1 Causation Theory

One of the most prominent features of Eustratios’ Neoplatonism is his acceptance of the Neoplatonic causation theory. This is evident from the beginning of the commentary on Posterior Analytics II. Following a rather traditional methodology, in the preface to his commentary the commentator addresses issues such as the subject of Aristotle’s work at hand and its place within the traditional division of philosophy. Writes Eustratios:

Τεσσάρων δὲ ὄντων αἰτίων κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην περὶ τοῦ εἰδικοῦ ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος αὐτῷ ἐνταυθοῖ, διότι καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι μέσον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον παραλαμβάνεται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑλικὸν χεῖρον τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ ἡ ἐκ τούτου γνῶσις ἀμαυροτέρα, συμπαρομαρτοῦν ἔχουσα τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἀχλυῶδές τε καὶ ἀβέβαιον. τὸ δέ γε ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ τελικὸν ἢ ἄμφω ἐξῄρηται τοῦ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτια, ἢ εἴ ποτε τούτων θάτερον ἔχεται, ταὐτὸν τῷ εἴδει ἔστι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ τέλος.¹¹

Among the four Aristotelian causes, the present treatise mainly concerns form, insofar as in scientific demonstrations, the formal cause is mostly considered as the middle term. Matter is the weakest of all causes, and the related knowledge is less certain, for it carries the obscure and unstable nature of such cause. By contrast, the efficient and final cause either transcends the effect, or—anytime the second of these is present—it is identical with the form, which is the end.

According to Eustratios, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II primarily concerns the formal cause as the middle term in a scientific demonstration. Possibly Eustratios has in mind the discussion of the four causes in II.11, where Aristotle claims that (94a35–36) “The middle term has also been proved to be explanatory of what it is to be something.”¹² Indeed the problem of this chapter is that the Philosopher also mentions the other causes, thus leaving the impression that in demonstrations the middle term can sometimes be the formal cause, whereas in other instances it can be the material, efficient or final cause. By contrast, there seems to be quite an agreement among scholars that the middle term is always the form or definition (like Aristotle himself implies in Posterior Analytics II, chs. 8–10), even though this element is “in some cases an eternal ground of the consequent (viz. when the consequence is itself an eternal fact), in some cases an efficient or a final cause (when the consequence is an event).”¹³ Because of this, it seems that Eustratios claims that Posterior Analytics II deals with form or the formal cause is a sound one.

However, this is not relevant to the purpose of my analysis, nor is Eustratios’ claim that in Aristotle’s theory of causation the formal and the final causes overlaps.¹⁴ (re vera in Physics II.7 all causes are said to be identical with eidos except matter).¹⁵ This latter point is undoubtedly true. However, what strikes my attention is the commentator’s claim that the efficient and final cause “transcend the effect” (ἐξῄρηται τοῦ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτια).¹⁶ In fact, in prop. 75 of his Elements of Theology the Neoplatonist Proclus wrote that “every cause properly so called transcends its resultant” (Πᾶν τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον ἐξῄρηται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος).¹⁷

According to Proclus every cause must transcend its effect and cannot be immanent in it. The background for such a claim is that among Aristotle’s four causes form and matter are only to be regarded as concomitant causes, whereas the efficient and final cause are causes properly so called, insofar as they act within the intelligible world and actual causation only concern this realm.¹⁸ More importantly, the Neoplatonists did not simply accept Aristotle’s four causes. They also added two new causes as a further Platonic correction to Aristotle’s theory, namely the paradigmatic cause and the instrumental one, the former being a cause properly so called, the latter a concomitant one.¹⁹ Eustratios is perfectly aware of this, and elsewhere in the commentary he acknowledges the existence of the paradigmatic and instrumental cause as well. However, he disguises the Platonic origin of the addition by claiming that Aristotle himself has left aside the paradigmatic and instrumental cause in light of the nature-based approach widespread in his work.²⁰ The explanation witnesses Eustratios’ deep knowledge of the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, for this very same explanation occurs in the commentary on Physics by John Philoponus, according to which Aristotle’s approach to causation is that of a scholar interested in nature alone.²¹

Another fascinating text is found at p. 185.21–27. As the commentator comments on II,13, 96a24–32, he notices an aporia in the text. Aristotle writes:

Τῶν δὴ ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ ἑκάστῳ ἔνια ἐπεκτείνει ἐπὶ πλέον, οὐ μέντοι ἔξω τοῦ γένους. λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρχειν ὅσα ὑπάρχει μὲν ἑκάστῳ καθόλου, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῳ. οἷον ἔστι τι ὃ πάσῃ τριάδι ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ τριάδι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν ὑπάρχει τῇ τριάδι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὑπάρχει τε πάσῃ τριάδι καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρχει (καὶ γὰρ τῇ πεντάδι ὑπάρχει), ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ γένους· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πεντὰς ἀριθμός, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔξω ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν.

Some of the items that hold something always extend further than it without going outside its kind. (I say that they extend further if they hold of it universally and also hold of something else.) E.g. there are items which hold of every triplet and also of non-triplets: existence holds of triplets and also of non-numbers; odd holds of every triplet and extends further (it also holds of quintuplets), but it does not go outside its kind-for quintuplets are numbers, and nothing outside number is odd.

Eustratios expands the text and ponders if items such as “being” and “existence” are said according to genus, species, proper, or accident. He concludes that these terms are only said according to the ten categories, not as genus, species, etc. In the same vein, the ten categories do not instantiate “being in general”, but only “being” according to each. Yet, at a certain point, it seems to me that the wording introduces non-Aristotelian elements. Here is Eustratios’ comment:

πάντα γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος μετεσχηκότα τοῦ τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὄντα λέγεσθαι οἰκείως ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν κλῆσιν ταύτην ἀπομερίζεται, τὸ μὲν ὡς οὐσία, τὸ δ’ ὡς ποσόν, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο τι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μετέχον οἰκείως ἑαυτῷ μετέχει τῆς τοῦ μετεχομένου φύσεως. οἰκείως οὖν ἑκάστῳ ἐφαρμοζόμενον τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν οἰκείως κατηγορούμενον λέγεται, καὶ οὔτε γένος οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε διαφορὰ οὔτε ἴδιον οὔτε συμβεβηκός.²²

In fact, since all these things are said both to be and exist as beings insofar as they participate in that which is firstly Being, each of them is classified according to its respective denomination, one as substance, the other as quantity, and so on. All participants participate in the nature of the participated according to their own capacity. In this manner, existence, being, and being qualified fit according to the recipient’s proper nature and are predicated accordingly (not as genus, species, difference, proper, or accident).

As I said before, “being” is not predicated according to genus, species, etc., but according to the ten categories. However, whereas this fits in with Aristotle’s ontology, Eustratios’ claim that each thing participates in that which is Being properly so called according to each thing’s capacity and nature introduces the idea that somehow Being is a Form in the Platonic sense and that the ten categories are subordinated to Being as a Platonic form. Also, in this case it seems to me that Eustratios introduces a causation theory based upon Proclus’ theory of participation developed in the Elements of Theology (and elsewhere), according to which participation takes place according to the nature and capacity of the participant.²³ We are far away from Aristotelian ontology as we know it today.

2 Knowledge

Knowledge is another crucial issue in Eustratios’ philosophy, one that makes his allegiance to Proclus’ Neoplatonism clear. I shall now present a few pieces of textual evidence supporting this view. In a doxography found in our commentary concerning knowledge and concept formation in the Platonists and Aristotle, Eustratios adds his view and writes:

ἐν τῇ τάξει τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ προσεχῶς μετά τι μετέχει τρανότερον τοῦ προσεχῶς πρὸ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ προσεχῶς μετὰ νοῦν, μετέχει τοῦ νοῦ μᾶλλον ἤπερ τὰ πόρρω τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ τούτου ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπηχήματα αἱ κοιναὶ καὶ αὐτόπιστοι ἔννοιαι, δι’ ὧνπερ φέρει τινὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀμέσους τοῦ νοῦ ἐπιβολὰς ἀπομίμησιν, αἳ δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν αὐτῇ ὡς ἐμπυρεύματα ἐν αἰθάλῃ ἀποκεκρύφαται τῇ ἐπικρατείᾳ τῶν χειρόνων δυνάμεων συγχεόμεναι, λέγω δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς τε καὶ ζωτικῆς, διὰ τὸ φθανούσας ταύτας ἐνεργεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι γενεσιουργούς τε οὔσας τῷ τε σώματι προσεχῶς χορηγούσας τὴν σύστασιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὰς δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείας παρασκευαζούσας τῇ κρείττονι. ὧν ἐνεργουσῶν σὺν σφοδρότητι ἀπροσεκτεῖν ἑαυτῇ συμβαίνει τὴν λογικὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνων κατασυρομένην ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀπείρως ἔτι ἔχουσαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα θεωρίας καὶ πράξεως, καὶ ποδηγίας δεομένην, ἵν’ ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὰς ἐγκειμένας ἐννοίας προβάληται.²⁴

Within the hierarchy of forms that which follows immediately after something participates in a clearer manner in that which is located immediately before it. Therefore, since the soul comes immediately after the Intelligence, it participates in the Intelligence more than that which is located farther than it and has common and self-evident notions as echoes in itself of the Intelligence, by means of which the soul preserves a particular imitation of the immediate intuitions of the Intelligence. These notions are indeed like live coal covered in ash and are confused because of the predominance of the lower potencies, I mean the nutritive and vegetative ones. Since these become first apparent as they act in the body, they are related to the generation process and they contribute directly to the constitution of the body, and this fits the following purpose: these potencies make sure that the bodily operations function in a better way. [Yet] when these potencies act, it happens to the same soul that its rational part becomes vehemently inattentive; since the impulse of those potencies drags the soul, it still possesses an imperfect knowledge and practice of this world, and needs assistance in order to bring forth the science found in itself and its innate notions.

The passage at hand should be read in parallel with an earlier passage from the same commentary, where Eustratios describes common notions as “echoes” of the Intelligence in us (i.e. the intelligible contents in our soul that allows it to imitate the perfect knowledge of the same Intelligence), and claims that this innate knowledge is somehow inactive due to the shock of the birth. Yet, the commentator continues, if correctly stimulated, the flame of knowledge may burn in us once more, a metaphor implying that we can activate the innate knowledge in us through training or experience.²⁵ As I have argued elsewhere, here Eustratios is indebted to Proclus and his thesis that concepts assembled from the manifold particulars are somehow inferior to the innate knowledge in the soul. However, these later-born concepts—as Proclus calls them—are helpful in that they stimulate the inner knowledge of the soul.²⁶

In what follows, I shall discuss the passages at hand in more detail:

i) Eustratios, On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 257.35–37:

“Within the hierarchy of forms that which follows immediately after something participates in a clearer manner of that which is located immediately before it. Therefore, since the soul comes immediately after the Intelligence, it participates in the Intelligence more than that which is located farther than it.” (ἐν τῇ τάξει τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ προσεχῶς μετά τι μετέχει τρανότερον τοῦ προσεχῶς πρὸ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ προσεχῶς μετὰ νοῦν, μετέχει τοῦ νοῦ μᾶλλον ἤπερ τὰ πόρρω τοῦ νοῦ.)

This passage is taken from Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 193: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ προσεχῶς ἀπὸ νοῦ ὑφέστηκεν (“Every soul takes its proximate origin from an intelligence” [transl. Dodds]).

ii) Eustratios, On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 2, p. 257.38–258.2:

“And [the soul] has common and self-evident notions as echoes in itself of the Intelligence, through which the soul preserves a particular imitation of the immediate intuitions of the Intelligence. These notions are indeed like live coal covered in ash and are confused because of the predominance of the lower potencies.” (καὶ τούτου ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπηχήματα αἱ κοιναὶ καὶ αὐτόπιστοι ἔννοιαι, δι’ ὧνπερ φέρει τινὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀμέσους τοῦ νοῦ ἐπιβολὰς ἀπομίμησιν, αἳ δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν αὐτῇ ὡς ἐμπυρεύματα ἐν αἰθάλῃ ἀποκεκρύφαται τῇ ἐπικρατείᾳ τῶν χειρόνων δυνάμεων συγχεόμεναι.)

Here Eustratios claims that the soul has been granted by the Intelligence common and self-evident notions, echoes of the intelligible contents found in the same Intelligence.²⁷ He also compares this innate knowledge to burning coal and claims that due to the shock of the birth and the connection with bodily powers, the soul is unaware of these innate contents.²⁸

Fire-related images are frequently present in Neoplatonic literature to describe knowledge. The Neoplatonists were paying tribute to the Chaldean Oracles when comparing knowledge to fire or flames.²⁹ Also, the form epibolai, here used for describing the immediate intuitive knowledge proper to the Intelligence, occurs frequently in Neoplatonic literature for accounting for the intuitive nature of knowledge-intellection properly so called vis-à-vis the non-intuitive character of discursive reasoning.³⁰ More importantly, Eustratios calls the innate reasons in the soul, namely the echoes of the Intelligence or Nous, “common and self-evident notions” (αἱ κοιναὶ καὶ αὐτόπιστοι ἔννοιαι). Common notions derive from the Stoic vocabulary and have been integrated into Neoplatonism as synonymous with axioms or the starting point for discursive reasoning.³¹ They also signify general conceptions formed through sense-perception and accepted by everyone, with the obvious caveat that, since they derive from the sensible world, these conceptions are faulty.³² However, the identification found in Eustratios between the innate reasons in the soul and common notions is rare. In his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6, however, the commentator gets closer to Proclus as he identifies common notions with Aristotelian concepts abstracted from sense-perception data. Writes Eustratios: “At the beginning, the soul only possesses common notions as the result of its activity and concepts that are echoes in itself of the separate Intellect” (μόνας ἔχει ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας οἰκεῖα ἐνεργήματα καὶ νοήματα ἀπηχήματά τινα ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχοντος νοῦ).³³

Also, this passage equates the innate reasons in the soul as echoes of the separate Intelligence; however, here, common notions are said to be the result of the soul’s operation, as it assembles concepts made out of sense-perception data, whereas the innate reasons in the soul are said to be noêmata. This is undoubtedly consistent with Proclus’ epistemology. In fact, in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides Proclus famously wrote:

οὔτε δ’ οὖν τοῖς παρά τισι καλουμένοις ἐννοήμασιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγειν προσήκει τὰ νοήματα ταῦτα τὰ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν λόγων, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐπικοινωνῇ ταῖς προσηγορίαις—ἐνεργήματα γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνεγειρόμενα. (“We should not, therefore, equate these thoughts arising from essential reason-principles with what are called by some ‘notions’ even though the terms are almost identical, for these latter are objects stimulated by sense-impression.”)³⁴

This Proclus passage is the source of Eustratios’ text. Thus, apparently, readers face an inconsistency: in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II, Eustratios refers to the innate reasons in the soul as common notions, whereas in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI, Eustratios speaks of common notions as concepts assembled from sense-perception data. Yet, scrupulous research into Proclus’ vocabulary suggests a way out, for even this Neoplatonist seldomly uses the expression “common notions” concerning the innate reasons in the soul.³⁵ In short, I am inclined to believe that Eustratios’ allegedly inconsistent terminology reflects a certain ambiguity in his beloved Neoplatonic sources.

iii) Finally, in the very end of this passage, Eustratios writes that:

“[Yet] When these potencies act, it happens to the same soul that its rational part becomes vehemently inattentive; since the impulse of those potencies drags the soul, it still possesses an imperfect knowledge and practice of this world, and needs assistance in order to bring forth the science found in itself and its innate notions.” (ὧν ἐνεργουσῶν σὺν σφοδρότητι ἀπροσεκτεῖν ἑαυτῇ συμβαίνει τὴν λογικὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνων κατασυρομένην ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀπείρως ἔτι ἔχουσαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα θεωρίας καὶ πράξεως, καὶ ποδηγίας δεομένην, ἵν’ ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὰς ἐγκειμένας ἐννοίας προβάληται.)³⁶

In a purely Neoplatonic fashion, Eustratios claims that the body and its powers are an obstacle that makes it difficult for the soul to attain intellectual knowledge. Under these constraints, the soul cannot bring forth the innate reasons or notions found in itself. The occurrence here of the form proballein, literally “to bring forth” or “to project” is extremely important insofar as post-Iamblichean Neoplatonists consistently refer to this form to describe knowledge as anamnesis or recollection.³⁷ Once again, the presence of this form in Eustratios’ passage is far from coincidental.

So, is Eustratios a Neoplatonist? In a certain way, answering this question is not easy, for Eustratios wants his readers to believe he is not supporting what he deems as the Platonic view. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the passage here under scrutiny presents the commentator’s view on how we grasp concepts as an alternative to the Platonic and the Aristotelian views.³⁸ Against Aristotle, the commentator claims that knowledge properly so-called involves more than grasping some common trait from sense-perception data. By contrast, knowledge is recollection. However, if this is the case, why does Eustratios feel he must distance himself from the Platonic view? Because accepting such a view in its entirety also entails pledging allegiance to metempsychosis and, in general, to the pre-existence of souls over their bodies, two doctrines incompatible with Eustratios’ Christian beliefs. By contrast, according to the commentator, the innate reasons in the soul have been placed in our soul at the time of its creation along with the body.³⁹ If this is the case, however, one cannot help but notice that despite this Christian corrective to what he defines as the Platonic doctrine, Eustratios’ support for innatism is firmly rooted in what we now call “Neoplatonism”.

True, elsewhere in this commentary Eustratios claims that the human intellect acts by imitating, insofar as possible, the divine mind and strives to become perfect by assimilating to God,⁴⁰ but nowhere in his philosophical commentaries is he obsessed by coloring his Neoplatonism with Christian undertones. On the contrary, in most of the cases he simply compares the imperfect human intellect with the perfect knowledge of the Nous, the separate Intelligence of the Neoplatonists. At times he goes even further than that and speaks of the One that exists beyond knowledge. Like when he states that, concerning knowledge, human intellect first knows things by imitating their causes, namely by imitating the perfect knowledge of the Intelligence that contains all forms. Afterward, however, “it is allowed to go beyond the sensible world of nature, to join the divine things and to connect with the Intelligence intellectually; finally, it connects with the One that exists beyond knowledge” (ὑπέρ τε τὴν φύσιν γίνεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ τοῖς θείοις συνάπτεσθαι τῷ τε νῷ συγγίνεσθαι νοητικῶς καὶ ἔτι τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπὲρ νόησιν).⁴¹

This is a fantastic endorsement of the late Neoplatonic theory of ascent to different stages of knowledge.⁴² For example, that the One lies beyond the intelligible world and human knowledge is one of the key-doctrine in Neoplatonism. Furthermore, the need for the soul to unite with the One is vastly found in Neoplatonic literature. To mention just one of the best-known examples, consider, for instance, Plotinus’ emphasis on the need for the soul to unite with the One.⁴³ Furthermore, in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 1, Eustratios explains in a purely Proclean fashion that the union with the One takes place because there is a trace of the One itself in the soul, namely “the bloom of the intellect”.⁴⁴ True, Christian sources also potentially provided Eustratios with a similar vocabulary.⁴⁵ However, as I have argued elsewhere, when reading Eustratios’ commentaries one gets the impression that the existing similarities between pagan and Christian Neoplatonic texts allow the commentators to fill his exegesis with the vocabulary of pagan Neoplatonists.⁴⁶

3 Metaphysics

As I demonstrated in the previous sections, the commentator’s causation theory and epistemology are imbued with Neoplatonic doctrines that in most cases hark back to Proclus’ writings. It is now time to discuss Eustratios’ metaphysics. By “metaphysics” I mean the general view of how reality is structured. My analysis of Eustratios’ causation theory and epistemology highlighted that he believes in a sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world. Causation properly-so called only takes place in the intelligible world. The same holds for knowledge: actual knowledge involves knowing the intelligible forms in the separate Nous. Several passages in our commentary allow expanding on these findings concerning Eustratios’ metaphysics. In what follows, I will discuss only a few of these.

In the very beginning of book 2 of his Posterior Analytics Aristotle writes: “The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if something is, what something is” (Τὰ ζητούμενά ἐστιν ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσαπερ ἐπιστάμεθα. ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν).⁴⁷ Taking a cue from Aristotle’s introductory remarks, Eustratios develops an extremely long exegesis that casts Aristotle’s theory of science within the framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics.⁴⁸

Eustratios’ interpretive strategy here is consistent with what he does elsewhere in his commentaries on Aristotle. At first, he provides readers with a primary and safe explanation of the meaning of the lemma; then, he develops his interpretation. After interpreting Aristotle’s text literally,⁴⁹ Eustratios explains how knowledge takes place by imitating the Intelligence and uniting with the One.⁵⁰ Afterward, he offers further considerations of what has already been explained “from the point of view of logical argumentations” (λογικῶς) starting from a “physical” (φυσικῶς) and “theological” (θεολογικῶς) approach.⁵¹ For the sake of the record, I suspect this distinction among different levels of discourse or perspectives hearkens back to the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle and, more in general, the Neoplatonists. Such a distinction need not be associated only with the Iamblichean and post-Iamblichean distinction between physical and theological Platonic works but rather with the possibility of approaching the same subject according to different perspectives. While attempting to accommodate Aristotle with Plato, the physical perspective is often associated with Aristotle’s philosophy, whereas the theological one is with Plato. Among the many witnesses that may be discussed here, I would like to point out the importance of a passage from Ammonius’ commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, where the commentator mentions the same three perspectives (the logical, the physical, and the theological). The passage reads as follows:

Λογικώτερον μὲν λέγεται κυρίως διαλαβεῖν τὸ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ζητεῖν

τῶν πραγμάτων, φυσικῶς δὲ τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ζητεῖν, θεολογικῶς δέ ἐστι

πόθεν προῆλθον ἅπαντα καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συστάσεως ἑκάστου ζητεῖν.⁵²

In the proper sense, what is called “to deal with in a more logical way” is to inquire into the accidents of realities; in a physical way, to inquire into substances, [and] in a theological way, to investigate whence all things have proceeded, and the principle of the constitution of each thing.

I associate precisely this theological perspective with the notion of “metaphysics” discussed in the present chapter. Eustratios at first associates the four Aristotelian causes with the four things we seek referred to by Aristotle in the lemma. The commentator concludes that the “what something is” (τί ἐστιν) corresponds to form; the “fact” (τὸ ὅτι) with matter; the “reason why” (τὸ διότι) to the final cause, and the “if something is” (εἰ ἔστι) to something “that imitates the principle whence the origin of movement comes” (τὸ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως μιμούμενον), a periphrasis that in Aristotle and the commentators stands for the efficient cause.⁵³

The commentator’s primary focus is, however, on the final cause. Eustratios writes:

καὶ αὖθις ὥσπερ τὸ ἓν πρώτιστον ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξῃρημένον τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προϊόντων, ἄρρητόν τε παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἄφραστον καὶ ἄγνωστον πάσῃ γνώσει καὶ ἄληπτον, αἰτία πρωτίστη διὰ πάντων χωροῦσα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ μηδενὸς τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν ἀπολειπομένη, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι ζήτησις πάσης ζητήσεως ὑπερήπλωται καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν πρὸ τῶν λοιπῶν τεθεώρηται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις παρέπεται, οὐκ εἶδος ζητοῦσα καθ’ ἑαυτήν, οὐκ αἴτιον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἁπλῶς.⁵⁴

Furthermore, once again, just like the One exists as the most supreme of all beings and transcends its effects, and is ineffable by all language, incomprehensible, unknown by all knowledge, unintelligible, the supreme Cause that advances towards everything that comes from it and never abandons that which comes after it; so in the same way also the quest over “if something is” transcends all other questions concerning its simplicity, and must be in itself considered before the remaining ones, as it is involved in the others. In fact, [such question] does not investigate the form per se, nor the cause, but the very same Being in general.

This text assimilates the final cause, which is the most important among the previously mentioned questions, to the One through analogy. The way Eustratios describes the One pays tribute to Proclus’ Platonic Theology, where concerning the one, transcendent, and unparticipated Cause, the Diadochus writes:

Ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν τὰ ὄντα παραγόντων θεῶν μία καὶ ἐξῃρημένη καὶ ἀμέθεκτος αἰτία προϋφέστηκεν, ἄρρητος μὲν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἄφραστος, ἄγνωστος δὲ πάσῃ γνώσει καὶ ἄληπτος, πάντα μὲν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐκφαίνουσα, πάντων δὲ ἀρρήτως προϋπάρχουσα, καὶ πάντα μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέφουσα, πάντων δὲ οὖσα τέλος τὸ ἄριστον.⁵⁵

Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and unparticipated cause pre-exists, a cause ineffable by all language, incomprehensible, unknown by all knowledge and unintelligible, unfolding all things into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to [all things], and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things.

At this point, Eustratios’ strategy becomes clear. The four questions referred to by Aristotle correspond to the logical level. The physical level entails associating the four questions to the four Aristotelian causes that are explanatory of the phenomena studied by physics. The theological level entails discussing through analogy the four Aristotelian questions and causes with the causation of the One and, in general, with causation in the intelligible world.

At times, however, the commentator simply distinguishes between the causation that takes place “there” (ἐκεῖ) with what happens “here” (ἐνταῦθα). Like when he claims that, just like in the sensible world the question “what something is” (τί ἐστιν) determines and defines in the guise of a limit the essential property of each thing, so in the intelligible world the primordial opposites of “Limit” (τὸ πέρας) and “Unlimitedness” (τὸ ἄπειρον) derive from the First Cause and pre-exist that which comes afterward. In such a way, continues the commentator, “Limit” determines and defines all beings and is the cause of their constancy, unity, and consistency, whereas “Unlimitdness” is responsible for the generation process and multiplicity.⁵⁶ This is reminiscent of prop. 90 of Proclus’ Elements of Theology: “Prior to all that is composed of limit and infinitude there exist substantially and independently the first Limit and the first Infinity.” (Πάντων τῶν ἐκ πέρατος καὶ ἀπειρίας ὑποστάντων προϋπάρχει καθ’ αὑτὰ τὸ πρῶτον πέρας καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία.)⁵⁷

When presenting his theological interpretation of Aristotle’s four questions and causes, Eustratios often refers in general to what “they say”.⁵⁸ I argue that on all these occasions Eustratios is thinking of the Neoplatonists, particularly his beloved Proclus. The latter is, for instance, the shadow lurking behind Eustratios’ claim that just like Being in the intelligible world is a third element resulting from the mixture of Limit and Unlimitedness, so here in the sensible world the question of the “reason why” (τὸ διότι) involves a mixture between the two extremes and the middle terms within syllogisms.⁵⁹ Leaving aside Eustratios’ reference to the question of the “reason why” (τὸ διότι), the commentator’s discussion of Being as a mixture of Limit and Unlimitedness is taken directly from Proclus, e.g. the Platonic Theology, where the Diadochus writes that Being in its most fundamental sense is Limit, Unlimitedness, and Mixture in which Being itself is a third element, that is to say Mixture.⁶⁰

That Eustratios had this Proclean text on his desk when composing his commentary is evident in the following passage, where the commentator develops the aforementioned analogy between Being as Mixture and Aristotle’s “reason why” (τὸ διότι):

καὶ αὖθις ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν τριαδικὸν διὰ τὴν μῖξίν φασιν, ὅτι τριῶν τούτων ἐν παντὶ μικτῷ δεῖ, κάλλους ἀληθείας συμμετρίας, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διότι ἀποδείξει τό τε εὔσχημον τοῦ λόγου θεωρεῖται, κάλλος ὂν προσῆκον αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τῶν προτάσεων, καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τάς τε προτάσεις καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα.⁶¹

Furthermore, once again: just like they say that Being is triadic because it results from mixture (so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary, namely beauty, truth, and symmetry), so in demonstrations that are explanatory of the “reason why” the soundness of the argument is taken into consideration, namely the beauty that belongs to such demonstration, the truth of the premises and the symmetry resulting from the essential nature of the connection between the premises and the conclusion.

I suggest comparing this passage with Proclus’ Platonic Theology where the Diadochus discusses Philebus 65a2:

Καὶ μονὰς οὖν ἐστι τὸ μικτόν, διότι μετέχει τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ δυοειδές ἐστι, καθ’ ὅσον ἐκ τῶν δύο προελήλυθεν ἀρχῶν, καὶ τριάς, καθ’ ὅσον ἐν παντὶ μικτῷ τριῶν τούτων δεῖ κατὰ τὸν Σωκράτην, κάλλους, ἀληθείας, συμμετρίας.⁶²

That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the One; and it is dual-formed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles; but it is a triad, so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry.

Clearly, this Eustratian text depends upon Proclus. What follows bears, even more, the trace of the Diadochus. In fact, at a certain point, Eustratios insists on his theological explanation of the four Aristotelian questions. This time, however, he will leave aside the One and the first principles that come right after the One and discuss the Neoplatonic notions of Being, Life, Nous, and Soul. However, even the way Eustratios moves onto another topic reveals his acquaintance with Neoplatonism. Eustratios writes:

εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα σιγῇ ἐάσθων ὥσπερ ἐν ἀδύτοις ἱεροῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένα, τό τε αἴτιον ἓν καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνου δεικνυόμενά τε καὶ ἐκφαινόμενα, οὐ ποιούμενα οὐδὲ παραγόμενα.⁶³

If you wish, let us pass over in silence the first principles, things hidden in innermost holy sanctuaries, namely the one cause and the realities that the One manifests and reveals, which are neither produced nor caused.

This is an extraordinary text. Eustratios elegantly wishes to shift his focus from the One to the lower realities. However, in doing so, he provides readers with a clear glimpse of the Neoplatonic principle according to which the One and that which is around the One, namely the henads firmly established in the One (and are distinct from it only from an external point of view), are unknowable and must be approached through silence.⁶⁴

Accordingly, the commentator discusses the analogy between these lower levels of reality and the four Aristotelian questions. First comes being (τὸ ὄν), writes the commentator, which is the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), then comes life (ἡ ζωή), which is the same as knowledge (ἡ νόησις), then comes the intellect (ὁ νοῦς), which is the same of the knower (τὸ νοοῦν), finally comes the level of the soul (ἡ ψυχή).⁶⁵ Except for the level of the soul, this text otherwise appears to depend once again upon Proclus’ Platonic Theology:

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν μάλιστα τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ νοῦς μέν ἐστι τὸ γνωστικόν, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ νόησις, νοητὸν δὲ τὸ ὄν.⁶⁶

For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible.

Afterwards Eustratios develops the analogy between the four Aristotelian questions and Life, Being, Intellect, Soul:

τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔστι περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ζητοῦν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὄντος ἔστιν εἰκών· τὸ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἐπεὶ τὸ γνώρισμα τοῦ ὄντος ζητεῖ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐκφαίνει ὡσπερεὶ κρυπτόμενον, καὶ πρόοδος ἐκείνου εἰς τοὐμφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς γίνεται, τῆς ζωῆς ὡς δυνάμεως οὔσης ἢ ἐνεργείας, δι’ ἧς τὸ ὂν νοεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται· τὸ δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει τῷδε τόδε, τοῦ νοῦ ὡς ἄμφω ἑαυτῷ συνάπτοντος, νόησίν τε καὶ τὸ νοητόν, τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑποκείμενον, τὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀποτεινομένην. τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἐστιν, ὅτι λόγος αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ λόγους τῶν ὑπὸ λόγον καὶ αἰτίας τῶν ὑπ’ αἰτίαν καὶ μέσα τῶν ἐμμέσων ἀναζητεῖ τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκει· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ κινεῖσθαι αὐτῇ ἀπὸ προτάσεων ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα.⁶⁷

Thus posing the question in general terms “if something is” is an image of pure Being, whereas posing afterwards the question “what something is” addresses a token of being and reveals it as hidden. The procession coming from Being moves from unclarity to clarity, Life being a sort of power or act by means of which Being is known and grasped. The question “if something exists” as such and such involves the Intellect connecting in itself both knowledge and intelligible, the latter as subject, the former as extending around and towards it. “The reason why” concerns the Soul, for the Soul is reason and investigates and discovers the reasons that exist under the class of reason, the causes that fall under the class of cause, and the middle terms among the intermediate ones. Moreover, from whatever source and place, it is moved by itself from the premises to the conclusions.

This text must be understood within Eustratios’ previous distinction among different interpretive levels. Aristotle’s logic is an explanatory model valid in the sensible world: thus, posing the questions “if something is” and “what something is” within this logical approach only grasps an image of pure Being and a faint likeness of it. By contrast, following his Neoplatonism, the commentator implies that true Being only exists in the intelligible world.⁶⁸ That this is the case, it is clear from a similar passage in the same commentary where Eustratios explains in detail the existing relationship between the logical, physical, and theological approaches concerning knowledge. According to the commentator, knowledge moves from the logical level, whereby we connect premises and conclusions within syllogisms to the natural one, insofar as by considering the species of the natural beings we come to know Nature itself. Finally, while considering the species in the demiurgic reasons, we move to the one and First Cause. In the end, claims Eustratios, in these three levels knowledge works in the same way, striving for the more universal terms and causes.⁶⁹

Regarding the reference to Life as that through which Being is first known, surely Eustratios has in mind Proclus’ triad of Life, Being, Intellect, and the Diadochus’ claim “that Life communicates the movement inherent in it, inasmuch as Life is the first procession or movement away from the steadfast substance of Being” (καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τῆς παρ’ ἑαυτῇ κινήσεως καὶ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ πρώτη πρόοδός ἐστι καὶ κίνησις ἀπὸ τῆς μονίμου τοῦ ὄντος ὑποστάσεως).⁷⁰ More difficult is finding an earlier Neoplatonic passage that explains Eustratios’ claim that posing the question “if something exists” involves the Intellect or Intelligence as connecting knowledge and the intelligible. Surely in Proclus’ metaphysics (see Elements of Theology, prop. 167) the Primal Intelligence is identical to its thought. However, a possible explanation of this Eustratian passage involves the link with Proclus’ claim, in his commentary on Timaeus, that the second aspect of the Intelligence is that “connecting the intellect with the intelligible” (ἡ συνάπτουσα τῷ νοητῷ τὸν νοῦν).⁷¹ What sense is meant in this account for “if something is” or “exists” questions is not immediately clear. Finally, claims Eustratios, the soul acts discursively, that is to say through discursive reasoning and connects in dioti explanation premises and conclusions by looking for the middle term.⁷²

All the evidence suggests that Eustratios accepts the general outlines of Proclus’ metaphysics. The commentator allows the existence of the One and the henads. At a lower level, he allows the existence of the intelligible world, which he describes as true Being, along with Proclus’ triad of Life, Being, and Intellect. Then comes the level of the soul. But there is more: in our commentary Eustratios writes:

ἀεὶ γὰρ ταῖς καταδεεστέραις τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἡ μετουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ τῶν προσεχῶς αὐτῶν προϊσταμένων παρέχεται, οἷον τοῖς σώμασι διὰ τῆς φύσεως, τῇ φύσει διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τοῦ νοῦ, τούτῳ διὰ τῆς ζωῆς, ταύτῃ διὰ τοῦ ὄντος.⁷³

In fact, for the weaker hypostases participating in the Good always takes place through the levels that come right before them, like Nature for the bodies, Soul for Nature, Intellect for Soul, Life for Intellect and Being for Life.

This is a summary of participation among different levels of reality discussed at length by Proclus in his Platonic Theology.⁷⁴ Even the expression “participation in the Good” (ἡ μετουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) reflects Proclus’ vocabulary very closely.⁷⁵

Elsewhere in his commentary, Eustratios also refers to Proclus’ theory of whole and parts and the idea that wholes are unparticipated monads that generate a plurality of terms coordinated with them.⁷⁶ However, whereas this latter view is ascribed to “the followers of Plato” in the guise of a doxography, the present paper suggests that the commentator identifies his own position with that of the Platonists.

4 Conclusions

In my conclusive remarks I would like to address two issues, namely Eustratios’ position within eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantine Neoplatonism and the importance of the Byzantine commentators on Aristotle in the Greek Middle Ages.

Regarding the first issue, the main character in the Byzantine reception of Neoplatonism and Proclus is noticeably the consul of the philosophers, Michael Psellos (d. after 1076). After Zervos’ 1920 consequential Un philosophe néoplatonicien du XIe siècle: Michel Psellus, the consul of the philosophers was granted the title of a steady reader of Proclus and that of a true Byzantine Neoplatonist.⁷⁷ Indeed, Michael himself famously elected Proclus as the highest peak ever reached by ancient philosophy. Furthermore, Michael’s writings are rife with excerpts, citations, and references of all sorts to this Neoplatonist.⁷⁸ Yet, recent research shows that Psellos’ use of Proclus needs to be qualified: at times, Michael produces personal notes with excerpts from Proclus; on other occasions, he uses Proclus’ vocabulary for his theological writings, or he relies on Proclus for his view on literature and authorship.⁷⁹ Finally, he often harshly criticizes Proclus’ paganism as incompatible with Christianity.⁸⁰ In short, it is unclear whether or not Michael fully endorsed any of Proclus’ tenets in metaphysics or epistemology.

By contrast, in light of what has been said in the present paper, I suggest shifting our attention from Psellos to Eustratios. The latter is one of the most significant medieval readers of Proclus, one who heavily relied on Proclus to present his views on causation, concept-formation, and metaphysics. In short, I argue that our commentator is the crucial figure in what has been called the “Proklosrenaissance” in Byzantium.⁸¹

In this regard, I would like to mention a few words on the potential link between Eustratios of Nicaea and Nicholas of Methone. As previously mentioned, according to the editor of Nicholas’ Refutation, Athanasios D. Angelou, Nicholas challenges Eustratios’ Neoplatonism, precisely in his commentary on Posterior Analytics II.⁸² Indeed, identifying Eustratios as Nicholas’ target is fascinating. As Angelou has promptly suggested, at first glance Eustratios’ consistent appropriation of Proclean texts and doctrines is unparalleled in the Middle Byzantine period, and because of this a link with Nicholas would seem obvious. However, is it so? Did Nicholas have in mind Eustratios when writing his Refutatio Procli? Even though that may seem disappointing, I have doubts about such a connection. Here is why.

First, the chronology of Eustratios’ philosophical commentaries does not fit in with Nicholas’ floruit. As far as I know, there is no precise dating for the composition of Eustratios’ commentary, but all the evidence suggests the early twelfth century as a reasonable guess. As anticipated above, Nicholas composed his Refutatio Procli around the mid-twelfth century, some forty years after the commentary on Posterior Analytics II. Since Nicholas addresses contemporary readers of Proclus, I find it hard to imagine that he is reacting to a work written four decades earlier.

Second, recent scholarship on Nicholas suggests that in rejecting Proclus’ metaphysics the bishop of Methone addresses contemporary theological debates,⁸³ whereas Eustratios’ commentary hardly counts as a text addressing theological matters. True: Eustratios was condemned in 1117, but on that occasion the synod condemned his Christology, not his Neoplatonism. It is worth recalling that Eustratios’ philosophical commentaries were written after the request of his contemporaries (i.e., the Commentary on Posterior Analytics II) and Princess Anna Komnene (Commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics I and VI). These texts were not meant to circulate outside these circles and cannot be regarded as official theological documents aiming at establishing one or more dogmata.

Third, in his philosophical commentaries Eustratios does not exclusively focus on Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Surely, he cites from the Elements, but he also dwells on a vast array of other Proclean works like the Commentary on the Parmenides, the Platonic Theology, and the Commentary on Alcibiades I. In short, Proclus’ Elements of Theology does not play any specific role in Eustratios’ ambitious project of commenting on Aristotle through the looking glass of Proclus. That is why it is unlikely that, when writing the Refutatio Procli, Nicholas had the Metropolitan of Nicaea as his target in mind.

Concerning the second issue—namely the place and importance of Eustratios as a commentator in Byzantine intellectual history—in a recent paper, Dimitri Gutas and Niketas Siniossoglou wrote that the Byzantines did not produce philosophical works worthy of the name. In particular, the authors harshly dismissed the Byzantine Aristotelian commentators as mere scholars, writers who simply repeated what Aristotle said without adding anything new because medieval Greek commentators were oppressed by hordes of ignorant monks ready to charge them with heresy.⁸⁴ Leaving aside the fact that, just like the Byzantines, Medieval Islamic and Latin Christian philosophers (and mutatis mutandis, the philosophers living in pre-modern societies) were also not granted unlimited and undisputed intellectual freedom, this paper proves that Gutas’ and Siniossoglou’s hasty dismissal of the Byzantine commentary tradition is questionable. The case of Eustratios’ creative and passionate adoption of Proclus demonstrates that the Byzantine Aristotle commentators deserve scholarly attention. Eventually, Eustratios was condemned in 1117, but his condemnation was due to his alleged subordinationism in Christology. His Neoplatonic commentaries of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics I and VI and of Posterior Analytics II were not involved in the trial against our commentator. The time has come for scholars to carefully read the commentaries on Aristotle produced by Eustratios and others in the Greek Middle Ages in order to avoid the generalizations and prejudices of the past.