In modern-day philosophy of religion, one of the most avidly discussed topics is the problem of evil. It poses a challenge for theists, namely that evil seems difficult to reconcile with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God. Actually two versions of the problem are treated in the current literature. The “logical” problem of evil contends that there is a straightforward contradiction between the existence of evil and the existence of God. The “evidential” problem allows that while some evil might be allowed to exist by God—for instance, to facilitate meaningful free will—the amount and nature of suffering in the world is overwhelming evidence against God’s existence.
The medieval philosophical traditions also had two versions of the problem of evil, which we might call the “justification problem” and the “causation problem.” The justification problem is the one that modern-day philosophers of religion worry about: given that God would seem to have the motive and ability to eliminate evil, why doesn’t He do so? The causation problem is: how can evil derive, however indirectly, from a good first cause? This version of the problem is similar to other questions familiar from Avicenna’s philosophy, for instance how multiplicity can come from Him given that He is purely one, or how matter or material things can come from Him even though He is immaterial.
Avicenna’s treatment of evil is complicated, in part because he seeks to address both problems.1 A fundamental feature of his view, which he borrows from the Neoplatonic tradition, is the idea that evil is mere privation, a lack of some good, or of some perfection [T1]. A paradigm example would be blindness, which is simply the eye’s failure to have the power it ought to have. This move allows Avicenna to say that everything, that is, everything that exists, does come from God. All existents are the necessary consequence of His knowledge, and partake in His goodness, precisely by existing. This is what Avicenna means by “providence” [T2]. From all of which it is already obvious that evil is essential to only those things that are nothing by themselves, such as blindness. In other cases, when we do have something that is evil in relation to something else (such as fire burning someone’s clothing), the privations that we call “evil” are “accidental” [T1]. Avicenna explains that there is nothing bad about fire as such. Its burning is essential and thus good for it, but accidentally bad for something that falls into fire and burns. Even such obviously bad things as injustice are not anything bad by themselves. In fact, in relation to those who perform injustice, or to their irascible faculty, injustice might be something good. This account is further explained by al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī and Ibn Kammūna [T34, T54, T65].
On these grounds, Avicenna develops his solution to the problem of evil. Evil is an inevitable result of things pursuing ends that are good for them, but at cross-purposes to one another [T3]. Fire is essentially such that when something falls into it, it burns. It is not God’s fault that it happens. Even God would not be able to stop fire from burning, since it is metaphysically impossible to go against essential dispositions. It is nobody’s fault, not even an “act of God” as we sometimes say, but a metaphysical necessity. This solution was widely adopted by a few post-Avicennan authors, such as Bahmanyār, al-Khayyām, al-Suhrawardī, Ibn Kammūna [T9, T11, T46, T61]. To the worry that Avicenna’s position would undermine divine omnipotence, al-Shahrazūrī says that the idea of divine omnipotence is a fairytale for people who lack philosophical understanding [T70]. Al-Shahrastānī is not impressed by Avicenna’s solution to the problem of evil, though. Even if the burning is caused directly by fire, isn’t it still ultimately traced back to God [T24]?
Furthermore, argues Avicenna, good predominates over these accidental evils [T4], with essential goodness prevailing in the world as one would expect given the universal rule of divine providence. In addition to the obvious good we can see in this world, there is the prospect of reward in the afterlife. As for punishment and suffering in the afterlife, this is a just penalty for misdeeds and is not something to be blamed on God [T5], followed by al-Suhrawardī at [T48]. Also, the prospect of punishment is salutary because it provides a “deterrent” (takhwīf) against bad behavior [T5]. In fact, punishment in the afterlife is matter of “greater good.” More people are deterred from committing sins by the example of people punished for their sins than there are people punished. Notice that with these last points, Avicenna is shifting his attention from the problem of causation to the problem of justification. If all he sought to explain is how evils can be traced back to a good source, it would be enough to explain that things are good insofar as they come from that source, that is, insofar as they exist. The point about the predominance of the good is required only to answer the question why God did not refrain from creating a world with so much privative and accidental evil in it. As noted by Avicenna and often by later authors, it would be a greater evil to refrain from creating the world if more good were thereby lost, than evil avoided [T3, T9, T10, T35, T63]. This, by the way, would be a possible response to the “evidential” problem of evil mentioned above. Yes, there is much evil in the world. But there is even more good, and one cannot have the latter without the former.
Though the privation theory of evil was not original to Avicenna, it was distinctive of him that he so clearly identified good with existence. His successors saw this as an account that could compete with those developed within the kalām tradition. Good and evil were at the center of disputes between the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite theological schools. Leaving aside the subtle differences internal to the two school traditions, which are laid out in [T73], we can frame the disagreement as one between a rationalist account of good and evil, and a voluntarist account that traces good and evil to God’s commands [T27, T36, T58]. As al-Shahrastānī succinctly puts it [T27], the Muʿtazilites held that “reason (ʿaql)”2 indicates the goodness and badness of acts, in the sense that God the exalted must reward and praise whoever does good, and must punish and blame whoever does bad, whereas the Ashʿarites said that “good” is whatever God commands and rewards, and “bad” whatever He forbids and punishes.3
Now, the Muʿtazilites did not need to say that all obligations and prohibitions can be determined by reason. For instance it would be hard to believe that natural reason could discover the obligation to pray five times a day, or perform a pilgrimage to Mecca. (Even if we somehow figured out that prayer and pilgrimage are called for, why exactly five times? And why Mecca?) So we should be more careful and say, as Ibn al-Malāḥimī does in [T12] cf. [T73], that for the Muʿtazilites some obligations can be known by reason, while others are imposed by revelation, for reasons explained at [T13]. Some Muʿtazilites formulated it as the rule that the goodness or badness of a given action is due to an attribute or “aspect” that belong to it by its very nature [T18, T76].4 A frequently mentioned case is lying, which is known by reason to be bad, so that reasonable people always prefer to tell the truth, all else being equal [T16, T29]. A clever twist on this is that, if we didn’t know lying to be bad, we could not trust in God’s revelation as a source of obligation anyway, since we need to know that God, being good, will not lie to us [T72, T77].5 In favor of the Muʿtazilite position, we may also point out a counterintuitive consequence of the voluntarist theory, namely that good and evil as we know them could have been reversed [T77]. God could have, for instance, made it good to lie and evil to tell the truth, or good to murder the innocent and evil to offer them help.
In favor of their divine command theory, though, the Ashʿarites pointed out that no type of action is in fact invariably good or bad. This shows that actions do not have their normative features as essential attributes, as the Muʿtazilites believed. The fact that we find some things agreeable by nature, and others disagreeable, does not show that they have intrinsic moral value and disvalue [T39]. Indeed “naturally” good things are sometimes bad, and vice-versa. For example, lying may be beneficial if it achieves a desirable outcome [T28] or if one has promised to tell a lie and thus, ironically, needs to lie in order to be a truth-teller [T38]; see also the response to this scenario at [T78]. Lying and truth-telling are, in themselves, value-neutral [T31]. Against this line of argument, Ibn al-Malāḥimī denies that he and other Muʿtazilites are only appealing to natural preference and aversion, since these are in fact distinct from the judgments of reason [T17, cf. T59].
If actions do not have their moral value intrinsically, as the Ashʿarites insist, then where does the value come from? At first glance the Ašʿarite answer is simple: it comes from God’s commands. But actually their position is more nuanced than that. Though they reject the grounding of moral judgments in real attributes of things, they do recognize the possibility of harm and benefit for moral agents. Already al-Ashʿarī allowed that “good” and “bad” can be used to refer to that which is harmful and beneficial, in light of the inborn dispositions created in us by God: “what is bad is avoided for the imperfection and harm that it results in for one who does it, and the good and wise act is chosen because of the benefit and perfection that it results in for one who does it.”6 So the reason it is “good” for us to follow God’s Law and bad to violate it is that this is in our interests. For any given agent, good and bad are always relative to the agent’s goals and are thus subjective [T6]. Al-Rāzī adopts a hedonist version of the subjectivist thesis, according to which good and bad always have to do with the agent’s present and prospective pleasure and pain [T40].7
Having grounded normativity in self-interest, the Ashʿarites face the difficulty of explaining cases of pure altruism, where one person helps another despite having nothing to gain from it. The Ašʿarites simply bite the bullet here, insisting that pure altruism does not really exist and finding reasons connected to self-interest to explain why a reasonable person would help another even without hope of praise or other reward [T7, T42]. They bite another bullet when it comes to a further puzzle that rationalists can pose: given that God has no goals and is not subject to His own commands, how can He be good? To this the Ašʿarites simply respond that God transcends good and evil [T6, T41]. If what He does is “more appropriate” this is on the side of the thing God makes, not in the sense of being more appropriate for God [T74, T75].
In light of their account of normativity and their strong commitment to divine omnipotence, which makes God the creator of all things including human actions, the Ashʿarites face a very specific version of the problem of evil. This would be a special case of what we have called the “justification problem”: given that God commands us to perform certain acts and avoid others, why has He created our bad actions and failed to create the good ones we should have performed but didn’t? For their full answer to this question, the reader should consult our chapter on Free Will, Determinism, and Human Action; for the importance of voluntary choice see also [T37] in this chapter. But in this context we can firstly repeat the point just made, that God is beyond good and evil so it makes no sense to accuse Him of failing to do what he “ought” to have done. That is why the Ashʿarites are willing to accept that even bad things do fall under God’s will [T8, T79]. This is denied by the Muʿtazilites, consistently with their position that human agents can originate their own actions [T20]. An Avicennan version of the Ashʿarite view is presented by al-Shahrastānī, who says that God bestows only existence on bad human actions. Since existence is good, as Avicenna held, this absolves God from blame [T21, T22].
These passages show how Avicenna’s ideas about good and evil were integrated into this long-running and pivotal disagreement of the kalām tradition. For an even more explicit attempt to do this, we can turn to al-Shahrastānī in [T30] and al-Āmidī in [T50]. They see the “philosophers” as agreeing with the Muʿtazilite view, since the philosophers would allow reason to judge things as good without recourse to the religious Law. Comments made by al-Ṭūsī bear this out: he identifies practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) as the faculty by which we determine what is good or beneficial [T53]. But other authors felt that Avicenna’s views were basically irrelevant to the kalām debates, because of his determinism. Ibn al-Malāḥimī thought that, while Avicenna did have to deal with the problem of evil’s causation, he really had no need to address its justification, since according to Avicenna God could not have done anything differently anyway [T14]. This point is repeated by al-Rāzī [T35], who is even more explicit in saying that Avicenna’s account of “deterrent,” which as we saw is part of his justification of God, is superfluous in his deterministic system [T43]. More generally al-Rāzī claims that “providence” must mean something quite different for the philosophers than it means for those who accept God’s voluntary agency [T33]. True to form, al-Ṭūsī jumps to defend Avicenna at [T57].
Of course, a fundamental contrast between the Avicennan normative theory and those that emerged in kalām was that Avicenna defined evil as privation and non-existence, rather than as violation of God’s Law or of reason. But as we already saw, the equation of existence with goodness came in handy for al-Shahrastānī in exculpating God. Other authors who argue in favor of this equivalence include Bahmanyār, ʿUmar al-Khayyām, al-Ṭūsī, Bar Hebraeus, and Ibn Kammūna [T9, T11, T54, T62, T67]. Bar Hebraeus even combines the privation theory with an Ashʿarite conception of good and evil as the beneficial and harmful [T66].8 But there were numerous critics [T32], some of whom offered counterexamples: pain exists but is bad [T24, T35,T47], and demons likewise [T26], while for other things, like stones, existence is neither good nor bad [T15]. Al-Ṭūsī considers and responds to an interesting objection, namely that we sometimes say people, for instance those in agonizing pain, would be “better off not existing.” This shows that non-existence is sometimes good rather than bad [T60]. Al-Āmidī raises the worry that Avicenna’s theory may imply that evil is caused by God after all, since it is contingent and everything contingent must be preponderated by God [T51]. Of course Avicenna would deny this, since what causes evil is the inevitable incompatibility of some essences with some other. This incompatibility cannot be traced back to God.9
Avicenna’s claim is that evil arises only as an accident or inevitable by-product of essential goods. Again this view is discussed by a number of authors, including al-Khayyām, al-Shahrastānī, al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī, al-Ṭūsī, and Ibn Kammūna [T11, T22, T23, T34, T45, T54, T61]. What is bad from one point of view may be good from another [T52, T65]. And the great scheme of things, which is of course good, requires evils. For instance evil, or at least lesser good, is needed so that individuals and classes of things may be distinguished from one another [T64, T71]. Also, death and destruction are necessary, because each generation needs to make way for the next [T69]. In short, we live in the best possible world, because God has made the world in accordance with His perfect wisdom and knowledge [T70]. As al-Suhrawardī puts it, the world displays a “universal order” or “arrangement” that contains incidental, unavoidable evils that are not, as such, willed by God [T44, T46, T49].
It seems plausible that if the best possible world had more evil in it than good, God would not have created it. This is why Avicenna insisted that good outweighs evil in our world. Unsurprisingly many agree [T55, T56, T70]; see also the passages mentioned above where it is argued that more good would be lost than evil eliminated, if God failed to create the universe. But al-Shahrastānī did not necessarily agree, since he thought that humans are more often wicked than righteous in their use of free will. Still, the voluntary evils in question are “relative,” not essential, and of course God’s own acts are always good [T25]. That last point is a conclusion Avicenna could have reached from another direction: since God is pure existence and existence is goodness, God is the pure good. That sounds like something all authors in our period would want to endorse, but even here there is diversity of opinion, as al-Shahrazūrī suggests that intelligible substances other than God might claim the title of pure goodness [T68].
Texts from Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, Bahmanyār, al-Khayyām, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, al-Shahrastānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī, al-Āmidī, al-Nasafī, al-Ṭūsī, Bar Hebraeus, Ibn Kammūna, al-Shahrazūrī, al-Samarqandī, al-Ḥillī.
Good and Evil
[T1] Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt IX.6, 339.13–340.13 [trans. Marmura, mod.]
[evil as non-existence or privation]
Know that evil (al-sharr) is spoken of in several senses. Thus, “evil” is said of what is akin to deficiency, namely ignorance, weakness, and deformity in physiognomy. “Evil” is [also] said of what is like pain and distress, which consist in an apprehending of something in virtue of a cause, not merely in the lack of a cause. (a) For the cause that negates the good, impedes the good, and yields its nonexistence, is sometimes a separate thing that is not perceived by that which is harmed, as when the clouds cast shade and prevent the sun’s shining on that which needs the sun to perfect itself. If that which is in need is capable of perception, it will perceive that it does not benefit, but it will not perceive that the clouds have intervened as part of it. It will rather [perceive it] inasmuch as it can see. But it is not inasmuch as it can see [340] that it is harmed, afflicted, or suffers some deficiency in this situation. It [is rather harmed] inasmuch as it is some other thing. (b) Then sometimes [the cause of evil] may not be separate, and may be perceived by someone who is impaired, as when someone who loses integrity (ittiṣāl) in an organ because of a rupturing heat. For, inasmuch as he perceives the loss of integrity through a power in that very organ, he also apprehends the harmful heat. So in this case, two perceptions are combined: one, along the lines described above, perceiving non-existent things, another, as also described above, perceiving existing things. This existing object of perception is not evil in itself, but only relative to this thing. As for being imperfect and impaired, this is not an evil merely in relation to [the thing] such that [the imperfection] would have an existence that is not an evil for [that thing]. Rather, its very existence is nothing but an evil in it, and is an evil in the very manner of its being. For blindness can be only in the eye, and inasmuch as it is in the eye can only be an evil, having no other aspect in terms of which it would not be an evil. But heat, for example, may become an evil relative to the one who suffers from it, but it has another aspect in terms of which it is not an evil. Thus, evil is in itself (bi-al-dhāt) privation, but not just any privation: only privation of what the thing’s nature demands, in terms of the perfections that belong permanently to its species and nature. But evil is accidentally (bi-al-ʿaraḍ) the nonexistent, or that which impedes perfection for what should have it.
[T2] Avicenna, Ishārāt, 333.7–12 [trans. Inati, mod.]
[providence and the best order]
Providence is the First’s comprehensive knowledge of the universe, and of how the universe must be so that it may have the best order, and of the fact that it is necessarily derived from Him and from His comprehension of it. Thus the existent corresponds to what is known, in the best order, without any intention or search proceeding from the First, the Truth. Therefore the First’s knowledge of the manner of the befitting arrangement of the existence of the universe is the source for the emanation of good in the universe.
[T3] Avicenna, Ishārāt, 333.14–335.4 [trans. Inati, mod.]
[necessity of evil]
Things that are contingent in existence include those whose existence can be entirely free of evil, disorder, [334] and corruption; those that cannot attain excellence without some evil’s accidentally arising from them when motions cross and moving things clash; and also in [this] classification, there are things that are evil either absolutely or for the most part. If the pure good is the principle of the emanation of existence that is good and befitting, then there is necessarily emanation of the first type [of existent], for instance the existence of the intellectual substances, and the like. Likewise the second type emanates necessarily. For if great good failed to exist and were not produced to avoid a small evil, then great evil would result. Take for instance the creation of fire: fire would not provide its benefit or give its full help to perfect existence, without being such as to harm and damage whatever animal bodies happen to collide with it. The same goes for animal bodies. They cannot acquire their excellence without being such that they can be harmed by their states of motion and rest, and also the states of fire, for instance, that lead to coming together and collisions that produce harm. For their states and the states of things in the world [around them] lead them to make mistakes in their obligations which lead to injury in the afterlife, and concerning the truth. Or, [it may lead to] excessive and dominating agitation worked by desire or anger, which leads to injury in the affairs of the afterlife. The abovementioned powers would not be sufficient without being such that, when [335] collisions occur, error may accidentally befall them, and dominating agitation. But this happens to individuals that are fewer in number than those who are safe, and at times less frequent than the times of safety. This being known by primary providence, it is as if it is intended accidentally. Thus evil enters determination (al-qadar) accidentally, as if it were “pleasing,” one might say, accidentally.
[T4] Avicenna, Ishārāt, 335.6–336.4 [trans. Inati, mod.]
[predominance of the good]
You may say that the majority of people are dominated by ignorance, or obedience to desire and anger. Why then is this sort [of evil] said to be unusual for them? Learn that the states of the body in its disposition are three: the state of the one who excels in beauty and health, that of one who is average in these two respects, and that of ugliness, sickliness, or disease. The first and the second [types of person] receive [respectively] an abundant or moderate portion of worldly and physical happiness, or they are [simply] saved. Similarly, the states of the soul in its disposition are three. First, the state of the one who has attained full excellence in mind and character, who will have the highest degree of happiness in the future life. Second, the state of one who has not attained this [level], especially regarding the intelligibles, yet whose ignorance is no impediment to the afterlife, even if he does not have a large store of knowledge that would be very [336] useful for the afterlife. Still this person is among those who are saved, and receive a portion of goods in the hereafter. Finally one who, like the ill or sickly, will be harmed in the next life. Both extremes are unusual, the middle being prevalent and predominant. If [the intermediate group] is added to the virtuous extreme, [the number] of people saved turns out to be abundantly predominant.
[T5] Avicenna, Ishārāt, 337.9–338.11 [trans. Inati, mod.]
[punishment and the Muʿtazilite view of our knowledge of good]
Perhaps you will also say: if there is destiny (al-qadar), then why is there punishment? Consider the following answer. Punishment of the soul due to its sin is, as you shall learn, like the body’s disease due to its gluttony: it is a necessary consequence to which past conditions lead, whose occurrence inevitably gives rise to the occurrence of their consequences. It’s another story when it comes to the other kind of punishment, which has an external principle. Furthermore, if an external punisher is admitted, this too will be good, since [338] a deterrent (al-takhwīf) must exist among established causes, so that for the most part it is useful. Belief [in punishment] ensures deterrent. So even if it happens that, because of destiny, someone goes against what the deterrent and consideration require, doing wrong and committing a crime, still there must be belief [in punishment] for the sake of the common end, even if it is not applicable to that person and not required by the Willing, the Merciful. If there were nothing here apart from the person afflicted by destiny, there would not be much common, universal utility in his particular destruction. But one should disregard the particular for the sake of the universal, just as one disregards the part for the sake of the whole. Hence a painful organ may be severed in order to save the whole body.
As for what we gather is said about injustice and justice, and about acts (afʿāl) that are called unjust and acts contrary to these, and about the need to forsake the former acts and adopt the latter, all on the grounds that these are primary premises, [we say that] they are not of universal necessity. Rather, most of them are among widely accepted premises agreed upon for the sake of well-being (al-maṣāliḥ).
[T6] Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 162.2–7; 163.1–7; 164.8–165.12 [trans. Yaqub, mod.]
[Ashʿarite definitions of “good” and “bad” as agent-relative]
Indeed, what is specifically called “obligatory” (wājib) is that act the refraining from which leads to evident harm. If this harm occurs in the next life, I mean the hereafter, and is known through the revelation, we call the act “obligatory,” and if the harm obtains in this world and is known through reason, in this case too the act might be called “obligatory.” Someone who does not believe in the revelation might say it is obligatory for a hungry person who is dying of hunger to eat if he finds bread. He means by “eating is obligatory” that doing so it is preponderant over refraining from doing so, because of the harm that is caused by refraining from it. We do not forbid this convention according to the law. […]
[163.1] As for the term “good” (ḥasan), its meaning is determined through a tripartite division of how an act may relate to the agent. First, [the act] may be suitable for him, that is, it serves his purpose; second, it may be contrary to his purpose (gharaḍ); third, it may serve no purpose for him to perform it or refrain from doing so. This division is established by the intellect. That act which is suitable for the agent is called “good” for him; its being “good” means nothing other than its suiting his purpose. The act that is contrary to his purpose is called “bad” (qabīḥ); its being “bad” means nothing but its being contrary to his purpose. The act that is neither contrary to nor suitable to his purpose is called “frivolity,” (ʿabath); that is, there is no benefit in it at all. Someone who engages in frivolities is called “frivolous” and might be called “foolish” (safīh). Someone who does what is “bad,” that is, an action that is harmful for him, is [also] called “foolish,” and the name “foolish” is more applicable to him than to the frivolous. […]
[164.8] This conclusively shows that good and bad, for all people, refer to two relational items that vary owing to relations, and not essential attributes (ṣifāt al-dhawāt) that do not vary by relation. It is surely possible [165] that a thing is good with respect to Zayd and bad with respect to ʿAmr, whereas it is not possible that a thing is black with respect to Zayd and white with respect to ʿAmr, since colors are not relational qualities (al-awṣāf al-iḍāfiyya).
Now that you understand the meaning, you should know there are also three usages for the term “good.” One may use it for whatever serves a purpose, whether the purpose is near at hand or far in the future. Or one may use it specifically for what serves a purpose in the hereafter; and this is what the revelation deems good, that is, it exhorts its performance and promises a reward for it. This is how our companions [i.e. the Ashʿarites] use it. […]
[165.10] There is a third usage of “good,” as when it is said: “an act of God is good no matter what, even though God has no purpose with respect to Himself.” This means there are no repercussions for God or blame of Him because of the act, for He is the agent in His kingdom, in which no one else has a share.
[T7] Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 166.4–9; 170.1–171.6 [trans. Yaqub, mod.]
[against the absolute understanding of “bad”]
A person might use the term “bad” for what is contrary to his purpose, even though it is in accordance with the purpose of someone else. But he pays no heed to the other person—everyone is by nature preoccupied with himself and places little value on everything else—and hence he judges the act to be absolutely bad. He might say that it is intrinsically (fī ʿaynihi) bad, but in fact his reason is that it is bad with respect to him, in the sense that it is contrary to his purpose, as if his purposes were the whole world with respect to him. Thus he imagines that what is contrary to his purpose is contrary in itself, and accordingly he relates badness to the essence of the thing and makes an absolute judgment. […]
[altruism objection and response]
[170.1] Someone might say: your view comes down to the claim that good and bad reduce to what is suitable to, or contrary to, purposes. But we see that the reasonable person deems good that in which he has no benefit, and deems bad that in which he does have benefit. Regarding deeming something good: a person may see a human being or an animal about to die, and would deem it good to save him, even with a drink of water, although he does not believe in the revelation and does not expect a reward for it in this life, and it is not performed in view of people, so that cannot expect praise for it. In fact, one could stipulate that he has no purpose in view, and still he would prefer saving [the victim] over ignoring him, because he deems the former good and the latter bad. […]
[171.1] Regarding the person who does not believe in revelation and yet prefers to save rather than to ignore a victim, the elimination of the harm that will befall a person is a part of human empathy, and is a nature from which it is impossible to detach oneself. He imagines oneself to be in the same predicament, and supposes that another is able to save him but refrains from doing so, and realizes that he would deem this bad. Then he goes back to himself and imagines that person who is about to die to be himself; by nature he feels aversion to what the person who is about to die thinks of him; and thus he eliminates this aversion from his soul by saving the victim.
[T8] Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 107.12–108.5 [trans. Yaqub, mod.]
[everything, even the “bad”, is the object of God’s will]
Now you should know that, according to us, [divine will] attaches to all originated things, insofar as it has become apparent that everything originated was created by God’s power, and whatever power creates requires a will to direct the power to the object of power, and specify [the power] for it. Hence every object of power is willed, and every originated thing is an object of power, therefore every originated thing is willed. Evil, unbelief, [108] and sin are all originated things; therefore they are inevitably willed by God. […]
[108.3] As for the Muʿtazilites, they say that all sins and all evil deeds are committed against God’s will; in fact, He is averse to them. It is well-known that most of what takes place in this world is sin. So he is averse to more things than He wills. So, according to what they claim, He is closer to impotence and deficiency. May the Lord of the worlds be exalted over what these benighted men say!
[T9] Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 658.7–660.12
[evil as clash of goods]
As for the existence of different kinds of evil (al-sharr) in this world and how they enter into divine decree (al-qaḍāʾ), it is as I say: it is known that contingent quiddities have no causes (sabab) for their essences or for being contingent, nor for needing an cause (ʿilla) for their existence. Nor [do contingent quiddities have] a cause for being contrary (al-mutaḍāddīn) and hindering each other in existence. Nor is there a cause for the fact that everything originated is perishable. Nor is there a cause for the fact that the contingent falls short of the existence of the essentially necessary existent, or for its deficiency in comparison to the rank (rutba) [of the necessary existent]. Nor is there a cause of fire’s burning, or for the burned thing’s being susceptible to burning. For all these are constituents of quiddities and the nature of the elements, or among the concomitants of [this nature]. This is why one observes that the final ends (ghāyāt) of some existents harms other existents, or [659] corrupts them. For instance the final end of the irascible faculty harms the intellect even though it is good (khayran) in respect of the irascible faculty. You have learned previously about the necessities that follow upon final ends.
[evil as privation and potentiality]
Evil does not attach to anything whose existence at the utmost degree of perfection, and in which there is no potentiality. The reason is that evil is the privation of existence (ʿadam wujūd), or of the perfection of existence (kamāl wujūd), and all this [sc. privation] holds [only] insofar as something is in potentiality.
[different degrees of good]
There is a gradation of deficiency in comparison to the rank of the First. For instance, the deficiency of the Earth in comparison to His rank is greater than that of the Sun. All this is due to the difference between the quiddities in themselves. If the deficiency in all quiddities were alike, then the quiddities would all be one and the same. And just as there is gradation in the quiddities of species, so likewise in the quiddities of individuals that fall under the species.
[absolute good and accidental evil]
You should know that there is much evil in the natural world, yet it is not predominant. Furthermore, even though one conceives the concomitants of all final ends and [corresponding] necessities as evil in relation to some things, they are not without good. One may know this on the grounds that they are concomitants of the absolute good. Good is decreed [by God] essentially, whereas evil is decreed accidentally. Whatever is decreed is predestined (muqaddar). By “accidentally” we mean that, if we relate [evil] to that in which there is a benefit for us, then it will be accidentally [evil]. Yet it is the same to say that everything is good and that everything is predestined, for it is all willed by the First. You know that He Himself is the final end for every existent and that everything relates to Him in the same way.
[universal good and relative evil]
Furthermore, if something is evil in relation to something else, this does not mean that it is evil in terms of the order of the universe. Rather it might [660] be good in relation to the universal order. Hence, there is no evil in relation to the universe, and everything that has been decreed is predestined. In general, even though each individual may be deficient in relation to another and each species deficient in relation to another, still it is perfect in itself. [Even] injustice, despite being evil, is good in relation to the irascible faculty.
[the necessity of evil]
It would be wrong to say that the First Governor could bestow existence upon a pure good that is free from evil. For this [sc. pure goodness] is necessary in absolute existence, but not necessary in each single existence. So [God] bestowed existence upon whatever could exist in that way, and bestowed existence upon whatever could exist without being free of evil. If He had not bestowed existence upon that which is not free from evil, this would be an even greater evil. Therefore the existence of this contrast is not without good. The evil in it is only in respect of the privation that harms it. If everything were non-existent, and there were no existence at all, then that would be more rightly called evil. If on the other hand He created everything free from evil, with one and the same state and attribute, then there would be only one quiddity.
[T10] Al-Khayyām, Kawn wa-taklīf, 143.2–6
[the necessity of evil]
If someone asks, why did He create contraries and mutual hindrances in existence? We respond: withholding a great good because of a small evil is itself a great evil. Neither universal true wisdom nor universal generosity distributes essential perfections to all existents in such a way that it would unjustly lessen the lot of any of them. Still, there is a gradation in nobility due to their closeness and remoteness [to and from God]. This does not happen because of miserliness on the part of the True, the exalted, but due to the requirements of everlasting wisdom.
[T11] Al-Khayyām, Jawāb ʿan thalāth masāʾil, 167.19–169.6
[evil as privation]
Contingent existents emanate from the sanctified existence in an order and arrangement. Then, there are among existents those that are necessarily contrary to each other, without anyone making them [to be such]. If such an existent comes into existence, contrariety comes into existence necessarily; [168] and if contrariety comes into existence necessarily, then privation (ʿadam) comes into existence necessarily; and if privation comes into existence then evil comes into existence necessarily.
[accidental evil]
Someone may say: the Necessary Existent bestows existence on blackness and heat, so that contrariety comes into existence, since if A is the cause of B, and B the cause of C, then A is the cause of C.
He has said something correct and true, with no confusion in it. However the discussion on this topic must fit the purpose: namely that the Necessary Existent bestowed existence upon blackness, so that necessarily contrariety exists, and hence the Necessary Existent bestowed existence on contrariety among concrete things accidentally, not essentially. No doubt may be raised against this. He did not, however, make blackness contrary to whiteness. He bestowed existence on blackness not insofar as it is contrary to whiteness, but only insofar as its quiddity is contingently existent. Every contingently existent quiddity is brought into existence by the Necessary Existent, since existence itself is good. However blackness is a quiddity that cannot help but be contrary to something else. So whoever bestows existence on blackness insofar as it is contingently existent comes to bestow existence accidentally on contrariety. So evil is not related to whomever bestows existence on blackness in any respect, if the primary purpose—but God is exalted above having any purpose, so rather the true everlasting providence—is oriented towards the good. This kind of good, though, cannot be free of evil and privation. Hence, evil is related to Him only accidentally, but we are speaking here not about the accidental but the essential. […]
[predominance of good]
[168.19] There is another question which is very simple for those who inquire well into metaphysics: why did He bestow existence upon something, knowing that privation and evil would follow upon it?
[169] Response to this: blackness, for instance, has a thousand goods but only one evil. Withholding from willing a thousand goods because of one evil is an enormous evil, given that the relation between the good of blackness and its evilness is larger than the relation of many thousands to one. This being so, it is clear that the evil that exists in the creatures of God, the exalted, is accidental, not essential and that evil is very little in the first wisdom, so it cannot be compared in quantity and quality to good.
[T12] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 135.4–12
[reason and the Law as sources of obligation]
The Muslims say, concerning [religious obligation and the Law], that God the exalted created those who are endowed with reason to have [religious] obligation, by which they mean that He, the exalted, required them to act out the necessary things which are hard [to achieve], but avoid the bad ones, which are hard to avoid. He recommended that they should do the recommended things, which are hard [to achieve], those being of two kinds, rational and legal (ʿaqliyya wa-sharʿiyya). The rational ones are those whose judgments are grasped by reason. The rationally necessary is, for instance, the need to offer thanks in gratitude, reject whatever harms the soul, and make fair judgments over one’s servant, such as the need to return what was borrowed, or the paying of debts. The legal ones are for instance the need to pray, tithe, fast, go on the pilgrimage, and so on. As for bad [acts], the rational ones are injustice, lying, futility, demanding what is bad, and so on. The legal ones are for instance wicked usury, adultery, drinking wine, and so on. The rationally recommended are for instance showing benevolence towards others, while the legal would be for instance supererogatory prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage.
[T13] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 136.1–9
[the purpose of religious obligation]
[The Muslims] say that God, the exalted, created those who are endowed with reason to have [religious] obligation. The reason is that He, the exalted, would otherwise have created them for no purpose, so that their creation would be futile and bad, which is absurd. Therefore He must have created them for a purpose. This purpose cannot have to do with Himself, since nothing can benefit or harm Him, the exalted. So the purpose can only have to do with those who are endowed with reason. He cannot have created them in order to harm them without their deserving this or benefiting from it, since this would be terrible injustice. Therefore He can only have created them in order to benefit them and show benevolence towards them. The utmost benevolence is the reward, as we have described it. So He can only have created them for that. However, it is only good to perform the utmost benevolence for those who deserve it, since it would not be good to exalt [the creature] from the outset, given that it would involve bringing him to greatness, a greatness that would not be good unless it were deserved. Don’t you see that it would not be good for us to declare people of low stature to be great, as if they were prophets and sages?
[T14] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 141.19–142.3
[how the problem of evil is and is not relevant for the philosophers]
Why does this question even arise for you [philosophers], given your principles? Don’t you say that these things that come to be are necessitated through necessitating causes which cannot necessitate anything different from what they necessitate? They can only say yes. We say: then you have already freed yourself from such difficulties as, why is one [necessitated] thing nobler than another? Why is one thing base, another noble, [or] good and evil? According to your principles, the correct response should be that it could not have been otherwise. If something cannot be otherwise, one cannot ask why it did not come about in some other way. To seek for any aspect of wisdom, asking why did it come about in that way, is nonsense and superfluous, on your principles.
However, one can raise difficulties against you in another way, for which there will be no reply. It may be said to you: why is there, in the chain that goes back to the pure good, anything evil or [142] base? Did it proceed from something evil or base? If you say it proceeded something evil, then we force on you the same difficulty that arose concerning the initial [evil]. And this implies that the whole chain would be evil and base. If on the other hand you say that [the evil] came forth from that which is purely good and noble, then we ask you: how can evil proceed from the pure good?
[T15] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, 112.17–113.5
[against the equivalence of goodness and existence]
As for their statement that good in its true reality is existence, and evil non-existence, this is a stupid idea that only the foolish would accept. We say to them: reasonable speakers of Arabic use “good (khayr)” for the beneficial and the fine (ḥasan), and “evil” for the harmful and bad, that is, that which brings no benefit for those who are capable of attaining10 it, in cases where the harmful is unjust. (Don’t you see that bloodletting, cupping, and the arduous path towards seeking profit and knowledge are harmful, but not evil? One might call the harmful which is not unjust “evil,” but only in a wider sense.) What then do you mean by saying that existence is good in itself? Do you mean that existence is beneficial to the existent itself, or to something else? If you mean the former, this is absolutely false. For the existence of rocks is no better for them than their non-existence, since they do not benefit from existing. Likewise the existence of injustices and monstrosities such as insulting God, or futility, or unbelief in [divine] grace, or spurning knowledge, is not better than their non-existence. If on the other hand you mean the second, this is not [113] absolutely true either. For the existence of the intrinsically harmful and of ignorance, when they are futile, is not good for anybody, like if one for instance insults himself, or believes the heavens are below him and the earth above him. When they say that evil is non-existence, and that pain is the perception of non-existence, this too is absolutely false. For pain is something sensible, as evil for the soul. But sense-perception does not connect to non-existence, only to something existent, even if non-existence may accompany it. That is why if one person insults another unjustly he thereby causes him distress; no one would believe that there is a non-existence of something here, yet it is evil and harmful.
[T16] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 149.11–150.17
[God cannot do evil]
This is shown by the fact that God the exalted knows the badness of the bad, knows He has no need of it, knows that the obligatory is obligatory, and knows He has no need to violate [the obligatory]. So it follows that He cannot do bad or violate the obligatory. […]
[all else being equal, we always choose the good]
[150.7] Whoever is like this cannot do bad or violate the obligatory, since if one of us says to someone, “if you commit an injustice I will give you a dirham, but if you do justice, I will [also] give a dirham, and if you speak the truth I will give you a dirham, but if you lie I will [also] give you a dirham,” and if injustice and justice are equal for him in cost, and in respect of all goals apart from goodness and badness, and if he does not believe in the meriting of reward and praise for justice and truth, nor in the meriting of punishment and blame for injustice and lying (or if we suppose that he simply fails to think about this), then he will not waver between neither injustice and justice, nor between truth and lying, as he might waver between two just actions or two truths, the benefit of choosing both being the same. This is a matter of necessary knowledge. We say that [in this case] the person will not choose injustice or choose to lie. This is due to his knowledge that injustice and lying are bad, and he knows that has no need of them. If he believed that injustice and lying were good, or that there is some outweighing benefit in injustice and lying, he could choose them. So it stands that the reason why he does not choose [injustice and lying] is his knowing that both are bad and that he has no need of them. If this is so in our case, then all the more is it so for God the exalted, as explained above.
[T17] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 847.3–848.23
[against al-Ghazālī: the rational basis of good and bad]
Then he [the Ashʿarite opponent] said: by saying “good” we mean that which corresponds to nature, and we seek pleasure in it, and “bad” means that to which nature is averse, and which we disdain. […]
[848.13] We say to him: on the whole, you rely on making the aversion of nature the criterion for deeming something to be bad, even if that act is not deemed bad from the perspective that reason is averse to it. But we have already shown the difference between deeming something as bad from the perspective of nature, and doing so from the perspective of reason. We have shown that by “bad” we mean the latter, not the former. It suffices to refute his long-winded account to give an example of bad things which are not harmful to anyone. Someone might say that it is nature that is averse to them; we however show that it is reason that prohibits them. Take for instance ignorance and futile actions. Each person finds within himself that his reason prohibits believing that the heavens are below him, and earth above him. This is why no one believes such a thing if his reason is of sound condition. [Reason also] prohibits talking to rocks. Its command, prohibition, and blame apply to other cases like this which are prohibited by reason. But there is no harm for anyone in them. Someone might say that there is indeed harm, because one would inconvenience oneself by talking to rocks. To which one may say: if reason prohibited this because it is harmful, then if we assumed that there were some benefit in it that exceeds the harm, reasonable people would then deem it good, and not call whomever does it foolish.
[T18] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 851.2–7
[badness as residing in aspects]
Our masters used to say that [acts] are deemed bad due to the aspects (wujūh) that occur to them. This means that they originate, and there is either a negative or affirmative connection (qarīna) with their origination. Take for instance the origination of the harmful. Inappropriateness is connected to its origination. So long as it is not known or supposed to ward off some [further] harm, or have some legitimate goal, it is deemed bad. They express this by saying that it is deemed bad because of its “being unjust.” Along the same lines, if there is connected to the origination of belief the fact that what is believed is otherwise than is really the case, they express this by saying that it amounts to ignorance, and they say it is deemed bad because of its “being ignorance.” And likewise for all other cases of badness.
[T19] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 858.6–7
[against divine command ethics]
If [being forbidden by God] is what “bad” means, according to you, whereas good is that to which [God’s] command is connected, then in saying this, they run into the problem that the acts of God the exalted are not good.
[T20] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 248.7–12
[Muʿtazilite position on whether God wills good and evil]
The Muʿtazilites, who believe in originated volitions, say that God the exalted wills His specific acts in the sense that he intends their creation according to what He knows. His will comes just one instant before the result of His action. Concerning the acts of those who are under obligation, He wills that the good acts should happen, and the bad ones not. But what is neither good nor bad, neither required nor prohibited, is the “allowed (al-mubāḥāt).” The exalted Lord neither wills it, nor is He averse to it.
[T21] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 249.1–6; 250.4–14
[Muʿtazilite argument that God does not will human acts]
The Muʿtazilites say: if an eternal attribute is connected to [numerous] objects, the connection must be common, as the eternal is not specified by anything. So if [His] will were eternal it would connect to every willed act, both His own and those of His servants. Among the willed acts of the servants is Zayd’s willing to move, while ʿAmr wills to be at rest. So the Eternal would need to will to both volitions and both objects of volition. But whatever He wills must occur. This leads to the co-occurrence of two contraries at one and the same time. […]
[response: God wills existence only]
[250.4] Why did you say that willing two volitions entails willing two objects of volition, so that the co-occurrence of two contraries would follow? God the exalted only wills their volitions in respect of their existence, and their arising anew, but not in respect of their objects of volition. […]
[250.10] The secret is that there is only one respect in which the eternal will is connected, namely whatever arises anew and does so insofar as it is originated, and is specified with existence rather than non-existence, at a certain moment rather than another. The two volitions have in common that they arise anew, and [the volitions] are related to [the objects of volition only] insofar as they arise anew and are specified [as existing]. Neither contradicts the other in this respect, so the [divine] will is not connected with two contraries.
[T22] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 251.1–5; 252.1–253.19
[the problem of evil]
The Muʿtazilites said: it stands firm in our minds that whoever wills good is good and whoever wills evil is evil; that whoever wills justice is just and whoever wills injustice is unjust. If the eternal will were connected to everything that comes to be, then both good and evil would be willed. Therefore, being good, being evil, being just, and being unjust would be attributed to the one who wills [them]. This however is repugnant in God’s case, praise be to Him! God the exalted said: “God does not will injustice for the servant” (Qurʾān 40:31). […]
[response: God wills only existence, moral responsibility lies with humans]
[252.1] The secret is that the eternal will is not connected to the acts of the human as the object of volition insofar as [the human] is obligated, either in the case of obedience or disobedience, of good or of evil. Nor is [the divine will] connected to [the act] insofar as it is an act of the human, and is [the human’s] acquisition in the respect in which it is related to him. Volition of the act of someone else, insofar as it is this other person’s act, is wish and desire. It is only connected to it insofar as it rises anew and is specified with existence as opposed to non-existence, and is determined in one way rather than another. In this respect [the object of volition] is described neither as good nor as evil. If the word “good” is applied to existence as such, this application means something other than what is disputed between us. The Creator, the exalted, wills existence as such, and existence as such is good. Therefore He wills good, and by His hand there is [only] good. As for the aspect that is related to the human, which is an attribute of his act in relation to his power, capacity, time, place, and obligation, in this respect it is not willed by the Creator, the exalted, nor is it an object of His power. Now, it being ascertained, by the preceding demonstrations, that God the exalted is the creator of the deeds of humans, just as He is the creator of all that comes to be, and given that He creates by choice (al-ikhtiyār) and will, not by nature or essentially, He is therefore willing and choosing that existence arises anew and that the existent is originated. Furthermore, existence as such is entirely good, and whoever wills [it] is good. As for evil, insofar as it is existent it already participates in good. In this respect it is good and willed [by God]. For this reason no pure evil is realized in existence. So He, the exalted, wills existence and wills good, but the human wills both good and evil.
[accidental evil]
This is why the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) said that evil enters the [divine] decree and will only accidentally, not essentially, and due to [253] secondary intention, not primary intention. For according to them evil is either non-existence or the privation of a perfection of existence. […] [253.8] The eternal will and lordly providence are connected with both items and classes [sc. both the perfect and the imperfect] together, but one [class] is connected by way of inclusion, implication, and accidentality. This is called a “secondary object of will and intention.” The second [class, that is, the perfect] is connected by way of positing, foundation, and essentiality. It is called a “primary object of will and intention.” For instance, you know that the universal intention for rain’s falling from the sky is the arrangement of the world and the arranging of existence. This is good in an absolute sense. But if an old house that was about to fall down is destroyed by it or kills an old woman who was on the brink of death, this is evil relatively, not fundamentally, and by secondary intention, not primary intention.
[universal good]
The existence of universal good together with some particular evil is closer to wisdom than the [total] non-existence of good without the occurrence of particular evil. Its absence would lead to corruption in the order of all existents. This would be a great evil and terrible harm.
[T23] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 261.7–262.2
[evil is accidental, not absolute]
Absolute evil has no existence. Likewise the essentially evil is no occurring thing, only something expressed verbally. If it were to occur, it would be absolute, universal, essential, existent evil. But if existence is realized for it then goodness has already occurred for it, due to its existence, since existence as such is good. So it is verified that absolute evil has no existence, except in verbal expression and the mind. […]
[261.13] By contrast accidental evil does have existence, in a way. It only attaches to that which has something potential in its nature. This happens only on account of matter. Something attaches and accidentally occurs to [matter] in itself, in its initial existence, namely some feature that prevents [matter] from its proper aptitude for perfection, towards which it is oriented, so as to ruin its mixture and make it recalcitrant in substance to the reception of specification, formation, and organization. So the creature becomes distorted and the structure defective, not because the agent failed but because whatever it acted upon failed to receive [the act properly]. This may lead to the fact that ruinous habits come forth from that structure. The animal soul may overwhelm [262] the human soul, so that the person brings forth wicked acts and false beliefs.
[T24] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 263.15–264.14
[kalām response to philosophical views on evil]
The theologians (mutakallimūn) said: we do not disagree with the views you have adopted concerning what the pure good is, from whence the pure good comes, or that the cosmic order is oriented towards perfection in existence. The disagreement between us concerns only the goods that attach to the acts of humans and their acquisition. For example false beliefs, vain ignorance, [264] ruinous habits, and base acts: do they occur in accordance with our will to the exclusion of the Creator’s will, or they are willed by Him, the exalted? Whatever else happens in terms of base forms, dangerous animals, heavenly disasters, earthly blights, and their consequences in terms of anxieties, griefs, pains, and aches: we do not disagree whether they are good or evil. We do not [need to] say that they are goods or benefits, or that in every evil among them and together with every suffering and trial there is some benevolence, or that in every strife and disaster there is some benefit, or that there is some special [task] for every dangerous animal, or that every body brings both benefit and harm, or that every harm is benefit in relation to something else. Rather we force a more general problem upon you. According to you, all existence, whatever it includes, whether spiritual and corporeal, proceeds from the First in the aforementioned order as concomitants of something. But that which comes forth as concomitants is more like what happens by second intention than by first intention. What then is the difference between the evils that occur in generated things and that must come about accidentally, and the fundamental generation, in which generated things and their occurrence happen as concomitants? For there is then nothing in existence that must come about essentially, such that something else would then have to come about accidentally.
[T25] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 266.1–267.2
[predominance of evil]
We say: we see that the corporeal world is full of afflictions, trials, disasters, and strife, replete with calamities, maladies, misfortunes, and sorrows, shot through with ignorance and false beliefs. Most people are blameworthy in their character traits, are of mean disposition, and have an irascible faculty that overpowers the intellectual one, to the point that one can find in each century perhaps one person who may be said to have divine wisdom, which according to you is likeness to God. […] [266.9] So how can you, dear philosophers (falāsifa), keep saying that there is no absolute evil in the world and that it is not realized for the most part? What you find in existence clashes with what you keep insisting. Just consider human souls and what is predominant in their states of knowledge and ignorance, fine and wicked character traits, true and mendacious statements, good and evil acts. You will then know that evil prevails and predominates in the corporeal world, especially in human souls. In general, whenever we find inborn nature and divine determination dominating human choice and acquisition, then good and righteousness predominate. But whenever we find human choice and acquisition dominating, evil and corruption prevail. So we come back to the point that there is no evil among the acts of God, since the only evil that exists in them is relative to one thing rather than another. Evil only enters human voluntary actions. [267] Again, insofar as they may be traced to God’s will—may He be praised—they are good. But insofar as are traced to the acquisition of human, they acquire the name of evil.
[T26] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 265.8–12; 267.2–5
[demons as pure evil]
We say: you have affirmed an order in existence whereby you state that existence is primary and more apt in some existents, in others not. Why then don’t you affirm a contrariety (taḍāddan) as well, so as to judge that existence in some existents is pure good and in others pure evil? You have already heard from the proponents of the religious Law that there are spiritual angels, which are entirely good, as well as demons, which are entirely evil.
[267.2] The religious Law may be adduced to establish the reality of demons and their leader, the cursed Iblīs. It is impossible to deny this, once one has affirmed the truth of the statements and reports of [the Law] on the basis of clear signs and astounding miracles.
[T27] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 370.5–371.9
[Ashʿarite divine command theory]
The teaching of the people of truth is that reason [on its own] does not indicate whether anything is good or bad in respect of what God the exalted imposes as an obligation (taklīf) in the religious Law. This means that the acts of humans do not have intrinsic attributes (al-ṣifāt al-nafsāniyya) of being good or bad, such that if someone performs them or refrains from doing so, he would impose a necessity upon God to reward or punish. Indeed, something may be good according to the religious Law, even though something else just like it and equivalent in its intrinsic attributes may be bad. “Good” means that the religious Law lays down reward for whomever does it, “bad” that religious Law lays down punishment for whomever does it. […]
[Muʿtazilite position]
[371.3] The dualists, transmigrationists, Brahmans, Khārijites, Karrāmites, and Muʿtazilites had a different view. They came to think that reason indicates the goodness and badness of acts, in the sense that God the exalted must reward and praise whomever does good, and must punish and blame whomever does bad. Acts have intrinsic attributes of being good and bad. When the religious Law lays them down as such, it is only informing us about them, not imposing them. Furthermore, there are some good and bad [acts] that are perceived to be such necessarily, such as [the goodness] of beneficial truth and [the badness] of lying without benefit.
[T28] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 371.17–372.11
[Ashʿarite argument: moral version of the Flying Man applied to truth-telling]
The people of truth said: let us imagine a human who is created all at once, with intact inborn disposition and perfect intellect, without his having any moral character instilled in him, or being educated by parents, or brought up in the religious Law, or being taught by anyone. He is then confronted with two things: first, [372] that two is more than one, second, that lying is bad, in the sense that God the exalted should blame the one who does it. Doubtless he will not hesitate about the first, but will hesitate about the second. Whoever thinks both cases are alike in relation to his reason has departed from common sense and shows great contrariness. Or does he not accept that God the exalted is unharmed by lying, and goes unbenefited by truth? For both [true and false] statements are on a par as far as obligation (al-taklīf) is concerned, so [the newly created person] cannot give preponderance to the first over the second by relying on his reason alone.
What this shows is that truth and lying, in their essences and true realities, are realized only in their essences as nothing more than these true realities. For instance truth is said to be a report of something as it is, whereas lying is a report about something being other than it is. We know that whoever perceives these true realities understands what it is for them to be realized, without its occurring to him that they are good and bad. Thus good or bad does not come into the essential attributes of either one, which are only realized as their true realities. [Good and bad] do not belong to them as being obvious to the imagination (wahm), as has been shown, nor do they necessarily attach to them in existence, since some true statements are blameworthy, like pointing out a prophet who is fleeing from a tyrant. And some lies are praiseworthy, such as refusing to point him out. So, being bad does not enter into the definition of lying, nor does it attach to it either in the imagination or in existence. […] [373.2] It remains only for them to take refuge in the human custom of calling whatever harms them “bad” and whatever benefits them “good.” We have nothing against using the words like this, but their use differs with the custom of one group of people to another, from one time to another, from one place to another, and from one relation to another. Whatever differs in these associations and relations has no true reality in itself. Sometimes people deem the sacrifice of animals good, sometimes bad. It may be good in relation to a given people, time, and place, or may be bad. But we are here discussing [religious] obligation such that the good necessarily calls for reward, and no blame can be ever applied to it. The perception of this sort of thing is not excluded for reason. This is the approach of the people of truth, in the best way of affirming it and laying it down.
[T29] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 373.13–375.5
[Muʿtazilite arguments]
We [the Muʿtazilites] say: if a need occurs to any reasonable person, and he can satisfy it just as well by speaking the truth as by lying, so that both are completely equal in terms of attaining the goal, it is more fitting that he chooses the truth than the lie. If in his view lying had no attribute that required avoiding it, the truth would not be preponderant over it.
They [the Muʿtazilites] say: let us suppose someone who has been reached by no religious message, or is in the state of denying the religious Law, so that no preponderance is implied by [religious] obligation. This [374] notwithstanding, reasonable people would still deem saving a drowning person, or rescuing the dying, to be good, and injustice and enmity bad.
The following is even clearer. Let us suppose a discussion between two reasonable people, prior to the imposition of the religious Law, who are disputing about some issue, whether to deny or affirm something. There can be no doubt that they distinguish truth-telling from lying. Then, one of them denies what the other says as something bad, and affirms his own statement as something good. Consequently, the issue between them over this denial escalates into an actual quarrel. Each accuses the other of ignorance. Each demands that the other give up on their own claim and accept his own, and demands that he concede the point. So if goodness and badness were completely abandoned [in the absence of religious Law], then all disputation would be eliminated, and it would be possible to insist on or deny anything.
You may say that this is only possible by custom (al-ʿāda), but cannot have anything to do with obligation. But we say that it is not mere custom. Rather, sound reason is a judge between two people who are disagreeing over an issue, whether to affirm or deny it. Whatever is good according to reason is good according to divine wisdom. And whatever is good according to [divine] wisdom is necessary, with the necessity of wisdom, not of obligation. Nothing is necessary for God the exalted because it is an “obligation.” Rather it is necessary for Him only insofar as His wisdom makes a determination or ordains it.
[T30] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 375.6–377.3
[the philosophers’ view that only knowledge is intrinsically good]
The philosophers (falāsifa) added to [the points made by the] Muʿtazilites an argument and a clarification. They said: existence includes pure good, pure evil, and mixtures of good and evil. The pure good is what reason seeks for its own sake, while it rejects pure evil for its own sake. But the mixture [is sought after] in one respect and [rejected] in another. No reasonable person doubts that knowledge, both generally and specifically, is a praiseworthy good and to be sought, while ignorance, both generally and specifically, is a blameworthy evil, and not to be sought. Whatever is sought by reason is deemed good by reasonable people, while whatever is avoided by reason is deemed bad by the many. Sound inborn nature (al-fiṭra) calls us to bring about whatever is deemed good, and reject whatever is deemed bad, regardless whether a lawgiver imposed it upon us or not.
Furthermore, praiseworthy traits and righteous characteristics such as abstinence, generosity, courage, and bravery are deemed good as acts, while their opposites are deemed bad as practices.11 Perfection is state of humans achieved through the perfection of the soul in respect of two powers: true knowledge and good practice, [thereby] achieving likeness to God the exalted and to the higher spiritual things, insofar as one’s capacity allows. Religious laws are imposed with the aim only of facilitating what is determined by the intellect, without altering it. Rather, given that particular intellects [376] may fall short of acquiring all intelligibles, and are incapable of leading the way to the universal benefits that encompass the whole human species, it was necessary according to [divine] wisdom that there be a religious law among the people. […]
[376.14] [The philosophers] said: the Muʿtazilites erred in referring bad and good to the essential attributes of acts, but were right to make this determination in the cases of knowledge and ignorance. For acts differ in respect of individuals, times, and other relations, so [good and bad] are not intrinsic attributes that attach to them in such a way as never to be separated from them. But the Ashʿarites erred [too], in eliminating [goodness] from knowledge, which as a species is never blameworthy, and [badness] from ignorance, which as a species is never praiseworthy. For [377] eternal happiness and misery are characterized by [knowledge and ignorance] and are restricted to them. One chooses or refrains from acts accidentally, not essentially, and they differ in relation to this or that individual and time.
[T31] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 378.16–379.19
[response to the Muʿtazilite truth-telling argument, cf. T29]
Their objection is incorrect. What has been mentioned as concerns the difference between knowing that two is more than one, and judging that lying is bad, is obvious and we have no quarrel with it. But [the rest] of what you mentioned [379] is not conceded. For the two options of truth and falsehood are equivalent to the person who is in need. If he chooses truth, his choice is not something necessary; nor is the knowledge that he must choose it connected to [him] necessarily. If he is pleased to [tell the truth], it is due to some motivation, custom, or goal that brings him to this. But if someone considers truth and lying as being equivalent in terms of blame at some time, or punishment at another, then neither of the two will preponderate over the other owing to any feature it has in itself.
[response to their argument from altruism]
As for the fact that reasonable people deem rescuing a drowning man good, and enmity bad, which calls them to offer commendation for the former act, and to censure the latter act, and so on, we concede this. But we are here discussing the case of [religious] obligation, and whether it is incumbent upon God the exalted to reward and punish, even once He knows that neither harm nor benefit results from [the person’s] action.
[response to their argument from disagreement]
As for two people disagreeing about whether to deny or affirm some topic dealt with by reason, prior to the imposition of the religious Law, where each of the two rejects the view of the other, this is conceded. But [again], the issue is about what is incumbent upon God the exalted, whether He is necessitated to issue praise or blame, reward or punishment, for that act. This is hidden from us. How do you know He is satisfied with an act and issues reward for it, but is dissatisfied with another act, and issues punishment for it? […] [379.17] It is impossible to compare His acts to those of humans, since we see that many acts we deem to be bad are not deemed bad by Him, such as the infliction of pain upon wild animals, the destruction of crops and children, and so on.
[T32] Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 391.10–392.6
[response to the philosophers]
Their statement that existence includes pure good, pure evil, and mixtures of good and evil is the remark of someone who does not realize what good and evil are and what is meant by good in first place. According to you, good applies to every existent; so evil applies to everything non-existent. Hence your saying that existence “includes” pure good makes no sense. It is as if you said that existence includes existence, which is pointless repetition. Thus your statement is out of order. As for pure evil, pure evil is non-existent, so how can existence include non-existence? But the division is incorrect from the start, since the question that has been posed concerns motions that are subject to [religious] obligation. It is good and evil with regard to [such actions] that is intended by “good and bad (al-ḥusn wa-al-qubḥ).”
You have granted to us that the [moral] status of acts cannot be known necessarily. [392] Reason is not guided to it by inquiry, because it differs in respect of various relations and times. So there remains only your statement that knowledge as such is praiseworthy, and everything praiseworthy is sought for its own sake, whereas ignorance is the reverse of this. Which is conceded. But when someone formulates a goal, does this impose necessity upon God the exalted to reward him, or not? Or if he should fail to formulate it, but rather pursues the contrary, does this make punishment necessary, or not? The dispute concerns [good and bad] only in respect of [religious] obligation, not in respect of the thing in itself and its form.
[T33] Al-Rāzī, Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 252r9–12
[on providence]
They claimed that the Exalted’s [knowledge] of how the arrangement of existence should be, in order that it may occur in the best and the most perfect way, is the cause of the emanation of that arrangement from Him. This knowledge is providence. Those however who argue for God’s being a voluntary [agent] claimed that providence is His creation of the created in the most beneficial way for it.
[T34] Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, vol. 2, 548.12–20
[evil as privation and relativity of evil]
As for existing things, they are not evil essentially, but accidentally, insofar as they encompass the privation of necessary or beneficial things. This is indicated by the fact that, whenever we find an act being called “evil,” it is a perfection in relation to its agent. Its being evil is only in relation to something else. Injustice, for instance, proceeds from the faculty that is unjust when it dominates, namely the irascible faculty. For it, domination is a perfection, and a benefit of its innate disposition. This act is good in relation to it, since if it lacked it, then in relation to it, that would be an evil. [Injustice] is evil only in relation to the one who suffers from injustice when his possessions are taken away from him, and in relation to the rational soul, whose perfection consists in mastery over this faculty. When that faculty gets away from the rational soul, the rational soul loses its mastery over it, which must be evil for the rational soul.
[T35] Al-Rāzī, Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 256r2–257r3
[the predominance of good over evil, and hedonism]
How evil enters into the divine decree and an explanation that good is predominant: [the philosophers] based [their solution] of this issue on the grounds that good is existence and evil is non-existence, as we have set forth in the chapter on existence. But on my view, this is a merely verbal analysis. If one means by “evil” the non-existence (ʿadam) of something that should be, then [evil] is privative (ʿadamī). But if one means by it pain and whatever leads or contributes to it, it is existing (wujūdī). There is no doubt that pain is an existing quality. For the most part, what people mean by evil is pain, and whatever leads to it.
Then, drawing out the implications of this principle, [the philosophers] went on to say that something is either pure good, pure evil, or good in one respect and evil in another respect. The pure good is that which cannot have non-existence, nor can any of its attributes. This is the existent that is necessary in itself in all respects. Its existence has already been established. Pure evil, by contrast, is impossible, since insofar as it is existent it will not be evil. As for that which is evil in one respect and good in another, it is of three kinds: [good and evil] may be equal to one another [in it], or good may predominate, or evil may predominate.
That in which good predominates exists necessarily, since foregoing a greater good for the sake of lesser evil is itself a great evil. Also, when we inductively investigate the states of existent things aside from God the exalted, we find that good predominates in them. In the case of separate substances, such as intellects and souls, there is no doubt that good predominates in them. As for bodies: the same goes for the celestial spheres, since they are far from being receptive to non-existence, disruption, alteration, or change in12 any stable qualities. And good predominates in the elements too. Even if there is much sickness, there is more health; even if there is much pain, there is more pleasure.
If someone asks: why is good not free from evil? We say: because this is impossible in itself. When [God] creates fire for the sake of its benefits, it necessarily follows it that it can burn the limbs of animals, and this is evil. So, if it is impossible in itself, the fact that [God] lacks power [to do otherwise] is no weakness. [256v] This is the summary (al-mulakhkhaṣ) of what [the philosophers] say.
Someone may say: the debate [over evil] is irrelevant for the philosophers (al-falāsifa), since according to them God the exalted necessitates through His essence and is not a voluntary agent. Asking why someone made evil instead of good applies only to someone who voluntarily chooses between acting and non-acting, not someone who necessitates.
But even if we concede this, we have nevertheless shown that what is meant by “evil” is pain. So, if even one establishes that the Creator, the exalted, is necessary in Himself, one must still show that evil may be denied of Him, by giving an argument that pain cannot apply to Him. But [the philosophers] have not given such proof; they were content to leave us in the dark. As for the celestial bodies, we do not concede that non-existence is impossible for them. Even if we did concede this, their goodness would only be complete on the interpretation we have suggested, so one would need to establish that pains do not apply to them. But they have provided no proof for this at all. From the fact that they are incapable of receiving non-existence and change in their essences and their attributes, it does not immediately follow that they did not experience pain from the very beginning. As for the elements, we do not concede that good predominates in them, because according to this usage “good” means pleasure. We do not concede that pleasure predominates in the world of generation and corruption. For some people never experience pleasure at all. Also [some philosophers] claim that [pleasure] means nothing but the removal of pain. On this assumption, there are only two states: pain and its removal. Pain is not good, and its removal is something privative, so it is not good either. Then some of them were ingenious and found examples where pleasure may be affirmed, without any removal of pain. But such examples, even if they try to trick us into thinking they are in the majority, are actually small in number, assuming they are genuine cases. In which case one cannot settle on the view that good is predominant; rather what is predominant is pain and its avoidance. Pleasure is unusual. In which case we may pose again the problem that was already mentioned against them: evil predominates and even if it does not, then at least it is equal [to good]; if things are like this, undertaking to create was either foolish, or futile.
As for their statement that it is impossible to separate good from evil, we say: this is based on denying that [God] is a voluntary [agent]. Otherwise he would be capable of making a body that is hot when it would need some benefit from its being hot, and not hot if its being hot becomes harmful. You should know that [257r] there are only two ways to escape these problems. Either one says that [God] is necessitating and then the whole discussion is irrelevant. Or, one says that He is a voluntary [agent], while denying that one can apply good and bad (al-ḥusn wa-al-qubḥ) [to Him]. One should not ask about what is done by God the exalted.
[T36] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 346.4–13
[the difference between the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions]
The most important thing in this question is to clarify where the disagreement lies. We say: there is no disagreement about the fact that we understand by our reason (bi-ʿuqūlinā) that some things are agreeable to our natures, others repugnant. Pleasure, and whatever leads to it, is agreeable; pain, and whatever leads to it, is repugnant. There is no need for religious Law to understand these agreeable and repugnant things. Also, we know by our reason that [knowledge] is an attribute of perfection, and ignorance an attribute of deficiency. The disagreement is only about the fact that some acts are connected to blame in this life and punishment in the afterlife, while other acts are connected to praise in this life and reward in the afterlife. Is this due to an attribute that is referred to the act itself, or is this not the case, and instead purely the judgment of religious Law? Or is it due to the judgment of those who have understanding? The Muʿtazilites said the reason for these judgments are attributes that are referred to the acts, but our doctrine is that it is nothing but a judgment of the religious Law.
[T37] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 347.12–16
[the link between freedom and responsibility]
If the acts of humans are either necessary or random, then talk of things’ being good and bad by reason must be false. It is obvious why this would be false according to our doctrine. It would also be false on the Muʿtazilite doctrine, because either way voluntary choice is undermined. If there is no voluntary choice then there remains neither good nor bad.
[T38] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 348.14–18; 349.10–15
[the relative badness of lying]
If lying were morally bad because it is lying, then all lying would have to be bad. Then a lie that would facilitate the liberation of prophets and messengers (peace be upon them) from facing unjust execution, or any sort of harm, would be bad. But clearly this is not so. This indicates that the reason that lying is bad is not that it is lying. […]
[349.10] If an unjust man says to someone: “I will kill you tomorrow,” then good would be either that he does kill him—which is false straightaway—or that he does not kill him. If he does not kill him, then his saying “I will kill you tomorrow” turns out to be a lie. So if lying were bad, then refraining from killing would imply the bad, and whatever implies the bad is itself bad. Thus refraining from the bad would be bad. Since this is false, we know that lying cannot be judged to be bad absolutely.
[T39] Al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, 349.16–22
[against the Muʿtazilite appeal to intuition]
Objection from the opponents: we know by the evidence of reason that injustice is bad and benevolence good. This knowledge is not acquired from the religious Law. Someone who rejects the religious Law will still have this knowledge, which indicates that this knowledge is acquired from reason. Response: this kind of good and bad come down to what nature wishes and rejects. There is no debate as to whether this is known by reason. The disagreement is only about the fact that the act is connected with blame and punishment, or praise and reward. Is this on account of an attribute that subsists in the act? What you have mentioned does not show this.
[T40] Al-Rāzī, Maʿālim, 91.9–92.8
[rational hedonism]
We know necessarily that there are things which we like and those which we dislike. Now, it need not be the case that everything that we like is liked only because it results in something else, and that everything that we dislike is disliked because it results in something else. Otherwise either a circle or a regress would follow, and both are false. So it follows conclusively that something exists that is liked for itself, not due to something else, and something that is disliked for itself, not due to something else. Upon consideration, we know that what is liked for itself is pleasure, delight, and avoidance of pain and grief. Anything else is liked because it results in one of these things. As for that which we dislike for itself, it is pain, grief, and avoidance of pleasure and delight. Anything else is disliked is disliked due to something else. Having understood this premise, you should know that our teaching is that good and bad are established in this world (al-shāhid) by the requirement of reason. But they are not at all established for the true God, the exalted. And there are several ways to show that they are established in this world by the requirement of reason.
First, pleasure, delight, and what results in one or both of them, are in that respect judged as good by the self-evident requirement of reason. But pain, grief, and what results in one or both of them, are judged as bad. In that respect, they must be avoided, by the requirement of inborn nature, unless this respect is outweighed by another. In which case this judgment [that the painful is bad] is undermined. For instance, [92] even though dissolute life brings a sort of pleasure, reason still prohibits it. It does so simply because it believes that it will be punished with pain and grief that is greater [than the pleasure]. This yields evidence for the view (jiha) that good and bad, what is wished and what is dreaded, are nothing but what we have mentioned.
Second, those who say that deeming a thing good or bad is due to the religious Law, interpreted the bad as follows: punishment arises from doing it. So we say to them: do you concede that reason requires that we beware punishment? Or do you say that this necessity too is established only by the religious Law? If they opt for the first, they have thereby conceded that good and bad are established in this world through the requirement of reason. But if they opt for the second, then the necessity to beware that punishment is only because of a further necessity. This [further] necessitation would also mean the imposition of punishment, and this yields a regress in the imposition of such punishments, which is false. So it has been established that reason judges good and bad in this world.
[T41] Al-Rāzī, Maʿālim, 92.10–13
[good and bad do not apply to God]
You should know that, as we have established that deeming good or bad is nothing but obtaining the beneficial and avoiding the harmful, and that this can only be established by reason in cases where benefit and harm are possible, and that God is exalted above this, it thus follows that one cannot establish good and bad in His case. If however the opponent means something else by deeming good or bad, not obtaining the beneficial and avoiding the harmful, then he must explain it to us, so that we can inquire whether it can be established in the case of God the exalted, or not.
[T42] Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, vol. 3, 66.18–69.20
[Muʿtazilite arguments against consequentialism, with replies]
The Muʿtazilites said: the proof that considering [an act] good or bad is distinct from considering it as useful and harmful is that something may be bad while being beneficial, or good while being harmful, which requires that we distinguish between them. This may be shown in several ways.
[67] First: injustice is beneficial for the unjust man, even as he sees, being of sound reason, that injustice is bad. Second: take a person who writes a poem that is composed from flawless words, in a nice script, and reads it out in fine voice, but the poem includes abuse of angels, prophets, and righteous men. Listening to these flawless words and perfect combinations read out so finely is pleasurable, yet sound reason judges it as bad. Third: a useful lie is useful, even as sound reason denounces it as bad. Fourth: if someone sees a sick, blind person facing death in a desert with no one [else present], his reason will call him to show benevolence to this sick and blind person. Here, sound reason deems this benevolence to be good, but by showing benevolence he must reduce his own property and take trouble upon himself. Here, sound reason calls for performing this act of benevolence to that sick person,13 even though there is no benefit for him in it at all. After all, giving over property to [the blind man] is a reduction in [his own] property, which is harmful. [Furthermore] that the sick, blind person does not take any awareness of him, so that the passerby cannot expect to be mentioned by him with praise and gratitude. And there is no one else in this desert, such that one could say that he only showed benevolence to him so that onlookers could praise him. Then too, the passerby might be an atheist who denies God and the afterlife. So one cannot say that he undertook this benevolence because he was wishing for a reward. Here then, sound reason judges that this benevolence is good even though it is without any sort of benefit.
Through these examples it is obvious that reason makes judgements about good and bad that are distinct from judgments about the beneficial and the harmful.
[68] Those who deny deeming good and bad [based on the judgment of reason] responded: everything you have mentioned comes down to seeking the beneficial and avoiding the harmful.
As for the first argument, namely their statement that the unjust acquires benefit from injustice even as his reason judges it to be bad, we say: if the unjust man judged injustice to be something good, then it could not be that he would avoid injustice against himself. His spirit would become a target for murder, and his property a target for plunder. He must judge injustice as bad when it comes to his own welfare and property, in order for his spirit and his property to be preserved from loss and ruin. As for the second argument, which was the well-composed poem including abuse against angels and prophets, we respond: the judgment that it is good goes against the welfare of the world. This is shown in two ways. First, if we allow that abuse and insult, then there remains no place in the hearts for God’s command and prohibition. This must yield disorder and confusion, and lead people to praise the vicious among them over the virtuous. Second, the noblest of existents is God, praise be to Him; and the one who is the most gracious to those who are in need is God the exalted. If insulting Him were not prohibited, then the virtuous could not petition for the avoidance of the harmful, which is opposed to the welfare of the world. As for the third argument, which was their statement that a useful lie is useful, even as reason determines it to be bad, the response is: to allow lying goes against the welfare of the world. For if we allow lying, then given that what we hear is a basis for formulating many goals in acting and refraining from action, if in these situations [what we hear] appears to be a lie, any deeds based on it will then be wasted. So the heart of the person who would perform the act will be enfeebled, and his whole life will be wasted. All this is contrary to the welfare of the world. [69] As for the fourth argument, which was showing benevolence to a blind and sick person who is in a desert where there is no one else, the response is: in this case, there is a wish [on the part of the benevolent person] for welfare, and in several respects. First, the human is formed in such a way that whatever he sees to happen to someone else of his kind, he envisages as happening to himself. When this individual sees the sick person in such a situation, his estimation and imagination straightaway envisage this situation as happening to himself. Thereupon his nature inclines towards trying to free [the sick man] from that misfortune. If he did not do this, it would pain his heart. So his performance of that act is required in order to satisfy the sympathetic fellow-feeling from his heart, in which there is great welfare. Second, one of the things laid down in consideration of preserving the welfare of the world is that people wish to show benevolence, in the hope that if this sort of situation happened to them, someone would make an effort to show mercy to them. Since this idea is in consideration of the welfare of the world, people inevitably have a consensus to deem it as good, and deem it bad to refrain from it. Because people have become acquainted with this consensus and agreed upon it, and continuously follow it from the beginning of life to its end, these attitudes are inevitably settled in their hearts and their minds.
So we have established that all these examples mentioned by them do not leave the realm of caring about what brings welfare and destruction, through a single intermediary or many. So that which we said has been established: good and bad only mean trying to acquire what is beneficial and avoid what is destructive. And so long as one agrees that it is absurd that this motivation arise for God the exalted, talk of motivations based on good and evil is absurd in the case of God the exalted. So that settles the discussion of this point.
[T43] Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 2, 562.5–12
[against Avicenna’s theory of punishment as deterrent, cf. T5]
First, this response is based on the idea that there must be a deterrent (takhwīf). But just as it might be asked, if all is predetermined, why is there punishment? So one can ask, if all is predetermined, why is there deterrent? Since a negative or positive response would be the same in both cases, one cannot make one of them a premise for the other.
Second, this would be true only if the damned were fewer in number than the saved. But according to the doctrine of the Muslims, they are more in number than the saved. For the people of Islam are fewer than the unbelievers, and all unbelievers are condemned. If he denies this, then he has disagreed with the commonly held position of Islam, even though his whole purpose with this answer was to go along with what they say. Rather the correct response would be to say that the question why is there punishment if there is predetermination is a spurious one, since punishment also falls under determinism, not outside it. If this is so, then it would be wrong to look for a reason.
[T44] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 466.17–467.5 [trans. Kaukua, mod.]
[the necessity of evil]
Were it not for opposition, there could be no generation and corruption, and were it not for generation and corruption, infinite individuals could not exist. Elemental species can only occur [467] through interaction (tafāʿul), and some opposition is necessary for interaction. So it stands that, were it not for opposition, there could be no eternal emanation that is constantly renewed, no infinite amount of rational souls would occur, the elemental world would be obstructed from [producing] life, and most of what is possible would remain in sheer non-existence.
[universal good]
When that which bestows existence upon evil regarding an individual is considered from the perspective of the universal arrangement (al-niẓām al-kullī), it is good to the extent that existence is able to include goodness and arrangement, which outweighs the [evil] in it.
[T45] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 467.8–16
[particular evils as incidental]
Let it not be asked: why did He not make this class [of existents] free from evil? Since that would be absurd. For one cannot make something be other than what it is. If He did not make this class, then there would be limitation on the first class [of best existents], and this class would not arise. One cannot make water anything other than water, or fire anything other than fire. It is impossible for fire to touch a garment without burning it, provided there is nothing to hinder the burning. If you consider the situation of someone whose garment was burned by fire and the extent to which he has [thereby] been harmed by [fire], and the extent to which [fire] was useful for him over the course of his life, you will find that they are not even comparable. This is the case in relation to one single individual, but what about the case where something is useful for the whole species but would be harmful for that individual alone? It would be good in relation to the arrangement of the species, just as one might amputate a limb for the health of a body. If you consider the universal arrangement, there is no evil.
[T46] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashārīʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 467.17–468.9; 469.4–8 [partially trans. Kaukua, mod.]
[incidental evils are not willed by God]
One might go on at length about this issue [of how evil comes to be in the world] if one imagined that the world is only created for the sake of humans. If one however applies reason and inquiry to this issue, on which so much has been said, one will realize [468] that if [God’s] volitions were random, in which case there would be no universal rules that have been imposed from eternity and until eternity, then human affairs, animals, and so on would not be as they are. The Giver of the Decree (al-qādir)—whose volitions the common folk and the practitioner of medicine, who emulates the wise [sc. Abū al-Barakāt], suppose to arise anew to provide well-being (maṣāliḥ)—has not decreed that man escape blinding, or that his bodily temperament be preserved, or that widows never be neglected, or that guardians of privacy not be regularly violated, or that young orphans not be left unnursed and unfostered, which would afflict both the orphans and [their nurses], or that manifold diseases not be sent down, or that there be no false religions with all their dogmas, blind adherents, and plundering. If He decreed that [all this] not be made, through volitions that arise anew—as [Abū al-Barakāt] said, “He chooses it, so it is; it is, so He has chosen it”—why has He not willed what is in the best interest (maṣlaḥa) for this individual? If this is how the volitions are, then Zayd’s blindness or the length of ʿAmr’s life are unimportant for the universal arrangement. […]
[469.4] If someone says: He did what He wanted and one should not ask why, we say: why should one not ask why? Because the tongue is damaged, or because inquiry is prohibited (ḥarām), or because argumentation leads nowhere concerning it? All these options are wrong. If one opens the door of “one should not ask why” for topics of rational debate (al-maʿqūlāt), then whenever one wants to have an argument—as it might be, whether the world requires [a preponderating factor] for the specification of its contingent aspects, or whether one should affirm or deny divine attributes, and so on—the opponents can always say, “one should not ask why.”
[T47] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 472.5–8
[against the privation account of evil]
Whoever says [that evil is privation] should bear in mind that compound ignorance necessitates the increase of pain in the afterlife. Both compound ignorance and the pain that arises from it are something existing (wujūdī), and are evil. If it were only evil because of the absence of perfection—which is knowledge and faultless dispositions—then compound ignorance would not increase pain insofar as it is compound.
[T48] Al-Suhrawardī, Mashāriʿ, Ilāhiyyāt, 473.13–18
[automatic retaliation]
You should know that there is more happiness than suffering. Besides, the ranks of people in the afterlife are just like their ranks in this life; and happiness and suffering does have ranks. Therefore, if the preceding is clear, then no one should even ask why there is punishment if everything is predetermined, since wicked dispositions and obnoxious manners necessitate pain all by themselves, without any authority or source of retribution from outside. If a sickly person stops following his diet and sicknesses take hold of him, this happens not because some censorious doctor inflicted retribution on him; rather, it is one of the consequences to which his ravenous appetite drove him.
[T49] Al-Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, 106.11–16 [trans. Kaukua, mod.]
[on providence]
As for providence, nothing happens because of it. As for arrangement (al-niẓām), it is concomitant to the marvelous order and the relations that follow from the things separate [from matter] and their reflected radiations, as stated above. This providence is what they used to refute the principles of those who subscribe to the luminous realities that have talismans [i.e. material images], but it is itself wrong. Once it has been refuted, the order of the barriers (al-barāzikh) ought to be due to the order of pure lights and their illuminations, which are included in the causal descent that is impossible for barriers.
[T50] Al-Āmidī, Ghāyat al-marām, 203.4–205.10
[different theories of good and bad]
The Muʿtazilite view is that the goodness and badness of the good and the bad are essential attributes. The philosophers (falāsifa) agreed with them on this, as did those who deny prophecies. But there was disagreement among these groups concerning how the perception of this [good and bad] occurs. The Muʿtazilites and philosophers said that one sometimes perceives [good and bad] rationally, sometimes through the religious Law. Among the things perceived by reason some are self-evident, for instance the goodness of knowledge and belief (imān), and the badness of ignorance and unbelief; and also [what one perceives] through inquiry, like the goodness of a truth that is harmful, and the badness of a lie that is beneficial. By contrast, what is perceived through the religious Law is for instance the goodness of displays of obedience, and the badness of doing things that are prohibited.
[205] As for those who deny prophecies, they only admit the perception of [good and evil] by reason, with no reported religious Law.
As for the People of Truth, according to them good and bad are not essential attributes that belong to a subject of inherence. Rather the description of something as good or bad holds only because the religious Law deems it to be good or bad, by allowing it and laying down a reward for it on the one hand, and prohibiting it and laying down a punishment for it on the other. Beyond this, reason deems it good in consideration of certain extrinsic features and separate notions among [its] accidents, as the result of goals and connections. But these vary along with various associations and relations. So the good is nothing but that which is allowed, or that whose performance is praised, in accordance with the religious Law; or that with which a goal is associated. And likewise for bad, but the opposite.
[T51] Al-Āmidī, Rumūz al-kunūz, fol. 114v7–115r1
[the source of evil is matter]
What is like this [sc. pure evil] does not proceed from pure goods. Rather, it must be traced back to that which is connected to matter, and prevents it from the disposition of receiving its perfection, like when the semen in the womb is affected by certain causes that prevent it from having a mixture that is suitable for the reception of the perfection of its innate nature; or [evil] may be connected to something that incidentally occurs to matter in terms of causes that prevent it from receiving perfection. […]
[evil must trace back to God]
[114v16] Someone might say: the claim that evil does not come forth from pure goods is simply to assert what is at dispute, without any proof. Furthermore, pure evil is neither necessary of being, since otherwise it could not be accidental to instances of matter; nor is it impossible of being, since otherwise it would never be realized, being impossible. So [evil] is contingent, and so must have a preponderating principle. This preponderating principle is either the Necessary Existent or something contingently existent. If it is the Necessary Existent, which is pure good, then pure evil has come forth from it. If however it is something contingently existent, then it is either good, or evil, or good in one respect and evil in another respect. If the first option is the case, then evil has [again] come from good. If the second option is the case, then there must be a [further] preponderating principle for it, but this cannot go on as an [infinite] regress. So, if [the regress] stops at the Necessary Existent, evil [again] would come forth from Him. Finally, if the third option is true, then evil either comes forth from it in terms of its good aspect or in terms of its evil aspect. You have already understood what applies to both options, from the first and second options [in this dilemma]. So the third option [115r] must be such that what is evil in it would go back to the Necessary Existent, according to the foregoing argument. This means the coming forth of evil from good, and there is no way around it.
[T52] Al-Nasafī, Sharḥ Asās al-kiyāsa, 312.12–17
[evil may always be relative]
It is not impossible that one and the same thing be good in one respect, and evil in another respect. If this were the case, we could not make an unqualified judgment whether [a given thing] is good or bad. Nor is it impossible either that it be good in relation to some individuals, and bad in relation to other individuals. And the same goes for the predominance of good or evil in [a given case]. The truth about this sort of question is that it is [merely] verbal, and depends on the traditional report that the word “good” means existence while “evil” means non-existence, whether according to general linguistic usage or according to another [specific group of] people.
[T53] Al-Ṭūsī, Qawāʿid al-aqāʾid, 453.1–6
[moral good and evil are established through practical intellect]
The philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) said: inborn reason (al-ʿaql al-fiṭrī), which judges self-evident things such as the whole’s being greater than the part, does not make judgments concerning the goodness or badness of an act. It is practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī), which governs the well-being of species and individuals, that makes judgments about this. This is why one sometimes judges the goodness of a thing, or its badness, in light of whether it is beneficial. They called whatever is demanded by practical reason, but which is not mentioned in any religious laws, “the judgments of the unwritten religious Law,” whereas they called that of which the religious Law speaks “the judgments of the written religious Law.”
[T54] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 936.4–938.1
[evil as accidental and privative]
One must verify the quiddity of evil before moving on to the [present] object of inquiry. I say that evil is applied to privative features insofar as they are not productive, such as the lack of whatever one ought to have, like death, poverty, and ignorance. But it is likewise applied to existing things, such as the existence of whatever entails that someone oriented towards perfection is prevented from achieving it. For example the cold that harms fruits, or the clouds that prevent the bleacher from doing his job, or blameworthy acts like [937] injustice and adultery, or base character traits like cowardice and avarice, or pains and griefs, and so on.
Upon inquiring into this, we find that cold in itself, insofar as it is a certain quality, or in relation to its cause that necessitates it, is not evil. To the contrary, it is a perfection. It is evil only in relation to fruits, because it corrupts their temperaments. What is essentially (bi-al-dhāt) evil is the fruits’ lack of the perfections that [ought to] belong to them. Cold becomes evil only accidentally, because it entails this. And likewise for clouds. Injustice and adultery too, insofar as they are features that come forth from, as it might be, the irascible and desiring powers, are not evil. Rather, in this respect they are perfections of those two powers. They are evil only in relation to the victims of injustice or the political order, or in relation to the rational soul that is too weak to subdue the animal faculties. So the essential evil is the fact that one of these things lacks its perfection. [Evil] only applies to the causes of [this lack] accidentally, by leading to it. The same goes for character traits which are the principles of [injustice, adultery, etc.]. Likewise pains are not evil insofar as they are perceptions of things. Nor are they [evil] insofar as these things exist in themselves, or come forth from their causes. Rather they are evil only in relation to the one who is pain, who lacks the integrity of an organ that should maintain it.
From this it results that, in its quiddity, evil is the privation of existence, or the privation of the perfection of an existent, insofar as that privation does not suit it or does not produce in it [what it needs]. Existents are not evil insofar as they are existents. They are only evil in relation to things deprived of their perfections, not essentially, but because they lead to that privation. So evils are items that are associated and relative to specific, concrete individuals. In themselves and in relation to [938] the universe, they are not evil at all.
[T55] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 939.3–5
[the predominance of good]
As for the three remaining divisions, namely pure evil, the cases where evil predominates, and the cases where it is equal to that which is not evil, these do not exist. For both real and relational existences among the existent things are inevitably larger in number than relational privations, which arise in the aforementioned way.
[T56] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 943.12–944.11
[against the predominance of evil]
There has been a supposition (wahm) that most people are miserable [in this life], to say nothing of the next world. This entails the predominance of evil among the human species, which is the noblest of generated species.
[944] The Master [sc. Avicenna] dispels this supposition by saying that the existence of the ignorance which is the opposite of certainty (that is, compounded and deep-rooted ignorance) is rare in comparison to the existence of certainty. The common and widespread kind is simple ignorance, which does no great harm in the afterlife.
The same goes for the two posterior faculties [i.e. irascible and appetitive]. For the existence of evils that are opposite to the virtuous dispositions are rare, in comparison to their existence. What is common and widespread are character traits that fall short of the extremes of virtue or viciousness. In these states, souls are like bodies in respect of the extremes of beauty and health and ugliness and sickness, or the condition in the middle between them. Further, it is clear that the middle state is predominant over the other two. Therefore evil is not predominant.
[T57] Al-Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 3, 953.7–954.5
[response to al-Rāzī T43 on punishment as deterrent]
I say to the first point [namely that the deterrent would be irrelevant in a determinist system]: determinism (qadar), in the sense relevant in the teaching of the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ), is the necessity of particulars’ being traceable to their multiple causes. This is to be distinguished from determinism in the sense relevant in the teaching of the Ashʿarites among the theologians, since they say that there is no agent and no producer other than God.
The response mentioned by the Master [sc. Avicenna] is in keeping with his principles: the human act is, according to him, traced back to his power and his will, both of which are [further] traced back to their own causes. The deterrent (takhwīf) is one of the causes of willing to act well. Thus the occurrence of the deterrent among the causes that entail good is indeed necessary, even while it is determined. Its exercising causation is correct, according to what the Master mentioned, and is not in contradiction to its being determined, since everything that is determined is caused, according to him.
But according to the principles of the Ashʿarites, so long as the deterrent has no effect, it exercises no causation at all, just as the excellent commentator [al-Rāzī] said. On their view, the discussion of determinism should be abandoned, because they entirely abandon causation. Which is why they say, [954] “ask not about what He does.”
To the second point: the Master did not wish to follow the way of the theologians who simply insist on what they declare to be the case. Rather he wants to follow the way he spoke on this issue in his metaphysical books. And in the Revelation, one comes across no judgment that the damned are more numerous than the saved. To the contrary, one can find passages contrary to that judgment.
[T58] Al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, 339.3–10
[the nature of the disagreement within kalām]
[Al-Rāzī] said that “good (al-ḥusn)” and “bad (al-qubḥ)” may mean the agreement and aversion of nature, or the fact that something has the attribute of perfection or of deficiency. These are both rational notions. But they may also mean that which necessitates reward and punishment, or praise and blame. These are imposed by the religious Law according to us [i.e. to al-Rāzī and the Ashʿarites], as opposed to the Muʿtazilites.
I say: the Muʿtazilites do not disagree with what he mentioned. Rather, the difference lies in a different meaning of “good” and “bad,” namely that certain acts necessitate praise or blame in accordance with either reason or the religious Law. The Muʿtazilites argued that according to this meaning, the judgment that justice and truth are good, and injustice and lying are bad, is necessary (ḍarūrī). This is why both those who acknowledge the religious Law and others, who do not recognize it, are all in agreement about this. But the people of the sunna [i.e. the Ashʿarites] deny this.
[T59] Al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, 341.14–16
[natural value does not align with rational value]
According to [the Muʿtazilites], it is incorrect to explain [good and] bad in terms of the occurrence of agreement or aversion. The reason is that frequently what is agreeable is bad. For instance, when someone who needs something extorts something from someone who does not need it. This is agreeable for him, but it is bad. Then too, frequently what provokes aversion is good. For instance, restraining the unjust man from injustice through various kinds of schooling. This will provoke aversion [in him], but it is good.
[T60] Al-Ṭūsī, Ajwibat masāʾil Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Mayāwī, 19.7–20.2; 22.7–24.3
[objection to the intrinsic goodness of existence, with reply]
The philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) suggest to us that existence is goodness (khayriyya), the perfection of existence is the goodness of existence, and evil has no essence but is rather the privation of substance or the privation of the well-being of substance. […]
[19.11] But someone might say: “would that I did not exist!” In fact even the most excellent of the prophets, may God pray for him and his family, is reported to have said: “would that the Lord of Muhammad had not created Muhammad!” […] [19.16] If someone is found to be in pain and suffering, people say, “it would be better for him not to exist.” [20] And all who considered [this] said: this is a primary judgment, judged by reason to be self-evident. But if this human did not exist, there would remain nothing, so of which thing is one saying that it would be good for it not to exist? […]
[22.7] [Response:] if someone in pain wishes for his own non-existence, this is because the privation of good is an effect of the existence of evil, as already stated. [He wishes for non-existence] not under all circumstances, but only while he is focusing on the pain and nothing else. This is impatience, and those who have perfected themselves in patience guard themselves against it. If he were to focus on good things, either present or expected, then he would be a thankful servant [of God], satisfied and happy with those goods. Wishing for non-existence is still not absurd, though, because he is not seeking after restfulness, pleasure, or perfection that he would achieve while being non-existent. Rather, he seeks only liberation from pain. Whenever someone does not know how to be liberated from intense pain, he finds it by seeking his own non-existence, to render his pain non-existent. […]
[23.10] As for when common people saying of someone who is in pain, “it would be better for him not to exist,” this means that if the person in question, who is suffering from pain, were not existent at all, so that he would not suffer from pain, then that would be better for him than his being existent while in pain, since the privation of pain is better than his existence. But to relate goodness to him while he is non-existent, by saying “better for him,” is in virtue of imagination (tawahhum), not reason. For imagination (wahm) may reckon that the dead man might take pleasure after his death being remembered as a good person, or on account of having a righteous son, or good descendants, and the like. It is as if they are imagining themselves as taking such pleasure after dying. In a similar way the imagination may reckon that in this case that someone suffering from pain would be at rest from his pain once he is non-existent. It ignores reason’s judging that existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive, just like its judgment that death excludes perception. This and other, similar cases are false, imaginary judgments.
The upshot of the inquiry, having achieved verification on these issues, is to say: “non-existence is better than existence for someone in pain” is a false, imaginative proposition. If one instead says, “the absolute non-existence of someone in pain is better than his existence,” then it becomes a proposition of mere false belief. For whoever says this passes this judgement only because his reason testifies that the privation of good is better than the existence of evil, but he fails to know about the goods, both actually and potentially existent, for the one who suffers from pain. If he understood about the actual and potential goods of the one who suffers from pain, and understood that they are preponderant [24] over that evil which is the existence of pain, he would not pass that judgment. For his reason also judges that the existence of a great good together with the existence of a lesser evil is better than the non-existence of the great good along with the non-existence of the lesser evil. For otherwise, divine wisdom would not require its existence like this.
[T61] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 475.1–10
[evil as the uncaused consequence of essences]
The evil in the world does not detract from the providence of the Necessary, even if it falls under the divine decree. For there are states that have no independent cause, nor are they produced by anyone other than the agent of the quiddities to which they are related. It is known that contingent quiddities have no causes for their essences or for their being contingent. Nor does their need for a cause (ʿilla) for their existence itself have a cause (sabab). Nor is there a cause for their being opposed to one another and hindering one another in existence. Nor is there a cause for the fact that the contingent falls short of the Necessary Existent in itself, or for its inferiority to His rank. The same applies to the fact that fire burns and cotton is susceptible to being burnt by it. For both belong to the constituents of the quiddities and the nature of contingency, or are among its concomitants. Likewise a given goal of certain existents may be harmful for certain others and corruptive of them, such as the goal of the irascible power which is harmful for reason, even though it is good in respect of that power [itself].
[T62] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 475.13–476.7
[evil as privation]
[Evil] is nothing existing, but rather is privative. If it were existing, it would either be evil (b) for itself or (a) for something else.
(a) If for something else, then this is either (a1) because it induces privation for this other thing, or for certain of its perfections, or (a2) it is not because it induces privation for this [other thing]. (a1) If it does induce privation, then evil is nothing but the privation of that thing or of that which is a perfection for it. (a2) If on the other hand it does not induce privation, then one cannot conceptualize it as an evil for that for which it was supposed as an evil. For we know that it disrupts neither the thing itself nor the existence of any of the thing’s perfections, in any way. Hence, its existence does no harm to that thing.
(b) What if, on the other hand, it is evil for itself? This too is false. For the existence of something results in neither the privation [476] of itself nor the privation of any of its own perfections. Even if it did result in these, the evil would be that privation, and not [the thing] itself. But in any case such a result is inconceivable, because by their very natures things seek their own perfections, not the privation of [these perfections] insofar as they are perfections.
[T63] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 476.14–19
[why there must be evil]
It is impossible for these goods and whatever is similar to them to be free from evil. Even though the good that is free from evil is necessary for existence in absolute terms, it is not necessary for each case of existence. What was able to exist in this way [sc. without evil] has been made to exist, but so has that which could [only] exist while being affected by evil. If the latter had not been made to exist, this would be a greater evil, since the existence of this type of thing is not without good. The evil in it is only in respect of the privation that finds a way into it. If it were entirely non-existent, that that would truly be evil.
[T64] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 477.15–18
[evil accounts for variety between humans]
There is no way for humans to exist without the existence of opposed powers, and these cannot be in balance such that none of them dominates the others. Otherwise all individuals would be one and the same. This means that the states of certain humans brings them into complications that do harm in respect of the return (maʿād) and the truth; or else they escape from the desire and anger that cause harm both to this person and to others.
[T65] Ibn Kammūna, al-Jadīd fī al-ḥikma, 477.20–478.1
[evil acts are perfections for those who do them]
We find no case where we call acts “evil” but that [the act] is a perfection for its efficient cause. It might be that it is evil in respect of the recipient, or in respect of some other agent that is prevented from acting by itself upon that matter. The evil whose cause is a deficiency and shortcoming that befalls the natural disposition (jibilla) is in fact not good in respect of anything, nor [does it happen] because an agent produced it. On the contrary, it [occurs] because the agent did not produce it. [478] It is related to the Necessary only in an accidental way.
[T66] Bar Hebraeus, Mnārath qudhshē, vol. 9, 20.10–18
[mixture of Ashʿarite and Avicenna’s definition of evil]
We say that good, insofar as it is good, is beneficial, while evil, insofar as it is evil, is harmful. If evil were existent in the nature of acts, God—may His goodness be praised—would be found to be an efficient cause of a harmful cause, which is absurd. God created things insofar as they are, and insofar as they are good, not insofar as they are not good. Thus, goodness is something created and something natural which is implanted in the nature of acts. When those acts are performed against the law they are called bad from the perspective of the law, not from the perspective of nature. […] The fact of existing for any act is its existence (īthūthā), whereas evil is non-existence (laythāyūthā). If evil were existent in the nature of acts then one and the same act would be found to exist and to not exist at the same time. This is absurd.
[T67] Bar Hebraeus, Mnārath qudhshē, vol. 9, 28.4–9; 30.21–24
[defense of privation theory]
They say: every nature is desired by whoever benefits from it, and is avoided by whoever is disturbed by it. Being at rest is good for [whoever is disturbed], whereas being disturbed is bad for him. If disturbance, which is evil, were non-being, and had a privative nature, how would anyone avoid non-being? Moreover, how can anything that does not exist be disturbing, harmful, or cause suffering? Therefore, evil is not by nature non-being.
We say: disturbance is nothing more than the privation of rest. Avoiding disturbance is nothing but being restored to [a state of] rest. Therefore, whoever avoids [disturbance] is not really avoiding it, but is simply restoration to [a state of] rest.
[T68] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 612.18–613.1
[pure good as the intelligible entities]
The first class, the totality of which is absolutely good and in which there is no evil at all, are entities that occur as complete in existence and are in need of nothing that ought to belong to them. Nor are they mingled with anything that ought not belong to them. They are actual in all respects. For instance the intellects and so on, and likewise celestial souls. For, even though there is something potential in them, they are never hindered in their emergence from potentiality to actuality. The existence of this class is necessary, as you learned from the rule of the contingency that is more noble and more base: the existence of [613] the more noble is necessary whenever the more base exists.
[T69] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 614.1–4
[evil in generation and corruption is required for the persistence of the human species]
You should know that all the kinds of evil exist only in the world of generation and corruption, on account of the opposition that occurs in it. But they are few in comparison to the goods in it. If, on account of the opposition, neither generation nor corruption were to occur in this world, then there could not exist an infinite number of souls, and likewise of individuals.
[T70] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 616.10–23
[the popular idea of God’s omnipotence]
The giver of the religious Law forbade mentioning the secret of determinism (sirr al-qadar), because unveiling it would lead the common folk to imagine that God the exalted has weakness. If someone says that God the exalted has power only over contingents, but not over the impossible, or that He does not have power to create fire that does not burn, or that He cannot create anything resembling Himself, then they would suppose that He is weak. So it is better to tell them that He has power over everything, so that they glorify [Him] in their souls and honor [Him] in their hearts.
[against the predominance of evil]
As for the theologians, who are prohibited from the secrets of true knowledge and never got beyond the circle of supposition (wahm) and imagination, they are the ones who pay attention only to the world of generation and corruption. So they claim that there is more evil in existence than good, and suppose that the world was created only for the sake of man, who is the paragon (khulāṣa) of existence. They exalted [man] above the angels (may God’s blessing be upon them all). But you have already learned that there is evil only in the world of generation and corruption on account of the aforementioned opposition. It is in only a few animals, in comparison to the world of generation and corruption, which in its turn is insignificant and paltry in comparison to existence [as a whole]. Besides which, health and well-being predominate in animals. Damage through evils occurs to them only rarely, as has been explained.
[T71] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 617.4–12
[necessity of evil]
Why does the second class, the one in which good predominates over evil, not exist in such a way that evil does not attach to it at all, so that the only thing that exists would be unadulterated good, all by itself?
Response: if this were the case, then the second class would be the same as the first, the one in which there is no evil at all, whereas the second class is the one in which there is more good than evil. If it were wholly free from evil it would be the first class. So if you ask, “why doesn’t this class exist in such a way that evil does not attach to it at, all so that it rather would be good in its entirety?” this would be like asking, “why isn’t the second class the first class, and why wasn’t the second class made as something other than itself? Why was fire, which is one of the particular cases that fall under this [second] class, or some other particular cases to which evil is attached, not something other than themselves?” All of which is invalid.
[T72] Al-Shahrazūrī, Shajara, vol. 3, 620.14–621.5
[there can be no better world]
So from this you understand that existence cannot be more perfect (atamm) than it is. If it could be more perfect than it is, then it would be necessary for its existence to come from divine generosity, as “He is not a withholder of the unseen” (Qurʾān 81.24). The truth is rather that the bestowal of existence upon a more perfect world is something impossible and absurd, and no one has power over it. If there is no such thing as power over it, then one cannot be weak concerning it. Weakness applies only when something is contingently existent in itself; if the cause falls short of bestowing existence upon it at all, or falls short of bestowing upon it a more perfect and more flawless existence, then this would be weakness. Understanding this principle dispels many doubts. […]
[God has no goals and cannot be compared to humans]
[621.4] The worst of the mistakes and delusions of [the theologians] was their drawing analogies between the acts of the Necessary in itself and human acts, and positing goals for His act and His creation, like the goals of humans.
[T73] Al-Samarqandī, Ṣaḥāʾif, 464.3–465.3
[the debate over good and bad, cf. T36 and T58]
Good and bad may be used in three senses. First, something’s being suitable for a nature or in conflict with it. Second, something’s having the attribute of perfection or deficiency, such as knowledge or ignorance. Third, something’s being connected to present praise and future reward, or present blame and future punishment. There is no disagreement as to whether good and bad are rational on the first two interpretations. But there is disagreement about it on the third interpretation.
The Ashʿarites said that [good and evil] are by the judgment of religious Law alone. The Muʿtazilites, Karramites, and Brahmans said that they are rational as well, that is, [good and bad] are due to the essence of the act or one of its attributes. But the intellect is sometimes able to perceive it independently, as with the goodness of justice and badness of injustice, and sometimes not independently, as with the goodness of fasting on the last day of Ramadan and the badness of fasting on a feast day. Nevertheless, so long as the religious Law imposes it we know that if neither of them had special characteristics on account of which this is good and bad, then the religious Law would not impose it.
Furthermore [the Muʿtazilites] disagreed with each other. The early Muʿtazilites said that [good and bad] are due to the essence of act, such as the goodness of truth and the badness of lying. But the later ones said that [good and bad] are due to an attribute, since truth is only good if it is beneficial and lying [465] bad only if it is harmful. And some of them said that good is due to the essence but bad is due to an attribute. The Jubbāʾites among them said that good and bad are a matter of perspective (bi-al-iʿtibārāt). If hitting orphans is considered from the perspective of educating them, then it is good; but if it is considered from the perspective of injustice, it is bad.
[T74] Al-Samarqandī, Ṣaḥāʾif, 466.10–467.12
[Muʿtazilite argument from prophecy]
If good and bad were due to the religious Law then whatever God the exalted does would be good. Then it would be good on His part to bring forth miracles from a liar, in which case prophecy could not be established on the basis of miracles. Also, prior to the establishment of prophecy we would not be able to judge that lying is impossible for God, so there would remain no trust in prophecy.
[467] They responded: the goodness of something does not make it necessary that it occur; also, it could still be bad in respect of the religious Law. But this calls for further inquiry, as the opponent had said that there would be no trust in prophecy, not that it would occur or fail to do so.
The truth on this issue: the acts and judgments of God the exalted are connected only to that which is best and most appropriate, either in itself or in relation to another. For, if they were connected to something that is not best and most appropriate, then it would be deficiency to make this thing happen, it not being more appropriate, or would even be foolishness, and this is absurd for the Powerful and Wise, the exalted. If on the other hand it were most appropriate for Him, then He would be deficient in His essence, and would be perfected by and in need of [this thing], since bad aspects deter from acting and one only does [something] when one needs it. This too is impossible for God the exalted. Then too, how can it be applied to the Powerful, Wise, and Sufficient that He would refrain from the more appropriate and do what is worse? Again, it would eliminate trust in prophecy, and the promise and the threat. This is my own view on this issue.
[T75] Al-Samarqandī, Ṣaḥāʾif, 470.2–6
[the sense in which God does the more appropriate]
The truth on this issue is that God the exalted is powerful, wise, and knowledgeable. He must either act or not act, and He chooses the more appropriate and better from the two options. Refraining from what is more appropriate without necessity or need for such a powerful [agent] is deficiency, and is impossible. The appropriateness in question is not relative to God the exalted, but to the bare facts (nafs al-amr) and to humans. From this perspective, the act is not in conflict with perfection; to the contrary it is nothing other than perfection, whatever would vary from it would be nothing but deficiency and frivolity.
[T76] Al-Ḥillī, Taslīk al-nafs, 163.3–6
[types of good and bad as attributes]
If an act has no attribute (ṣifa) additional to its origination, then it is like the motion of someone who is absent-minded or asleep. If it does have [such an attribute], then it may be good: if it has no attribute additional to its goodness, it is allowed; if it has an additional attribute and if blame follows from not performing it, it is obligatory; otherwise, it is recommended. Or it may be bad, in which case its performance by a knowledgeable agent deserves blame.
[T77] Al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 281.9–23
[reason is needed as a basis for the religious Law]
[Al-Ṭūsī] said: both [good and bad] would be undermined absolutely, if they were established only by religious Law.
I say: this a second way to argue that good and bad are rational. Exposition of this: if [good and bad] were established only by the religious Law, then they would in fact be established neither by the religious Law nor rationally. Everyone agrees that the consequent is false, so likewise the antecedent. Explanation of the hypothetical premise: if we did not know the good and the bad of things rationally, we would not judge lying as bad, so we would allow its occurrence on the part of God (He is greatly exalted above this!). So if He informs us that something is bad, we cannot conclude that it is bad, and if He informs us that something is good, we cannot conclude that it is good. This is because of allowing lies, since we would allow that He commands the bad for us, and prohibits the good for us, so that on this assumption we would deny His wisdom, may He be exalted.
[divine command theory would allow good and bad to be reversed]
[Al-Ṭūsī] said: otherwise there could be reversal.
I say: it has occurred to us, in interpreting this argument, that if good and bad were not rational then there could be a reversal of good and bad, so that whatever we imagine to be good would be bad, and vice-versa. Then large communities might believe it to be good and praiseworthy for someone to damage them, and blame someone who helps them, just as we believe the reverse of this. Since every reasonable person knows this is false, we conclude that these judgments [of good and bad] come down to determinations of reason, not to commands and prohibitions in the religious Law, or to [mere] customs.
[T78] Al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 282.10–22
[lesser evil response to lying examples, cf. T38]
[Al-Ṭūsī] said: doing the lesser of evils, so long as liberation is possible.
I say: this can provide a response to the doubts raised by the Ashʿarites. The first of these was that, if lying were bad, then the lie that leads to liberating the prophet from the hands of an unjust man would be bad. The consequent is false, since the liberation of the prophet is good, therefore the antecedent is likewise [false]. The second was their example of someone who says “I will lie tomorrow.”14 If it is good for him to tell the truth by keeping his promise, then it follows that it is good for him to lie [tomorrow]. But if it is bad for him to do so, then the truth is bad and lying is good.
The response to both problems is one and the same. For liberating the prophet outweighs telling the truth, and not doing so is worse than lying. Thus it is obligatory to perform the lesser of the evils. Namely the lie, since it includes a great benefit that outweighs the truth. Again, [the person who says “I will lie tomorrow”] is obligated not to lie tomorrow, since if he does lie tomorrow, he will do something that is bad in two ways, namely the decision to lie and its performance, but good in only one way, which is the truth [of his promise]. Whereas if he refrains from lying, then he refrained from both lying and from deciding to lie. Here there are two good aspects, [decision] and act, and only one bad aspect, namely lying. Also, one can avoid lying in the first example by dissembling (al-tawriyya).
[T79] Al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 283.7–14
[whether God wills the bad]
People differed on this point. The Muʿtazilites said that God the exalted does not do what is bad, nor does He violate that which is obligatory. But the Ashʿarites disagreed, and led evils back to God, may He be exalted above this! The argument for the Muʿtazilite view is that God is motivated to do what is good, and has nothing to dissuade Him from doing so. But He does have something to dissuade Him from doing what is bad, and lacks motivation to do so. He has power over all objects of power, and given the existence of power and motivation, the act follows necessarily. The reason we say this is that God the exalted is self-sufficient, and it cannot be that He is in need. And He knows the goodness of the good and the badness of the bad. It is known necessarily that, whenever someone knows what is bad and is sufficient without it, he does not produce what is bad. Whereas if someone knows what is good, has power over it, and is free from all sorts of corruption, then he bestows existence upon it.
On the topic see M. Rashed, “Théodicée et approximation: Avicenne,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000), 223–257; S. Inati, The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sīnā’s Theodicy, (Binghamton: 2000); C. Steel, “Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Evil,” in J. Janssens and D. De Smet (eds), Avicenna and his Heritage, (Leuven: 2002), 171–196; R. Fontaine, “ ‘Happy is He Whose Children Are Boys’: Abraham Ibn Daud and Avicenna on Evil,” in D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (eds), The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics (Berlin: 2011), 159–176; A. Shihadeh, “Avicenna’s Theodicy and al-Rāzī’s Anti-Theodicy,” Intellectual History of the Islamicate World 7 (2019), 61–84; H. Erlwein, “Ibn Sīnā’s Moral Ontology and Theory of Law,” in P. Adamson (ed.), Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World (Berlin: 2019), 29–52; J. Kaukua, “The Question of Providence and the Problem of Evil in Suhrawardī,” in S. Rizvi & M. Terrier (ed.), The Problem of Evil: A Challenge to Shiʿi Theology in Islamic Philosophy (Leiden: 2021).
In this chapter we often translate ʿaql as “reason”; in other contexts we have often rendered it as “intellect.”
For earlier views on good and evil in the Muʿtazilite tradition see e.g. M. Heemskerk, Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology: ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice (Leiden: 2000); R. El Omari, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) (Leiden: 2016); S. Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics (Princeton: 2008). Further reading on the debate between the Ašʿarites and the Muʿtazilites on good and bad includes M. Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam (Leiden: Brill 1994); G. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: 2009); M. al-Attar, Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought (New York: 2010).
See A. Shihadeh, “Theories of Ethical Value in Kalām,” in S. Schmidtke (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 384–407, esp. 392.
The idea that we use reason to establish the reliability of prophecy and revelation is found prominently in al-Ġazālī’s Deliverer from Error and also defended by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. For the former see P. Adamson, Don’t Think for Yourself: Authority and Belief in Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame: 2022), ch. 3; for the latter see T. Jaffer, Rāzī. Master of Qurʾānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning (New York: 2015), ch. 3.
Report of Ibn Fūrak, quoted from A. Shihadeh, “Theories of Ethical Value in Kalām,” 399.
See further A. Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Leiden: 2006), and for al-Rāzī’s response to Muʿtazilism, S. Çetin, “Hüsn ve Kubh Konusunda Fahreddin Er-Râziʾnin Muʿtezile’ye Yönelik Eleştirileri,” Edebali İslamiyat Dergisi 2 (2018), 81–110.
See further F. Benevich, “Bar Hebraeus on Evil,” Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 73 (2021), 191–218.
On the essential independence of things from God see also the chapter on Non-Existence in the present volume.
Reading al-iḥrāz instead of al-iḥtirāz.
Reading ʿamaliyya as in MS F.
Reading fī instead of wa-.
Deleting the second fa-hāhanā ṣarīḥ ʿaqlihi yadʿūhu ilā fiʿl dhālika al-iḥsān as dittography.
Deleting lā.