1 Introduction¹

The history of the controversy between the Greek and the Latin churches has never been written on the basis of the theological treatises composed by the authors involved in the discussions, both real and invented. Most probably one of the reasons why this has not yet been done is that the lives of many of these authors, especially those who lived during the 12th century, are obscure—too obscure for those of us who wish to understand the relationships among the intellectuals and their reciprocal influences.

Of Nicholas of Methone’s life only scant pieces of information have survived. We do not know when he died, or whether he participated in some important church synods or encounters with Latin envoys,² but in his case the picture is even more obscure due to the accusation of plagiarism both in relation to his Refutatio Institutionis theologicae Procli³ and his theological writings on the Holy Spirit.⁴ This charge, in light of most recent studies on this important churchman and philosopher, should be reconsidered, especially on the basis of those internal pieces of evidence that show his corpus to have a coherent plan, designed to defend Byzantine orthodoxy against the threat represented by both the Latin addition of the Filioque sentence to the Creed and the “Hellenic tales” (οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μῦθοι).⁵

Since most scholars are generally more interested in the “philosophical” writings of Byzantine intellectuals than in their theological writings, the aim of this paper is to offer the reader the most meaningful and original argumentative knots of Nicholas of Methone’s writings on the Filioque and to highlight the passages and arguments that would be interesting for a further analysis of the reception of classical, late antique, and medieval philosophy. Indeed, some scholars have already discussed the relevance of the theological writings of Nicholas to better understand the Refutatio Procli: the most famous and quoted is certainly the review of Angelou’s edition by Kazhdan, in which the relevance of the twelfth-century historical context, and the relationship between the churches for the composition of the philosophical refutation of Proclus, are left open for further research;⁶ others have claimed that Nicholas’ philosophical production has no relationship with the theological literature and discussions of the time; and, furthermore, others defending Nicholas’ paternity of the Refutatio Procli have used the anti-Latin stance of the text in order to prove its date of composition during the 12th century.⁷

The aim of this paper is neither to enter into the discussion of the paternity of the texts attributed to the Bishop of Methone, nor to interpret the theological side of the Refutatio Procli: Joshua Robinson⁸ and Nicolò Carmelo Benvenuto⁹ have already devoted their doctoral dissertations and articles to these controversial and complex topics; the goal of this chapter is instead to present Nicholas of Methone’s theological writings on the Holy Spirit in order to add some relevant cases to the ongoing debate on the relationship between the theological and the philosophical realms in Nicholas’ production, especially because those scholars who have also mentioned the anti-Latin writings generally refer to one or two of these texts, but do not take into account the entire corpus.

∵

Four works attributed to Nicholas of Methone are preserved, but only one of them (no. 3) has recently received a critical edition.¹⁰ These works include:

1. A reply to a question on the Holy Spirit, Ad magnum domesticum (Angelou, n. 7; RAP G19828)¹¹

2. A treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, Adversus Latinos de Spiritu Sancto (Angelou, n. 1, RAP G368)¹²

3. A collection of principal refutations of the new Latin dogma, Refutationes theologicae doctrinae Latinorum, also known as Syllogismi¹³ or Oratio 7¹⁴ (Angelou, n. 3, RAP G19831)¹⁵

4. Memoirs from various writings written against the Latin blasphemy on the Holy Spirit, Memoriae contra Latinos (Angelou, n. 4, RAP G19835).¹⁶

It is impossible to establish a definite evidence-based dating for these writings, however, according to the contents, it seems plausible to propose a hypothetical order of composition from one to four: number one is a general text on the Holy Spirit, which is not explicitly addressed against the Latins, but was composed in reply to a question posed by a megas domestikos, perhaps John Axouch (died 1150 ca.),¹⁷ while the last one is a sort of “Reader’s Digest” of all the writings that Nicholas dedicated to the procession of the Holy Spirit.¹⁸

In this paper I discuss these four texts, which are clearly attributed to Nicholas, bishop of Methone by the manuscript tradition; however, as hinted in this volume by Carmelo Nicolò Benvenuto¹⁹ and widely discussed in his doctoral dissertation,²⁰ there are various problems of attributions for at least the Memoriae (attributed also to Niketas Stethatos)²¹ and some parts of the Syllogismi (attributed also to the Patriarch Nicholas IV Mouzalon),²² which I will mention only briefly in the dedicated sections.

A thorough study of Nicholas of Methone’s theological doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit would deserve a monograph. Nevertheless, in this publication I will first concisely describe the Ad magnum domesticum, and then I will dedicate more space and attention to the main work on the procession of the Holy Spirit, the Adversus Latinos de Spiritu Sancto, trying also to highlight if and when we can find passages that should be analysed in the light of Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli. I will then finally pinpoint the passages from the Syllogismi and the correspondences of Memoriae that complete this succinct overview.

2 Ad magnum domesticum

The title of the Ad magnum domesticum preserves the questions asked to Nicholas by a megas domestikos, by imperial order:²³ why is the Holy Spirit said to have descended on and dwelt in the Apostles οὐσιωδῶς, “in essence” (based on a passage from Gregory of Nazianzus’ Oration 41, on Pentecost)? Is there any difference between the way in which the Spirit substantially inhabits the Apostles and the substantial relationship between the Spirit and Christ? Indeed, if there is no difference, then should the Apostles be called “christs”? But, if the relationship is different, what is the difference?²⁴

The passage by Gregory of Nazianzus that triggers the entire discussion is the following:

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀμυδρῶς· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐκτυπώτερον· τὸ δὲ νῦν τελεώτερον, οὐκέτι ἐνεργείᾳ παρὸν ὡς πρότερον, οὐσιωδῶς δέ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, συγγινόμενόν τε καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον.

But while the first manifestation was obscure, the second ⟨was⟩ more manifest and the present one is more perfect: because the Spirit is no longer present by his action, as before, but it is substantially, as one could say, that He is present to the Apostles and resides with them.²⁵

This set of questions is not explicitly linked to anti-Latin polemics, but Nicholas’ explanations form the basis of his theology of the Holy Spirit, his “pneumatology”. The text opens with a series of references to the Spirit in the Old and New Testament (e. g. the chrism in Is. 61: 1; joy and exultation in Gal. 5: 22) and his role in the life of Christ: the Spirit and the Virgin, the Spirit and Christ’s baptism, the Spirit as the finger of God that drives away the demons, and so on. The turning points in Nicholas’ and Gregory’s exegeses are after Christ’s death and resurrection, when Christ himself breaths forth the Spirit (Io. 20: 21–23), on appearing to the Disciples, and later, after the Ascension, when he sends the Spirit at Pentecost (Mc. 16: 19; Lc. 24: 50–53; Act. 1: 6–11).

In order to explain how and why the Spirit exists differently in the Son and in the Apostles, Nicholas clarifies that the Spirit is “substantially” in the Son because the two are the unique substance of the Divinity, while the same condition is not applicable to the Apostles, who are creatures, and the divine substance cannot be confined within creation. The Bishop of Methone uses a passage from Gregory of Nazianzus’ Oratio 31, on the Holy Spirit, to reinforce his first point:

[…] πάντα τῇ οὐσίᾳ πληροῦν, πάντα συνέχον· πληρωτικὸν κόσμου κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀχώρητον κόσμῳ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν […].

[…] [the Spirit is] filling all with his essence, containing all: filling the world²⁶ in his essence, not limited by the world in his power […].²⁷

Then he goes on to explain that since God is infinite, while the world is limited, and since the unlimited cannot be contained in the limited,²⁸ therefore, when the Spirit comes upon and dwells in the Apostles, he is not contained in his entirety in each one of them, as he is in Christ,²⁹ but in the Apostles the Spirit is divided and in parts.³⁰ It is important to highlight the two different expressions employed in these passages: the Spirit is ἀχώρητον, “cannot be confined”, but can be χωριστόν, “separable”. Nicholas’ point could be summarised in a simple concept: the Divinity is infinite but at the same time can be divided into parts, as the Spirit is in residing in each creature. The conclusion to one of the questions posed by the megas domestikos, therefore, is: if the Spirit does not exist in the same manner in the Apostles and in Christ, then the Apostles cannot be called “christs”; rather they can be called “Christians”, a simple conclusion to quite a tedious question. One wonders if this was a serious matter for discussion in Constantinople, as Nicholas seems to present it in the proem, or if it was a personal curiosity of the megas domestikos.³¹

Nicholas goes back to Gregory of Nazianzus’ passage from Oratio 41 and draws attention to the three fundamental stages in the life of Christ—(1) before he was glorified by his suffering, (2) after the Resurrection, and (3) after the Ascension³²—in order to clarify (always on the basis of Gregory) how the manifestation of the Spirit was possible only after the Resurrection. He explains at length the meaning of Gregory’s text and then concludes, clarifying that the Theologian did not use the expression “substantially” in a complete, absolute way³³ but “tempered”³⁴ it (ἐκόλασε)³⁵ by the addition of the words “as one could say” (ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις). Therefore, the “substantial” (οὐσιωδῶς) presence of the Spirit in the Apostles is different from his presence in Christ, because in Christ the Spirit was present, quoting again Gregory, “not operating, but accompanying a person of equal dignity” (ἐῶ γὰρ Χριστὸν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ παρῆν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνεργοῦν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁμοτίμῳ συμπαρομαρτοῦν),³⁶ “id est”—adds Nicholas—“as cooperating in the one and undivided operation, as supremely united and belonging essentially in a supra-essential manner according to the equality of honour of the nature” (τουτέστι συνεργοῦν κατὰ μίαν ἀμέριστον ἐνέργειαν, ὡς καὶ ὑπερηνωμένον καὶ συνουσιωμένον ὑπερουσίως κατὰ τὴν ὁμοτιμίαν τῆς φύσεως).³⁷

In this way Nicholas concludes his reply,³⁸ but not the treatise; in fact he feels the need to explain fully why Gregory said that the Spirit was “substantially” present in the Apostles not in a “simple and open way” (καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλῶς) but in a such a “tempered”³⁹ way (ἀλλ’ οὕτω κεκολασμένως).⁴⁰ To resolve the case, Nicholas mentions the hint left by Gregory himself (ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις) and interprets “substantially” (οὐσιωδῶς) as referring to Aristotle’s πρώτην οὐσίαν.⁴¹ Consequently, for Nicholas the Spirit was present in substance because the Divinity and the name, “God”, are common, and therefore the οὐσία is common, while each person of the Trinity is what the philosophers call ἄτομον, individual, but both what is common and what is personal are substance.⁴² A reasoning that could sound quite eccentric in the panorama of the twelfth-century polemical writings, which are primarily concerned with clearly and rigidly distinguishing between the common substance (οὐσία) and the personal hypostases (ὑποστάσεις) and carefully identifying and specifying the personal characteristics, not common, and the collective substantial characteristic shared by the Divinity.⁴³

So, according to Nicholas, the Spirit had always been present in substance, following his Aristotelian interpretation of the adverb οὐσιωδῶς, together with the Father and the Son, but he was not present σωματικῶς, αἰσθητῶς⁴⁴ (“physically” and “sensibly”)—here quoting again Oratio 41 by Gregory⁴⁵—because he could manifest himself through his operation (διὰ μόνης τῆς ἐνεργείας)⁴⁶ only after the Resurrection, in the “tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them” (Act. 2: 3): this indeed was the time of his presence, of his personal and substantial manifestation, which human beings had not experienced before.⁴⁷ Finally, Nicholas clarifies that in this way it is also possible to understand the meaning of the passage of Io. 7: 39: “Up to that time the Spirit had not been given, since Jesus had not yet been glorified.”

[…] οὕτως πρότερον ἐνεργείᾳ παρόν, ὕστερον οὐσιωδῶς ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις (ὁ περιττὸς τὴν ἔξω σοφίαν, κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον δηλαδὴ τῆς κατ’αὐτὸν πρώτης οὐσίας, ὃν ὁ λόγος φθάσας ἐδήλωσε) τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπεδήμησε συγγινόμενόν τε καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον […].⁴⁸

[…] so, the Spirit, being present before through operation, then descended upon the Apostles substantially as one could say (i.e., the remarkable one in pagan wisdom, according to the meaning of the primary substance as he defined it, which this writing has already elucidated) being associated with the disciples and living with them […].

A third part follows, which in fact is as an addition to the main reply to the megas domestikos. Nicholas summarizes the previous conclusions, and then resolves three other issues against (1) those who think that the Spirit is the “inbreathing/infusion” (ἐμφύσημα) of Christ; (2) those who think that the Spirit is only a “simple activity” (ψιλὴ ἐνέργεια); and (3) those “who call him finger of the Son-hand”.⁴⁹ This set of errors brings with it the heresy of the Latins: in particular, calling the Spirit “inbreathing/infusion” (ἐμφύσημα) is proper to their heresy, which teaches that the Spirit proceeds from the Son.⁵⁰ Nicholas goes on to list all the passages of the Scriptures where the Father and the Son are also called “spirit”, or where the name, “spirit”, is used in many different contexts, e.g. when Paul writes about the “spirit of slavery” and the “spirit of adoption” (Rom. 8: 15), etc.⁵¹

Most interesting is the following passage, where Nicholas explains why the Spirit cannot be a simple operation (ψιλὴ ἐνέργεια). Again, he starts from Gregory of Nazianzus:

Εἰ ἐνέργεια, φησίν, ἐστί, ἐνεργηθήσεται οὐκ ἐνεργήσει, καὶ ὁμοῦ τῷ ἐνεργηθῆναι παύσεται· τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια. Πῶς οὖν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τάδε λέγει καὶ ἀφορίζει καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ παροξύνεται, καὶ ὅσα κινουμένου σαφῶς ἐστιν, οὐ κινήσεως;

“And if [the Spirit] is activity”, as Gregory says, “he will be acted on, he will not be acting [i.e. as the agent], and when he will not be acted upon anymore he will cease to be: for such is activity. How then does he act, speak words, set apart, grieve, get angry, and do anything that clearly belongs to a moving [agent], and not to a movement?”⁵²

After having quoted Gregory, he tries to offer an explanation that could also take into account Cyril of Alexandria, who calls the Spirit “natural, and essential, and enhypostatic operation” (ἐνέργεια φυσική τε καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος).⁵³ Indeed, because the holy Fathers cannot contradict each other, we must therefore understand that one is the Spirit blown to the Apostles, through the Lord’s insufflation (διὰ τοῦ κυριακοῦ ἐμφυσήματος), and another one is the Spirit sent from the Father through the Son, in the form of tongues of fires, because this second one is not an insufflation, or an operation (ἐμφύσημα and ἐνέργεια), but the ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος, i.e. the natural, essential and enhypostatic operation.⁵⁴

Nicholas’ writings, although not being addressed to the Latins, thus contain two crucial issues relating to the presence and coming of the Spirit, which will be reemployed by the theologian in his openly anti-Latin writings: the first issue, which is in fact the question posed by the megas domestikos, is how the Spirit can be present in each man, and if he is present substantially; the second issue, an additional explanation by Nicholas, is about the differences between the insufflation (ἐμφύσημα) from Jesus and the “physical”, “sensible”, and “substantial” descent at Pentecost. Among Nicholas’ works, the reply to the megas domestikos is certainly the one most extensively devoted to the exegesis of patristic passages, and is clearly the one that is least motivated by the Filioque polemic; however, it seems that this text somehow lays the foundation for the pneumatology that Nicholas will develop in the other treatises.

3 Adversus Latinos de Spiritu Sancto⁵⁵

The Adversus Latinos de Spiritu Sancto can certainly be considered the main treatise composed by Nicholas of Methone against the addition of the Filioque to the Creed. The text opens with a traditional invocation for assistance to the Holy Spirit and to the Son, the only source and teacher of the revealed knowledge. However, starting from the first lines Nicholas embroiders his treatise with references to the De divinis nominibus, using a sequence of adjectives, composed of the preposition ὑπέρ, typical of the usus scribendi of Dionysius the Areopagite:

Βασιλεῦ οὐράνιε, παράκλητε, ἀγαθέ, προσκυνητέ, θεὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ ὑπερούσιον, τὸ ὑπέρφωτον, τὸ ὑπέρζωον, τὸ ὑπέρσοφον […].⁵⁶

The close dependence upon the Areopagite, of which many examples can be found later in this same text and in the Memoriae,⁵⁷ makes this treatise a fundamental work for understanding the context in which the Refutatio Procli was also conceived; it also closely links the two texts and provides a much more striking and meaningful analysis than the Syllogismi, which is the text that has almost exclusively been used when discussing the relationship between the theological and the philosophical productions of the Bishop of Methone.⁵⁸

As for all the writings by Nicholas discussed in this publication, one must bear in mind that the printed editions of the texts are not fully reliable; however, in this case it is possible to get a general idea of the contents and the concepts that the Bishop of Methone developed in his theological production. After the opening prayer (εὐχή), the version printed by Simonides incorporates a sentence, attested by the manuscript tradition,⁵⁹ similar to the following:

Ἔκθεσις ἐν συνόψει τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὀρθοῦ δόγματος μετά τινος συμμέτρου κατασκευῆς.⁶⁰

Exposition in a brief but comprehensive statement of our right dogma with the aid of some suitable (συμμέτρου) constructive reasoning (κατασκευῆς).

It is clear that a meticulous study is needed to clarify if these words are the title given by Nicholas himself, or if some marginalia were added by a scribe. However, this sentence perfectly sums up Nicholas’ plan for his text: a brief but comprehensive exposition, which includes a full canonical arsenal, from the Sacred Scriptures to the ecumenical councils, with additional space⁶¹ for suitable arguments based on constructive, logical reasoning.

Nicholas’ exposition opens with the traditional profession of Faith: “We believe in one God, in three persons or hypostases, contemplated in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit […]” (Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν ἐν τρισὶ προσώποις εἴτουν ὑποστάσεσι θεωρούμενον Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι […]).⁶² But what is noteworthy for our research, which aims at presenting the writings of Nicholas of Methone in the context of his Refutatio Procli, is the fact that this text, from the very first pages, hides a numerous hints, allusions, and references that can be read as addressed to Proclus’ and Dionysius’ readers, i.e. to those who could certainly recognise them at first glance.

After the basic presentation of the pillars of orthodoxy, Nicholas argues that the Sabellian confusion of the hypostases revives Judaism, and the Arian division of the divine substance inclines toward Hellenic polytheism, while the pious way is a secure middle way “that has the safe rope of the Lord’s tradition” (ὥσπέρ τινος ἀσφαλοῦς ἐχομένη πείσματος τῆς κυριακῆς παραδόσεως).⁶³ This metaphor of the secure rope is not a generic image, but in fact comes from Plato’s Laws⁶⁴ and is quoted many times in Proclus, in particular in a passage from the Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus:

Ταῦτα δὲ εἰδὼς ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ὥσπερ ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἔχεσθαι τῆς τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν παραδόσεως· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ μὲν πλημμελῆ τῶν δοξασμάτων φευξόμεθα, ταῖς δὲ καθαρωτάταις ἐννοίαις Ἰαμβλίχου συνεψόμεθα.⁶⁵

Being mindful of this, I think that one should cling as if to a stout mooring-rope to the doctrine of our own teacher. For it is through this that we shall avoid discordant theories and follow the purest conceptions of Iamblichus.⁶⁶

In Nicholas the ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος (safe rope) is that of the παραδόσεως (tradition) of the Lord (κυριακῆς), while in Proclus it is of τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν (probably Syrianus).

However, there is a second peculiarity in Nicholas’ passage: the fact that, instead of insisting only on Arius, Sabellius, the Pneumatomachoi and the other heresiarchs, he adds the “heresies” of the Jews and the Hellenes.⁶⁷ The usage of the Hellenes-Jews couplet seems to be inherited from his beloved Gregory of Nazianzus⁶⁸ or from the acts of the councils,⁶⁹ but it is quite unusual—I would say unattested—in the other twelfth-century polemicists, who rarely refer to the Jews and the Hellenes in the anti-Latin texts devoted to the discussion of the Filioque, while of course they abundantly refer to the Jews in the texts dedicated to the Azymes.⁷⁰

A third point of interest in the opening of the Adversus Latinos, which—indeed—seems to be planned with the aim of clarifying all the important references that must be grasped to understand the text, is the following:

Τούτων οὕτως ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων, φέρε τὸν σκοπὸν τῶν προκειμένων ὀνομάτων κοινῇ συνδιασκεψώμεθα· καὶ τῇ ἀναπτύξει τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν σημαινομένας προσωπικὰς ἰδιότητας θεωρήσωμεν.⁷¹

Having agreed on these ⟨principles⟩, let us investigate by common consent the meaning of the proposed names, and through the explanation of the names let us perceive the personal characteristics communicated by them.

Here, it is clear at first sight that Nicholas, while proposing to investigate the meaning of the names of the Trinity through the explanation (ἀναπτύξει) of them, is invoking the authority of the Areopagite,⁷² exactly as he does in the title of his Refutatio Procli: Ἀνάπτυξις τῆς Θεολογικῆς Στοιχειώσεως Πρόκλου.⁷³

The following passage remains in the same context and is the most meaningful for our understanding of the relationship between Nicholas, Proclus and, of course, Dionysius the Areopagite. However, it is also an unusual approach to the Filioque question, where the author hints at his philosophical background and interests through his use of easily identifiable and peculiar “jargon”. The quotation is long, but Nicholas’ words deserve to be read in full:

What, then, does the name of the Father mean? And what does that of the Son mean? And what does that of the Spirit mean? Is it not because the Father is fertile principle (γόνιμός ἐστιν ἀρχή) and cause of Divinity (καὶ αἰτία θεότητος) and, to say it according to the great Dionysius, “primal source of Divinity” (πηγαία θεότης)?⁷⁴ ⟨The primal source of Divinity is⟩ in itself ungenerated, but by itself brings forward (προάγουσα) entities which are similar according to the substance (κατ’ οὐσίαν ὅμοι’ ἅττα), and both generates (γεννῶσα) the Son and emanates (προβαλλομένη) the Spirit, according to the double emanation⁷⁵ of the fertile power (κατὰ τὴν διττὴν τῆς γονίμου δυνάμεως πρόοδον): in fact it is neither necessary that the Father is brought forth from another (οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλοθεν τὸν Πατέρα προῆχθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη)—that (ἐκεῖνο referred to ἄλλοθεν) in fact would be the Father, the principle that brings forth, not this—, nor ⟨it is possible⟩ that he, being himself Father from whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is and takes its name,⁷⁶ and having in himself the “auto-fertility” (τὴν αὐτογονιμότητα), halfway (ἐξ ἡμισείας) would have brought forth the fertile power (τὴν γόνιμον δύναμιν), so that perhaps he would have either generated only or emanated only. And further, because at any rate the generative capacity (γονιμότητος) is seen down here in some way with the senses, and shows the double way of emanation (τὸν διττὸν τῆς προόδου τρόπον); not only, in fact, the man generates (γεννᾷ) a man and horse generates horse according to the generative emanation of fertility (τὴν γεννητικὴν τῆς γονιμότητος πρόοδον), but also the root emanates (προβάλλει) the plant and the water proceeds from the source (ἐκπορεύεται) and the sun pours out (προχέει) the light through its ray according to the emanating power of him who is fruitful (κατὰ τὴν προβλητικὴν τοῦ γονίμου δύναμιν).

The “primal source of Divinity” (ἡ πηγαία θεότης) in itself, therefore, having preceded the entire generative power (τὴν γονιμότητα) and emanating it whole and perfect (ὅλην αὐτὴν καὶ τελείαν), both supernaturally generates (γεννᾷ μὲν ὑπερφυῶς) the Son and in a supra-essential manner brings forth (ὑπερουσίως προάγει) the Spirit, and not one before and the other later, but both simultaneously, and each secretly and ineffably, since neither the generation nor the procession (ἢ τῆς γεννήσεως ἢ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως) can be circumscribed by time or age, but eternally and above all beginnings, above all reason and every notion: since the offspring, if in this way must be said, and that who proceeds are envisaged together (συνθεωρουμένων) as perfect, or rather supremely perfect by the originator and unoriginated hypostasis of the Divinity (τῇ ἀρχεγόνῳ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ τῆς θεότητος ὑποστάσει). And in this way, indeed, the theogonic hypostasis of the Divinity (ἡ μὲν θεογόνος ὑπόστασις τῆς θεότητος) also is and is called Father. ⟨Of⟩ the other ⟨persons of the Divinity⟩, like sprouts sown by the divine (βλαστοὶ θεόφυτοι),⁷⁷ the one ⟨is and is called⟩ Son since certainly he is brought forth by generation (γεννητῶς προῆκται), the other ⟨is and is called⟩ the Spirit since ⟨he is brought forth⟩ by procession.⁷⁸

This passage is markedly saturated with a lexicon that a reader of the Refutatio Procli will find extremely familiar. It is certainly not an aim of this publication to discuss this quotation from a genuinely philosophical point of view, but only to highlight those elements in Nicholas’ approach to the Filioque question that are particularly distinctive and innovative in the contest of the polemical literature against the Latins. The analysis will be conducted mainly on the basis of the language used.

A first peculiarity is the choice of the adjective γόνιμος, ‑η, ‑ον (productive, fertile, fruitful), which Nicholas employs seventeen times in his entire literary production, but exclusively in the Refutatio Procli (7 times) and in the Adversus Latinos (10 times). This is an adjective that must have been particularly useful to express his point of view, if he even creates a neologism from this lemma, αὐτογονιμότης, Fruchtbarkeit an sich (fertility in itself), which according to our present knowledge of Medieval Greek seems to be a hapax.⁷⁹ Certainly the use of this adjective is a hapax in the context of the polemical literature against the Latins. In fact, a search conducted on the (published) texts composed from the ninth to the twelfth century, and dedicated to the Filioque, has produced no results: nobody before Nicholas had ever talked about the Father by using the adjective, “productive, fertile” (γόνιμος). There is no doubt that Nicholas was influenced by Proclus in this choice: in fact, the adjective γόνιμος, ‑η, ‑ον is one of the philosopher’s favourites insofar as he uses it consistently, especially in the Theologia Platonica (92 times) and in the In Platonis Timaeum commentaria (55 times).⁸⁰ In general, according to the statistics that can be derived from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, Proclus is the author who uses it the most (235 times; the second being Plutarch, with only 63 times, and the third being Aristotle, with 57), while Dionysius the Areopagite, whom Nicholas quotes openly in this passage, does not use it very often (four times in its entire corpus: two in De divinis nominibus and two in De coelesti hierarchia). On the other hand, if we analyse the term γονιμότης, Proclus does not use it all, while the Areopagite employs it again only four times (three times in De divinis nominibus and once in De coelesti hierarchia).⁸¹

It can be noted, therefore, that Nicholas employs a passage from the Areopagite to support his orthodoxy but at the same time seems to interweave the patristic source with a markedly Proclean lexicon. The full passage from Dionysius, which backs Nicholas’ opening, is the following:

Πάλιν, ὅτι μέν ἐστι πηγαία θεότης ὁ πατήρ, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς θεογόνου θεότητος, εἰ οὕτω χρὴ φάναι, βλαστοὶ θεόφυτοι καὶ οἷον ἄνθη καὶ ὑπερούσια φῶτα, πρὸς τῶν ἱερῶν λογίων παρειλήφαμεν.⁸²

Again, we have received from the Scriptures that the Father is primal source of Divinity (πηγαία θεότης), while the Son and the Spirit are, if one must say so, sprouts sown by the divine of the theogonic Divinity, and like flowers and supra-essential lights.

A second striking usage is the insistence (in very few lines) on the word πρόοδος (κατὰ τὴν διττὴν τῆς γονίμου δυνάμεως πρόοδον […]; τὸν διττὸν τῆς προόδου τρόπον ἐμφανιζούσης …; κατὰ τὴν γεννητικὴν τῆς γονιμότητος πρόοδον […]). This is again a term widely used by Proclus, Damascius and also Dionysius in De divinis nominibus and, unsurprisingly, extensively employed by Nicholas in the Refutatio Procli.⁸³ However, and this time surprisingly, it is also used in the texts against the Latins, where Nicholas, instead of using a more “traditional” expression such as “modes of the existences” (οἱ τρόποι τῶν ὑπάρξεων), insists on using the “double emanation” or “double way of the emanation” to refer to the existences of the Son and the Spirit.

It is fundamental to insist on the words employed by Nicholas because, just as the Fathers of the Church built a precise set of expressions that could be used in the Christological discussions, the Greek theologians between the 9th and 12th century concentrate their effort (and Nicholas is one of the most accurate) on defining the exact theological lexicon for the procession of the Holy Spirit.

It could be interesting for scholars of philosophy, who try to understand Nicholas’ Refutatio Procli and the reasons why it was composed, to highlight the fact that for a twelfth-century Byzantine theologian the term πρόοδος (emanation), when interpreted—as in Nicholas—as a synonymic form for οἱ τρόποι τῶν ὑπάρξεων (way/modes of the existences), becomes a technical term that refers to the eternal origins of the Son and Spirit from the Father, and, therefore, cannot be interpreted according to the philosophical framework of Proclus’ Institutio theologica. Moreover, it must be emphasized that although πρόοδος is employed for “emanation, originating, coming from”, and—as it has been shown above—is also acceptable to describe both the Son’s generation and the Spirit’s procession, it should never be confused, especially by modern translators, with “procession”, which is a term that applies only to the existence of the Holy Spirit, for which the dogmatically correct term in Greek is only ἡ ἐκπόρευσις.

Even if Byzantine theologians use the “Hellenic” philosophy for discussing the procession of the Holy Spirit, and they indeed do it (e.g., the use of Aristotle in the Ad Magnum domesticum analysed before, but also, for example, the dialogues by Niketas of Thessalonica),⁸⁴ Nicholas feels the need to refute Proclus because his “theology” is not applicable to Christian orthodoxy, and it is not applicable especially in the struggle against the Latins, which at this point in history is not only a major concern but is also an utterly philosophical debate; it is sufficient here to quote the importance of Nicholas’ contemporary Hugo Eteriano, who knew and refuted his positions.⁸⁵

Here it could be interesting to recall Kazhdan’s point of view:

Theology is a very delicate discipline in which nuances acquire the magnitude of dogma. One might emphasize the human nature of Christ to indicate the possibility of human deification; one might even emphasize the hierarchical structure of the Trinity […]. Nicholas emphasized the monarchical principle. The unity of the Trinity was for Nicholas not an antiquarian question to be considered in connection with philosophical errors of the fifth century. […] Nicholas lived and worked when the “Latin question” was the major problem that Byzantium faced. Nicholas, as is well known, took a clear-cut anti-Latin stand […].⁸⁶

Nicholas insists on the monarchy that is the paternal principle inside the Trinity and perceives Proclus’ hierarchical emanations as a possible risk, because he feels that they could open the way to the procession of the Spirit from the Father “and” the Son. However, it must be clarified here that there is only one instance in the Refutatio Procli in which the Bishop of Methone explicitly mentions the Latins: this is the passage he inserts when discussing chapter 22 (κβʹ), “All that exists primally and originally in each rank is one, and not two or more than two, but all are μονογενές.” He writes:

Ἢ τάχα κατ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ὁ φιλόσοφος οὗτος ἐνταῦθα ἐξελάβετο τὸ μονογενές, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἄρα ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ πρώτως καὶ ἀρχικῶς ὂν γένος ὂν καὶ ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὕτω τοῦτό φησιν. Οὕτω δ’ ἂν καὶ χρήσαιτό τις τῷ θεωρήματι τούτῳ κατὰ Λατίνων τῶν δύο τὰ ἀρχικὰ αἴτια τοῦ Πνεύματος λεγόντων, Πατέρα καὶ Υἱόν· πλὴν ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μεταφραστέον ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβὲς τὸ πρόβλημα καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ χρηστέον.⁸⁷

Or perhaps this philosopher does not understand μονογενές here according to either of the ways just mentioned, but rather he means it thus: as “that which exists primitively and originally”, being genus and principle of the things from it. And thus someone might even use this proposition against the Latins, who say that the Spirit has two principial causes, Father and Son; but indeed first one must paraphrase the proposition in a pious sense, and thus one must use it.⁸⁸

Still, when analysing the relationship between the anti-Latin production and the Refutatio Procli, it is remarkable to note how in the Refutatio Nicholas puts a great effort into clarifying how both the noun πρόοδος, the verb παράγω, and its noun, παραγωγή, are misused by the philosopher. A very noteworthy chapter to consider in this context is number 29 (κθʹ), which—according to Robinson’s thorough analysis of the Refutatio Procli—is also the first time that Nicholas uses πρόοδος in connection with the intra-trinitarian relationship.⁸⁹

Ἀλλ’ ὁ σοφὸς οὗτος μηδὲν τούτων διαστέλλων καὶ τὴν ὁμοιότητα προτίθησι τῆς ταυτότητος ὡς ταύτης αἰτίαν καὶ τῇ κατὰ γέννησιν προόδῳ ὕφεσιν δίδωσι καὶ τὴν πρόοδον ἀδιαφόρως ἀντὶ τῆς παραγωγῆς καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ παραχθέντος λαμβάνει.⁹⁰

But this wise man, failing to distinguish these, places “similarity” (ὁμοιότητα) before “sameness” (ταυτότητος) as cause of the this [emanation], and gives “decline” for the “emanation” (προόδῳ) by begetting, and takes “emanation” (πρόοδον) indifferently for “production” (παραγωγῆς), and “begotten” (γεννηθέν) in the place of “produced” (παραχθέντος).⁹¹

At section 30 (λ´) Nicholas, again, takes great care in distinguishing the terms:

Καὶ τὸ τριακοστὸν τοῦτο κεφάλαιον ὡσαύτως σφάλλει τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ταὐτόν τι πρόοδον ἤτοι προαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν παραγωγὴν λαμβάνον. Ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀπό τινος προαγόμενον, τὸ ἀπό τινός φησι παραγόμενον καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ προάγοντι, ἐν τῷ παράγοντι.

Ἄλλο τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὅμοιον· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦ. Ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσιώδους καὶ φυσικῆς προόδου οὐχ ἁρμόζει τὴν ὁμοιότητα παραλαμβάνειν ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν ταυτότητα καὶ τὴν ἑτερότητα· οὐσία γὰρ οὐσίας, καθὸ οὐσίαι, οὔτε ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνομοία λέγονται· ποιότητος γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον. Ὁ μὲν Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα προΐασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς φυσικῶς καὶ ἀμέσως, οὐ μὴν καὶ παράγονται· συναΐδια γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ συνάναρχα καὶ ὁμοούσια.⁹²

And this 30th chapter causes bafflement (σφάλλει) in like manner as the previous one, since it takes “emanation” (πρόοδον), that is, “bringing forth” (προαγωγήν), to be the same thing as “production” (παραγωγήν). For instead of saying “that which has been brought forth from something”, he says “that which has been produced from something”, and instead of “in the bringer forth” he says, “in the producer”.

But “same” and “similar” are distinct, for the one is of substance, and the other is of quality. It is not fitting to understand “similarity” of the substantial and natural “emanation”, but rather “sameness” and “otherness”: for one substance is not said to be either “similar” or “dissimilar” to another, insofar as they are substances, for “similarity” and “dissimilarity” pertain to quality. The Son and the Spirit “advance/go forward/spring” (προΐασιν) from the Father “naturally” (φυσικῶς) and “directly” (ἀμέσως), and they are not “produced” (παράγονται), for they are co-eternal and co-unoriginate and consubstantial with Him.⁹³

Another example is from chapter 35 (λεʹ):

[…] ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὗτος ἀδιορίστως τὴν πρόοδον ἐκλαμβάνων ὡς κοινὸν ὄνομα κατά τε τῆς παραγωγῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς εἰκότως ἑαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ προσανέχοντας ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας κατασοφίζεται.⁹⁴

[…] but this wise man, understanding the “emanation” without distinction as a common name concerning the “production” (παραγωγῆς), both the super-natural (ὑπερφυοῦς) one and the natural one (φυσικῆς), misleads both himself and those relying on him, as might be expected from this ambiguity.⁹⁵

The Refutatio Procli is filled with these kinds of passages where the Bishop of Methone clarifies the meaning and proper acceptations of those terms when they are used to describe the Trinity. The noun, παραγωγή, and the verb, παράγω,⁹⁶ for example, cannot be employed to talk about the eternal generation and the eternal procession, because they imply the idea of making, or producing, something from non-being⁹⁷ and, therefore, the idea of creation. Creation—clearly in his perspective—cannot be applied either to the Son or to the Spirit, because “the Son and the Spirit are not produced”,⁹⁸ and this is the reason why Nicholas never uses this verb in his theological writings on the Holy Spirit.⁹⁹

While a clear definition of the acceptations in which a term can be used and interpreted is certainly one of the major concerns of Nicholas, the focal point of the introduction of the Adversus Latinos is the alarming confusion of the personal characteristics of the three persons of the Trinity that can be introduced by the Latin innovation: the Bishop of Methone wants to safeguard the πατρικὸν ἰδίωμα, the “characteristic property of the Father”, which is being the only θεόγονος ἀρχή, the “theogonic principle”.

This introductory part is split into two parts by a question (ἐρώτησις). Here the reader must be warned, again, that this analysis is based on the version of the treatise printed by Simonides and that, therefore, it will be possible to propose a reliable examination of the sections of the text (ἐρώτησις, ἀντιθέσεις, λύσεις, etc.) only after a proper critical edition will be published. However, according to Simonides’ version, we have only one question in the entire text, followed by a series of six antitheses/oppositions. The question is,

Πότερον οὖν τὸ πατρικὸν τοῦτο ἰδίωμα, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ προάγειν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ θεογόνως τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, δώσομεν καὶ τῷ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ὥσπερ τούτων ἑκάτερον πρός τε θάτερον καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἀκοινώτητος¹⁰⁰ ἡ ἰδιότης ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ ἀκοινώνητον πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ διατηρήσομεν τὸ ἰδίωμα, ἵνα καὶ ὄντως ἰδίωμα ᾖ;¹⁰¹

Will we then give this characteristic property of the Father, which is the bringing forth from himself of the Son and the Spirit through divine begetting (θεογόνως), also to one of those from him, or, since for each of the two—both with the other and with the Father—the specific character is not sharable, will we also so maintain the characteristic property of the Father as unsharable with those who are from him, so that it is also an essentially characteristic property?¹⁰²

Nicholas’ conclusion is the very heart of Orthodox pneumatology: the personal characteristics of each person of the Trinity must remain unmovable and unsharable, and there should be no inferiority among the three hypostases. For example, it is not possible to allow the Son also to have the property of emanating the Spirit, otherwise he would have two properties, being generated and emanating the Spirit, and the Spirit would have only one property, that of proceeding, so that he would then be inferior to the Son. Indeed, Nicholas here recalls the main fearsome heresiarchs: Sabellius, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, and their followers, because among them some negate the Trinity, falling into Judaism, while others lower the Divinity to the rank of the creation, falling into paganism (πρὸς Ἑλληνισμόν).¹⁰³

After the main introductory part, dedicated to the fundamental pillars of faith (which, it is important to highlight, is a traditional opening for a text against the Filioque, although—as has been shown—it is constructed by Nicholas in a very idiosyncratic way), the Bishop of Methone organises his text in a series of questions and answers indicated, in Simonides’ edition, by the words ἀντίθεσις (objection, opposing argument) and λύσις (solution): six objections and six solutions.

The first argument is based on two passages (Io. 10: 30, “I and the Father are one”, and 16: 15, “All that belongs to the Father is mine”) that represent the Latin objections, as presented by Greek authors, and should demonstrate that since the Son is equal in power to the Father (ἰσοδύναμον εἶναι τῷ Πατρί),¹⁰⁴ therefore they share the procession of the Holy Spirit. To these Scriptural passages Nicholas replies with a standard answer: the persons of the Trinity are one, but their personal characteristics are different and distinct in order to avoid confusion among the hypostases; he quotes various passages from the Areopagite that insist on the fact that there is only one source of the Divinity: the Father.¹⁰⁵ After this traditional explanation, Nicholas moves into a more philosophical approach, explaining why the “dyad” is unacceptable: because the risk is the introduction of a double cause in the Trinity, and, therefore, the Latin innovation.

In this respect, it is significant to present also a passage from Proclus’ In Platonis Parmenidem, and a passage from Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus to better understand Nicholas’ background. Proclus writes:

[…] πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ δυὰς ἀρχὴ καὶ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἐν θεοῖς, ἐν νοῖς, ἐν ψυχαῖς, ἐν φύσεσιν· ἡ δὲ αἰτία τοῦ πλήθους ἐστί πως καὶ αὐτὴ κατ’ αἰτίαν {τὸ} πλῆθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἓν τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἑνώσεως κατ’ αἰτίαν ἐστὶν ἕν· ὅλως δὲ ἡ δυάς ἐστι μὲν ὅπερ λέγεται δυάς, ἔρημος δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τὸ ἓν μέτεχόν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε ἡ δυὰς αὐτὴ καὶ ἕν πώς ἐστι, καὶ ἑνὰς ἄρα ἡ δυάς ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος, ἀλλ’ ἑνὰς μέν, ὡς μετέχουσα τοῦ ἑνός, πλῆθος δέ, ὡς αἰτία τοῦ πλήθους. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν οὔτε πλῆθος αὐτὴν οὔτε ἓν εἰρήκασιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, καὶ τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῆς ἑνοειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἓν δυοποιόν.¹⁰⁶

[…] for the dyad everywhere—among the gods, among the intellects, in souls, in natures—is the principle and mother of plurality; and the cause of plurality is itself, in a way, causally plurality, just as the one, the cause of unity, is causally one. In general, the dyad is exactly what it is called, a dyad; but it does not exist when deprived of unity, for everything that comes after the One participates in the One, so that the dyad itself is also in a sense one, and therefore both unity and plurality. But it is a unity as participating in the One, and plural as the cause of plurality. These critics, then, assert that it is neither plurality nor unity, but we say it is both unity and plurality; its plurality is one in form, and its unity is productive of duality.¹⁰⁷

The dyad, therefore, is a multiplier but in the intra-trinitarian relationship cannot be contemplated as a principle, because, as the Areopagite states, “Each dyad is not a principle; unity will be the principle of each dyad” (Πᾶσα γὰρ δυὰς οὐκ ἀρχή, μονὰς δὲ ἔσται πάσης δυάδος ἀρχή).¹⁰⁸

The theme is widely discussed in the Refutatio Procli and it could be extremely interesting for scholars of philosophy to compare the Refutatio with the reply that Nicholas offers to the first Latin objection in the Adversus Latinos. An important detail must be added: in this treatise against the Filioque, Nicholas decides not to quote verbatim the famous passage from Gregory of Nazianzus, “For this reason the monad moved towards a dyad since the beginning and at the Trinity came to a halt” (Διὰ τοῦτο μονὰς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη),¹⁰⁹ although he quotes it both in the Syllogisms¹¹⁰ and in the Memoriae.¹¹¹

The reply is long and articulated,¹¹² but some passages are worth quoting. After citing a patchwork of passages from the Areopagite,¹¹³ Nicholas starts a long commentary with a rhetorical question, which clearly places the discussion in the realm of theology in contradistinction to “Hellenic wisdom”: “Do you see how in all theology the One shines? (Ὁρᾷς ὅπως ἐν πάσῃ τῇ θεολογίᾳ προλάμπει τὸ ἕν;)¹¹⁴ […] For this reason one is God the Father, and only Father, so that a dyad cannot be associated with the One (Διὰ τοῦτο εἷς Θεὸς ὁ Πατήρ, καὶ μόνον Πατήρ, ἵνα μὴ δυὰς παραζευχθῇ τῷ ἑνί).”¹¹⁵ Nicholas goes on to say that the same principle applies to the Son, who must be one and from one source, and to the Spirit, who again must be one and from one source. This is once more necessary so that “the One anticipates the dyad” (ἵνα τὸ ἓν πανταχοῦ τὴν δυάδα προφθῇ),¹¹⁶ and then again the Father cannot share his own personal characteristics with the Son and the Spirit and,

[…] ἵνα μὴ πάλιν δυὰς παραζευχθῇ τῷ ἑνὶ πρόσυλος οὖσα· καὶ κάτω κειμένη καὶ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἱλουμένη· καὶ τῷ, τε πληθυσμῷ τῷ, τε μερισμῷ, τὴν ἀοριστίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν συμπαρεισάγουσα· καὶ τό γε καθ’ ἑαυτήν, εἰς ἀχανές τι καὶ ἀφανὲς ἀνυπαρξίας πέλαγος¹¹⁷ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καταλαμβανόμενα παραπέμπουσα, εἰ μὴ προφθάνον τὸ ἓν συνεῖχε τὰ πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μετοχῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀνέσωζεν·¹¹⁸

[…] so that the dyad again does not unite with the One, being connected with matter, and lying below [i.e at the level of the creation], and being confined within the senses, and through both multiplication and division introducing infinitude and infinity, and wherefore guiding according to its very nature all the things possessed by her towards a kind of infinite and dark sea of nonexistence; if the One, anticipating ⟨the dyad⟩, had not united all things by participation in himself and had not brought them safely to his own nature;

(and then again, he comes back to Dionysius the Areopagite)

οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἀμέτοχον τοῦ ἑνός· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἓν τῷ ὅλῳ· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, ἓν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ· καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἓν τῷ εἴδει·¹¹⁹ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἓν τῷ γένει· καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς προόδοις,¹²⁰ ἓν τῇ ἀρχῇ·¹²¹ […] Καὶ οὐκ ἂν εὕρῃς τί τῶν ὄντων, ὃ μὴ τῷ ἑνὶ καθὸ πᾶσα ἡ θεότης ὑπερουσίως ὀνομάζεται, καὶ ἔστι τοῦθ’, ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τελειοῦται καὶ διασώζεται.¹²²

in fact, nothing among existing beings is not a partaker of the one, but what is many according to the parts is one as a whole, and the things that are many according to the accidents are one in the subject, and those things that are many according to the number or powers are one in the species, and those that are many according to the species are one in the genus, and the things which are manifold in their emanations are one in the principle. […] And you could not find any being that is without unity—wherefore the whole Divinity is called [such] suprasubstantially—which is what it is and reaches its perfection and is preserved.

And he finally concludes:

[…] ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας θεωνυμίας ὅσαι τὴν ὅλην θεαρχίαν χαρακτηρίζουσιν, ἐπίσης ἑκάστη τῶν θεαρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἡ θεολογία προσάπτει, ἐξορίζουσα πᾶσαν ἐκεῖθεν θεωνυμίας ἑτερότητά τε καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἃ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν συνθέτων εἰσίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐπίσης ἑκάστῳ τῶν θεαρχικῶν προσώπων ἔστι καὶ ὀνομάζεται· εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς Υἱός, ἓν ἅγιον Πνεῦμα.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἕν· εἷς γὰρ τὰ τρία Θεός· καὶ τὸ ἓν ἑκάστῳ ἕν, κατ’ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐν τῷ παντί· ἀπεληλαμένης ἐκεῖθεν, καὶ τῆς καθόλου τε καὶ ἐπὶ μέρος διαφορᾶς· οὐ γὰρ τρεῖς μερικὰς οὐσίας τὴν θεότητα εἶναι πιστεύομεν· ἀλλὰ μίαν ἀμέριστον τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσι πλεονεκτήμασιν εἰ καὶ τοῖς προσωπικοῖς μερίζεται ἰδιώμασιν […].¹²³

[…] therefore, as theology equally attributes all the other divine appellations that characterize the entire Godhead to each of the divine hypostases, driving away from there any diversity, inequality and dissimilarity of the divine appellation, and the more and the less, which are rather proper to matter and to composite entities, so also the One equally is and is called in each divine person: one the Father, one the Son, one the Holy Ghost.

Since they are also one, the three in fact are one God, and what is in each one is one, in no way different from the one who is altogether, and the distinction between what is universal and what is in part is eliminated here: we do not believe, in fact, that they are three partial substances of the Deity, but that it is one and undivided, in all its essential virtues, although it is divided in the personal characteristics […].

A detail must be added here: the Adversus Latinos presents an atypical usage of the term θεολογία; Nicholas employs it fourteen times, while the other authors before him (e.g., Photios or Niketas Byzantios) use it very rarely (up to four times). This again is a sign of how difficult it was for the Bishop of Methone to deal with the “Hellenic theology” of Proclus, on the one hand, and the new “Latin theology”,¹²⁴ on the other—a battle that he needs to fight in order to safeguard the orthodox doctrine as it is taught by “our first and only teacher and master who, being himself both God and interpreter of the theology, will announce these things.”¹²⁵ It is easy to understand Nicholas’ concerns from these few words: even the term θεολογία must be handled with great care. It is God who is the teacher, the exegete, and the master: the “theology” proposed by Proclus does not fit into the orthodox, God-inspired “science of things divine”.

The following four refutations/solutions (λύσεις) are each also exegetical replies that clarify the Greek interpretations of some passages from the Gospel. The second objection is based on three widely used passages: “When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father” (Io. 15: 26); “He will not speak on his own; he will speak only what he hears, and he will tell you” (Io. 16: 13); and, “It is from me that he will receive what he will make known to you” (Io. 16: 15). According to Nicholas the Latins use these passages to demonstrate that whatever thing is sent, this very thing proceeds from the sender. The reply insists on a feature that is peculiar to Nicholas’ writings: the painstaking attention to the meaning of words—in this case, the difference between ἡ ἀποστολή (“sending forth”) and ἡ ἐκπόρευσις (“procession”),¹²⁶ the same clear distinction that can be found also in the Syllogismi where he distinguishes between ἐκπόρευσις, ἀποστολή, μετάδοσις, ἐμφύσησις;¹²⁷ while in order to explain Io. 16: 15 he goes back to a widely quoted passage from Photios’ Mystagogia, in which the Patriarch explains that there is a difference between saying “it is from me that he will receive” and “it is from mine that he will receive”, because in saying “from mine” Christ intends “from my Father and not from me.”¹²⁸

The third reply is to the objections based on the passage of Io. 20: 22: “And with that he breathed on them and said, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit’.” Nicholas recalls some of the themes he used in the Ad magnum Domesticum in relation to the fact that the term, “spirit”, can be used in different ways: to talk about God and the Holy Spirit, but also to talk about angelic spirits, or about the spirit “of slavery” and the spirit “of adoption” (Rom. 8: 15),¹²⁹ etc.

It is also worthy of attention to note here how deeply Nicholas is engaged in tracing the limits of the usage of a word or, as in this case, in recognising the polysemantic value of a noun like “spirit”:

πῶς ἂν αὐτὸς συστείλῃς τὸ ὄνομα εἰς ἓν σημαινόμενον; Εἰ δ’ ἀνάγκη πολυσήμαντον ὁμολογεῖν τοῦτο καθὰ καὶ δέδεικται, προσήκοι ἂν τῷ νουνεχεῖ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξεταστῇ, μὴ ἁπλῶς οὕτω καὶ ἀδιακρίτως ἐκδέχεσθαι τὴν φωνήν, ὡς ἓν τούτῳ σημαίνουσαν πανταχοῦ τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς τριάδος Πνεῦμα· ἀλλὰ διαστέλλειν, οὗ μὲν τοῦτο, οὗ δὲ ἐκεῖνο σημαίνεται· ἵνα μὴ τῷ ἀλληνάλλῳ¹³⁰ τῆς ἐκδοχῆς· εἰς ἀτοπίας ἀποκρημνίζηται βάραθρα.¹³¹

How could you reduce the name ⟨of the Spirit⟩ to mean one thing? If it is necessary to recognize this ⟨name⟩ as having many meanings as it has been demonstrated, it would be convenient for the intelligent inquirer of truth not to accept the expression so simply and indiscriminately as if ⟨this expression⟩ in this way meant everywhere one, [i.e.] the Spirit who is an essential part of the Triad, but to distinguish where this means this and where that, so that he is not plunged into abysses of senselessness by confusing the interpretation.

A fourth solution answers to a hypothetical question, which is typical of the anti-Latin writings, on what can be considered ἄτοπον—which can be translated both with a theological sense, as “wicked/outrageous”, and with a more philosophical meaning, as “paradoxical/absurd”—in stating that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.¹³² Nicholas lists seven reasons why the Filioque is ἄτοπον, and almost all of them refer to the fact that it does not respect the tradition and the teaching of the Scriptures and the Fathers and introduces “a new addition” (ἡ νέα προσθήκη) to the Creed.

The fifth question-and-answer cluster is dedicated to the passages in which the Spirit is called the “Spirit of Christ” (Rom. 8: 9); “the breath of his mouth” (2 Thess. 2: 8); and “Spirit of truth” (Io. 15: 26). Nicholas uses a traditional reply: “procession” is not connected to “possession”, otherwise God, who is called the “God of Abraham [and] of Isaac”,¹³³ should come from the Patriarchs.

Ἐγὼ δὲ διαφορὰν οἶδα τοῦ εἶναί τι τοῦδε, καὶ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦδε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οἰκείωσίν τινα βούλεσθαι δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναφορὰν πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον.¹³⁴

I know, instead, that there is a difference between being “of something” and “from something”: the first case shows a certain appropriation, the second case a reference to the cause.

In this reply we also find a clear explanation of what Nicholas intends for πρόοδοι, and why in his Refutatio Procli he tries so insistently to refute the Philosopher’s position:

[…] εἴ γε φυσικὴν ὁμολογητέον ἡμῖν εἶναι τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν· τουτέστιν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς φύσεως τοῦ ἐξ οὗ ὁποίαν καὶ τὴν γέννησιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἵνα καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ μόνῳ διαφέρωσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ πρόοδοι.¹³⁵

[…] if we must acknowledge the natural procession of the Spirit, that is to say from the very supernatural nature of the one from whom is also the generation of the Son, so that the “emanations” differ from each other only in the manner.

The sixth and last exegetical passage is dedicated to Io. 10: 30: “I and the Father are one.” Again, here we find the attempt to offer a very literal interpretation of the Gospel passage: Christ did not say, “I and the Father ‘am’ one”, but “I and the Father ‘are’ one” because he wanted to signify the distinction between the persons:

[…] οὐκ εἶπεν Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἓν εἰμί, ἵνα κατὰ πάντα τηρήσῃς τὸ ἕν· ἀλλ’ ἓν μὲν εἰπών, ἔδειξε τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν· ἐσμὲν δὲ πάλιν εἰπών, ἔδωκε καὶ τὴν τῶν προσώπων διαίρεσιν.¹³⁶

Having concluded the exegesis of the traditional quotations from the Gospel, attributed by the Greek polemical literature on the Filioque to the Latins, Nicholas, starting with Paul, retraces the teachings about the Spirit and his procession from the Father that can be found in the New Testament, and concludes with an outline of the decisions of the first four ecumenical councils (Nicaea in 325, Constantinople in 381, Ephesus in 431, and Chalcedon in 451).¹³⁷

4 Refutationes theologicae—Syllogismi¹³⁸

The Refutationes theologicae, Κεφαλαιώδεις ἔλεγχοι, which will be called Syllogismi to avoid any confusion with the Refutatio Procli, contain a collection of short refutations of the new Latin dogma of the Filioque, in the form of “syllogisms”¹³⁹ and summarize the main faults of Latin pneumatology, already presented in the other writings. The text was published for the first time by Demetrakopoulos¹⁴⁰ and divided into 47 sections. In this case as well, we cannot completely rely on the printed text, unfortunately, and need a proper critical edition in order to draw well-grounded conclusions, however, it is possible to obtain a general understanding of Nicholas’ way of refuting the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. This section presents only selected passages from those which could enrich the analysis of Nicholas’ philosophical background.

In this writing, as in the others presented above, one of the major concerns of Nicholas is how to explain the relationship between God as monad and God as Trinity. This is a “hot topic”, very well documented throughout the Refutatio Procli, starting from its very proem,¹⁴¹ but we also see the issue here in the beginning of the Syllogismi where in a very short preface the Bishop of Methone summarizes his point of view. This is a rather conventional opening for a text dedicated to the Filioque: indeed, the theologians feel the urge to start from a common foundation that can be shared by Greeks and Latins; however, they do not usually refer to the difference between μονάς and τριάς but rather to that between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, while Nicholas insists on the fact that the Godhead is monad and triad:

Ὡμολόγηται, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὅλη θεότης μονάς ἐστι καὶ τριὰς κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τριὰς ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις, καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν ὑποστάσεων μονάς ἐστι καὶ ἓν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἰδίωμα, ὃ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποστάσεων διακρίνεται.

It is confessed both that the entire Divinity is monad and that is triad according to what is common to the substance, and is triad according to the hypostases, and each one of the hypostases is monad and one according to its proper distinctive feature, which distinguishes it from the other hypostases.¹⁴²

In Refutatio Procli Nicholas expresses the same point in various passages, e.g.,

Τριὰς οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ θεότης ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ μονὰς καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ οὔτε τὸ τριὰς εἶναι ἀρνεῖται τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν ἀρνεῖται τὸ εἶναι τριάς, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑκατέρου μᾶλλον ἑκάτερον οὖσα βεβαιοῦται.¹⁴³

We confess therefore that the Divinity is a triad and that the same is a monad and the One; its being three does not deny its being the One, nor does its being the One deny its being three, but rather from both it is confirmed to be both.¹⁴⁴

Even more notable is the first passage § 1 in which Nicholas states that to say the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son would imply that one comes from two, that the Spirit would have two principles, as the Father and the Son are two and not one,

Εἰ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται, εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐκ τῶν δύο καὶ δύο ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ἓν γὰρ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ εἷς καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς εἷς. Πατὴρ δὲ καὶ Υἱὸς οὐχ εἷς, ἀλλὰ δύο, εἰ καὶ τῇ φύσει ἕν· ἄλλος γὰρ καὶ ἄλλος, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο.¹⁴⁵

If the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he would be the one [coming] from two and there would be two principles of the one; for indeed the Holy Spirit is one, as also the Father is one and the Son is one. Father and Son are not one, but two, although they are one according to nature; two persons indeed but not two things.

Then he adds,

Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων οἱ λόγοι πρόεισιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὰ ὄντα διανέμονται· εἴη ἂν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θεωρουμένη μονὰς ἐκ δυάδος, καὶ ἡ δυὰς ἀρχὴ τῆς μονάδος, ὅπερ ἄτοπον καὶ τῇ κοινῇ ἐναντίον ἐννοίᾳ, καθ’ ἣν τὸ ἓν πάντες καὶ τὴν μονάδα δυάδος τε καὶ παντὸς προτάττουσιν ἀριθμοῦ, ὡς ἄρα τῆς μονάδος ἀρχῆς οὔσης δυάδος τε καὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ.¹⁴⁶

And because the reasons of all beings pre-exist in God, and from there are distributed to the beings, the entire monad would be contemplated in beings from a dyad, and the dyad would be the origin of the monad, a thing that is absurd and contrary to common understanding, according to which everybody places the one and the monad before the dyad and before every number, because the monad is principle of the dyad and of every number.

In § 2 and § 3 he insists on the fact that the double procession would imply double causes, that one of the two principles would be imperfect and that nothing perfect can have an imperfect cause and at the same time that the dyarchy would banish the monarchy from the one Divinity.¹⁴⁷

The third section is more specifically devoted to the idea of God’s perfection: if the procession from the Father is and must be perfect, then the addition of a procession from the Son is superfluous.

Εἰ τελεία ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπόρευσις τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος (τελεία δέ, ὅτι Θεὸς τέλειος ἐκ Θεοῦ τελείου τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα), τί δήποτε συντελεῖ πρὸς ταύτην ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὕτη συνεισφέρει τι, οὐ τελεία ἐκείνη […].¹⁴⁸

If the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is perfect—perfect indeed because the Spirit is perfect God who comes from a perfect God who is the Father—what then does the ⟨procession⟩ “from the Son” contribute to this? If, in fact, also this [i.e. the procession from the Son] furnishes something, then that one [i.e. the procession from the Father] is not perfect […].

The following sections (§§ 4-5-6-7) present some well-known refutations: if there is only one procession from the Father and the Son, it means that they share the same common characteristic, but this is impossible because in the Trinity a feature is either common to the three persons or is proper to one hypostasis: what is proper is not common, and what is common is not proper. If the Father and the Son share one property it means that either the Spirit is inferior to them, or he must share a property with the Father, that of generating the Son, which is of course an absurd consequence.

Section § 8 is dedicated to one of the crucial issues that potentially link the Latin heresy and the philosophical threat: the proliferation of persons in the Trinity, i.e., a new form of polytheism. Following the previous reasoning that leads Nicholas to say that the Spirit should also be cause of the Son, here he argues that even if we allow that the Son cannot be from the Spirit, however, in order to safeguard the equality in honour and power, the Latins must tolerate the Spirit’s emanating something else, which must be equal in nature and power to the Spirit who emanates it and to those from whom the Spirit is brought forth (προάγω—not by chance the verb we have already discussed in the Adversus Latinos),¹⁴⁹ but these reasonings would lead to a proliferation of persons in the Trinity and even overtake Hellenic polytheism.¹⁵⁰

Although sections § 9 and § 10 discuss the famous passage of Io. 14: 28, “The Father is greater than I”—which in 1166 triggered a fierce debate that opposed Latin and Greek interpretations of the verse of the Gospel of John—it is not possible to ascertain whether Nicholas is somehow referring to contemporary events and debates, since the passage is widely discussed in almost all anti-Latin texts.¹⁵¹

Section § 11 again deals with the statement that nothing personal can be shared in the Trinity. In this case, if the Father were to share the procession of the Spirit with the other two persons, the Spirit would proceed from himself, being both cause of himself and caused—a thing, says Nicholas, that not even the tales of the Hellenes imagined.¹⁵²

Sections §§ 12–25 allow Nicholas to go back to his main concern (the monad, the dyad, the triad) and try to entangle the Latin heresy by making ample use of Aristotle. Section § 12 in particular includes a passage that, in slightly changed form, appears also in the Memoriae, and that is worth mentioning again as a bridge between philosophy and theology:

Εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ Πατὴρ Πατήρ, καὶ μόνον ὁ Υἱὸς Υἱός, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς μόνου τοῦ Πατρὸς ὅ τε Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἀλλὰ δύο Πατὴρ καὶ Υἱὸς τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς Πνεύματος αἴτια, ἡ δυὰς ἄρα καὶ τῆς μονάδος προτέτακται καὶ ὑπεράνω τῆς μοναδικῆς τριάδος βέβηκε, καίτοι κάτω που παρὰ τῶν ἔξω σοφῶν ἡ δυαδικὴ σύνθεσις τῇ ὕλῃ προσέρριπται· ἡ γάρ τοι καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἄνω παρὰ τῆς ἐναρχικῆς μονάδος ἐν τῇ τριάδι συνεκφωνηθεῖσα δυάς, ἕως οὔπω τῆς πηγαίας μονάδος κεχώρισται, οὐδέπω δυάς, ἀλλ’ἡ μονὰς κυρίως κρατεῖ, δι’ ὃ καὶ τριὰς καὶ εἶναι καὶ νοεῖσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι.¹⁵³

If [it is] not [the case that] only the Father is Father, and only the Son is Son, and only from one Father are both the Son and the Holy Spirit, but rather [that] two—Father and Son—are the causes of one Spirit, then the dyad would stand before the monad and mount above the monadic Triad, and indeed down here (= in creation) somehow the dyadic composition is assigned to matter by the “Hellenic philosopher”; indeed—let me tell you—according to us up there (= the divine realm) the dyad which is pronounced together in the Triad by the monad which is principle of unity, so long as it is not yet separated from the primal-source monad, it ⟨is⟩ never yet at any time dyad, but a monad legitimately rules and, because of this, also Triad both is, is perceived, and is called such.

Section § 13 insists on the fact that two principles in the Trinity are inconceivable. Sections § 14 and § 15 implicitly discuss a reference to the Scriptural passage, “the Father is greater than I” (Io. 14: 28).¹⁵⁴ Nicholas concludes from this that the Son clearly cannot be a cause of the Spirit for the following reasons: the Father is cause of those hypostases who are from him, and therefore is greater than them by reason of hypostasis (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ὑποστάσεως) and not by reason of nature (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως); since the nature is shared by the three persons, and since the Son is not the same hypostasis as the Father and cannot cause anything by reason of nature, otherwise he would be greater than the Spirit (as the Pneumatomachoi say), it clear that the Son cannot be cause of the Spirit.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, at § 15 he adds that even if the Son were to be a cause of the Spirit by reason of hypostasis, he would be part of the hypostasis of the Father, and therefore he would complete him, since the Father would in that case be in need of fulfilment, which is clearly an absurd consequence.

Section § 16 goes back again to discuss monad, dyad and triad, adding convoluted explanations of the relationship between the three concepts.

[…] οὐδαμοῦ δυὰς τῇ μιᾷ θεότητι παραζεύγνυται· οὐδεὶς ἐν τῇ τριάδι συνδυασμός· οὐ μετὰ τὴν μονάδα δυάς, εἴτε καὶ τριάς, ἵνα καὶ δυάδα πρὸ τῆς μονάδος ἢ καὶ τριάδος νοήσω, ἀλλὰ μονὰς μὲν ἡ πηγαία τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς δύο μονάδων αἰτία· φθάνει δὲ ταύτας ἑαυτῇ ἑνοῦσα· καὶ πρὸ δυάδος νοουμένη τριάς, καὶ ἅμα ἑνὶ μὲν φωτὶ περιαστράπτουσα καὶ τρισί […].¹⁵⁶

[…] in no case does the dyad join the one Divinity: there is no combination in the Triad, and it is not the case that after the monad there is a dyad and afterward there is a triad, so that I must know a dyad before the monad or the triad, but the monad is the fontal cause of the two monads that come from it; and she anticipates them, uniting them in herself and the Triad is thus known before the dyad and brightly shines, together, with one and three lights […].

But the most intriguing passage is the following:

[…] οὐκέτι μονὰς μονάδων αἰτία πρὶν δυασθῆναι τρισσουμένη, καὶ τριὰς τὴν δυάδα προφθάνουσα, ἵνα κἂν τούτῳ τὸ ὑπερφυὲς αὐτῆς παραδείξῃ· ἀλλὰ μονὰς μὲν δυάδος, αὖθις δὲ δυὰς μονάδος αἰτία, καὶ δυὰς πρὸ τριάδος νοουμένη, καὶ ἀριθμὸς ἄλλος αὐτομάτως ἀναφαινόμενος ὑπερβαίνων τὴν τριάδα καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον προβαίνων, καὶ τὰ ἄτοπα ἄπειρα.¹⁵⁷

[if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then] … monad is no longer cause of monads, being tripled before being doubled, with triad anticipating the dyad, so that in this too it would demonstrate its supernatural [character], but monad is cause of dyad, and again dyad is cause of monad, and dyad is conceived before triad, and spontaneously another number appears that surpasses the triad and advances towards infinity and infinite absurdities.

The tortuous expression, οὐκέτι μονὰς μονάδων αἰτία πρὶν δυασθῆναι τρισσουμένη, although remaining somewhat obscure, seems to have received the attention of at least one admirer, Joseph Bryennios (born ca. 1350, died before 1438, probably 1430/1), who created his treatises by assembling passages from numerous twelfth-century authors,¹⁵⁸ and quoted this passage twice verbatim.¹⁵⁹

Sections §§ 17–24 implicitly discuss the famous passage from Io. 16: 15, “All that belongs to the Father is mine”, and its exegesis is based again on the fact that the Son cannot have the same personal properties of the Father.¹⁶⁰ Nicholas uses a very common set of refutations: the Spirit would send forth a fourth person from himself, such that “the Spirit, as being from two causes, would not be simple: the Father, uncaused cause, and the Son both caused and cause”;¹⁶¹ the Spirit would be son of the Son and nephew of the Father; the Spirit would have an intermediary in his procession from the Father (οὐδ’ ἂν ἀμέσως);¹⁶² the procession and the generation must occur simultaneously (ἅμα).¹⁶³

Although Nicholas employs Aristotle and refers to his logic quite often in order to construct his confutation of the Latin Filioque, and although many other theologians refer (even if they do not mention him by name) to Aristotelian logic,¹⁶⁴ sections §§ 24–28 are quite original in the panorama of anti-Latin polemicists. To be more accurate, one should say that Nicholas in these passages seems to be using more Porphyry, or other Aristotelian commentators (e.g. David the Conqueror, Pseudo-Elias/Pseudo-David),¹⁶⁵ than Aristotle himself, when he discusses the fact that a characteristic proper to the Father cannot be shared by the Son, by using a parallel with the property of the “ability to laugh” that belongs to human beings:¹⁶⁶

§ 24 Πᾶν ἴδιόν τινος ἀπ’ ἐκείνου μεταλαμβανόμενον, οὗ περ ἂν ἴδιον ᾖ, καὶ καθ’ ἑτέρων τινῶν δύο λεγόμενον, εἰ μὲν κατ’ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίσης ἀληθεύεται, ὁμοφυῆ· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ ἑνός, τοῦ ἑτέρου δὲ μή, ἑτεροφυῆ τὰ δύο ταῦτα δείκνυσιν ὄντα· οἷον φέρε εἰπεῖν. Τὸ γελαστικὸν ἴδιον ὂν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἴδους, ἀπὸ τούτου δὴ μεταλαμβανόμενον λεγέσθω πρῶτον κατά τινων δύο καὶ ἀληθευέτω, οἷον Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος· γελαστικὸν γὰρ ἑκάτερον τούτων· οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοφυεῖς Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων. Λεγέσθω πάλιν καὶ καθ’ ἑτέρων δύο, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀληθευέτω, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου μηκέτι· οἷον κατὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ κατὰ τῆς γεγραμμένης εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτης ὄντως γελαστικόν, ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι· ἑτεροφυῆ ἄρα τὰ δύο ταῦτα Σωκράτης καὶ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ.

Κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐπειδὴ τὸ προάγειν τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἴδιον ἐστὶ τοῦ Πατρός, τοῦτο δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς μεταλαμβανόμενον καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λεγόμενον καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος, κατὰ μὲν τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἀληθεύει, ὡς τὸ καινὸν¹⁶⁷ δόγμα φησί, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ Πνεύματος οὐκέτι· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ προβάλλει· ἑτεροφυῆ ἄρα τὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁμοφυῆ, ἢ κατ’ ἀμφοῖν ἀληθευέτω τὸ προβάλλειν τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἢ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀληθεύει.

When whatever characteristic property of some given thing is conveyed far from that thing, of which it should be a characteristic property, and is said in relation to other two, if in equal terms it is truly predicated in relation to both, ⟨they are⟩ of the same nature; if instead it ⟨is said⟩ in relation to the one, and not to the other, these entities prove to be of a distinct nature; let us say an example. The ability to laugh, being a characteristic property of the species of human beings, conveyed far from this, must then be said primarily in relation to the other two [entities] and truly predicated, as for instance Socrates and Plato: each of them is, in fact, able to laugh; therefore Socrates and Plato are also of the same nature. And again, ⟨the ability to laugh⟩ must also be said in relation to other two, and now must be truly predicated in relation to one, and now not in relation to the other: as for instance in relation to Socrates and the depicted portrait of him: Socrates, verily, is able to laugh while his portrait is not; therefore, these two things—Socrates and his portrait—are of a distinct nature.

Then, according to this same reasoning, since it is a characteristic property of the Father to bring forward the Spirit by himself, if this is conveyed far from the Father and said in relation to the Son and the Spirit, in relation to the Son it is truly predicated, as the new dogma [i.e. the Latins’ Filioque teaching] says, but in relation to the Spirit it is not: indeed he does not bring himself forward; therefore the two—the Son and the Spirit—are of distinct nature. But if these are of the same nature, either the bringing forward of the Spirit from them is truly predicated in relation to both, or if it is not true in relation to one, it is not true also in relation to the other.

Sections §§ 25–26 concentrate on the fact that what is common (κοινόν) cannot be a characteristic property (ἴδιον) and vice versa. Section § 27 goes back to the τὸ γελαστικόν, “to be able to laugh”, but in this case Nicolas also opens the section by quoting an uncommon passage from Photios’ Mystagogy:¹⁶⁸

Οὐδὲν ἴδιόν τινος ὑποστάσεως ἑτέρᾳ ὑποστάσει ἐφαρμόζειν δύναται· ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὰν ἴδιόν τι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτως ἐξιδιωσαμένου μεταλαμβανόμενον κατά τινος ὑποστάσεως πραγματικῶς ἀληθεύει, ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρώτως αὐτὸ ἐξιδιωσάμενον εἰς λόγον ἀνάγεται φύσεως· οἷον τὸ γελαστικὸν πρῶτος ἐξιδιοῦται ὁ καθόλου λεγόμενος ἄνθρωπος, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου μεταλαμβανόμενον ἀληθεύει πραγματικῶς κατὰ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων· ἀλλ’ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, ὁ πρῶτος τὸ γελαστικὸν ἐξιδιωσάμενος, οὐχ ὑποστάσεως ἀλλὰ φύσεώς ἐστιν ὄνομα. Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τὸ προάγειν τὸ Πνεῦμα πρῶτος μὲν ἐξιδιοῦται ὁ Πατήρ, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μεταλαμβάνει τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Υἱός, ὑπόστασις ὤν, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸν Πατέρα λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μήδ’ εἶναι ὅλως Πατέρα.

No characteristic property of a hypostasis can apply to another hypostasis, but whenever what is a characteristic property—being conveyed far from “the one to which it is primarily peculiar”—is truly predicated in reality in relation to another hypostasis, that one “to which it is primarily peculiar” itself is brought up to a dimension of nature. The ability to laugh, for example, is primarily peculiar to what we call man in general and then, if it is conveyed far from this, is truly predicated successively in relation to all men. But man in general—the first to whom the “ability to laugh” is peculiar to—is the name of a nature and not of a hypostasis. If, therefore, on the one hand the Father first has as his peculiar property also to emanate the Spirit, but on the other hand from him also the Son partakes of this, being a hypostasis, it would be consequent to say also that the Father is not a hypostasis, but a nature, and if this is so, he would not be Father at all.

Section § 28 still remains in a strictly logical context:

Ἔτι τὸ Πνεῦμα ἢ ἶσον εἶναι ἀνάγκη ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ Υἱοῦ· ἀλλ’ ἶσον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐκ δύο, ὥς φασι, τὸ ἐξ ἑνός· ἦν γὰρ ἂν καὶ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ κἀκεῖνος ἐκ δύο· λοιπὸν δὲ ἢ μεῖζον ἔσται, ὅπερ οὐδείς ποτε τῶν κατὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λυττησάντων εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησεν, ἢ ἔλαττον, καὶ πάλιν ἀναζῇ Μακεδόνιος.

The Spirit must be either equal to, greater than, or inferior to the Son, but what is from two, as they (the Latins) say, would not be equal to what is from one: indeed it would also be from one or that would also be from two, so it will be either greater, a thing that no one of those who raged against the Son has ever dared to say, or lesser, and again Macedonius revives.¹⁶⁹

Sections §§ 29–30 are dedicated to the exegesis of Io. 15: 26 and Io. 20: 22, while from § 31 onward we have various sections dedicated to the proper lexicon that should be used to discuss the procession: § 31 (ἐκπόρευσις, ἀποστολή, μετάδοσις, ἐμφύσησις); §§ 32–33 (χορηγεῖσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ἐκπορεύεσθαι); § 34 (πέμπεσθαι and ἐκπορεύεσθαι); § 35 ἀποστολἠ καὶ ἐκπόρευσις, and the ministering spirits (καὶ πάντα τὰ εἰς διακονίαν ἀποστελλόμενα λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα).

Sections §§ 36–38 recall the themes that Nicholas treated in the Ad magnum domesticum, which go back to the treatise’s main question: is Pentecost the essential manifestation of the Holy Spirit? The Bishop of Methone concludes that there must be a difference between ἐμφύσησις καὶ ἐκπόρευσις, between ἐμφύσημα καὶ πνεῦμα: in one case we must understand a manifestation in time, an economic operation, while in the other case we must understand the eternal existence of the Spirit and his τρόπος τῆς ὑπαρξέως (mode of subsistence).

More interesting and original in the panorama of 9th–12th-century writings on the procession of the Holy Spirit is section § 39,¹⁷⁰ where Nicholas explains the difference between τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν καὶ τὴν ἐκπομπήν (“sending forth”) and quotes Io. 15: 26:

[…] τῷ μὲν γάρ, Ὅταν ἔλθῃ, εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐδήλωσε τοῦ Πνεύματος καὶ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον· τῷ δὲ εἰπεῖν, Πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ Πατρός, τήν τε ταυτοβουλίαν τῆς ὅλης Τριάδος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ κοινὸν ἔδειξε θέλημα· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀποστολὴν εἶναι νομιστέον, ὡς ἂν εἰ εἶπεν, ὅτι ἐλεύσεται κατὰ κοινὴν εὐδοκίαν καὶ θέλησιν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἅμα· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ πρόοδος αὐτοῦ παριστᾷ […].¹⁷¹

[…] by saying “when he comes”, [Christ] made clear the Spirit’s free will and “free movement”, but by saying “I will send [him to] you from the Father”, he showed the identity of the will of the entire Triad and the one, shared desire: from there indeed it must be understood that his good will and that of the Father are the sending forth, as he said that ⟨the Spirit⟩ will come according to a common good-will, [according to] his and the Father’s intention, together and simultaneously, from which his emanation also occurs […].

Again Nicholas insists on a clear differentiation of terms and here, quite originally, introduces in the “sending forth of the Spirit” the idea that there is a common action that shows “the identity of will and the one and common desire”,¹⁷² an insistence on a link among the persons that is not usually highlighted and that could have opened a way to reconcile with the Latin opponents, if it had been pursued further.

Nicholas moves to section § 40, where he links § 39 with § 40 by reference to the idea of movement, or better, of the two movements (procession and generation) and quotes the famous passage from Gregory of Nazianzus’ Oratio 29, which Nicholas repeatedly uses both in his writings on the Filioque and in the Refutatio Procli: “the monad in the beginning is moved to a dyad until it rests in the Triad.”¹⁷³

Sections §§ 41–42 are dedicated to the Photian exegesis of Io. 16: 14: “He will glorify me because it is from me that he will receive what he will make known to you.” But again, Nicholas finds his “original” way to discuss it, concentrating on the vocabulary of the intra-Trinitarian relationship and the difference between λῆψις (“reception”) and ἐκπόρευσις (“procession”).

The sections from § 43 onward are dedicated to the exegesis of the passage from Gal. 4: 6: “Because you are his sons, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, the Spirit who calls out, ‘Abba, Father’.” Nicholas here discusses the difference between being “from” something and being “of” something, mixing Biblical examples and Aristotelian echoes (§ 44 and § 45)¹⁷⁴ that bring the reader directly to the end of the text at paragraph § 51 (at least in the version printed by Demetrakopoulos).¹⁷⁵ The foolish consequences of saying that the Spirit should proceed from the Son, since the Spirit is “of the Son”, are the following: the Father, being “Father of Christ” would proceed from Christ, and the Son, being of the Father would proceed (instead of being generated) from the Father, so they all would share in procession (τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ Πνεύματος).

At § 46, Nicholas is again inspired by his beloved Aristotelian logic, where the reasoning is supposed to be “universal” and not according to likeness (Ἢ καθόλου μὲν οὕτως, οὐχὶ κατὰ λόγον δὲ τῆς ὁμοιότητος).¹⁷⁶ In this case, since the Spirit is of the Father and proceeds from the Father, in the same way since the Spirit is of the Son, he should also proceed from the Son: therefore, following the same logic, since both the Father and the Spirit are of the Son, according to the same equivalence of signification (κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀδιαφορίαν), the Spirit being of the Son would be paternal cause of the Son (πατρικὸν αἴτιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ). At § 47 moreover, always following the same logic, we would conclude that since they are both from the Father, they should come from him in the same way: therefore either they should both be by procession or by generation. § 48 adds the last exegetical passage of the Biblical quotation that identifies the Son as light (Io. 1: 7–9; Hebr. 1: 3; Ps. 35: 10; Io. 8: 12). Here Nicholas insists again on the fact that although the Son is said to be the light of the world, he does not of course come “from” the world, but he comes “to” the world.¹⁷⁷ From § 49 to § 51 the Bishop of Methone focuses on the fact that, although the Father and Son are also called “spirit”, and although there are other spirits (angels, souls, etc.), the procession is proper only to the Holy Spirit (ἴδιον τὸ ἐκπορευτόν).¹⁷⁸

Nicholas’ final conclusion lies in the middle of section § 51: the Latin innovation is neither proved through logic nor proved through doctrine (τὸ ἀναπόδεικτον καὶ ἀμάρτυρον):

Τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἀνεξέλεγκτόν τε καὶ ἀναπόδεικτον πᾶν τὸ περὶ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου προσώπου λεγόμενον καὶ μὴ ἀπό τινος καθόλου ὁρμώμενον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθόλου καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων καθόλου αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἐξ ὧν καὶ οἱ ἔλεγχοι· ἀμάρτυρον δέ, ὃ μήτε ὁ μάρτυς ἐδογμάτισεν ὁ πιστός, μήτε τις τῶν θεοπνεύστων ῥητῶς ὑπηγόρευσεν.¹⁷⁹

For the same reason, anything that cannot be proved or demonstrated about a single and only person, cannot even be said to derive from any universal principle: for demonstrations –from which refutations also arise– proceed from universals, and ⟨are valid⟩ insofar as they apply universally; while that which lacks testimony is what neither the faithful witness has taught nor any of the divinely inspired authors has explicitly declared.

The choice of Nicholas appears clear: the Κεφαλαιώδεις ἔλεγχοι, a text that is structured as a sequence of logical reasoning and questioning to Latin opponents, must rely on Aristotelian logic. How far Nicholas is inspired by Aristotle himself, or by his commentators, is a complex field of research that requires the competencies of both philologists and philosophers, and cannot be dealt with here. However, it is unquestionable that Nicholas feels the need to approach the Latins through a “syllogistic” method that has its ancestor in Aristotle, although most probably it is inherited primarily from Photios.

This clear case, together with the fact (for example) that the Sacrum Armamentarium, written at the order of Emperor Manuel Komnenos by Andronikos Kamateros, includes a collection of “syllogisms” from Nicholas of Methone, Theophylact of Ohrid, Photios, Niketas Byzantios, and the previously condemned philosopher, Eustratios of Nicaea, all seem to prove that during the Komnenian era the “guardians of Orthodoxy”¹⁸⁰ did not altogether condemn applying Aristotelian logic to dogmatic discussions. Rather, as Michele Trizio has clearly argued in his book on Eustratios, they condemned the use of Aristotle in discussions on the two natures of Christ,¹⁸¹ because those dogmatic discussions were perceived as concluded, “pacified”, clarified and sanctioned by the ecumenical councils, while the discussions with the Latins on the procession of the Holy Spirit were still “works in progress” that needed the help of the ancient philosophers and their logic, as was the case in the Patristic age.

5 Memoriae

It is necessary to say a couple things about this text, because at present it exists in two published forms and is attributed to two different authors: one was published in 1897 by Arsenij Ivačenko under the paternity of Nicholas of Methone and entitled Memoriae contra Latinos—Ἀπομνημονεύματα ἐκ τῶν ἐν διαφόροις λόγοις γεγραμμένων κατὰ Λατίνων περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα βλασφημίας (Angelou, n. 4; RAP G19835);¹⁸² another was published in 1930 by Anton Michel and attributed to Niketas Stethatos (11th century), with the title Synthesis contra Latinos et de processione Spiritus Sancti (or Contra Latinos et de processione spiritus sancti)—Ἑτέρα σύνθεσις κατὰ Λατίνων, ἐν οἷς βλασφημοῦσι εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον λέγοντες ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦτο ἐκπορεύεσθαι. Τοῦ Στηθάτου (RAP G19631).¹⁸³

The second “version” of the text is probably the most famous, because it was included in the dossier dedicated to the so-called schism of 1054 by Michel. This ample work, which remains even today one of the most important contributions on the primary sources of the reciprocal excommunication between the papal envoy, Humbert of Silva Candida, and the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius,¹⁸⁴ is unfortunately not reliable in many aspects. It is possible to mention, for example, the attribution to Michael I Cerularius of a Panoplia, which was exhaustively rejected by Jugie, Laurent, and Darrouzès, who together proved that the anthology had been assembled in the context of the Council of Lyons II in 1274.¹⁸⁵ Regrettably even Michel’s studies on the paternity of the Synthesis seem to be built on a rather unsound analysis of the manuscript tradition. In this volume, Carmelo Nicolò Benvenuto hints at the problems,¹⁸⁶ and in his doctoral dissertation he thoroughly discusses the manuscript tradition and presents some convincing evidence. The reader should refer to the recent publications by Benvenuto for further details, but it can be said that it appears extremely uneconomical for Nicholas to have copied a treatise composed by Niketas Stethatos, and to have used it, dismembered into bits and pieces, in his other writings; rather, it would be more realistic (also on the basis of the titles and the dedicatory closing) to consider the Memoriae certainly as a compilation, but assembled by Nicholas of Methone from his own corpus of writings, and not from a text by Niketas Stethatos, as was stated by Michel.¹⁸⁷

The tile of the Memoriae is:

Νικολάου τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπισκόπου Μεθώνης συλλογὴ τῶν γραφέντων αὐτῷ ἐν διαφόροις λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος κατὰ τὰς τῶν Λατίνων βλασφημίας.

By Nicholas of Methone, a gathering of things written by him in various treatises on the Holy Spirit against the Latins’ blasphemies.

While the title of the text attributed to Niketas Stethatos is:

Ἑτέρα σύνθεσις κατὰ Λατίνων, ἐν οἷς βλασφημοῦσι εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον λέγοντες ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦτο ἐκπορεύεσθαι.

Another synthesis against the Latins, who blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, saying that he proceeds from the Son.

Even the mere analysis of the nouns chosen for the titles, where σύνθεσις (synthesis) and συλλογή (gathering) are used, would be enough to correctly identify this kind of composition: a patchwork of other writings,¹⁸⁸ but the conclusion of the text, printed by Arsenij, is even more decisive:

Ταῦτά σοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πανσέβαστε καὶ πάντιμε κεφαλή, παρ’ἡμῶν ἐσχεδίασται ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἐν διαφόροις λόγοις γεγραμμένων ἡμῖν κατὰ τῆς τῶν Λατίνων εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα βλασφημίας, ὅτι μὴ τὸ τοὺς λὸγους ἔχον βιβλίον προχείρως εἴχομεν δοῦναί σοι.

These memories of the things that we have written in various treatises against the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit of the Latins, for you in the present ⟨composition/booklet⟩, pansebastos and excellent head, were put together on the spur of the moment by us because we did not have the book that contains these treatises readily accessible to give it to you.¹⁸⁹

Where the words μὴ προχείρως εἴχομεν δοῦναί σοι (“not to have something ready to be given as a present”) explain also how Nicholas worked, how he extracted so many verbatim quotations from his other writings, the Bishop of Methone, in fact, does not say that he did not have the book with him; he says that he does not have a book “readily accessible” to be donated to the Pansebastos, words that could also mean that he did not have a spare copy ready to be given to his reader and, therefore, he needed to ἐσχεδίασται, which certainly means “to improvise”, “to put together on the spur of the moment”—but, most probably, it could also include the idea of “summarising, giving an outline”.¹⁹⁰

Having already presented, in some details, the other treatises, this section does not insist on the contents, but offers a table with the correspondences, that can help the reader to get a sense of the treatise’s structure.

The Memoriae—whether attributed or not to Nicholas of Methone¹⁹¹—are a patchwork of passages that can also be found in Nicholas’ writings on the Holy Spirit’s procession. It is not thorny to identify these long, sometimes verbatim passages of “self-plagiarism”; as the reader has seen in the previous pages, Nicholas has some very idiosyncratic habits: the painstaking precision in distinguishing the meaning and the usage of a word; the philosophical background reflected in the choice of words that he uses; and the introduction of very few—and always the same—quotations from Church Fathers.

6 Conclusion

This contribution has attempted to present the main lines of development behind the reasoning and the central doctrinal arguments that Nicholas of Methone employed in the four treatises that form his corpus dedicated to the Holy Spirit against the Latin Filioque. This exposition’s aim was to offer, in a shortened English version, the contents of a collection of works that are otherwise almost completely ignored, and to highlight the unique aspects and innovative ideas that a corpus on the procession of the Holy Spirit can offer to a reader. In this respect, the conclusion of these pages should highlight three major issues that arise while studying the literary production of twelfth-century intellectuals.

The first, fundamental issue is the fact that it is necessary to study the complete production of a learned Byzantine philosopher, not necessarily to understand his reasons completely, but rather at least to obtain a more reliable picture of the motivations behind his writing—as it is in this case—the refutation against a fifth-century pagan philosopher. A twelve-century bishop involved in the dispute on the Filioque—a difference with the Latin Church that had not been resolved by conciliar decision, and that did not have a ready, clear theological answer from the Fathers—needed to go back to Hellenic wisdom, as was the case in the Patristic age, to develop a full doctrine of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. But going back to the Hellenic wisdom, a Byzantine theologian needed also to write against a hierarchical emanation framework, such as the Proclean one, that could be dangerous in the development of the doctrine of the procession. Indeed, the twelfth century was a time of elaboration, creation, and exploration, prompted by the confrontation with the Latin intellectuals who were present in-person in Constantinople (e.g., Hugo Eterianus).

A second issue is linked to the main concern of Komnenian-era theologians (who in many cases should indeed be considered philosophers too): they needed to develop a proper theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit and, therefore, they strove to establish and clearly define a lexicon that could be used to express that “pneumatology”. Nicholas of Methone, in this respect, is one of the most remarkable examples, inasmuch as he gave painstaking attention in selecting the exact word and in commenting on wrong usages by the Latins (and also by Proclus).

A third and last point is the importance of the historical context; banal as it could sound, this is still a desideratum in many studies. Kazhdan’s review of Angelou’s edition of the Refutatio Procli, which all the publications on Nicholas of Methone quote, suggested some streams of research in 1989:

Theology is a very delicate discipline in which nuances acquire the magnitude of dogma. […] One might even emphasize the hierarchical structure of the Trinity—Niketas of Maroneia […]. Nicholas emphasized the monarchical principle. The unity of the Trinity was for Nicholas not an antiquarian question to be considered in connection with philosophical errors of the fifth century. […] Nicholas lived and worked when the “Latin question” was the major problem that Byzantium faced. Nicholas, as is well known, took a clear-cut anti-Latin stand. […] But what was the major difference between the Latins and Byzantium as seen by the Greeks? Kinnamos, Nicholas’s contemporary, wrote about the crusaders: “Their dignities are peculiar and resemble distinctions descending from the height of the empire, since it is something more noble and surpasses all others. A duke outranks a count; a king, a duke; and the emperor, a king. The inferior naturally yields to the superior, supports him in war, and obeys.” Byzantine monarchy, on the one hand, and Western hierarchy, on the other—such was the social confrontation of two worlds, and in this context the Refutation, with its emphasis on the divine “monarchy” and with its rejection of hierarchical emanation, can be read as a genuine twelfth-century document.¹⁹⁶

Unfortunately, it seems that thirty years of research have not fully exploited these hints yet. Kazhdan suggested two fields of research: the first one is related to the theological analysis of the issue. Greek theologians strenuously defended the monarchy within the Trinity because it was dreadful for them to conceive a second source of Divinity, and they suspected that the Latins, claiming a role for the Son in the procession of the Spirit, could assign to the Son a characteristic that, being proper to the Father, was not shareable: the property of being the only principal cause, origin. Moreover, to introduce a role for the Son could create a hierarchy within the Trinity that was not conceivable either: it is possible to have a monarchy (one cause) in the Trinity, but not to have an emanative hierarchy of three main causes, because this would create a sort of polytheism (which in fact brings Nicholas back to the Hellenic tales, and therefore also to Proclus). In this respect, Kazhdan’s reference to Niketas of Maroneia is not completely convincing, but he did not know the whole text now published.¹⁹⁷ A second hint is left in the review of Angelou’s edition, which could even sound “overly reductive”, as Robinson wrote,¹⁹⁸ but cannot be overlooked. Kazhdan traces a parallel between the Byzantine monarchy and the Latin hierarchy, on the one hand, and the monarchical principle of the Trinity and the Proclean emanative hierarchy, on the other. It is certainly not the case that Nicholas of Methone defended the monarchical principle of the Trinity against Proclus in reaction to the Latin political structure—nor did he attack Proclus’ philosophy merely because it resembled Western models. Yet, it is worth considering the possibility that he may have rejected both the Latin social order and Proclus’ emanative hierarchy precisely because neither reflected the monarchical principle at the heart of Trinitarian theology and of the ideological framework of the Greek, medieval Roman Empire: one God, one City, one Emperor.