The Marcianus graecus Z 512 (= M) transmits the oldest preserved copy of Proclus’ Elementatio theologica.1 This manuscript of the late 13th century contains a variety of texts on very different subjects—grammar, rhetoric, poetry, astrology—including works by Michael Psellos and Theodoros Prodromos.2 After excerpts from Proclus’ Hypotyposis, the Elementatio theologica follows on ff. 128r–176v. It is a beautiful copy written in the Fettaugen style until f. 173v. From f. 174r on (at prop. 203, p. 178,1
In this contribution I intend to examine the scholia on the text that have been written in the margin in the first part of the text.4 As I will show, they throw an interesting light on discussions on participation that are antecedents of the most important theological controversy in the 14th century, the debate between Gregory Palamas and his opponents, above all Nikephoros Gregoras. I will first give a survey of all ancient scholia on the text and in a second part will focus on a recurrent theme in the scholia: how to interpret participation and Proclus’ claim that the First is unparticipated.
1 Part One: Scholia in Procli Elementationem theologicam
The scholia are found in the margins of M as far as f. 155v, that is, as far as prop. 121. I distinguish three layers of scholia:
-
Most scholia are in a hand that clearly resembles the hand of the copyist of the main text writing in Fettaugen style. They are indexed (*).
-
There are some scholia in another contemporary hand, writing in clear black ink, for instance on f. 128r–v. This may have been the same hand that added titles to some propositions following the
α -tradition. They are indexed (⁘). -
Some scholia are in smaller characters and lighter brown. I presume that they are in a different but contemporary hand, but it often remains unsettled. They are indexed ÷.
Some scholia are difficult to read because pages have been cut in the upper or inferior margin. Fortunately, there is a copy of M, the Par. gr. 2028 [sigle Pa], f. 74r–105r, a parchment manuscript, bound with a more recent paper manuscript of Aristotle De anima and De sensu, copied by Constantinos Lascaris. The Proclus copy may be of the 14th–15th century (prop. 1–4 have been added by a later hand; prop. 211 at the end is missing). The scribe added the scholia from M in the margin or inserted them before or after the propositions. Although this scribe makes many errors, his copy is very useful to supplement what cannot be read in M. I have added these supplements between brackets, […]. Moreover, this copy also helps us to recover some scholia that must have been on the lost pages of M (one folium after what is now f. 130 and another after what is now f. 132 have been lost in M). A recent copy of Par. gr. 2028 is the Par. gr. 1842 (17th century), which also contains some scholia. Interestingly, no scholia are found in the manuscripts that depend on M ante correctionem of which the Par. gr. 2045 is the leading manuscript. More surprising is the fact that they are not found, as far as I had access to digital images, in any of the other recent manuscripts, which derive mostly from Bodl., Laud. graec. 18, a copy of M made in 1358 by Stelianos Choumnos.
The (*)scholia written by the hand that also copied the main text were probably already in the manuscript that the copyist used as his model. For the copyist sometimes makes errors in copying, or is uncertain, which shows that he was not himself the author of those scholia. (Examples of such errors are found in scholia at prop. 1, 8, 22, 34, 40, 47, 767, 68, 74, 78, 84, 116, and 121.) Moreover, the scholia are copied in the inferior or superior margins, without signs of reference to the main text. Some scholia even appear on a page after the proposition they refer to. If, however, the (*)scholia were already found in the model of M, they were older than the late 13th century when M was written and may date from the 11–12th century. We know that Psellos had a copy of the Elements of Theology in the text tradition to which the Marcianus belongs.5 It is therefore possible that the (*)scholia that were found in the model of M go back to Psellos’ school. The other scholia were added into M and date from the first half of the 14th century, when the Proclus text was also radically revised.
In the following survey of scholia, passages supplemented by Par. gr. 2028 are between […] brackets; words added by myself are between ⟨…⟩; and words deleted are between {…}. Editorial comments are between (…).6 When possible, I indicate the proposition to which the scholium refers.
f. 128r
ad titulum:
⁘
Note that some entitle the Elements of Theology: General assertions about the divine (principles).7
ad prop. 1:
⁘
⁘
⁘
⁘
⁘
⁘
⁘
About One and Multitude.
The One is before all things and before Being and before the essence of the Intellect; therefore he calls the first cause One.
The whole is one and one by participation.
Every multitude participates somehow in the One, whereas the One is absolutely unparticipated.
Note that the One is participated and that all participate in the One.
Note that the One is somehow participated, not absolutely: it is thus somehow capable of being participated, not absolutely, whereas it is absolutely unparticipated.
The things that are one by participation have become one.
f. 128v
ad prop. 2:
⁘
Participation indicates some communion and union.
ad prop. 3:
⁘
Whatever is ⟨one⟩ by participation is manifestly also generated and caused, and note that participation is a generation.
ad prop. 4:
⁘
One thing is what is unified and another the One, and one thing is what is by union one and another what is by itself one, that is One and absolutely One.
f. 129v
ad prop. 5:
The rational and the irrational are together in their genus as contradistinguished.
ad prop. 6:
*
*
Note that what is unified is from henads.
Note that even union is a henad by union and a participation in the One.
ad prop. 7:
*
Note that what produces is unparticipated and non-ordered as well as uncoordinated with what is produced.
f. 130r
ad prop. 8:
*[
*
Note that what is unparticipated is not said to be unparticipated because of negation or removal of all participation or union or relation, but because of superiority or excellence. For every superiority implies relation and respect; next, that which is caused is said to participate necessarily in its cause.
Since Plato calls the first cause One and Good, for that reason Proclus determined about the One first, and then about the Good.
Note that this Good or ‘the-Good’ is unparticipated and unrelated and uncoordinated and beyond.
ad prop. 9:
*
About the self-sufficient, both the perfect and imperfect, which is inferior to the Good. One thing is the self-sufficient and the other the Good that transcends the good that is self-sufficient, for the self-sufficient too participates and is therefore inferior to the First.
ad prop. 12 (deest in M10):
[
About the principle and cause.
Note that the cause must necessarily be participated by the things caused.
Note that he calls the Good both cause and first principle and that this is the first cause.
Note that he declares both here and in prop. 28. that the first cause and the primary Good are participated. If this is the case, in what sense is the First ‘unparticipated’? In an absolute sense or according to privation?
f. 131v
ad prop. 15:
÷
÷
Reversion is to conjoin according to one part with all other parts.
What is what reverts upon itself, and how does it happen? Note that reversion upon itself is proper to the incorporeal.
f. 132r
ad prop. 17:
*
Note that what is self-moving reverts upon itself and thereby is incorporeal and firstly ⟨self-moved⟩.
ad prop. 18:
*
About giving a share in being or participation, and what is this giving a share in being or from being or participation and in what sense it is said.
f. 132v
*
Note that, in case of sharing in being, something is better, something less, and something primary, something secondary, and something superior, something inferior, and that there is no equality and identity in them, nor are they all said to be one.
f. 133r
ad prop. 22:
÷
Note that he calls the monadic the ‘only-born’.
÷
That is to say: even if we admit that there are more principal causes, there is the same impossibility.
f. 133v
ad prop. 24–25:
*
*
*
*
*
Note that ‘unparticipated’ is not said in one sense, but in many.
Note that the (term) ‘unparticipated’ indicates what is transcendent and superior and exceptional.
Note that one thing is the participant, another what is participated and another what is unparticipated. Here ‘unparticipated’ indicates what is not participated and what exists before what is participated.
Note that the first is called participated as pertaining to all, not to something.
Note that it is said that it [i.e. the first] is both participated and is unparticipated and transcending all things.
f. 134v
ad prop. 27:
*
Note that the producer produces by power; that what is produced is not a part of the producer.
f. 135r
ad prop. 28:
*
Participation indicates some communion, and what participates has something in common with what is participated.
÷
By ‘both’ (
ἑκάτερον ) he means distinction and participation.
*[
How then from being? It imparts being and it participates in being.
f. 135v
ad prop. 28:
*
It is necessary, he says (p. 32, 20–21), that the effect participates in its cause.
Note that the participation of something indicates its relation.
*{
He explained how it derives its being from there. He says how the effect participates in the cause: for it is not as if it were a part of its being, but as being united with it according to causality and the causal relation, if this being and essence and existence really are because of this cause. Therefore, what participates in a cause participates in a relation (to that cause), for a cause is thought to stand in relation.
⁘
Note that union indicates participation.
ad prop. 30:
⁘
Note that procession is twofold.
⁘
Because of union or relation (ad p. 34, 18).
f. 136r
*
Iamblichus speaks of two kinds of generation: the one remains within oneself, the other proceeds outwards and according to procession, and the one is without relation, the other is relative.
ad prop. 31:
⁘
Note that the similar is not in all respects the same.
*
Note that reversion is an assimilation of what reverts to that towards which it reverts: for it wants to be similar and to imitate it.
f. 136v
ad prop. 34:
*
Note that there is both essential and not essential reversion, but the latter is relational because it has the intellect as principle.
f. 137r
*
Note that it (i.e. what reverts) has its being from it (i.e. that upon which it reverts) as well as the fact that it is by its essence cognate to it and similar, and suchlike; not according to (full) similitude, but according to kinship and union and relation, because it has its being proximately from it and immediately and because its being is from that and that is the cause of its being according to the power that produces its being.
f. 137v
ad prop. 38:
*
Note that reversion is of well-being and because of well-being and towards well-being.
ad prop. 39:
*
Note that there is not only reversion of being, but also of cognition.
ad prop. 40:
*
What are the beings that subsist by themselves? They are self-subsisting. If something is self-subsisting, it is also self-sufficient, and if something is self-sufficient, it is also self-subsistent.
f. 138r
*
Note that the self-subsistent comes after the First and that the First is not self-subsistent.
ad prop. 41:
*
Note that he says that those beings are produced by themselves that exist and subsist by themselves and do not need something else to be and to subsist.
ad prop. 42:
*
The intellect thinks itself and is the intelligible of itself and the same intellect is both intelligible and thought.
f. 138v
⁘
What is the distinctive feature of the self-subsistent?
f. 139r
ad prop. 47, p. 46,33:
⁘
He took ‘composite’ for ‘not of like parts’.
ad prop. 48:
⁘
How is what is not perpetual not self-subsistent? That there are two modes according to which something can be non-perpetual.
f. 140r
ad prop. 53:
title: *
⁘
the eternity in the eternal thing instead of “without relation and on itself”
⁘
Note that participation indicates a relation
*
He calls here what exists by itself unparticipated, not what is absolutely not participated; what is suchlike is also unrelated as it exists by itself and is not participable nor in other things.
f. 140v
ad prop. 55:
*
*
Note that time is said in two modes, one as a whole, the other as part.
Note that sempiternity is twofold, one eternal, the other temporal.
ad prop. 56:
*
Note that secondary beings are contained in the first by power.
*
Note that he says that because of the essential power of the producer the product is of the being of the producer and participates in its being and subsists according to its being.
f. 143r
ad prop. 65. p. 62.16–17:
⁘
This statement applies to what exists intelligibly.
f. 143v
ad prop. 67:
*
*
*
Note that he calls the form a whole and wholeness and the particulars and individuals parts.
About the whole and wholeness and magnitude: how many differences of the whole and of wholeness.
What is the same in some respect and what is in some respect he removed from wholes in proposition 66.
ad prop. 68:
⁘
Note that there is some first whole and a second whole and a composite whole.
ad prop. 69:
*
Note that the whole that consists of parts is inferior to the whole that is prior to parts.
f. 144v
ad prop. 73:
*
Note that wholeness and the whole come after being, for not every being is a whole.
f. 145r
ad prop. 74:
*[
Just as the whole is less extensive than being, so the form is less extensive than the whole; therefore being is more extensive than the whole, the whole more than the form. Note that the whole is before the forms and that being too is before the forms; therefore it is before the intellect and before (its) substance.
f. 146r
ad prop. 78–79:
÷
He speaks of a twofold power: one is the effective power of the agent cause, the other the receptive power of what is acted upon.
⁘
Note that activities are rightly called second powers.
*
Note that power in itself is absolutely power and what is commonly called power.
*
Note that perfect power is close to act and acting or is identical with them.
f. 146v
*
*
*
*
Note that the activities that are called “in potency” are called “powers” according to the perfect powers.
Note that ‘power’ is said by the philosophers in a twofold sense, and also ‘in potency’.
Note that also ‘power’ can be said to be ‘in potency’ and ‘in potency’ ‘power’.
Proclus seems to speak of ‘in potency’ in a single sense—for only the imperfect ⟨power is in potency⟩—and of ‘power’ in a twofold sense.
f. 147r
ad prop. 84:
*[
Note that he calls the incorporeal and intelligible beings infinite not according to magnitude or multitude, but only according to power.
f. 147v
ad prop. 86:
*
Note that he speaks of ‘infinite’ in three senses.
f. 148r
ad prop. 87–88:
*
*
Note that being is before eternity; the first God is therefore also ‘before eternity’.
Note that what participates in eternity is after eternity and inferior to it; hence what participates in time is also inferior to time.
ad prop. 89:
title: *
f. 148v
ad prop. 90:
*
The first before the limited is the infinite and every infinitude is before the limit.
f. 149r
ad prop. 94
*
Note that infinity is before eternity.
f. 150r
ad prop 99:
*
Note that he calls the unparticipated ungenerated.
*
One must investigate here what the meaning of ‘unparticipated’ is, whether it is not to be participated or not to participate. For the argument seems that it means not to participate in something else, neither to exist from some other cause.
f. 150v
ad prop. 100, p. 90,5:
⁘
By ‘cause of identity’ is meant the One.
ad 100, p. 90,14–16:
⁘
Note that what is in relation is found in the others.
f. 152v
ad prop. 109:
⁘
Note that what participates is particular insofar as it participates.
f. 154r
ad prop. 116:
*
Note: what he first said were unparticipated in every series, namely monads or henads, he now calls participated because of the first One.
f. 155v
ad prop. 121:
Note: existence is characterized by the Good.
2 Part II: Comments on the Scholia
2.1 The Problem of Participation
In many scholia the scholiast discusses the problem of participation, and in particular the question of how Proclus can affirm that the first cause is ‘unparticipated’, whereas he admits himself that all beings somehow participate in the One, as in the first line of the first proposition: “Every multitude somehow participates in the One.” To solve this problem the scholiast13 notices that the term ‘unparticipated’ is used in many senses (sch. ad prop. 24–25). In one (radical) sense ‘unparticipated’ means that something cannot at all be participated and is not participated by anything; in another (weaker) sense the term is used to indicate that a cause is transcendent, superior, out of range of what participates in it. When we take the term in this second sense, ‘unparticipated’ does not indicate a total removal of every form of participation.
As the scholiast observes: “Note that what is unparticipated is not said to be unparticipated because of negation or removal of all participation or union or relation, but because of superiority or excellence. For every superiority is found in relation and respect” (sch. 8). It is in this weaker sense that Proclus uses the term. As the scholiast notices again at prop. 99: “One must investigate here what the meaning of ‘unparticipated’ is, whether it is not to be participated [in the passive sense] or not to participate [in the active sense]. For the argument seems that it means not to participate in something else, neither to exist from some other cause.” Notice further the scholium at prop. 24, where Proclus distinguishes between the participant, what is participated and the unparticipated: “Here ‘unparticipated’ indicates what is not participated and what exists before what is participated”, but the scholiast adds: “Note that the first is called participated as pertaining to all, not to something.” In sum, “it is said that the first is both participated and unparticipated (in the sense of) transcending all things.” The scholiast also notices that Proclus sometimes calls the monads (henads) of each series unparticipated (as in prop. 100), but later seems to retract his view, insisting that all henads except the One are participable (prop. 116).
A crucial text for the scholiast is prop. 28, p. 32, 20–21:
Whatever the attempts of the scholiast may be, he does not go much further than the paradoxical conclusion that the One is both participated and unparticipated, both related and unrelated, depending on how one understands ‘un/participated’. However, he seems to indicate another way out of this paradox in the scholium in which he quotes Iamblichus and speaks of two kinds of generation: one without relation, another relative (see below).
We find a similar perplexity about how to understand
Although Nicholas and the scholiast come to the same conclusion, namely that the First cause is both unparticipated and participated, I see no influence of Nicholas’ arguments in the scholia nor in Nicholas from the scholia. After all, that conclusion was generally admitted in patristic thought. What is lacking in Nicholas is a discussion of the meaning of the term “unparticipated” and above all the connection made between participation and relation.19
The discussion on participation becomes extremely important in the 14th century in the discussions around Palamas. Palamas’ view is another attempt to solve the question of how God, the unparticipated cause beyond all being, can be participated and become the being of all beings. He distinguishes between the
One remarkable item in this context is the scholium at prop. 12: “Note that he declares both here and in prop. 28 that the first cause and the primary Good are participated. If this is the case, in what sense is the First ‘unparticipated’? In an absolute sense or according to privation?” The last formulation (
For these reasons, I first thought that the scholia in M related to the debate around Palmas’ position. However, if the main scholia(*) come from the model of M, they cannot be dated to the 14th century. Most probably they were found in a manuscript that belonged to the 12th century. As said before, manuscript M represents a text tradition from the school of Psellos. One may therefore suppose that the original group of scholia come from that school too. The text in M was radically corrected in the early 14th century (before 1358, when a copy, Bodleian. Laud. graec. 18, was made). The corrector used a manuscript of the tradition of Nicholas of Methone. He also added titles from that tradition and may have been responsible for some marginal and intertextual notes. As for Nikephoros Gregoras, he certainly used a manuscript of the Nicholas-tradition for his Proclus quotations, not the Marcianus or any of its descendants.23
2.2 The Iamblichus Fragment
On f. 136r one reads a scholium about Iamblichus’ conception of causal generation. The context is prop. 30 where it is said that what is produced “both remains in the producing cause and proceeds from it”:
Ἰαμβλίχος δίττας λέγει τὰς ἀπογεννήσεις , {τὴν θε 24 (?)}τὴν μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένουσαν ,τὴν δὲ ἔξω προίοῦσαν καὶ κατὰ πρόοδον ,καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄσχετον ,τὴν δὲ σχετικήν .
Iamblichus speaks of two kinds of generation: one remains within oneself, the other proceeds outwards and according to procession, and one is without relation, the other is relative.
This reference to Iamblichus is surprising, as this doctrine is nowhere else attested. The closest parallel I could find is in a quotation of Iamblichus by Simplicius, In Cat. 135.23–25. In this text Iamblichus gives a metaphysical explanation for how the power of the One produces the two types of quantity, discrete and continuous: “According to its activity that stays within, it produces discrete quantity; according to its proceeding activity, continuous quantity. Since it both remains and proceeds together, it generates both.” (
Is it possible that someone, having read this section in Simplicius’ In Cat. commentary, attributed this view to Iamblichus? Could it have been Psellos? Psellos expresses his admiration for the Proclean doctrine about “remaining, proceeding, and reverting”. He quotes the full text of prop. 35 and calls it the core (
To conclude, the scholia in M throw a fascinating light on the discussion on participation in the period between Psellos and the debate around Palamas. They are, in their different layers, both precursors of that debate and contemporary with it. They show again the lasting fascination for Proclus’ theological thought, which, through centuries of reading Dionysian writings, had indirectly impregnated Byzantine intellectual life deeply.
The Parisinus gr. 2423 dates from about the same period, but it is unfortunately incomplete.
Bibliothecae Diui Marci Venetiarum codices graeci manuscripti. Volumen II: Thesaurus Antiquus. Codices 300–625, ed. E. Mioni (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1985), pp. 369–374. On the history of the text of the Elementatio theologica see E. Dodds, “Introduction”, in Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963²), pp. xxxiii–xlvi and my contribution, “La tradition du texte de l’Elementatio Theologica de Proclus”, in G. Aubry, L. Brisson, P. Hoffman, L. Lavaud (eds), Les Éléments de théologie de Proclus: Interprétations, réceptions antiques et modernes (Paris: Hermann, 2021), pp. 27–67. I am very grateful to Dragos Calma for obtaining beautiful colour images of the manuscript thanks to funding from the European Research Council within the framework of the project Neoplatonism and Abrahamic Traditions (ERC_CoG_771640).
I forgot to mention the intervention of this second hand in Steel, “La tradition du texte”, p. 31 (see Dodds, “Introduction”, p. XXXV).
Some examples of these scholia were given in an appendix of Steel, “La tradition du texte”.
See Steel, “La tradition du texte”, pp. 36–37.
I thank John D. Demetracopoulos for having read a first version and having suggested corrections.
I could not identify who are these
The beginning of this scholion is illegible in M; Pa reads
As we know those scholia only from Pa, we cannot know whether they were firsthand or not in M.
M has only
In this concluding summary I mainly use the scholia of the first(*) scholiast. As for the other scholiast (⁘), he comments that “the One is somehow participated, not absolutely, whereas it is absolutely unparticipated”.
See also sch. at prop. 8 and at prop. 12 where same text is quoted.
On how Nicholas discusses Proclus’ view on participation, see J. Robinson, “Dionysius Against Proclus: the Apophatic Critique in Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of the Elements of Theology”, in D.D. Butorac, D.A. Layne (eds), Proclus and his Legacy (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 249–269, in particular p. 256 ff.
See Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. A critical edition with an introduction on Nicholas’ life and works by A.D. Angelou (Athens / Leiden: The Academy of Athens Athens / Brill, 1984), intr. p. 4.3–13 (translation J. Robinson, Nicholas of Methone’s Refutation of Proclus: Theology and Neoplatonism in 12th Century Byzantium. A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Graduate Program in Medieval Studies, Notre Dame (Indiana), 2014.). E. Dodds refers to this criticism on p. 211 (ad prop. 22): “[…] [Proclus] lays himself open to charges of inconsistency:
See Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 100, p. 98.6–10 (translation Robinson).
See Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 63, p. 65.7–10 (translation Robinson).
The term
See in particular Gregory Palamas, Pro hesychastis 3, ed. P.K. Chrestou,
Palamas’ main authority is (Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990), p. 222.16:
See Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen (Bonn: Weber, 1830), Logos 23.2 and 35.15–17 with quotation of the full text of prop. 24. See the contribution of Börje Bydén in this volume.
On Gregoras copy of the Elementatio see Steel, “La tradition du texte”, 37–38.
I could not make sense of the addition
See Michale Psellos, Philosophia Minora. Vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica. ed D.J. O’Meara (Leipzig: Teubner, 1989), p. 118.4–17.
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Proclus, Elementatio theologica
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. gr. 18
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 1842
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Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 2045
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 2423
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Bibliothecae Diui Marci Venetiarum codices graeci manuscripti. Volumen II: Thesaurus Antiquus. Codices 300–625, ed. E. Mioni, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1985
(Ps.‑)Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1990, pp. 107–231.
Gregory Palamas, Pro hesychastis 3, ed. P.K. Chrestou, Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα, ed. P.K. Chrestou, vol. 1, Thessalonike, Kyromanos, 1988 2.
Gregory Palamas, Contra Nicephorum Gregoram 2, ed. P.K. Chrestou, in Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα, ed. P.K. Chrestou, vol. 4, Thessalonike, Kyromanos, 1988.
Michael Psellos, Philosophia Minora. Vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica. ed D.J. O’Meara, Leipzig, Teubner, 1989.
Nicholas of Methone,
Ἀνάπτυξις τῆς Θεολογικῆς Στοιχειώσεως Πρόκλου Πλατωνικοῦ Φιλοσόφου / Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. A critical edition with an introduction on Nicholas’ life and works by A.D. Angelou, Athens / Leiden, The Academy of Athens Athens / Brill, 1984.Nikephoros Gregoras, Byzantina Historia, ed. L. Schopen, Bonn, Weber, 1830.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. and transl. E.R. Dodds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963².
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Bydén, B., “Proclus (and Nicholas of Methone) in the Hesychast Controversy”, in this volume, pp. 400–421.
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Perl, E., “St Gregory Palamas and the Metaphysics of Creation”, in Dionysius 14 (1990), 105–130; “Palamas Transformed: Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium”, in M. Hinterberger, C. Schabel (eds), Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500, Leuven, Peeters, 2011, pp. 263–372.
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