under His self-knowledge as a necessary implication (ʿalā sabīl al-luzūm), with no distinct form in His essence.
[T21] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 2, 501.13–17
[can particulars be perceived without sense organs?]
They said: it has been established in On the Soul that corporeal things with shapes are perceived only through a corporeal organ. So if the Creator, the exalted, perceived them, He would be a body or corporeal, which is absurd. One may reply: we have already shown in On the Soul, on the basis of decisive proofs, that something separate [from matter] can perceive corporeal things with shapes. So what you argue is false.
[T22] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 193.18–194.10
[multiplicity argument]
Those who admit that [God] the exalted is knowledgeable with respect to His specific self, nevertheless deny that He is knowledgeable about anything else. They prove this by saying that knowing one object of knowledge is different from knowing another object of knowledge. For somebody could know that Zayd knows about one object of knowledge while doubting whether Zayd knows about some other object of knowledge; and what is known is distinct from what is a matter of doubt. Therefore, [Zayd’s] being knowledgeable about one object of knowledge must be distinct from his being knowledgeable about another object of knowledge. [194] Having established this, we say: if God the exalted were knowledgeable about multiple objects of knowledge, then for every object of knowledge a distinct knowledge would need to occur in His essence. On this assumption, infinite multiplicity would occur in His essence, which is absurd.
[solution: knowledge is a relation]
Response: “knowledge” does not mean that forms equivalent to the quiddities of the objects of knowledge are impressed in the essence of the knower. Rather, “knowledge” means a specific relation and connection between the essence of the knower and the essence of the object of knowledge. This being so, the fact that He is knowledgeable concerning multiple objects of knowledge does require that multiple relations and connections occur to His essence. Yet this does not violate the unity of [His] essence. For one is half of two, a third of three, and a fourth of four, and so on endlessly in terms of the relations that belong to [one]. Yet this does not violate the unity of one; and the same applies regarding this problem [i.e. the case of God].
[T23] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 194.17–195.7; 196.18–197.3; 198.19–199.2
[historical report on the problem of knowledge of particulars in kalām]
[194.17] You should know that there have been two parties to this dispute within kalām. The first group—consisting of most masters among the people of sunna [i.e. the Ashʿarites] and among the Muʿtazila—said that knowledge about the fact that something will exist is the same as the knowledge that it exists once it does exist. In support of this claim they argued that, if we know that Zayd will arrive in town tomorrow, and this knowledge continues up to the next day and the arrival of Zayd in town, then we know with this same knowledge that he is now arriving in town. Thus we know that knowing that something [195] will exist is the same as knowing that it exists once it does exist. Someone would need some further knowledge only if he loses the previous knowledge. Given that God the exalted cannot lose knowledge, His knowledge that a given thing will exist is certainly the same as His knowledge about the existence of this thing once it exists.
But Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī said that this teaching is false. He ruled out saying that the knowledge that something will exist is the same as the knowledge that it exists at the point where it does come to exist. […] [196.18] You should know that after Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī gave these arguments to disprove the teaching of the masters, he concluded that there must be change in the knowledge that God the exalted has concerning changing particulars. He said: what necessitates His knowing the objects of knowledge is His essence, but the presence of those objects of knowledge is a condition for this necessitation. Once the object of knowledge arises in a particular way, then there is satisfied the condition for the essence’s necessitation of the knowledge about that thing’s [197] arising in that way, with the result that this knowledge occurs. But so long as the occurrence of that thing in this way is still non-existent, the condition for necessitation is not satisfied, so knowledge is certainly lacking too. But another knowledge arises, concerning the arising of that object of knowledge in a different way [e.g. as a future thing]. […]
[198.19] There is a fourth group among those who dispute this issue, namely those who say that God the exalted eternally knows the true realities and the quiddities of things. But knowledge about individuals and states occurs only once those individuals originate. This is the teaching of Hishām [199] ibn al-Ḥakam and that of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, since he cannot avoid being forced to accept this teaching.
[T24] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 195.17–196.13
[knowledge changes with the change of the known: the dark house example]
Second argument: His being knowledgeable about the fact that [something] will occur does not have as a condition that [this thing] is occurring just at the moment (fī al-ḥāl). It is His being knowledgeable that something is occurring that has the condition that it be occurring just at the moment. And when one of two things has some condition, and the other does not have that as a condition, the one cannot be identical with the other.
Third argument, this being the argument on which Abū al-Ḥusayn [al-Baṣrī] relied: just knowing that something will occur is not the same as knowing that it is occurring when it is occurring. For [196] someone might know that Zayd will arrive in town tomorrow. Then this person sits in a dark house, not being able to distinguish between night and day. He continues having this knowledge the whole while until tomorrow comes and Zayd arrives in town. This individual, just with his knowledge that Zayd will arrive in town tomorrow, will not come to know that [Zayd] is arriving in town now. Thus it is established that to know something will exist tomorrow is not the same as knowing that it exists, once it exists. Of course, if someone knows that Zayd will arrive in town tomorrow, and then knows that tomorrow has come, in that case a third knowledge is engendered out of those two, namely that Zayd is now arriving to the town.
Fourth argument: Knowledge about something is a form corresponding to that thing. Doubtlessly, the true reality that something will occur later but is not occurring now, is different from the true reality that it is occurring and present just at the moment. And if the objects of knowledge differ, so must the instances of knowledge.
[T25] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 198.12–18
[relational change as a solution to the change argument]
The proof you have mentioned to prevent change [in God] applies only to real attributes. One cannot rule out change for relational attributes. How could we say otherwise, given that we find God the exalted being together with that which is originated? Once that which is originated disappears, their being together is eliminated, and this implies that some change in relations occurs. Having established this, we say that such connections are among associations and relations. This being so, nothing prevents change from occurring with respect to them [sc. God’s relations].
[T26] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 199.4–24
[God’s knowledge and determinism]
If God the exalted were eternally knowledgeable about all particulars which are to come in endless time, then He would know all that will be done and will not be done by humans. Everything that God the exalted knows will occur, occurs necessarily, whereas everything whose occurrence God the exalted knows to be non-existent cannot occur. Hence, one must say that all creaturely acts are either necessary or impossible. But if this were so then no animal would be capable of acting. […] [199.12] For there is no power at all over that which occurs necessarily or cannot possibly occur. This leads to the conclusion that God the exalted has no power at all, nor does any creature have power; and that obligations and the sending of prophets are in vain; and that promise, threat, reward, and punishment are all in vain and unfair. This vitiates talk of [divine] lordship, for denying power of God the exalted means denying talk of [His] lordship. And talk of servanthood is vitiated too. For, if the servant has no power over his service, then command and prohibition are in vain. This being so, one must say that God the exalted is eternally knowledgeable of Himself and of His attributes, and of the quiddities, true realities, and attributes of things. As for knowledge of individuals and their changing states, this occurs only once they come into existence, so that these problems are resolved.12
[T27] Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, vol. 3, 163.12–164.5
[God knows individuation as being caused by Him]
The individual particular thing has a quiddity, and also has individuation and concreteness. This individuation and concreteness is either identical to that quiddity or is additional to it. If it is identical to it, then knowing about the quiddity is the same as knowing about it. So the individuation, insofar as it is this concrete individual, will be known. But if the individuation of that individual is different from that quiddity, then that individuation will be among the contingent quiddities too. The philosophers (al-falāsifa) admit that knowing the cause necessitates knowing the effect. [164] The knowledge of God the exalted concerning His own essence necessitates, therefore, that He is knowledgeable concerning the means by which that individuation and concreteness occurred. Hence, He must know about that individuation as such. So it is established that, given their claim that the knowledge of the cause necessitates the knowledge of the effect, they must acknowledge that He—may He be exalted—knows individuals as such. […]
[T28] Al-Razī, Maṭālib, vol. 3, 164.10–20
[argument from instinctive prayer]
[164.10] We see that when the people of this world face misery and hardship—whether they are believers or unbelievers, monotheists or heretics—they pray to God the exalted and ask Him to free them from that misery. Even if people were strongly convinced that God the exalted does not know particulars, when faced with such situations they would still inevitably turn to invocation, prayer, and obedience. As this shows, innate instinct (al-fiṭra al-aṣliyya) is a witness that the divinity of the world has power over whatever can be done, and knows the secret and the hidden. And of course the witness of innate instinct ought to be accepted rather than these obscure distinctions and abstruse inquiries. It is then settled that the divinity of the world knows particulars and can respond to [our] needs. I suppose that when Abraham—God’s blessings be upon him—said to his father, “O my father, why do you worship that which does not hear and does not see and will not benefit you at all?” (Qurʾān 19:42) this was precisely because his father belonged to the creed (dīn) of the philosophers (al-falāsifa). He denied that God the exalted is powerful and that God the exalted knows particulars.
[T29] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 1, 483.8–15
[argument that knowledge through causes is universal, with reply]
The demonstration [that knowledge by causes is universal] is that if we know, for instance, that A necessitates B, and the conceptualization of B (as such) does not prevent other things from sharing in common with it, nor from being caused by A, then nothing about just conceptualizing the meaning of B, which is the effect of A, prevents other things from sharing in common with it. Therefore, if something is known through its cause, it must be known universally.
But someone might say: when blackness, for instance, is individuated and concretized, its individuation must be due to a cause. If we understand the cause of its individuation we must understand that individuation, because it was established that knowing the cause is [itself] the cause for knowing the effect. So along these lines, we have come to know something on the basis of its cause not in a universal, but in a particular way.
[T30] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 2, 501.25–502.6
[knowing causes does not imply knowing individuals]
As for the second option, which is that His being connected [502] to causes implies His being connected to particulars, this is wrong too. For if something is understood by means of its cause, this must be so universally. If you know that when a given cause is present at such-and-such time in such-and-such a subject of inherence under such-and-such a condition, so that a given effect must be originated under such-and-such a condition, then [all] these qualifications, even though they do yield specificity (takhṣīṣ), still do not yield individuality (shakhsiyya). For it is entirely plausible that this qualified object, with these qualifications, can be predicated of many. So it is evident that knowledge by means of causes cannot imply knowledge about effects insofar as they are temporal.
[T31] Al-Rāzī, Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 122r19–122v1
[God knows individuals as such]
According to you, knowledge of the cause entails knowledge of the effect. So from the fact that the Necessary Existent knows Himself, it necessarily follows that He knows temporal individuals insofar as they are temporal individuals, not insofar as they are universals. This entails [112v] that He, the exalted, is knowledgeable concerning particulars.
[T32] Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, vol. 3, 124.21–125.10
[if knowing cause entails knowing effect, then knowing anything would imply knowing everything]
We know multiple quiddities and multiple true realities. Every true reality [125] that the intellect indicates must, in relation to other true realities, have one of three states: either it implies them, or it is incompatible with them, or it neither implies nor is incompatible with them. Implying something (kawn mustalzima li-al-amr) would be among the necessary concomitants (lawāzim) of that quiddity, and being incompatible with some other kind of quiddity would be another of its necessary concomitants. Neither implying nor being incompatible with a third kind [of quiddity] would, furthermore, be a third kind of necessary concomitant. If then knowledge of the necessary concomitants of one quiddity did follow from knowledge of this quiddity, then once we have come to know some quiddity, we must know that it implies one kind [of quiddity], is incompatible with another kind, and neither implies nor is incompatible with a third kind. When we know this, we would wind up knowing all quiddities. Therefore, if knowing the necessary concomitants of a quiddity followed from knowing that quiddity, then from knowing just one quiddity would follow knowledge of all quiddities in their infinity.
[T33] Al-Rāzī, Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 121v9–11
[if knowing cause entails knowing effect, then one would know all one’s own states]
According to what they say, our self-knowledge is the same as we ourselves. From this it follows that our knowledge of ourselves must be continuous. All our necessary concomitants are, however, the effects of ourselves. In which case our knowledge of all our necessary concomitants, such as being separate [from matter], persisting, being originated, and being capable of this or that, would arise continuously.
[T34] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 1, 456.22–457.2; 457.5–11; 457.15–23
[on the inclusive knowledge theory]
As for the third kind [of intellection] which is “simple,” in my opinion this is wrong. For knowledge, according to them, is just the presence of the form of an intelligible object in the one who intellectually grasps [it]. If this simple intellection is meant to be a single form that corresponds to the true reality of multiple things, then this is wrong. For if a single intelligible form were to correspond to multiple things, then it would be equal in quiddity to things which are different [457] in their true realities. Then this form would have different true realities, so that a single form would not be one single form, which is absurd. […]
[457.5] Perhaps by “simple intellection” they meant that the forms of the objects of knowledge occur all at once, and by “differentiated intellection” they meant that the forms of the objects of knowledge are present in temporal order, one after another. If this is what they meant, it is true and there is no quarrel with them. But this is not a middle level between pure potentiality and pure actuality, the latter being [intellection] that is differentiated. Rather, it amounts to saying that what is known is sometimes is gathered together all at once, and sometimes not, but follows and succeeds one on another. […]
[457.15] As for their claim that someone’s knowledge of his own capacity to answer includes knowing the response, we say: in such a state, he knows his capacity to [produce] something that would deal with the question, but he does not know the true reality of that thing. Yet this response has a true reality and a quiddity, and it has a necessary concomitant, namely that it deals with the question. So [before formulating the exact answer] the true reality is not [yet] known, but the necessary concomitant is known in a differentiated way. Likewise, if we understand by ourselves that soul is something that moves body, then its being a mover for the body is a necessary concomitant, which is known in a differentiated way even though the [soul’s] true reality is not known until we understand it in some other way. Thus it has been established that their claim is wrong. And this also emerges from the proof we mentioned, that a single item of knowledge cannot concern many objects of knowledge.
[T35] Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 102.9–103.2
[against the inclusive knowledge theory]
The items of knowledge that are connected to different objects of knowledge do differ [in themselves], as opposed to [the opinion] of my master and father. [103] In our view, investigation prepares knowledge about what is proved, and has as its condition knowledge of the proof. Moreover, the belief that body is eternal is opposed to the belief that it is originated, and has as its condition knowledge of the quiddity of body, and of eternity and origination.
[T36] Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, vol. 3, 151.4–10
[the philosophers do not really deny all particular knowledge in God]
Some people report that the philosophers (al-falāsifa) claimed that the Exalted is not knowledgeable about particulars. But this report is open to question. For His specific essence is a concrete essence, and He is knowledgeable about this concrete essence. But “particular” means nothing but this, so He is knowledgeable about a particular [after all]. Also, He is through His essence the cause of the First Intellect. It is evident from their teaching that they believe Him—may He be exalted—to be knowledgeable about [the first intellect] as such. Instead, it would be correct to say that [the philosophers] denied that He, the exalted, is knowledgeable about changeable things as such. And they also denied that He, the exalted, is knowledgeable about corporeal things in terms of their concrete specific magnitudes.
[T37] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 479.16–480.4
[against the inclusive knowledge theory]
As for the cases of inclusive [knowledge] mentioned among the three examples given, the opponent [might just] deny that [multiple] questions can be answered all at once. Rather, they are posed one after another, so that each question is inclusive of [480] the next one. Secondly, before [the answers are provided] in a differentiated way (al-tafṣīl), we find in ourselves nothing more than the ready capacity (quwwa qarība) to [give the answers] individually (takhṣīṣ). There is an obvious difference between the two capacities, one prior to being asked, the other after, the one capacity ready to hand, the other even readier (aqrab). For the capacity of finding things out (wujūd) has many levels.
[T38] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 480.8–10; 481.1–8
[proposal that God knows things through their forms in His essence, and reply]
[Another position adopted by recent philosophers] was that they sinfully claimed that the Necessary Existent knows things through their forms, and that the forms of all existents are in His essence. They said: these concomitant forms are extrinsic to His essence, and constitute a multiplicity that follows upon, rather than being intrinsic to [His] essence. Thus they avoid violating the idea of unity. […]
[481.1] We mentioned their statement “His essence is a subject of inherence for many accidents, yet is not affected by them,” simply because ignorant people might believe that this has some sense. For they might suppose that one can speak of “affection” only in cases of newly arising [features], just as one understands the category “being affected.” This however does save him [sc. the proponent of this view]. For even if the existence of an accident [in Him] does not necessarily imply that any affection newly arises, still it implies a numerical difference between two aspects, productivity and receptivity, because we have seen that action is one aspect, and receptivity is another. Moreover, how can any reasonable person agree that an essence is the subject of inherence for accidents, even though that essence is not described with the accidents that are realized in it? Isn’t the ascription of attributes to quiddities precisely because the latter are subject of inherence for the former?
[T39] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 487.17–488.19
[his solution: God’s knowledge by presence is relational]
The Necessary Existent needs no forms. He has illumination and absolute sovereignty, so that nothing escapes Him. Past and future things, whose forms are established in the heavenly rulers, are present to Him, since He has cognizance (aḥāṭa) and illumination concerning whatever bears these forms, and [488] the intellectual principles as well. So it is that “not even a speck of dust escapes Him: neither in the heavens nor on the earth” (Qurʾān 34:3).
If His knowledge is through presence and illumination, not through a form in His essence, and if something should for instance perish and a relation [thereby] perishes, still no change is implied in Him Himself. Similarly, if Zayd is existent and [God] is his principle, and if Zayd does not remain existent, and the relation of being a principle no longer persists, this implies no change in Him Himself. You know that if something on your right moves to your left, then there is a relational change with no change in you yourself. Temporal knowledge does in a way necessitate change, which is ruled out in the case of the Necessary Existent: if someone who knows that Zayd will arrive persists in [thinking] that he will arrive once he is arriving, then this person is ignorant. But if one knows that [Zayd] has arrived and the prior knowledge leaves [this person], then he changes. This applies to knowledge through forms. But when it comes to knowledge through presence and illumination of the things themselves, and of their forms which are in the heavenly perceivers, who are not prevented from changing and who are present with their forms and changes to the First, without Him changing, this does not follow.
[448.13] In general, the First knows all things without requiring any form, thought, or change. The descriptions (rusūm) of the objects of perception are present to Him by being themselves present (li-ḥuḍūr dhawātihā). […] Taken all together, those attributes that are attributes of perfection are equivalent to His essence (dhāt). He has negational and relational attributes, yet there cannot possibly be multiplicity in His essence. This is the only way to save the Peripatetic doctrine, and it involves no departure from the truth. But an explanation and complete presentation of why it is so is possible only through the doctrines of our book entitled The Wisdom of Illumination.
[T40] Al-Suhrawardī, Talwīḥāt, 243.20–244.3
[God knows only by presence]
Temporal things that change, and are material as individuals, are not necessarily concomitant and present in the Necessary Existent, [244] since He is absolutely free of matter. In general, any knowledge that is in any way necessary for Him, the exalted, does not necessitate addition, change, or representation in Him; [it is knowledge] for which mere presence suffices. Any other [knowledge] is impossible for Him.
[T41] Al-Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, 105.4–8 [trans. Walbridge and Ziai, mod.]
[against productive knowledge theory]
The Peripatetics and their followers say, “the Necessary Existent’s knowledge is nothing additional to Him but is only His not being unaware of His essence, which is separate from matter.” They also say: “the existence of things is from His knowledge of them.” Against them, it may be argued that if He knows and then something follows from the knowledge, then the knowledge is prior to the things and to not being unaware of them; for not being unaware of things comes only after they are realized.
[T42] Al-Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, 106.5–11 [trans. Walbridge and Ziai, mod.]
[the Illuminationist position, invoking relations]
Therefore, the truth about the knowledge of the Necessary Existent is given in the following principle of Illuminationism: that His knowledge of His essence is His being luminous to Himself and evident to Himself. His knowledge of things is their being evident to Him, either through [things] themselves or through what is attached to them, namely places (mawāḍīʿ) of continuous awareness on the part of the higher, providential [lights]. This is a relation, while the lack of any veil is negative. That this is sufficient is indicated by the fact that vision occurs simply by the relation of the evidence (ẓuhūr) of something to vision, along with the lack of any veil. Thus the relation of [God] to anything evident to Him is His vision and perception of that thing. The fact that there are numerous intellectual relations implies no multiplicity in His essence.
[T43] Al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 346.1–15
[against God’s knowledge as relation]
If knowledge is a relational attribute it is either existing (wujudiyya), non-existing, or neither existing nor non-existing. One cannot say the second or the third, as has been already [argued]. The only remaining option is that it is something existing. On this assumption it is either eternal or originated.
But it cannot be eternal. Otherwise it would not alter and change, since it is absurd to ascribe non-existence to eternal existence. And obviously associations and relations can change due to the variation in the object of knowledge itself. For the relation that is connected to the non-existent as such does not remain after [the non-existing thing becomes] existent, and vice-versa. Otherwise [knowledge] would be ignorance, which is impossible.
Nor can it be originated,13 for two reasons. First, this would imply that God the exalted is a subject of inherence for originated things, which is absurd, as will be explained. Second, there will be an issue with the origination of that attribute and its requirement for another knowledge, just as there was an issue with the first [knowledge], yielding an impossible infinite regress.14
[T44] Al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār, vol. 1, 346.16–21; 347.18–20
[knowledge must be an attribute of God]
They say: we concede that [God] is knowing but not that He knows through [an attribute of] knowledge.
We say: if one concedes that His being knowledgeable is an existing attribute that is additional to the essence, this is just what it means to say that knowledge subsists in His essence. Thereby is refuted their claim that His being knowledgeable is necessary, so that it is not caused by [the attribute] of knowledge. How this can be so, if knowledge is ascribed to Him? If someone says that [knowledge] is necessary in the sense that it cannot be separated from His essence—may He be exalted—we concede this. But this does not exclude that knowledge subsists in His essence. […]
[347.18] When two things exist, and there is one actual indication to both of them, such that it is impossible to indicate the essence of either one without indicating the other, then out of the two, the one that is dependent on the other for [its] existence is the attribute, while the other one, which is not so dependent, is the subject of inherence.
[T45] Al-Āmidī, Ghāyat al-marām, 77.17–23
[problems with God’s knowing temporal events, whether knowledge is an impression or a relation]
Knowledge about things that come to be consists in either the impression of their forms in the soul, or a relation that occurs between the [knower and the known]. If the former is the case, then the essence of the Necessary Existent must be divided into parts through the impression that has parts, as will be shown. If the latter is the case, then knowledge is either eternal or originated. It cannot be eternal, because otherwise the originated thing to which it is connected would need to be eternal, given that a relation cannot arise without the two things [it brings into relation]. But it is absurd to say that originated things are eternal. Yet if [the knowledge] is originated, that too leads to absurdity, as has been shown before [i.e. because God would then have attributes that are originated].
[T46] Al-Āmidī, Ghāyat al-marām, 78.17–79.15
[knowledge is one and unchanging, but has changing connections to changing things]
[Avicenna] is wrong to say that if [God’s] knowledge of Himself were connected to anything else, then [the two objects of knowledge] would be either identical or distinct, for both are absurd. For nothing prevents knowledge from being one in itself, even though the objects to which it is connected are different and distinct. [Knowledge] is connected to both of them, just as the sun is connected to whatever receives [its light] and is illuminated by it; or rather, just like what the opponent [sc. Avicenna] says about [the connection of] the Active Intellect to our souls. For it is one, even though the objects to which it is connected are different, multiple, and distinct.
They also rely on an invalid point when they specifically connect [God’s knowledge] to universals and not to particulars. For the connection of knowledge to that which comes to be necessitates no newly arising knowledge, nor prior ignorance. What preceded was the knowledge that [something] will come to be. The knowledge that something will come to be is the same as [79] the knowledge that it is coming to be at the moment of its coming to be, with nothing newly arising, and no multiplicity. The only thing that newly arises is the very thing to which [knowledge] is connected, and the connection to it. This does not necessitate that anything newly arise [on the side of] what connects [sc. on the side of the knower as opposed to the object of knowledge], following on prior knowledge that [something] will happen at the moment it happens, assuming [the knowledge] is continuous up until that moment. For, even if we eliminated all [newly] originated knowledge from the soul, [this thing] would not be unknown at the moment of its origination. Otherwise, knowledge that it will come to be would be ignorance at the moment of its coming to be, despite its assumed continuity. This is absurd. Thus, if one surely knows that Zayd will stand up at some particular time, for instance, then one does not find oneself to need any newly arising knowledge about this at the moment of its occurrence, if [one’s knowledge] extends to [this time], and we did assume that the prior knowledge remains until that time. Whatever a person may find in himself in terms of a contrast between how he is before [the known thing] happens and how he is afterward, just comes down to sensory perceptions and factors that are extraneous to knowledge, and that were not yet there before [the known thing] happened. But with regard to the knowledge itself, there is no [difference between the two states]. Rather, the most one could say is that the connection of knowledge [to the event] at the moment it happens was not yet realized before it happens. But this implies, at most, the absence of a connection between knowledge and the existence [of what happens] while the latter is still non-existent, and the new arising of a connection to it once it exists. This does not imply the conclusion that the attribute of knowledge is originated. Rather, knowledge has been eternal, even as the connections and the things to which it is connected newly arise and differ, resulting from the new arising and differentiation of the conditions needed for the connection.15
[T47] Bābā Afḍal, Madārij al-kamāl, 51.5–8 [trans. Chittick, mod.]
[the Knower as “universal of universals”]
Rather, the knower of the universal of universals is none other than the universal of universals. He who is aware of it is not aware of something belonging to himself, but is rather aware of himself. Those who are aware of anything below the universal of universals are aware of something belonging to themselves and depicted within it, but the universal of universals is both that which finds itself and that which is found. This is the perfection of all perfections and the final goal of all final goals.
[T48] Bābā Afḍal, Arḍnāma, 231.18–233.4
[the Knower through Himself encompasses all things in self-knowledge]
Comprehension (iḥāṭa) is arriving at something as a whole, with the knower covering the whole of what he knows. If there is an object of knowledge outside the knower’s comprehension, it is not known. There are two kinds of things: clear and unclear. Things in the intellect are not unclear, since the world of intellect is the world of clarity. The unclear is found only in sensation, imagination, and estimation, since there are some things that cannot be known to estimation, imagination, and sense. Moreover, [even] when [232] something becomes evident in sensation, evidentness and clarity may cease, because the sense object may depart from the sense organ, or the sense organ may not pay attention to it, so that what was clear becomes unclear.
One who knows through sensation is a potential knower, and the object of sensation is known only potentially, whereas one who knows by intellect is a knower actually, and what is intellectually known is known actually, both being complete. The potential knower is a trace and image of the actual knower, and likewise what is known potentially is a trace of the actually known. One who knows through sensation, at the level of particulars, and potentially, is a knower who does not know himself, since one cannot know sensation with sensation; for instance one cannot see sight with sight. […]. [232.10] One who knows intellectually does know himself, since one can know knowledge and the essence of knowledge with knowledge. For there is no distinction between knowledge and the one who knows. Likewise, whoever knows can also know the senses through knowledge. For these are particular items and objects of knowledge, whereas the one who knows in himself is universal, and the universal arrives at all particulars, whereas no particular can grasp the universal.
Whoever knows comprehends the known essentially. For the known is in the knower and there is no distinction between the essence of the knower and the known. The existence of the one who knows is being knowledgeable. If knowing belonged to the essence but the known were outside the essence, then there would be no connection or association between the known and the knower. Or the knower would need to step outside of his own essence in order to join that which is outside his essence; but stepping outside of one’s own essence is absurd. Or he would need to take that thing into [his] essence and to associate it with itself. But the non-essential cannot be associated with the essence. Hence the known is known in the essence and the knower comprehends the known. This comprehension is essential. Also, the comprehension of the one who knows is genuine (bi-ḥaqīqat). For [233] the one who knows is the “root” for the existence of knowing, whereas the known is a “branch”. Existence is more appropriate for the root than for a branch. Furthermore, the comprehension of the one who knows is universal. For there might be multiple objects of knowledge for whoever knows, even though there is no multiplicity in him. One who knows arrives at every known, is greater than it, and reaches up to something else [as well]. The more objects of knowledge there are, the greater is the one who knows.
[T49] Al-Abharī, Tanzīl al-afkār, fol. 49r6–11
[in defense of inclusive knowledge]
We do not concede that if [the parts of the response to a question] were known, then some would need to be distinguished from others. This would follow only if the knowledge of a thing implied knowing its distinctness from other things. Why do you insist on this implication, even though it is obviously wrong? For, if the knowledge of a thing implied knowing its distinctness from other things, then knowing the distinctness [of that thing] would imply knowing the distinctness of that distinctness, so that one would need to know an infinite number of things from knowing just one thing. But obviously this is necessarily false.
[T50] Al-Abharī, Ḥidāyat al-ḥikma, 194.2–7
[whether God knows by taking on conceptualized forms]
Someone might say: if the Creator were knowledgeable [by receiving a form from what He knows] then He would be both the producer of that form and its receiver. But this is absurd, because the receiver is the one who is disposed for something, whereas the producer is the one who produces something. The former is not the same as the latter, implying composition [in God].
We say: why can’t one and the same thing be disposed for a thing taken conceptually, while also engendering it? After all, the meaning of being “disposed for something” is that He is not in Himself prevented from conceptualizing [that thing], whereas the meaning of His “engendering” is that He is causally prior to that which is conceptualized. Why would you say that these are contradictory? Whoever believes that God’s knowledge of the things is identical to His essence really just denies all knowledge [in Him], since all knowledge is by inscription (al-irtisām).16
[T51] Al-Abharī, Hidāyat al-ḥikma, 194.13–195.4
[on the eclipse example]
Rather [God] perceives in a universal way, just as you know universally the eclipse that is in itself particular. For you say of it that it is an eclipse [195] that occurs after such-and-such a thing17 moves from such-and-such with such-and-such an attribute, and so on with all the accidents. Yet you do not know it as a particular, because nothing prevents what you have known being predicated of many. This knowledge does not suffice for the existence of that eclipse at this time, so long as observation is not added to it. And, as the change just mentioned [sc. the addition of new observation] is not possible in the case of God the exalted, He knows particulars only in a universal way.
[T52] Al-Abharī, Zubdat al-ḥaqāʾiq, fol. 163r21–163v20
[God’s has knowledge by capacity, presence, and governance]
On how the Necessary in Itself knows all things
Know that we intellectually grasp something [in the following ways]: (a) By an impression (bi-al-inṭibāʿ). This is the representation of an [163v] abstract form in an abstract essence, such as the representation of a universal form in the soul. (b) By capacity (bi-al-iqtidār). For instance when someone has intellectually grasped some problem and then forgets about it, then he is asked about it and he straightaway knows the answer. This is not [the same as knowing] “potentially (bi-al-quwwa),” since he knows at this moment that he is capable of answering, and this [knowledge] involves his knowledge of the response. For one perceives the difference between the state before hearing the question and the state afterwards, but the power (quwwa) was already there beforehand. (c) By presence (bi-al-ḥuḍūr), without the representation of a form, such as soul’s perception of its specific self. For the soul’s self-perception does not happen through the representation of a form, since every form in the soul is universal, not particular, so that its perception would not be the perception of the particular, specific self whose very meaning excludes anything else sharing in it. (d) By governance (bi-al-tasalluṭ). This is the perception of an abstract essence that bears a relation of governance to something else, without representing the form [of that thing] in [itself]. For instance, the soul perceives its specific self, which bears a relation of governance to body. […] [163v15] Now that you understand this, we say that the Necessary in Himself knows Himself with presential knowledge, since His abstract self is present to Him and not hidden from Him. He does not perceive things in the sense that forms are impressed [in Him]. Otherwise, He would simultaneously be the producer of those forms and their receiver, which is absurd. Rather he perceives them through knowledge by capacity and of governance. For His essence, which is the principle of differentiation between [all] objects of knowledge and which bears a relation of governance to existents, is present to Him. Hence He has knowledge by capacity and governance, and His knowledge encompasses all existents.
[T53] Al-Abharī, Bayān al-asrār, fol. 53v14–19; 53v20–54r3; 54r7–12
[God’s knowledge is by presence, not representations, but cannot know changing particulars]
We say that the Necessary in Himself is separate from matter and is sheer existence, and that things are present to Him in terms of the relation of principality and governance. For everything is necessarily concomitant to His essence (dhāt). His not being hidden from Himself (dhāt), along with His being separate from matter, is His self-knowledge. His not being hidden from the concomitants of His essence, along with His separation [from matter], and their [sc. all other things’] presence to Him, is His knowledge of the things. As for His knowing of things in the sense that there would be forms present, this is absurd, as you have learned. […]
[53v20] Relations are possible for God, as are negations; they do not harm His unity. His names are multiple because of these negations and relations. [54r] Nothing escapes His knowledge, “not even the weight of a speck of dust upon the earth or in the heavens” [Qurʾān 34:3]. The Necessary in Himself encompasses (muḥīṭ) all things and He perceives the numbers of existence. This is the same as presence and governance, with neither form nor image. […]
[54r7] The Necessary’s encompassing things is not something that changes with time, unlike our knowledge of temporal events. For if we know that Zayd will arrive, the judgment that he is arriving is false, but when He does arrives and our judgment remains that he will arrive, this becomes ignorance. Hence there must be change. But the Necessary in Himself is beyond all change. Therefore material, changing, temporal events are not present to the Necessary Existent, since He is absolutely separate from matter.18
[T54] Al-Nakhjawānī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, fol. 128r4–12
[accepts God’s knowledge by presence]
Know that the Master [Avicenna] transmitted this issue from the Greeks, and the truth about it has not yet occurred to him. But in the end, when he understood how [God’s knowledge works], he turned away from this approach and wrote an epistle called Three Sections, where he rejected this view [that God knows unchangeable things only]. The source of their delusion (wahm) was that they explained and understood knowledge as the occurrence of the forms of things in the mind, regardless whether [this happens] in the soul, which is among the things separate [from matter], or in powers, which are among material things. This is true for perceptions in the soul, but they thought that the knowledge belonging to the First and the separate [intellects] is of this kind too. They did not understand that in the First and the sanctified essences [sc. celestial intellects], intellection and knowledge are by way of action. [Their knowledge] is the cause and that which necessitates the existence of things. [They know] not through the occurrence of a form that would be inscribed in the essence of the one who grasps it intellectually, so that the knower would change due to the change of the know. Rather, [their knowledge] is the presential illuminational knowledge which is before that which is known, simultaneous with it, and after it.
[T55] Al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, 280.6–12
[against the receiver-producer argument]
As for the first objection, namely that knowledge is a relation between knower and known that is implied by His essence, which receives [the relation], so that one thing would be simultaneously receiver and producer, the response is: relations exist only in the intellect. They apply to pairs of things, each of which implies an attribute of relation in the other, so that it is a producer for that which the other receives, [but only] in the intellect. From this, it does not follow that one and the same thing is simultaneously producer and receiver for one and the same thing. His argument that two effects (atharayn) would need to be brought forth from something simple is wrong. For reception is not an effect; someone who both produces and receives brings forth only one effect. For when the effect of something else arises in him, that is not an effect he brings about.19
[T56] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 915.11–916.11
[God’s knowledge of everything without forms]
You have already learned that the First intellectually grasps Himself, He Himself and His self-intellection being distinguished not in existence, but only with respect to our mental consideration (iʿtibār), as has been argued before. It has been also determined that His self-intellection is the cause of His intellection of the first effect. Since it was determined that both causes—that is, He Himself and His self-intellection—are one and the same thing in existence without any distinction, you should [now] determine that both effects too—that is, the first effect and First’s intellection of it—are one and the same thing in [916] existence, with no distinction such as would imply that one of the two [sc. the effect] is distinct from the First, while the second [sc. intellection of the first effect] is realized in Him. And, since it was determined that the distinction between the two causes is purely a matter of mental consideration, you should likewise determine that the same goes for the two effects. Therefore, the existence of the first effect is identical to the First’s intellection of it, with no need for an auxiliary form that would inhere in the essence of the First—may He be exalted above that!
Furthermore, given that the intellectual substances intellectually grasp that which is not among their effects through the occurrence of forms in them, and they intellectually grasp the necessary First, and there is no existent that is not caused by the Necessary First, thus all forms of universal and particular existents occur in [the intellectual substances] according to the way they exist. The Necessary First intellectually grasps those substances along with those forms, not in virtue of any other forms, but in virtue of these substances and forms, and likewise according to the way they exist.
[T57] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ masʾalat al-ʿilm, 85.10–19
[God’s knowledge by presence and its mediation]
The perception of the First, the exalted, has two aspects. (a) On the one hand [perception] of Himself, which is just [perception] of Him Himself (bi-ʿayn dhātihi): here the perceiver, perception, and the perceived are one and the same. No number applies to them, other than in terms of aspects which intellects employ [to conceive of God in these three ways]. (b) On the other hand [perception] of His effects that are near to Him. He [perceives] these concrete effects in themselves (bi-aʿyān dhāwāt), since here it is wholly unthinkable that their presence, in the sense mentioned above, would be lacking. Here the perceived and the perceptions are identical, and no number applies to them except in terms of aspects; yet both differ from the perceiver.
As for His remote effects—like material [things] and non-existents which are such as to be contingently existent at some moment, or [such as to be] connected to the existent—these are [perceived by Him] by having their intelligible forms’ inscribed in His near effects, which perceive [the remote things] primarily and in themselves. And so on like this, until one reaches the perception of sensible things through the inscription of their forms in the organs that perceive them. For what exists in the present is [itself] present, and whoever perceives the present perceives whatever is present together with it.
[T58] Al-Ṭūsī, Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ, 141.10–16
[the First Intellect is particular yet known by God]
His claim that if [God’s] knowledge were particular, it would need to change along with the object of knowledge, is also subject to correction. For not every particular changes. The First Intellect is a particular, yet does not change. The particular that changes is a temporal particular, insofar as it is temporal. This is not something that proceeds from Him, the exalted, without any intermediary, but proceeds from Him only through intermediaries. [God’s] knowledge of it is along the same lines as the way that its existence is from Him. For knowledge of the existence of causes implies knowledge of the existence of their effects. And [knowledge] of the existence of their effects implies knowledge concerning the existence of the effects of their effects, and so on until the last effects are reached.
[T59] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 918.5–919.15; 924.13–16; 929.7–8
[what Avicenna meant by knowing of particulars in a universal way]
[Avicenna] means the distinction between on the one hand perception of particulars in a universal way, which rules out change, and on the other hand perception of them in a particular way, which changes along with them. Let it be clear that the First, the exalted, and indeed whatever engages in intellection, insofar as it is engaging in intellection, perceives particulars only in the first way and not the second. They are perceived in the second way only through sensation, imagination, or whatever else has the status of corporeal organs. Before explaining this, we say that the universality and particularity of perception are connected to the universality and particularity of conceptions (al-taṣawwurāt) which arise in them; assent (al-taṣdīqāt) does not come into it. For our statement “this man says this thing at this moment” is particular, while our statement “man says something at some moment” is universal. The only change between the two is whether “man” and “moment” are particular or universal. Every particular about which one passes a judgment has a nature that exists in the individual. Insofar as that nature becomes particular, [919] the intellect does not perceive it, nor does any demonstration or definition apply to it, because of the addition of a sensory indication or some such thing that specifies it, which can be perceived only through sensation or the like. If that nature is taken separately from those specifiers, it becomes universal so that the intellect perceives it, and demonstration and definition do apply to it. The judgment that was connected to it when it is particular remains as it was, except insofar as the judgment is connected to specifying items, insofar as they are specifying.
Having established this, we say: [suppose] someone perceives the causes of that which comes to be, insofar as they are natures, and also perceives their particular states and their features, such as their being adjacent or distant, touching or remote from each other, or composition and dissolution, insofar as they are connected to those natures, and he perceives the things which originate together with them, after them, and before them insofar as all this happens at certain moments which are determined, one through another, in such a way that nothing at all escapes [this perceiver]. So, the form of the world occurs for him including all its universals and particulars, both stable and newly arising and ending, which are specific to some moment to the exclusion of any other moment, according as it exists, with no difference whatsoever from how they are. That very same form would also correspond to other worlds, if they were to arise in existence, just as much as to this very world. So the universal form corresponds to the particulars that originate at their own times, but without changing along with them. This is how it is to perceive particulars in a universal way. […]
[924.13] If knowledge is connected to the universal, it is not at all connected to the particular that falls under that universal, unless [another] knowledge comes to help, and [the former knowledge] arises anew, so that it is connected to this particular in another way. For instance the knowledge that animal is a body does not by itself imply that human is a body, until another knowledge is attached, namely that human is animal. […]
[929.7] It would be correct to take the explanation of this issue in another way, by saying that knowledge of the cause necessitates knowledge of the effect, yet it does not necessitate its sensation.
[T60] Al-Ṭūsī, Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ, 147.14–148.5
[comparison between temporal knowledge and spatial location]
Avicenna’s teaching is that the judgment that something was in past, something is now, and something will be, can be made only by someone who is himself in time, with time changing for him. [148] Something is past and gone for him, something else is present for him, and yet something else is future for him and yet to come. Everything temporal is related to him from some specific interval. It is like when someone is in a given place, and some things are located in front of him, others behind him, others above him, and yet others below him. Everything located has a certain position with respect to him, which nothing else shares.
[T61] Al-Ṭūsī, Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ, 157.18–158.9
[God’s atemporal knowledge]
We have already mentioned that past and future, before and after, belong to the one [158] whose existence is temporal. As for Him who is exalted above time, time is for Him a single thing, from the eternal past into the eternal future (min al-azal ilā al-abad), related equally to Him. His knowledge encompasses its parts in a differentiated way (ʿalā al-tafṣīl), and insofar as one part comes after another. Temporal [knowledge] is like when one takes up a book and moves one’s gaze from one word to another, so that one word has been already read, the next word is present to as it falls under one’s eye, and a third word is not yet been seen. Whereas the [knowledge] that is exalted above time is like when someone has the whole book20 present to oneself, and it is readily available for the one who knows its arrangement. The First’s knowledge of temporal things is like this. As for His knowledge about things newly arising and coming to an end, this is through the intermediary of the soul which conceives of these things newly arising and coming to an end.
[T62] Al-Kātibī, Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, 46.1–4
[does knowledge of something imply knowledge of its concomitants?]
The knowledge of a quiddity need not imply knowledge of its proximate necessary concomitants. Otherwise, the knowledge of the concomitants of the concomitants would follow from the knowledge of its concomitants, and so on infinitely. Admittedly, the conceptualization of a quiddity together with the conceptualization of its proximate concomitants does imply a judgment concerning its relation to the quiddity. And from21 the first [concomitant] an inquiry can be led to something that is not proximately concomitant, or to something whose concomitant is one of the things that are concomitant to it [sc. the first concomitant].
[T63] Al-Kātibī, Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, 46.12–14
[knowledge follows the known]
Knowledge must change along with the object of knowledge, since it corresponds to the known, and one and the same item of knowledge cannot correspond to two different things. Since the change of universal natures is impossible, knowledge about them cannot change either; unlike the case of particulars, since knowledge about them can change, given that they can change.
[T64] Al-Kātibī, Jamīʿ al-daqāʾiq, fol. 145v9–12
[God’s knowledge by presence]
[God] knows Himself and [other] things without the impression (inṭibāʿ) of forms. As for His knowledge of Himself, it is because His concrete being (huwiyya), which is separate from matter and its attachments, is His knowledge of Himself. And as for His knowledge of [other] things, it is because He Himself necessitates their true realities themselves, so that the form that is the principle of all other existents is present to Him. This form is His knowledge of things by way of productive, inclusive22 knowledge, not passive, differentiated knowledge, since no impression [of a form] is possible for Him.
[T65] Al-Samarqandī, Muʿtaqad, 11.12–12.2
[argument for knowledge of particulars from God’s will]
The Necessary is knowledgeable, because when choosing, one cannot turn one’s intention towards something unknown. So, if [God] wishes to make something to exist, He inevitably knows the true reality of whatever He wishes to render existent. And if He wishes that [12] something persist (baqāʾ), then He knows this concrete thing as existing. Hence He knows both the true realities of existents and knows them as concrete things. The true realities are universal, while the concrete things are particulars.
[T66] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 181.12–182.6
[unchanging knowledge of changing things]
Changing particulars may be perceived in an unchanging way, or in a way that changes along with them. You may take as an example how this happens that, when you remember a poetic ode and it is present in your mind all at once, just as it was written, verse for verse and word for word, then perception of these in all their detail (tafāṣīlihā) occurs in an unchanging way. But when you read it one word after another and one verse after another, without representing its detailed words and verses all at once, this is the initial perception of such concrete, perceived details, but it changes along with the objects of perception.
When someone alludes to something particular, as when saying “Zayd is the one who is in [182] a given city” or “the solar eclipse will happen one month after our present moment,” this cannot be predicated of many things, and it is not grasped intellectually but rather perceived through the senses, so knowledge of it will be changing and particular. But when someone makes no allusion at all to any particular object (mushār ilayhi), but rather knows it by means of its causes—as when one knows through the causes the magnitude between two eclipses—then the knowledge of it does not change, and it makes no difference whether [the object of knowledge] is existent or non-existent. Then the perception of it is universal intellection.23
[T67] Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt, vol. 3, 371.1–2
[response to al-Rāzī’s claim that we know particulars by knowing their causes]
From one object of conceptualization, we may only make an inference to another object of conceptualization, and individuals can be perceived by the intellect only in a way that is compatible with being predicated of many things; what rules out [this sort of] sharing is, for instance, concrete being (al-huwiyya), concreteness (al-ʿayniyya), and being extramental.
[T68] Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt, vol. 3, 382.6–9
[God’s knowledge through forms amounts to knowing without forms]
It makes no difference whether that which is present and not hidden from Him is a form established in certain bodies, or for separate [intellects], or whether it has no form in being grasped by Him. So, things in the present and future, whose forms are established for the celestial governors, as you will learn, are present to Him, since He grasps the bearers of those forms [sc. the celestial intellects] by way of illumination.
[T69] Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt, vol. 3, 390.21–22
[against the relations solution]
We cannot say here that only the relation changes. For if we perceive that a given thing will be, then [that future thing] is negative [because it is not yet existent]. Hence there can be no relation to it. Thus its form must occur, and there has to be change.
[T70] Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt, vol. 3, 391.8–19
[God knows universals only]
So long as all things in the causal chain terminate at Him, He must know them all in a universal way, which is not subject to past, future, and present; for you have learned that whatever we know through its cause, we know universally. The knowledge of it does not change, regardless whether it is existent or non-existent. The Necessary Existent knows everything in a universal way, yet no individual escapes Him. So long as corruptible things are intellectually grasped in terms of their separate quiddities and whatever follows upon these without individualizing them, they are not intellectually grasped as corruptible. When on the other hand they are perceived as connected to matter and to the accidents of matter, and time, and individuation, they are not intellectually grasped, but rather perceived by the senses, or imagined. It has been shown that every sensory and imaginative form is perceived only insofar as it is perceived by the senses, or imagined, by a divisible and corporeal organ. So perceiving them in this way requires that sort of organ. But that which is absolutely separate [from matter] does not perceive through any corporeal organ. Otherwise it would be perfected through matter, rather than being completely separate from it. This is however a contradiction. So, if the Necessary’s separation from matter is beyond every [other sort of] separation, this type of perception is impossible for him.
[T71] Bar Hebraeus, Ḥēwath ḥekhmṯā, Met., 184.18–185.3
[knowledge through causes and definitive descriptions is always universal]
Every effect that is known through its cause is known in a universal way. For when we know A to be the bestower of existence upon B, we know B and its being brought into existence by A, yet both [items of knowledge] are universal. The definition of a universal [185] through a universal is universal. One thereby knows that the image (yuqnā) of Socrates which the intellect takes when he is perceived by it is universal, since it is compounded out of universal humanity and universal accidents, although only one of him is found in actuality.
[T72] Bar Hebraeus, Mnārath qudhshē, vol. 3, 66.6–68.32
[God only knows universals: change argument]
First objection: they say that, if God knew that Socrates is sitting now at this place, when he stands up and moves from this place, if what God knew before still remains as it was, it is not knowledge but ignorance, since He would know the Socrates who stood up and moved as the one who is still sitting. If however it does not remain, it changes. But it is impossible to introduce change into the nature of the Creator. Therefore, God knows Socrates in a universal way (kullāyāʾīth) only, for instance, that he is a human and that he is naturally capable of sitting and standing, of coming and going. This kind of knowledge is never subject to change, since no universal ever changes. St Dionysius confirms this view of ours when he says: “it is therefore insofar as the Divine Wisdom knows itself that it knows everything material immaterially and everything divisible indivisibly and everything multiple in a unified way.”24 He also said: “those that are, do not know Him insofar as He is, nor does He know them insofar as they are.”25
[being immaterial, God cannot know the material]
Second objection: every particular perception happens through a corporeal organ. For instance, vision is through the eye, hearing is through the ear, and the rest through the other [organs]. If the Creator had particular perception, He would have corporeal organs and would be a body, which is absurd. […]
[response: God’s transparent knowledge captures individuals as such]
[66.27] Solution to the first objection: We say that God—may His goodness be praised—knows that Socrates is sitting, and how long he will be sitting and when he will stand up, due to the completeness of His knowledge. From this it is known that His knowledge does not change at the time when Socrates stands up, since He already had knowledge before Socrates stood up about his standing up at the time when he stands up.
Question: they say that the knowledge through which a knower knows that Socrates is going to stand up does not suffice for the knower to know [that Socrates stands up] when Socrates stands up. For instance, a blind astronomer knows that at a given hour the Moon is going to be eclipsed. However, he cannot know that the Moon is eclipsed, as he cannot know that that hour has arrived. From this it is known that there is a difference between knowing that [Socrates] is going to stand up and knowing that he has stood up, and between knowing that the Moon is going to be eclipsed and that the Moon is eclipsed.
Reply: we say that what you have described happens only to us, who have deficient knowledge, since it is possible that we know that which comes to be without knowing the coming to be of the time at which it comes to be, as you said about the blind person who is deprived of vision. By contrast, the Creator is beyond any deficiency and His knowledge is complete in all ways, so nothing you said can apply to Him.
As for the claim in the book that you have drawn upon [sc. Dionysius], someone who is immaterial knows the material in an immaterial way. Indeed, He knows not through the senses, that is, the material organs, for instance, through an eye, ear, etc. Rather [He knows] through unified and immaterial knowledge. Furthermore, when the sainted book said that the Divine Wisdom does not know those that are “as they are,” it means that the Creative Wisdom does not know those that are “as they are” and at the time at which they are alone, but also before they come to be and after they cease to be.
[perception of the material without organs is possible, as argued by Abū al-Barakāt]
Solution to the second objection: we say that not every particular perception happens through corporeal organs. For the rational soul, for instance, despite having neither eyes nor ears, does knows the objects of vision and of hearing, and other sensible things besides. If it did not perceive them, how could it determine that opposites cannot occur altogether at one and the same time in one and the same subject, for instance white and black, as we have said many times?
[T73] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 499.18–500.4
[relations solution]
You must know that since divine perception is not through a form in His essence but rather through the illuminational presence which is the noblest among all types of perception, and negations and sheer relations are possible in the case of God the exalted. So if He knows anything through that presence, such as the form of the existent Zayd for instance, then He has a principle-relation to him. If the form of Zayd perishes [500], that principle-relation, which He had to it, perishes as well. Nevertheless, no change follows from its perishing in Himself, since you have already learned that the change of the relatum does not follow from the change of sheer relations. If we move from the right to the left something moves from the right to the left of us, and our relation to whatever is to the right and to the left changes without our essences’ being changed themselves.
[T74] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 506.3–7
[al-Ṭūsī and al-Kindī in agreement]
This is the gist of what that man [that is, al-Ṭūsī] said. Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī has already indicated it by saying: If the First Cause is connected to us due to its emanation into us, whereas we are connected to it only in some sense, then we may be aware of it to the same extent as something emanated may be aware of the emanator. Hence the extent of His knowledge about us cannot be related to the extent of our knowledge of Him, since [His knowledge] is more intuitive, abundant, and deeper than ours.
[T75] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 506.15–507.2
[God knows sublunary things directly and not through their impressions in celestial intellects]
As for the difference [between al-Ṭūsī’s and al-Suhrawardī’s theories of God’s knowledge by presence] it is [al-Ṭūsī’s] establishing all forms of existents in intellectual substances. You have already learned about this path that all intellectual substances grasp themselves through themselves and perceive all other existents through presential illumination without any form or image being in any of them, as we have established. Furthermore, you have already learned that the Necessary through Himself and the intellectual principles as they perceive abstract [507] intelligibles through presential illumination, also perceive material things through presential illumination without perceiving them through any form which would occur in the intellectual principles.
[T76] Al-Tustarī, Muḥākamāt, fol. 99v4–10
[whether God’s knowledge is through forms]
This is what he [i.e. al-Ṭūsī] said and it is reported that the eminent Bahmanyār pointed to this principle [that knowledge occurs without the impression of forms in the knower]. It is a good solution and splendid analysis, apart from the last statement, which stands in need of further investigation. For if knowledge is explained as the occurrence of the forms of His effects in concrete individuals, then the Necessary will lack intellection of non-existent things and their features, that is, [they will] be hidden from Him. A more principled way [to deal with these issues] is to say that we do not accept that the [supposed] absurdities follow. They would follow only if His knowledge of things consisted in the realization of forms in His essence. Yet speaking of a form that is equivalent [to the object known to God] does not imply this; for, when the philosopher [sc. Avicenna] says that the Exalted knows Himself, he means by “knowledge” that [God’s] concrete being is separate from matter and occurs to Him, as the Master [sc. Avicenna] has established elsewhere, and this idea is not additional to His essence, just as our knowledge of ourselves [is not additional to us]. But when he says that [God] knows other things, he means by this that the separate concrete being, which is the principle of things, occurs to Him and not to anything else. [For His knowledge of Himself is essentially identical to His knowledge of His effects, and He differs from them only in aspect. According to their account,]26 His knowledge of Himself and of other things thereby excludes that He is both producer and receiver, since this holds only if one explains [God’s knowledge] as inherence, but there is no need to do that. So we do not concede that knowledge is a real attribute that is additional [to His essence], and the same goes for the rest [of the divine attributes]. This is evident to any reasonable person.
[T77] Al-Urmawī, Maṭāliʿ, fol. 30v5–18
[the eternal truth of propositions]
Knowledge of an individual changes along with its changing. They said: if we know that Zayd is in the house while he is there, then when he leaves that knowledge has changed, unless it remains; but if it does remain, then it is ignorance, not knowledge. This calls for further investigation. For, if Zayd is in the house that day at sunrise, then it is true that: Zayd is in the house that day at sunrise. This proposition is known regardless whether Zayd is in the house before the sunrise that day or afterwards. If Zayd goes out of the house after the sunrise, that proposition does not become false. Rather it remains true, and its knowledge [can] occur after Zayd goes out. Therefore, one horn of the dilemma is wrong, especially given that “Zayd is not at home after sunrise” is true after he goes out after sunrise, since the truth of this [proposition] does not annihilate the truth of that proposition [that Zayd is at home that day at sunrise]. As for the knowledge that Zayd is at home after sunrise, this does not occur, which is why one says that it perished. What is reported about some of our companions, that [on their view] the knowledge that something will be is the same as the knowledge that something is now, ought to be understood in this way.
[T78] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 560.7–11
[knowledge changes along with what is known]
There is no doubt that the connection of knowledge to the future is different from the connection of knowledge to the present. Hence one may be in doubt about one of these two, while there occurs knowledge of the other. Again, the future occurrence is not the same as the present one, nor does it imply it. So the knowledge connected to [the future occurrence] must differ from the knowledge connected to [the present occurrence], whether one assumes that knowledge is a form or that it is a relation.
[T79] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 560.13–21
[knowledge of causes]
The knowledge of a cause may happen in three ways: (a) The knowledge of [a cause] regarding its essence, quiddity and true reality, but not regarding its accidents and concomitants. This sort of knowledge of [the cause] necessitates no knowledge of the effect, either completely or incompletely. (b) The knowledge of [a cause] insofar as it is the cause of an effect. Here the knowledge of the effect, insofar as it is an effect, does follow upon the knowledge of [the cause]. For the knowledge of the cause is knowledge of the relation of one thing to another. The knowledge of a relation calls for knowledge of the relata. However this does not imply complete knowledge of the effect. (c) The knowledge of [a cause] regarding what it is, and regarding its concomitants and its accidents, as well as that for which it is a concomitant and for which it is an accident, what it has in itself and what it has through a relationship to something else. There can be no doubt that this sort of knowledge of the cause does imply the complete knowledge of an effect.27
[T80] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 564.10–11
[against the agent’s knowing its own acts through knowledge by presence]
An action’s occurring for its agent does not imply its being intellectually grasped. For those effects that necessarily proceed from their causes may not be intellectually grasped by [those causes].
[T81] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 564.14–18
[against al-Ṭūsī’s claim that God’s knowing something is the same as that thing’s existing]
This eminent scholar comes to the view that [God’s] intellection of an effect is identical to the existence of the effect, with no call for any form other than [that of the effect]. But the existence of the effect differs from the intellection of Necessary Existent in Himself, and essentially, not only in terms of some aspect. How can it be true to claim that the intellection of something is identical to the very existence of that thing, given that the intellection of something is an attribute of one who engages in intellection, whereas the existence of something is not one of his attributes?28
[T82] Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 564.22–565.2; 567.13–568.6
[celestial intellects would function as “organs” for God]
The statement of this eminent scholar [i.e. al-Ṭūsī] that [God] intellectually grasps whatever is below intellectual substances through the existence of [that lower thing] in them, implies that [565] intellectual substances are like organs for Him, the exalted, such that He can intellectually grasp whatever is found in them. What then is the difference between these substances and the senses of the soul, which are the organs for perception? […]
[567.13] Do the objects of perception belonging to these two groups [sc. things in time and place] require corporeal organs to perceive the things that change and are present at their respective times, and to judge that those things are existent, or that something is absent that is [present] at some other time, that is, to judge that it existed at some past time or future time? Or do they not [require corporeal organs]?
It is true that we do require organs for our perception of [such things]. Yet it is not so for the Necessary Existent, either by the demonstration we put forward of His knowledge of them—may He be exalted—since He is their wise maker and thus knows about them; or by their aforementioned demonstration of His knowledge of them—may He be exalted—namely that He has knowledge of Himself, and the knowledge of the cause implies the knowledge of the effect.
Because they put forth arguments concerning the perception of the Necessary Existent on the basis of things having to do with us, and we perceive them only [568] through corporeal organs, such organs being denied in His case—may He be exalted—they could not avoid denying His perception of [temporal things]. The mistake arises at the first step. For anyone who says that the Necessary Existent perceives things only because they are inscribed in a substance that is separate from matter and intellectually grasped by the Necessary, the exalted, must take this substance [sc. the First Intellect] to be an organ for perception. Why then don’t they affirm organs for Him, through which He would perceive particular things that are connected to time and place? But this is a gross error; may God be exalted above such suppositions!
There is extensive literature on the topic. See for instance R. Acar, “Reconsidering Avicenna’s Position on God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” in D.C. Reisman (ed.), Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam (Leiden: 2004), 142–156; M.E. Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” in his Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazālī and Other Major Muslim Thinkers (New York: 2005), 71–96; P. Adamson, “On Knowledge of Particulars,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005), 273–294; S. Nusseibeh, “Avicenna: Providence and God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” in T. Langermann (ed.), Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy (Turnhout: 2009), 275–288; K. Lim, “God’s Knowledge of Particulars: Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides,” Journal of Islamic Philosophy 5 (2009), 75–98; F. Benevich, “God’s Knowledge of Particulars: Avicenna, Kalām, and The Post-Avicennian Synthesis,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 76 (2019), 1–47; J. Kaukua, “Future Contingency and God’s Knowledge of Particulars in Avicenna,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2022), published online: DOI:
Though it should be noted that his view is anticipated in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Providence, which argues that the heavenly gods exercise providence over the sublunary realm only at a universal level.
For the point that even human “knowledge,” properly speaking, is also of universals see Adamson, “On Knowledge of Particulars.”
On al-Rāzī’s own view see B. Abrahamov, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on God’s Knowledge of the Particulars.” Oriens 33 (1992), 133–155.
For the same example in antiquity see Boethius’ On the Trinity, in H.F. Stewart E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (trans.), Boethius: Theological Tractates and Consolation of Philosophy (London: 1973), § 5.
See further the chapter on Knowledge and Perception in our Epistemology and Logic volume, as well as Griffel, The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam, Part 3, chapter 1.
On al-Suhrawardī’s knowledge by presence see Kaukua, “Suhrawardī’s Knowledge as Presence in Context,” and H. Eichner, “ ‘Knowledge by presence’, Apperception and the mind-body relationship: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Suhrawardī as representatives and precursors of a thirteenth-century discussion,” in P. Adamson (ed.), In the age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth / Twelfth Century (London: 2011), 117–140. On Abū al-Barakāt see M. Shehata, “Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will.” Nazariyat 6 (2020), 99–131.
Reading yaʿqila instead of tuʿqala.
The egg of a vulture is an idiomatic example of something extremely rare. There is a wordplay here because “vulture (anūq)” is followed by a comparison that speaks specifically of reaching the star Capella (ʿayyūq).
A negation seems to be required here for sense: he wants precisely to accept that the relations and perceptions are multiple, but do not render God multiple.
We correct kull wāḥid to kullī wāḥid in correspondence to al-kullī al-wāḥid in the next line.
At Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 250v11–12 al-Rāzī instead bites the bullet and accepts determinism (jabr) as a response to this argument.
Which is al-Rāzī’s position.
Note that in al-Nūr al-bāhir, vol. 5, 201.16, al-Āmidī accepts that knowledge is a negational attribute, but in Rumūz al-kunūz, fol. 110v14 rather that it is a positive attribute.
Al-Āmidī accepts this solution also in Nūr al-bāhir, vol. 5, 200–201 and Rumūz al-kunūz, fol. 110v.
Note that the argument that prohibits the inscription of forms in God is accepted in Zubdat al-ḥaqāʾiq: see [T52] below.
Reading al-shayʾ kadhā instead of shamāliyyan with MSS Ḥ and B.
Al-Abharī also accepts God’s knowledge by presence in Talkhīṣ al-ḥaqāʾiq, fol. 92r11–15 and Maṭāliʿ al-anwār, fol. 131v15–19. In the latter, al-Abharī says that God knows Himself as the principle of all existents by way of presence. In Maṭāliʿ, fol. 132r4–9, al-Abharī rejects divine knowledge of temporal particulars, just like in Bayān.
Note that this argument is accepted as a problem for Avicenna in Sharḥ al-Ishārāt [T56] and is only solved with the knowledge by presence theory.
Emending al-kiyān to al-kitāb.
Correcting fī for min.
Deleting lā before ijmāliyyan.
Ibn Kammūna accepts the notion of God’s knowledge by presence at al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 430.2–9. He also accepts the idea that God knows the sublunary things through their impressions in the celestial intellects at al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 430.16–19. Still, Ibn Kammūna immediately says afterwards that God knows everything only in an unchanging universal way.
Ps-Dionysius, Divine Names VII.2, PG III, 869B.
Ps-Dionysius, On the Mystical Theology V, PG III, 1048A.
From Carullah 85r23–24. Two other MSS omit this because of the similar beginning of the following phrase.
Al-Ḥillī, Asrār, 566.11–13 accepts al-Rāzī’s arguments for God’s knowledge of particulars. He also accepts Abū al-Barakāt’s idea that change in the divine knowledge is merely relational.
Still, al-Ḥillī seems to agree with al-Ṭūsī at Asrār, 561.5–10 and 566.1–2.