1 Introduction1
The topic of “divine ideas” is well-known throughout medieval philosophy and theology, insofar as it was invoked to account for how God knows creatures throughout eternity and produces them on the basis of his knowledge. The notion, of course, finds its roots in Plato’s theory of the Forms or “Ideas” (
Although not well studied in recent scholarship, the notion of the divine ideas also brought about great interest in the later Byzantine intellectual world, especially in the aftermath of John Philoponus’ critique of Proclus’ view of the universe’s eternity. In this period one sees not so much the problem of squaring simplicity with the plurality of ideas in God, but rather how God can eternally hold and think the divine ideas without simultaneously producing for all eternity, if one holds that God can produce being simply by his thinking. This indeed appears to have been one of the main problems in the background of Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (
With this in mind, I would like to look at Nicholas’ commentary on Proposition 76 in Proclus’ Elements, where Nicholas discusses “the ideas of beings which pre-exist in God” (
2 Nicholas on Prop. 76: The “Ideas of Beings”, Eternalism, and the Divine Will
The main text where Nicholas discusses the divine ideas in God is in his commentary on Prop. 76 in Proclus’ Elements of Theology, where Proclus claims that “all that comes to be from an unmoved cause has an unchanging subsistence, while all that comes to be from a moved cause, a changeable subsistence.”5 In effect Proclus argues that all beings that either have an eternal existence or an existence that changes (i.e. a temporal existence) come from causes that themselves are correspondingly eternal and unmoved (for eternal beings) or in motion themselves (for temporal beings). What particularly concerns Nicholas is the first half of the proposition, where, in making the first claim, Proclus argues that the unmoved cause, as eternal, must also produce an eternal effect:
For if the maker is entirely unmoved, it produces its secondary [effect], not through motion, but by its own being (
αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ) from itself. And if this is the case, it contains the effect which comes from it, as concurrent with its own being. And if this is so, then while it may exist, it produces. But it exists always: therefore, it brings to existence always that which is after it, so that the latter comes to be always from it and always exists, attaching that which is always by its own procession to that which is always by [its cause’s] perpetual activity.6
In this passage, Proclus presents two means by which causes produce or “make” (
As it turns out, this notion of causal synonymy becomes a problem for Nicholas. Much of Nicholas’ commentary on Prop. 76 is aimed against the eternalist implications of Proclus’ framework, particularly when Proclus argues that both unmoved and unchanging causes eternally, or always (
We see Nicholas effectively respond to this kind of argument when he critiques the inference of the cause’s nature from its effects: for Nicholas, God as the first cause is incomprehensible (
It is then better (
ἄμεινον ) to attribute both the manner of creation (ποιήσεως ) and the persistence or change of things that have come into being or have been created to the intention (βουλήματι ) of the Creator, who defines according to his will (θέλημα ) the manner of creation, the measures of its persistence, and the order (τάξιν ) and change into one another of the things made […].15
Nicholas here infers from the case of God “holding together” a being, which would otherwise not continue to exist without God’s action, that it is then “better” (
The rest of Nicholas’ commentary on Prop. 76 hinges on the will as the main basis of all creation. For Nicholas, Proclus errs greatly when, by “rejecting the divine will, and determining by the Creator’s mere being (
We find an implied answer just afterward, when Nicholas ties the goodness of God’s causation to willing: the divine nature “created all things because of goodness, and that it did so, therefore, having willed to create, and not unwillingly, lest, with the denial of will, it should be denied goodness as well.”18 Here we find perhaps a difference in first principles held between Proclus and Nicholas. For Nicholas, since the expression of the cause’s goodness is no longer tied to the cause’s nature, but rather to its “will”, production from the cause’s being alone (
Readers of Proclus will recognize a subtle but important contrast here. Elsewhere in the Elements of Theology, Proclus emphasizes the goodness of productive causes, simply in their subsistence (
It is within this frame that Nicholas discuss the “divine ideas” in connection with God’s will, as the cause of created beings:
For this reason, Dionysius, who is divine and great in divine things, when speaking of the pre-existing ideas of beings (
ἰδέας τῶν ὄντων ) in God, calls these “the divine and good wills” (τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα ). And clearly God produces nothing among beings “by his very being” (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ), [i.e.] without willing, so as also “to have concurrently with his own being the [being] produced from him”,27 but all things are posterior to his unoriginate subsistence; only his begetting of the Son and “projecting” of the Spirit is “by his very being” (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ), and for this reason these are co-unoriginate and co-eternal and con-substantial with the Begettor and Projector. “Involuntary” (ἀκουσίου ) has no place there, but [God produces beings] by one will common to the three [persons], insofar as the goodness of the Begettor and Projector, of the Begotten, and of the Projected, is one and common.28
Here we find Nicholas’ positive, articulated response to Proclus when he connects the “ideas of beings” to God’s “wills” or “intentions” (
The more pertinent question is how Nicholas understands the “one common will” (
Nicholas’ distinction recurs in his reply to Prop. 167,31 where Proclus argues that the first Intellect thinks itself alone, while all subsequent intellects after the first think both themselves and their prior causes, i.e. the higher intellects above themselves.32 One of the main problems this presents for Nicholas’ Christian framework is that the angels are intellects, while God is also intellect, yet all created beings, including the angels as created intellects, do not know God in himself.33 Nicholas modifies Proclus’ claim and argues that angels, as lower intellects, cannot think of God in the same way that they think themselves: they can only know God in a lower way compared to the way they know themselves.34 This distinction in turn leads to another interesting, if initially puzzling claim, about how God thinks himself and the beings he produces:
However, [God] does not think (
νοεῖ ) only Himself, but He also thinks all the beings of which He Himself is cause; for if [He did] not also [think] these things, He would not think Himself as cause of these, which indeed is absurd; therefore He thinks also these, except in a way that is superior to the way these beings [think] themselves.35
At first glance, one might think this is just polemical hair-splitting from Nicholas. Proclus later in Prop. 170 claims that every intellect thinks all things (
One can see this in Nicholas’ subsequent reply to Prop. 169, where Nicholas follows up his earlier Prop. 167 claim by concluding that “intellect (
Nicholas’ reply to Prop. 174 helps to further clarify the reason for this distinction. In the proposition, Proclus claims that “every intellect gives rise to its consequents by intellection: its producing is in intellecting, and its intellecting is in producing.” Nicholas here disputes Proclus’ identity claim and maintains that intellection in itself entails knowledge of beings, whereas Being-itself is responsible for the production of beings:
Therefore, as Intellect [i.e. the very first and beyond-intellect Intellect (
τὸν πρώτιστον μόνον καὶ ὑπέρνοον νοῦν )] thinks all the things after it, and as Being it causes these to subsist from itself and makes [them] to be, and its intellection is making and [its] making is intellection. But it intellects the things after it more greatly than they are—in a way proper for itself, that is—according as it even makes by intellection, and, since it is both transcendent Intellect and the Being before all things, it also thinks itself as Being and pre-being, wherefore it is not said to make itself; for Being, or rather pre-Being (τὸ προόν ), is not made, and since it has nothing before itself, it would not be said either to make or to think anything before itself.40
In his commentary on Prop. 174, Nicholas pushes back against Proclus’ claim that “every” intellect creates when it thinks. One problem is that the angels, as intellects, do not create beings, but rather they “transfer the divine participations” (
Overall, Nicholas is cautious to emphasize a distinction in God between (1) God’s knowledge of himself (and the divine persons’ knowledge of each other), alongside the essential production of the Son and Spirit from the Father; and (2) God’s knowledge of created beings as the “divine ideas”, which Nicholas relates to the “one, common will” (
3 Nicholas’ Predecessors on the Divine Ideas: Ps.-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and John Philoponus
As we saw above, Nicholas draws on Ps.-Dionysius for his articulation of the divine ideas contained in God, and based on which God creates beings. However, Nicholas’ interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius is mediated by a concern for creationism—a concern, it should be noted, not present or explicit in Ps.-Dionysius himself. As will become apparent, Nicholas’ reading of Ps.-Dionysius involves a concern imported from other, earlier Byzantine figures, of which Maximus the Confessor and John Philoponus are two witnesses, if not possible influences, for Nicholas. But first we should briefly look at Ps.-Dionysius in himself.
3.1 Nicholas’ Initial Source for the Divine Ideas in Ps.-Dionysius
In the commentary on Prop. 76, Nicholas’ reference to Ps.-Dionysius’ terminology for “pre-determinations” and “wills” in God goes back to the De divinis nominibus V, where Ps.-Dionysius discusses the attribute of being as it pertains to God, and how God functions as the cause of beings. In De divinis nominibus V.8, after expressing how God is the direct cause of all intellects, souls, and material beings, Ps.-Dionysius goes on to show in what way God is a paradigm for the different kinds of beings:
But we say that the paradigms [of beings] are the being-producing and unifying logoi which have pre-existed in God, which theology calls both divine pre-determinations (
προορισμοὺς ) and good wills (ἀγαθὰ θελήματα ), which are delimiting and productive of beings, according to which what is beyond being (ὁ ὑπερούσιος ) both pre-determines and produces all beings.42
Ps-Dionysius’ language of the paradigms of beings which function as “pre-determinations” and “good wills” should be familiar from Nicholas’ commentary. One may initially think that Ps.-Dionysius’ ascription of the paradigms of beings (in the same way as the divine ideas) to the divine “wills” and “pre-determinations” is the same kind of argument we see in Nicholas. However, it is striking that Ps.-Dionysius does not appear to be worried about making an explicit distinction between the “wills” in God and God’s thoughts—much less between God’s being and his producing. For instance, earlier in De divinis nominibus I.5, Ps.-Dionysius claims that “by his own being (
One might, indeed, wonder whether Ps.-Dionysius’ position is any different from Proclus’ own position. If anything, it is tempting to see Ps.-Dionysius as tacitly accepting Proclus’ eternal emanative position: God’s mere existence alone, regardless of any distinct volition or operation, brings about all beings. All the more striking is the absence in Nicholas’ commentary of Ps.-Dionysius’ own use or interpretation of the term,
In any case, it seems clear that Nicholas appeals to a distinct anti-eternalist argument in his interpretation of the divine wills from Ps.-Dionysius—one reflecting a concern notably lacking in Ps.-Dionysius. Nicholas’ concern is not unique: the concern over an eternalist view of the world was commonplace among Byzantines up to Nicholas’ time, seen for instance one century before Nicholas in the Byzantine philosopher, John Italos.44 While tracing these proximate sources in Nicholas is a desideratum, here I would like to look at two early sources for this kind of anti-eternalist interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius that appears in Nicholas: proximately Maximus the Confessor and, behind Maximus’ arguments, John Philoponus. As we will see, Maximus’ understanding of the divine ideas in Ps.-Dionysius is mediated by Philoponus’ creationist framework. To understand Maximus, we should also look at Philoponus, whose strategy of arguing against Proclus, in turn, is worth comparing with Nicholas’ own.
3.2 Maximus the Confessor: Mediating Ps.-Dionysius’ Divine Wills within a Creationist Context
We see Maximus’ interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus V.8 in Ambiguum 7, when Maximus refers to the principles (logoi) of created beings as “pre-determinations” (
By truth itself, that which belongs to all beings is in him and by him, even while all things themselves—both beings which are and beings which will be—are not brought into being at the same time with their logoi, nor with their being known by God. Rather, every being is brought into being at the right moment according to the wisdom of the creator, being created in a manner fitting to their logoi and by receiving being in actuality in themselves. [Such is the case] since God is always a creator in actuality (
ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειάν ἐστι δημιουργός ) while beings exist in potentiality but not yet in actuality, because what is unlimited and what has been limited do not belong together.48
Here Maximus emphasizes that creatures are not “brought into being with their logoi”, or principles, even though God has and thinks the logoi throughout eternity. Instead, the distinction between potentiality (
At the same time, Maximus qualifies in what way God possesses and knows the logoi. On the one hand the logoi are identified with God, so that God knows himself in knowing the logoi. On the other hand, it is notable that Maximus does not say that God knows beings by unqualifiedly knowing himself, but rather that God knows beings in the following way:
[…] we say that [God] knows beings as his own, proper wills (
ὡς ἴδια θελήματα ), and they [i.e. the so-called “disciples of Pantainos”] added the following reasonable statement of the account: for if (1) [God] has made all things by will—and no one denies the statement—and if (2) it is always pious and right to say that God knows his own will, and (3) [God], as willing, has made each of the things that have come to be, then God therefore knows beings just as his own wills (ἴδια θελήματα ), since, as willing, he has made beings.50
Again, using Ps.-Dionysius’ language of “wills” (
If we look back at Nicholas’ discussion of the divine ideas in his response to Proclus, we can see aspects of Maximus’ framework in the background that potentially illuminate Nicholas’ own framework. In particular, we saw Nicholas emphasize a distinction between God in himself and the ideas of beings by which God produces beings. We also see a similar emphasis in Maximus emphasizing that God knows beings “as his own wills” (
In turn, the emphasis on God producing in terms of “will” or “wills” is correlated with beings which contingently exist: as Maximus argues, beings exist “in potentiality but not yet in actuality” (
3.3 John Philoponus: A Background to Maximus, and a Similar Anti-Eternalist Critique of Proclus
While there are other sources in the background to Maximus’ creationist argument in his interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius,54 one particular, possible influence behind this argument in Maximus is John Philoponus.55 We see this kind of argument in Philoponus’ response to Proclus’ fourth argument in the De aeternitas mundi,56 when Philoponus argues that God does not produce beings “involuntarily”—a key premise in Nicholas’ response to Prop. 76:57
For God does not bring his creations into existence by an involuntary (
ἀβουλήτῳ ) necessity of nature in the way that the sun illuminates and fire heats as soon as they are present by an involuntary necessity of nature. The cause of all things is above all necessity, for which reason it is not at all necessary that whatever is thought by God should exist simultaneously with the thought.58
One of Philoponus’ main points in this passage is that God’s possession of the principles, or reasons (logoi), of beings does not, in itself, entail that their products are necessitated or come to be. Before this passage, Philoponus refers to an example of a shipwright and builder who possess the principles for building the ship or house, yet need not always be building their respective products.59 The example of the sun/fire then becomes the very opposite to the example of the shipwright or builder with their products. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Philoponus’ sun/fire example directly hearkens back to a standard Platonist analogy for causation, seen in Plato’s Republic VI with the sun’s analogy to the Good,60 and extended to Neoplatonist descriptions of the Good’s, or One’s, production of beings.61 Philoponus’ negative interpretation of the sun/fire metaphor becomes a motif for later Byzantines, like Nicholas, to describe rather the dis-analogy to God’s causality of beings, where heat results immediately from the presence of fire, and in turn light results necessarily from the sun’s presence. Instead, Philoponus uses examples of rational agents like the shipwright and builder to describe God’s causality, where they are said to “project” or “bring forward” (
Philoponus applies this to God, but also draws a contrast to the human examples:
For [God] everlastingly (
ἀιδίως ) possesses the thoughts (νοήσεις ) and principles (λόγους ) of beings, according to which indeed he is a creator, in exactly the same way, and does not become different in any respect whether he produces or does not produce. For generally, it is not right to say that capacity (ἕξιν ) and activity (ἐνέργειαν ) are different [things] in the case of God: the two are one and the same thing and difference arises in the sphere of that which participates [in God].63
In this last line Philoponus emphasizes the unchangeability of God’s being by denying any distinction between God’s capacity and activity to produce: while the distinction obtains in the created world, capacity and activity are the same (
One can see a possible influence of Philoponus’ argument in Maximus’ distinction between God, the logoi, and created beings.65 First, just as Maximus emphasizes that God’s eternal thinking of the principles (logoi) of beings does not necessitate their actual existence, so Philoponus argues against the notion that God’s eternal thinking of beings necessitates their production. Both Philoponus and Maximus argue that God exists as an eternal creator, either as complete (in Philoponus:
Where we do find one difference is in how this argument is employed. Philoponus, in the passage’s context, employs this distinction to argue that there is no change between capacity and actuality in God, insofar as God produces creatures in time. Maximus, by contrast, uses the distinction to argue for the fact of creatures’ contingent existence in contrast to God, while he does not explicitly argue against change in God—even though the denial of change is implied in Maximus’ assertion that God is a creator in actuality. Still, both Byzantines maintain the same point that God’s possession of the logoi of beings, like the shipwright possessing the idea of the ship, does not necessitate the actual, eternal production of beings. Instead, the distinction between the divine ideas and created beings allows for a way to articulate how God possesses divine ideas without necessitating their simultaneous instantiation. Philoponus’ defense of the position that God possesses the logoi of beings without their necessary, concurrent production can thus be seen in Maximus the Confessor’s own position that God possesses the logoi of creatures, while creatures in themselves are conditioned by their potential existence in time. In turn, we can see how this argument makes its way to Nicholas.
3.4 Assessing the Relation between Maximus the Confessor and John Philoponus in Nicholas
If we look back at Nicholas’ framework, adapted from Ps.-Dionysius, we can see certain aspects made clearer from looking at Maximus and Philoponus in the background. For instance, Nicholas’ distinction of the “ideas of beings” (
In addition, Nicholas’ argument in Prop. 167 that God knows beings not through intellection unqualifiedly, but through specifically thinking of beings as their cause, mirrors Maximus’ argument that God knows beings also not through intellection but rather in virtue of the distinct wills or intentions (
So far this section has looked at Maximus as an influence in Nicholas’ creationist interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius on the divine ideas, and it has considered Philoponus, in turn, as an influence in Maximus. While we have already seen certain parallels between Nicholas and Philoponus, as mediated through Maximus, it is worth briefly comparing the argumentative strategies of Philoponus and Nicholas in their respective rejections of Proclus’ eternalist framework. As we saw in the Elements’ Prop. 76, Proclus argues that unchanging causes produce unchanging effects, and that if an unchanging cause were to produce a changing effect, this would implicate the cause in change; hence, the cause must be changeless. Philoponus’ response to Proclus is to reject the notion that change obtains in God by the production of contingent beings: capacity and actuality are the same in God, even if they are different in created beings.71
In Nicholas’ response to Prop. 76, we see a somewhat different response. Nicholas’ argument hinges on two aspects: (1) that “the manner of the creation, and the persistence or change of things that have come into being (
Still, certain aspects of Philoponus’ framework may find a parallel, if not influence, in Nicholas. For instance, Philoponus emphasizes the superiority of causality by willing rather than without willing—one of the main premises in Nicholas’ response to Proclus.75 In turn, Philoponus’ emphasis on the contingency of beings produced by God’s willing, based on their logoi in God, can also be found in Nicholas (and Maximus, as noted above) when he argues against beings as “concurrent” (
4 Conclusion: Nicholas’ Creationist Account of the Divine Ideas amidst the Byzantine Concern against Eternalism
In Sect. 1 we looked in depth at Nicholas’ understanding of the divine ideas as the means by which God produces created beings. One curious aspect in Nicholas’ argument, seen especially in his response to Proposition 167, is his distinction between God thinking himself and thinking of created beings as their cause. This can be related together with his two-fold distinction in causality, from his response to Proposition 76: God causes either (1) “by his own being” (
In Sect. 2 we looked at two particular early Byzantines as possible influences Nicholas’ creationist argument: proximately to Nicholas, Maximus the Confessor, and in the background to Maximus, John Philoponus. As noted, where Ps.-Dionysius equates God’s production of beings
Why Nicholas himself is concerned with eternalism in his articulation of the divine ideas, outside the earlier context of Philoponus and Maximus, is not entirely clear. Although this paper’s focus is on the early Byzantine sources behind Nicholas’ articulation, another important, more proximate context for Nicholas may be the middle Byzantine, Komnenian-era controversy surrounding John Italos and his ecclesial condemnation in 1082—some 70–80 years before Nicholas’ Refutation. Although explicitly aimed at Italos, the synodal condemnations appear to be a more wide-ranging, general critique of various ancient philosophical theses, like metempsychosis, the denial of the soul’s immortality, and, more pertinently, the eternity of matter and created beings.77 The picture is more varied with Italos himself: in texts like Quaestio 71, Italos appears, rather, to critique the idea of the pre-existence of matter and the eternity of the world, while re-using arguments for the world’s eternity from Proclus and Aristotle. Among a barrage of arguments, Italos argues that the first cause’s production of beings “by choice” (
Given this, various questions still remain. For instance, it is still not clear how one should understand the kind of “simultaneity” of the divine ideas in God—which are only contingently produced—and the causality of the divine persons, “in” or as God—which are necessarily and eternally produced: if Nicholas conceives of God as ‘intellect’—or rather in his words, “pre-Intellect”, following Ps.-Dionysius’ language—how does one understand the unity of God as intellect, while maintaining the distinction between divine ideas and the divine nature/persons in itself/themselves? While this question cannot be answered here for now, we can see that Nicholas defends a creationist account of the divine ideas, and in doing so continues a trend from earlier Byzantines which we can see traced back, at least, to Maximus the Confessor and John Philoponus.
I would like to thank Joshua Robinson, Lela Alexidze, and István Perczel, as well as Carlos Steel, Jan Opsomer, Arthur Oosthout, and Sokratis-Athanasios Kiosoglou for their immensely helpful comments and feedback with earlier versions of this paper and some of the ideas therein. This study and the resulting paper was generously supported by the European Research Council (within the framework of the project Neoplatonism and Abrahamic Traditions [NeoplAT], grant ref. ERC_CoG_771640) and the Research Foundation—Flanders (FWO) (within the framework of the project Substance and the Sensible World between Pagan Platonism and Early Byzantine Christians, grant ref. 3H210442), alongside the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Institut für Mittelalterforschung), KU Leuven (De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy), and HU Berlin (Institute für Klassische Philologie).
Among various examples, see Plato, Phaedo, 96a–102a (esp. 100b–e); on the notion of “cause” in relation to the Forms in this context, see D. Sedley, “Platonic Causes”, in Phronesis 43/2(1998), pp. 114–132.
Among other early Christian sources for the notion of Forms as ideas or rational principles (
See I. Zavattero, “In Augustine’s Footsteps. The Doctrine of Ideas in Franciscan Thought”, in J.F. Falà, I. Zavattero (eds), Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth–XIVth Century) (Canterano: Aracne editrice, 2018), pp. xi–xxvii; C.A. Vater, Divine Ideas: 1250–1325, PhD dissertation, Washington, DC, Catholic University of America, 2017, and more generally the collection of Falà, Zavattero (eds), Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 76, l. 1–2:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 76, l. 3–8:
See Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 18, esp. l. 16–18:
See e.g. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 28: “Every producer brings to existence things like to itself before the unlike” (
See Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 14 and 20.
For the surviving fragment of Proclus’ argument, see John Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 55, l. 25–p. 56, l. 26. On Proclus’ De aeternitate mundi, see H.S. Lang, A.D. Macro, On the Eternity of the World (De aeternitate mundi), Proclus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), esp. pp. 50–51 on the fourth argument.
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 55, l. 26–p. 56, l. 6 (trans. Chase, slightly modified):
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 56, l. 10–26.
Nicholas of Methone,
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 5–8 (translation from J.M. Robinson, Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus: Theology and Neoplatonism in 12th century Byzantium. A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Notre Dame (Indiana), 2014).
Trans. Robinson, modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 8–13:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 17 ff.
Trans. Robinson, slightly modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 15–18:
Trans. Robinson; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 25–27:
One sees this in Nicholas’ commentary on the adjoining Prop. 77, when he critiques and modifies Proclus’ claim that all things which exist in potentiality are brought to actuality by a prior principle already existing in actuality. Nicholas takes Proclus’ claim to mean that the first principle, or God, is the actuality of all beings in themselves, which he ends up denying in Refutation 77, l. 17–21 (trans. Robinson): “But we say that neither potentially nor actually is the divine all things, but transcendently and causally, and that, being itself creator of the matter too, it forms from this the individuals according to the pre-determinations of the beings in itself, or the divine wills.” (
Here I translate
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 119 and esp. 13.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 7, l. 23.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 117, l. 5; see also 134, l. 10, where all things desire (
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 117, l. 4–6:
Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, ed. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007–2009), VI, 1048.1–5.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 13, l. 3–8.
Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 76, l. 5 (which Nicholas quotes here):
Trans. Robinson, modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 76, l. 27–37:
One can, of course, see the inheritance of language from the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) to refer to the Son, alongside the Spirit, as “consubstantial” (
One may wonder how Nicholas understands the nature of the Trinitarian persons and their procession when it is “God” which is the implicit subject for both the production of creatures (lines 29–30:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 167, l. 1–4: “Every intellect (
For more on intellect for Nicholas, see Lela Alexidze’s chapter in this volume.
See Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 167, l. 18–21, who appeals to Matthew 11:27 where Christ says that no one knows the Son except the Father: for Nicholas this implies that no knowledge of the divine nature is possible for created beings.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 167, l. 25–29 (trans. Robinson, modified): “And the divine intellects think themselves as they are, but they think the things above them not as these are but in a lesser way, and they think the things after themselves as well, although [as] over which the things themselves are, functioning as mediators and ministers of the divine pre-thinking; and for this reason this would not be called a ‘return to the inferior’ [cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 167, l. 7–11].” (
Trans. Robinson, lightly modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 167, l. 4–7:
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 173, l. 1–3:
Trans. Robinson, modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 169, l. 1–3:
See Damascius, De Principiis II, 149.12–20 and 158.8–16. Cf. S. Gertz, “Knowledge, Intellect and Being in Damascius’ Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles”, in Ancient Philosophy 36/2(2016), pp. 479–494 and, in the context of causality, Greig, The First Principle, pp. 120–137, esp. pp. 125–128.
There is a further parallel to Damascius in Nicholas’ commentary on Prop. 169. In the second half of his response (lines 5–19), Nicholas argues against Proclus’ claim that intellect is unmoved (
Trans. Robinson, modified; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 174, l. 20–27:
Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation 136, l. 8–15.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990), V.8, p. 188, l. 6–10:
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, I.5, p. 117, l. 11–15:
See below, pp. 227–229.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 24, l. 1–3 (= PG 91, 1085A).
See Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 2, l. 5–12 (= PG 91, 1069A–B). For an analysis of this passage and what kind of target (Origenist and/or otherwise) that Maximus have had in mind, see P. Sherwood, The Earlier “Ambigua” of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, in Studia Anselmiana 36(1955), pp. 72–92; S. Gersh (ed), From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 219–220; and J. Greig, “Proclus’ Reception in Maximus the Confessor, mediated through John Philoponus and Dionysius the Ps.-Areopagite: A Case Study of Ambiguum 7”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 3. On Causes and the Noetic Triad (Leiden: Brill, 2022), pp. 120–126.
It is striking how both Maximus and Nicholas use Ps.-Dionysius against the eternalist arguments, broadly construed, of their opponents, i.e. Origenists and Proclus respectively. Of course, the kind of “eternalism” each directly critiques is distinct: for Maximus it is the eternal pre-existence of the soul (held by Origenists), and for Nicholas it is the eternal pre-existence of the whole cosmos (held by Proclus).
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 19, l. 3–12 (= PG 91, 1081A–B):
Comparing with Philoponus, it is noteworthy how Philoponus in Contra Proclum p. 76, l. 27, describes God’s possession and thinking of the logoi as
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 24, l. 13–20 (= PG 91, 1085A): ([…]
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 24, l. 1–13 (= PG 91, 1085A): “In the same way, the disciples of Pantainos (who became the teacher of the great Clement [who wrote the] Stromateis) also say that they are called by Scripture ‘divine wills’. For when they were approached by some of those who boast in their secular learning, and [were asked] how Christians believe that God knows beings (
The thought behind Maximus’ phrasing is likely little different from Proclus’ view of the henads’ knowledge of beings: see e.g. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 121 (esp. lines 14–18), which argues that the henads, as gods, possess providence by virtue of pre-containing Intellect and thus pre-containing all forms of knowledge pertaining to beings (cf. Prop. 134).
It is also noteworthy that the phrase
For example, Basil of Caeserea, In Hexaemeron, I, p. 17, l. 17b–c, argues that conceiving of God as an eternal creator would imply that creation took place spontaneously (
For comparisons of Philoponus and Maximus on anti-eternalist arguments, see M. Varlamova, “Philoponus’ Dispute Against the Eternity of the World and Its Influence on the Byzantine Philosophy”, in Scrinium 13(2017); G. Benevich, “John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor at the Crossroads of Philosophical and Theological Thought in Late Antiquity”, in Scrinium 7–8/1 (2011), pp. 102–130 (esp. pp. 123–124); T. Shchukin, “Matter as a Universal: John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor on the Eternity of the World”, in Scrinium 13 (2017), pp. 361–382; and “Proclus’ Reception in Maximus the Confessor, Mediated through John Philoponus and Dionysius the Ps.-Areopagite: A Case Study of Ambiguum 7”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad (Leiden: Brill, 2022), pp. 135–149.
From Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 57, l. 1 onward.
Although Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 76, l. 34, noticeably uses the word,
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 78, l. 11–17 (trans. Share, modified):
Cf. Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 36, l. 27–p. 37, l. 8 (trans. Share, modified): “A shipwright and a builder may be in possession of the logoi [i.e. principles] for [building] a ship or a house but not yet be creating [anything] based on them. The being of such logoi consists in their being thoughts of a certain kind, but when the creator acts in accord with them, they become paradigms as a consequence [of that]. If, then, the generated beings based on them do not in every case immediately follow upon [the existence of] creative logoi, nothing prevents the world from not always existing even if the creative logoi for the world are eternal.” (
Plato, Republic, VI, 507c–509b.
A noteworthy example is Plotinus’ principle that all entities possess an internal and external activity: for instance, the fire possesses its internal activity, as constitutive of its essence, while its external activity lies in heat as its exterior product or effect: see e.g. Plotinus, Enneads, V.1.3, l. 6–12. Plotinus applies this principle to the One’s production of Intellect, and Intellect’s production of Soul, and so on. On this see E.K. Emilsson, Plotinus (London / New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 48–57; and in comparison with Proclus’ principle of causation
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 77, l. 10–15.
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 76, l. 26–p. 77, l. 3 (trans. Share, modified):
At face value this is somewhat puzzling: Philoponus’ arguments suggest that some form of distinction exists in God, even though one cannot disentangle a distinct stage for a capacity that is not also in act in God, insofar as God is outside time. This reflects a tension in reading Philoponus, one which Koenraad Verycken (2010) recognizes when he argues that it would seem that “a separate divine volition, distinct from God’s eternal will to create the world, is needed in order to bring about the real existence of the world, which would be incompatible with the immutability of God’s willing activity” (p. 747). At least it is clear that Philoponus denies that there is a real distinction between capacity and act in God, although, as we have seen in Nicholas, he does not show how there may still be a distinction in God between the two while still affirming unity in God. For now, it is enough to point out that Philoponus provides a mechanism to understand God’s possession of the logoi as distinct from God’s activity of producing, and the type of transition between the two.
Cf. Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 76, l. 26–p. 77, l. 3 and above, n. 50. See also Varlamova, “Philoponus’ Dispute”, pp. 396–398.
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 76, l. 21–22.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 19, l. 9–10.
Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 19, l. 10–11.
Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 76, l. 21–22.
Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7, sect. 24, l. 13–20 (= PG 91, 1085A), and p. 218 above.
Cf. Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 77, l. 10–15, and p. 221, above.
Trans. Robinson; Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 76, l. 8–11:
Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 76, l. 15–18: “But Proclus, rejecting the divine will, and determining by the mere being (
See e.g. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 14, l. 54–60. On Nicholas’ notion of God as self-moved, see Joshua Robinson’s chapter in this volume.
See earlier n. 58.
Cf. above, pp. 208–210.
On the latter, see the Synodikon of Orthodoxy in J. Gouillard, Le Synodikon de l’Orthodoxie: Édition et commentaire, Paris, Éditions E. de Boccard, 1967, p. 59, l. 198–202. For a discussion of the condemnations in this period, see M. Trizio, “Trials of Philosophers and Theologians under the Komnenoi”, in A. Kaldellis, N. Sinissioglou (eds), The Cambridge Intellectual History of Byzantium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), esp. pp. 463–464.
John Italos, Quaestiones, 71, l. 54–57: “[And when they say that] if the universe is corruptible, then the cause of the world is diminished in dignity, let them tell us whether the cause creates by an act of will or by nature. If it creates only by an act of will, then its nature is not such that it is eternally creating. If it creates by nature, too, then, so also the next one and so on, and the regress will stop at something everlasting, after which there is no [other] everlasting [entity]” (trans. Kraft–Perczel, lightly modified). (
See Kraft, Perczel, “John Italos on the Eternity of the World”, p. 698, referencing Philoponus, Contra Proclum, p. 46, l. 3–p. 49, l. 8; cf. also Contra Proclum, p. 76, l. 26–p. 77, l. 3, discussed earlier.
One sees this explicitly in the Refutation’s prologue, l. 17–26. To what degree Nicholas is directly responding to Italos and/or Italos’ teacher, Michael Psellos, rather than to a contemporary nearer his time, is unclear; however, see J. Robinson, “ ‘A Mixing Cup of Piety and Learnedness’: Michael Psellos and Nicholas of Methone as Readers of Proclus’ Elements of Theology”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations, (Leiden: Brill, 2020), pp. 56–93, for some indicators that Nicholas may be directly responding to Psellos.
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