Introduction
The legal idea of an ‘economic constitution’ (Wirtschaftsverfassung) is an iridescent mind provoking thought in German law and legal scholarship since more than a century. It goes back as far as to the Weimar Constitution (1.), unfolded in the early scholarly debates on the content of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law (2.), but was not recognized as a constitutional principle by the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, however in its substance linked to the Basic Law’s fundamental rights by it and by legal doctrine (3.) and revived in its conceptual relevance by the emergence of the common market law of the European Communities and its practical implications for the legal order of the economy as well as by today’s explicit Union law provisions on the principles of this order (4.) and leaves scholarly legal doctrine with its permanent intrinsic task of clarifying the substantive systematic coherence of the economically relevant legal provisions with a view to their consistent interpretation and to counseling legislation and policy (5.).
1 The Roots of the Topic of an ‘Economic Constitution’ in the Weimar Constitution
Since it often proves difficult to trace back and identify the true inventor of a specific normative thought or idea, one can at least reach solid ground in naming a remarkable novelty in positive law texts. While the concept of ‘economic constitution’ can be traced back to the French physiocrats of the 18th century and the German economists of the historical-ethical school of the 19th century1 – more or less appearing like a “will-o’-the
The following articles of this part of the wrv provided for a broad array of economy-related constitutional guidelines, principles and rights, among them: the principle of freedom of contract in economic intercourse in accordance with the statutes (Article 152, par. 1 wrv); the right to own property and the protection against expropriation except for the common welfare and upon statutory grounds in exchange of adequate compensation (Article 153 wrv); the guarantee of the right of inheritance (Article 154 wrv); the state supervision of the distribution and use of the land (Article 155 wrv); the competence of the state to transfer into public ownership private economic enterprises
The normative scheme of the Weimar Constitution gave rise to scientific reflection on the normative overall order of the economy and the role of the state.9 The discussion about the basic constitutional orientation of the economic order was conducted primarily on the basis of the fundamental rights of the constitution.10 They received different interpretations: as a safeguard for the trade unions’ conception of economic democracy (Franz Leopold Neumann)11, as a socially modified liberal basis of the economic order (Albert Hensel)12, as state-bound institutions (Ernst Rudolf Huber)13 and as a blanket for the legislature (Franz Böhm).14 Before this discussion could unfold, the Weimar Constitution eroded with the National Socialists’ rise to power
2 Early Scholarly Debates on the ‘Economic Constitution’ of the Basic Law
With the new beginning of the state and the legal order after the fall of the National Socialist dictatorship and the end of the Second World War, a new perspective was also opened for the idea and practice of the legal “ordering of economic life”. In midst of the seething time19 of the different approaches of decartellization,20 the allied antitrust laws,21 the rise of the ordoliberal doctrine (Walter Eucken,22 Franz Böhm)23 and the concept of a social market economy (Alfred Müller-Armack,24 Ludwig
2.1 The Thesis of “Economic Theoretical Neutrality” of the Basic Law
The first line of thought promoted in particular by Herbert Krüger was linked to the evident lack of a separate section on economic life in the Basic Law. It deduced from this absence the thesis that economic policy and legislation were constitutionally bound to be guided by “economically value-neutral points of view” (wirtschaftstheoretisch wertneutrale Gesichtspunkte)29. During the time of fierce ideological-political controversies over Germany’s economic restructuring, Krüger argued that the constitution prevents every victorious majority from filling the constitutional blanket solely in accordance with its ideas. He concluded that any economic theoretical monism or purism of
2.2 The Thesis of the Constitutional Guarantee of the ‘Social Market Economy’
The most profiled positive thesis in early scholarly discussions on the content of Basic Law in relation to “economic life” held that the Basic Law guaranteed the social market economy. It was developed by Hans Carl Nipperdey.33 Although no explicit wording in the Basic Law supported his view, Nipperdey argued that this concept was inherent in the constitution and recognizable if looked at its composition of provisions from a viewpoint of economic models. For this conclusion he relied on a distinction of four models: first the liberalist market economy in the sense of the idea of “laissez faire, laissez aller” (liberalistische Marktwirtschaft), second the central administration economy (Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft), third the “order neutrality”
However, Nipperdey’s thesis went further. It was not limited to the model-like summation of the results of the (potential) application of the various constitutional provisions, but essentially asserted a model guarantee as an independent constitutional principle. In addition to the entirety of the explicit constitutional norms, the “social market economy” emerges as an own constitutional standard for the interpretation of individual provisions (such as the notion of the “constitutional order” as a limit of the individual right of every person to free development of his personality in Article 2 Basic Law or as a standard for determining the relationship between different freedoms) as well as a constitutional standard for assessing the legitimacy of economic law legislation (such as trade law or competition law) and of economic policy (in particular of state intervention in competition). In Nipperdey’s writings concrete consequences of this approach can be found such as the assessment of the prohibition of cartel agreements as a concretization of the constitution35 and, by that, the precedence of the freedom of competition over the freedom of contract (in the sense of concluding a cartel agreement); or a constitutional conformity requirement for state intervention, in particular by means of state aids, with a market economy.36 In the logic of this understanding of the Basic Law, the constitutional admissibility of public interventions was restricted to those aimed at safeguarding the functioning of the market economy or, as an exception, to those that were not in conformity with the market economy (marktinkonforme Interventionen), but could be legitimized on the basis of overriding requirements of the constitutional order, in particular the constitutional social policy principle.37
2.3 The Thesis of the Basic Law’s Institutional Guarantee of a Mixed Economic Constitution
The third line of thinking, elaborated by Ernst Rudolf Huber, centered in the thesis of an institutional guarantee of a mixed economic constitution in the Basic Law.42 It is based on the premise that the Basic Law, despite the lack of a separate section on economic life, has a certain system of the basic economic order in mind.43 Ultimately, however, this thesis is limited to the statement that constitutional guarantees of economic freedom are “balanced” with constitutional social bonds by the Basic Law44 and constitute in this sense a mixed
3 The View of the Federal Constitutional Court
The debate on the economic constitution of the Basic Law reached the Federal Constitutional Court (fcc) as early as in 1952, 1953 and 1954.45 78 companies had lodged constitutional complaints (Article 93, par. 1 no 4 lit. a Basic Law) against the statutory obligation to pay a one-off amount in the course of the reconstruction of the German economy to cover the urgent investment needs of coal mining, the iron-making industry and the energy sector (Investment Aid Act or Investitionshilfegesetz). In addition to their assertion of a violation of their fundamental rights (among them the freedom of action and in particular the right of free entrepreneurship and the guarantee of property), they had asserted a violation of the “unwritten” constitutional principle of economic policy neutrality as well as a violation of the existing economic and social order and of the requirement to use means in conformity with a market economy.
The fcc rejected the existence of such unwritten constitutional principles by saying that the Basic Law neither guaranteed the “economic political neutrality” (wirtschaftspolitische Neutralität) of government and legislative powers nor a “social market economy” that could only be managed with market-compliant means (martktkonforme Mittel).46 It added that the “economic political neutrality” of the Basic Law only consists in the fact that the constitution has not “expressly” taken a decision for a particular economic system (Wirtschaftssystem). The fcc concluded that this constitutional situation enables the legislature to pursue the appropriate economic policy, “provided it observes the Basic Law”. However, this restriction (“provided”) is significant in view of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law, which may only be restricted
The fcc, in consequence of its reasoning, found that the economic and social order of the time was an order possible under the Basic Law, but not the only possible order. Hence the court stated the constitutional irrelevance of whether the Investment Aid Act was in line with the previous economic and social order and whether the means used to steer the economy were in conformity with the market (marktkonform). However, in a remarkable twist, the fcc, when examining the compatibility of the Investment Aid Act with the principle of equality (Article 3 Basic Law) also addressed the argument of the complainants that the Investment Aid Act caused a shift in the “competitive position” (Wettbewerbslage) at the disadvantage of the obliged entities.48 The court recognized that any economic intervention (Wirtschaftslenkungsmaßnahme), by intervening in the process of social life, more or less corrects the free play of forces (das freie Spiel der Kräfte) and the competitive situation.49 Although the fcc found that such measures would not already be inadmissible by the sheer fact that they change the competitive situation, it nevertheless held that their inadmissibility could result from special circumstances (besondere Umstände) that would justify the conclusion that the legislature would act arbitrarily.50 Concerning the Investment Aid Act the court found that the limits of the discretion granted to the legislature had not been exceeded.51 But the fcc generally emphasized that such laws must be required by the public interest and must not arbitrarily neglect the interests of others that are worthy of protection.
This basic view has been confirmed by several subsequent judgments of the fcc,52 in particular in the judgment on the ‘co-determination’ in enterprises
Nevertheless, due to the fcc’s emphasis on the individual freedoms in economic matters, one cannot seriously dispute that, regardless of the fcc’s conceptional and terminological hesitation, the consequence of the constitutional freedoms is the basic guarantee of a market economy which is defined by free coordination of free preferences of offer and demand as well as the freedom of production and distribution and the guarantee of private property. This does not preclude the admissibility of state interventions in the economy but requires their justification, if they restrict fundamental freedoms as, e.g., concretized and differentiated in the judgment on Vattenfall’s complaint against the nuclear phase-out.57 Independent from this fundamental rights-based approach, the additional question might be raised as to whether the most relevant answer to the question of the constitutionally binding economic system in Germany has not shifted from the Basic Law to the law of the European Union (see iv.).
4
4.1 The Content of the eec-Treaty and the Union Treaty
When in 1957 the Federal Republic together with five other European States concluded the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (eec), the implications of its content for the significance of the Basic Law for answering the question of the relevant economic order in Germany went, it seems, unnoticed in the mentioned constitutional debate. However, in the separate scholarly discipline of European Community law the European economic order was quickly thematized by German authors (Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung).58 It could not be overlooked that the decision for a common market, based on
Hence it didn’t come as a surprise that in 1992/1993 the Maastricht Treaty on European Union included a clear normative statement on the economic order in the European Community which today reads as a (programmatic) obligation of the Member States and the Union to adopt “an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition” (today Article 119, par. 1 tfeu). Hence a principle of the intended normative order for the economy is enshrined in primary law. While in view of the ecj this provision “do(es) not impose on the Member States clear and unconditional obligations which may be relied on by individuals before the national courts”, but contains “a general principle whose application calls for complex economic assessments which are a matter for the legislature or the national administration”,68 concrete obligations in conceptual line with this obligation are included in the treaties such as the mentioned prohibitions of restrictions of the free movement or the mentioned rules on competition, in particular the requirement of compatibility of state aids with the internal market.
Eventually in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon broadened the normative qualification of the intended economic order of “an open market economy with free
4.2 The Constitutional Connection between European Union Law and the Basic Law
It is obvious that these statements of European Union law are not without relevance for answering the question of the legally binding economic system in Germany. I submit that they are even constitutionally binding. This is the result of the constitutional consequences of the opening clause of the Federal Republic’s statehood by the former general Article 24 Basic Law70 and today’s specific Article 23 Basic Law for the European Union.71 According to both provisions “the Federation may transfer sovereign powers”, “by a law”, to an external authority: in Article 24 Basic Law “to international organizations”, in Article 23 Basic Law to “the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the principle of subsidiarity and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law”. Such a law which concretely opens the Federal Republic’s statehood for accepting the rules of a common economic order had been adopted already in form of the Consent Act to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and, later on (in form of the respective Consent Acts), to all the subsequent amendments until today’s Treaty of Lisbon. Hence the question of the economic constitution in the Federal Republic cannot be reasonably answered without taking into account the effects of European Union law anymore. In this respect one can argue that the Basic Law as well
5 The Permanent Intrinsic Task of Scholarly Legal Doctrine
The current situation of Germany’s ‘economic constitution’ (in the sense of constitutionally rooted provisions for the economic life) leaves scholarly legal doctrine with the permanent intrinsic task of clarifying the substantive coherence of the normative system of the (moving) applicable legal provisions with a view to their consistent interpretation and to counseling legislation and policy. It comprises in particular four aspects.
5.1 Upholding the Autonomy of the Complex Legal Order
First of all legal doctrine in search of a coherent normative system for the applicable legal economic order has to methodically uphold the autonomy of the complex legal system in relation to models of economic theory.73 However, this caveat is without prejudice to take account of its insights in causal economic relationships74 (systemic rationality).
5.2 Identifying and Collecting Relevant Principles
The second aspect concerns the identification and collection of the principles in the legal economic order such as, in particular, the principle of an open market economy with free competition (Article 119, par. 1 and 2 tfeu), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 Charter of Fundamental Rights [cfr]; Article 2 and 12 Basic Law), the right to property (Article 17 cfr; Article 14 Basic Law), the freedom of contract (Article 6 cfr; Article 2 Basic Law), the equality principle (Article 20 cfr; Article 3 Basic Law); the freedom of association (Article 12 cfr; Article 9 Basic Law); the transnational market access freedoms of the internal market (Article 26 et seq. tfeu) with a system of ensuring that competition is not distorted in it (Protocol No 27); the principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments (Article 119, par. 3 tfeu); the normative objective of a highly competitive and social market economy (Article 3, par. 3 tfeu); the functioning of
5.3 Classifying and Evaluating Legal Norms in Relation to the Basic Principle of the Legal Economic Order
A third aspect of the task of scholarly legal doctrine is the classification and evaluation of legal norms in relation to the basic principle of the legal economic order. Since Article 3 teu as well as Article 119 tfeu center in the principle of a market economy, a possible structural understanding of the variety of norms with relevance for the economy can be found in their classification according to their objectives in relation to this principle. To these ends I propose to distinguish six groups of provisions according to their objective:75 provisions of guaranteeing economic freedoms for acting on the market;76 provisions for protecting the functioning of this system of freedom and competition against internally caused perversions by the conduct of its actors (in particular cartel agreements,77 abuses of dominant positions in a market78, concentration which would significantly impede effective competition)79 as well as against externally caused distortions of competition by public interventions (in particular state aids,80 preferential treatments in public procurement,81 preferential treatments of public undertakings)82; provisions for protecting specific common goods (Schutzgüter)83 or serving mandatory requirements84 in a competitive market economy (such as, e.g., health, the
5.4 Interpreting Individual Provisions and Defining Constitutional Conditions for Their Compatibility and Admissibility
A fourth aspect of the task of scholarly legal doctrine can be seen in interpreting individual provisions in relation to the basic principle of the legally intended economic order and in defining the constitutional conditions (national and/or European) for the compatibility of an individual legal provision or other policy measures in economically relevant matters. If the basic principle of an economic order is defined as a market economy, it seems adequate to take the economic freedoms as the starting point for fulfilling the basic objective of justice to decide structurally equal conflicts in an equal way and structurally different conflicts in an adequately different way.
As a consequence for the interpretation of a provision (given that it is interpretable), the less restrictive version for the economic freedom should prevail.91 As far as economic and legal policy is concerned legal scholarship is called to identify the general normative criteria for the justifying conditions for restrictions of economic freedoms including the freedom of competition as well as for distortions of competition and, by that, to identify the limits of
In particular in the legal issues of aptitude, necessity and adequacy, the consideration of insights of economic theory into the causal relationships of the market and competition and into market rationality93 can foster a convincing national or European constitutional assessment of existing or envisaged provisions: e.g. of the aptitude, necessity and adequacy of market bans of a certain product (such as the fixing of a minimum alcohol content for the marketing of fruit liquors);94 or of establishing specific antitrust devices for taming the conduct of it-undertakings of a dominant position in the market;95 or of European block exemptions from the general prohibition of cartel agreements between undertakings96 or from the general incompatibility of state aids with the internal market which threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.97
In this way, legal doctrine can develop persuasive authority in national or European constitutional law for the interpretation of existing provisions as well as for legal policy with relevance for the economic order.
The legal idea of an ‘economic constitution’ (Wirtschaftsverfassung) in German law and legal scholarship has seen a changeable development. Once triggered by the chapter on “the economic life” in the Weimar Constitution the idea inspired a fierce debate about the existence and content of the concept of Wirtschaftsverfassung in the Basic Law among scholars until the Federal Constitutional Court rejected its recognition as a constitutional principle. But it persists in the idea of macroeconomic market functions of the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. Independent from this orientation the actual relevance of German law in this conceptual line has been overtaken by the emergence of the common (today: internal) market law of the European Communities (today: the European Union) and its implications for the legal order of the economy (Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht) as well as by today’s explicit Union law provisions on the principles of this order as “an open market economy with free competition” (Article 119, par. 1 tfeu) and as “a highly competitive and social market economy” (Article 3, par. 3 teu). The intrinsic task of scholarly legal doctrine in this context continues: upholding the autonomy of the complex legal order in relation to models of economic theory without neglecting systemic rationality, identifying and collecting relevant principles, classifying and evaluating legal norms in relation to the basic principle of the legal economic order, interpreting individual legal provisions in this systematic context and defining the constitutional conditions (national and/or European) for the compatibility and admissibility of an individual legal provision or other policy measures in economically relevant matters.
See supra in this volume, P. Steiner, « Les Physiocrates, l’économie politique, l’Europe ». See also: R. Piepenbrock, Der Gedanke eines Wirtschaftsrechts in der neuzeitlichen Literatur bis zum Ersten Wektkrieg, Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1964; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I.: Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1999, p. 12; K. W. Nörr, « “Economic Constitution”: On the Roots of a Legal Concept », Journal of Law and Religion, 1994, vol. 11, n°1, pp. 343–354.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 12 (« Irrlicht »).
K. W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1988, pp. 166,173 ff. Ed.: see also supra in this volume, Section 1 – The Emergence of the Concept. From the Physiocrats to the Weimar Republic, and esp. the contributions of G. Grégoire (« The Economic Constitution under Weimar : Doctrinal Controversies and Ideological Struggles »), and the discussions by H. Rabault (« Le Concept de Constitution économique : émergence et fonctions ») and P.C. Caldwell (« The Concept and Politics of the Economic Constitution »).
English translation source for the wrv available at:
Article 1, par. 1 s. 2 wrv.
In the sense of “Reichsgesetze”; Article 151, par. 3 wrv.
K. W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen, op. cit., p. 167; M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke, Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, 2nd ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. 500 ff.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 181 ff.
See supra in this volume, G. Grégoire, « The Economic Constitution under Weimar : Doctrinal Controversies and Ideological Struggles ».
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 173.
F. L. Neumann, « Die soziale Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Weimarer Verfassung », Die Arbeit: Zeitschrift für Gewerkschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftskunde, 1930, vol. 7, pp 569–582.
A. Hensel, Grundrechte und politische Weltanschauung, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1931.
E. R. Huber, Das Deutsche Reich als Wirtschaftsstaat, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1931.
F. Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf. Eine Untersuchung zur Frage des wirtschaftkichen Kampfrechts und zur Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung, Berlin, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933, p. 337; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1994, pp. 101 ff., pp. 146 ff.; K. W. Nörr, « On the concept of the “economic constitution” and the importance of Franz Böhm from the viewpoint of legal history », European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, n°4, 1996, pp. 345–356.
See the legislative acts in H. Hildebrandt (ed.), Die deutschen Verfassungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Paderborn-Zurich, Schöningh, 1975, pp. 111 ff.
M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke, Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, op. cit., p. 503; L. A. Holm, Kartelltheorie und internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 2013, pp. 210 ff.
Ibid., p. 223.
R. Wagenführ, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1954.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 19 ff., pp. 36 ff., pp. 58 ff.
Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17 – August 2, 1945, Conclusions, in:
W. C. Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001.
W. Eucken, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1939; W. Eucken, « Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung », ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1949, vol. 2, n° 1, pp. 1–99; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts, op. cit., pp. 140 ff.
F. Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf, op. cit.; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 81 ff.; K. W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts, op. cit., pp. 146 ff.; K. W. Nörr, An der Wiege deutscher Identität nach 1945: Franz Böhm zwischen Ordo und Liberalismus, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 1993; K. W. Nörr, « On the concept of the “economic constitution” and the importance of Franz Böhm from the viewpoint of legal history », op. cit.
A. Müller-Armack, « Soziale Marktwirtschaft », in Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik: Studien und Konzepte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und zur Europäischen Integration, Freiburg, Rombach, 1966, pp. 243–250; F. Quaas, Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Wirklichkeit und Verfremdung eines Konzepts, Bern, Paul Haupt Verlag, 2000, p. 44; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.; K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. II: Von der sozial-liberalen Koalition bis zur Wiedervereinigung, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2007, pp. 3 ff.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 40 ff.
M. Schmoeckel and M. Maetschke, Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft, op. cit., pp. 504 ff.; Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ed.), Markt oder Plan – Wirtschaftsordnungen in Deutschland 1945–1961, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 1997.
See, e.g., H. Dreier, « Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung. Vorbild oder Gegenbild des Grundgesetzes », Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2019, vol. 69, n°16–17, pp. 19–26.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1984, pp. 250 ff.
H. Krüger, « Staatsverfassung und Wirtschaftsverfassung », Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 1951, vol. 66, pp. 361–368, esp. p. 363.
Ibid.; H. Krüger, Grundgesetz und Kartellgesetzgebung, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1950, p. 11.
E.g. K. J. Partsch, « Die verfassungsmäßige Sicherung von Wirtschaftsprinzipien », ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1954, vol. 6, pp. 19–38, esp. p. 22; E. R. Huber, « Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht », Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, 1956, pp. 97–102, spec. p. 98 ff.; H. Ehmke, Wirtschaft und Verfassung : Die Verfassungsrechtsprechung des Supreme Court zur Wirtschaftsregulierung, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1961, pp. 43 ff.; E.-J. Mestmäcker, « Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung », in H. Sauermann and E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.), Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung. Festschrift für Franz Böhm zum 80. Geburtstag, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1975, pp. 383–419, esp. pp. 394 ff.; R. Zuck, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Stabilitätsgesetz, Munich, Goldmann, 1975, pp. 31 ff.; H. H. Hollmann, Rechtsstaatliche Kontrolle der Globalsteuerung: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer normativen Kontrolle globalsteuernder Wirtschaftspolitik am Beispiel des Stabilitätsgesetzes, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, pp. 82 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 252 ff.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., p. 253.
H. C. Nipperdey, Die soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Verfassung der Bundesrepublik, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1954; H. C. Nipperdey, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Bundesverfassungsgericht, Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1960, pp. 10 ff.; H. C. Nipperdey, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Grundgesetz, 2nd ed., Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1961, pp. 44 ff.
Supra, footnote 24.
H. C. Nipperdey, Die soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Verfassung der Bundesrepublik, op. cit., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 21.
Supra, footnote 24.
H. C. F. Liesegang, Die verfassungsrechtliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Zentralfragen und Strukturprinzipien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung grundrechtstheoretischer Überlegungen, Hamburg, Hansischer Gildenverlag Heitmann, 1977, pp. 26 ff.; N. Reich, Markt und Recht : Theorie und Praxis des Wirtschaftsrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Darmstadt, Luchterhand, 1977, p. 80.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 255 ff.
On the general benefit of reflecting on market rationality in legal issues W. Möschel, Rechtsordnung zwischen Plan und Markt: am Beispiel von Preiskontrollen nach § 22 GWB, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1975, pp. 29 ff.
E. R. Huber, Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, op. cit., p. 101; E. R. Huber, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht, vol. I, 2nd ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1953, pp. 18 ff., pp. 30 ff. ; similar R. Schmidt, Wirtschaftspolitik und Verfassung, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1971, p. 135; critical e.g. H. Ehmke, Wirtschaft und Verfassung, pp. 26 ff.
E. R. Huber, Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, op. cit., p. 98.
Ibid.
BverfG, Judgement of 20 July 1954, Investitionshilfegesetz, BverfGE 4,7.
Ibid., D 5.
R. Scholz, Paritätische Mitbestimmung und Grundgesetz : verfassungsrechtliche Fragen zur gesetzlichen Einführung der paritätischen Unternehmensmitbestimmung, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1974, pp. 38 ff.; R. Scholz, « Grenzen staatlicher Aktivität unter der grundgesetzlichen Wirtschaftsverfassung », in D.Duwendag (ed.), Der Staatssektor in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, pp. 113 ff., esp. pp. 124 ff.; R. Scholz, Entflechtung und Verfassung, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1981, pp. 87 ff.
BverfG, Judgement of 20 July 1954, Investitionshilfegesetz, loc. cit., E 1 lit. f.
Ibid., D 5 and E 1 lit. f.
Ibid., E 1 lit.f.
Ibid., D 5 and E 1 lit. f.
See, in particular, BverfG, Judgement of 11 June 1958, Pharmacies, BverfGE 7, 377; BverfG, Judgment of 18 December 1968, Mills, BverfGE 25, 1; BverfG, Judgment of 16 March 1971, Petroleum Storage, BverfGE 30, 292.
BverfG, Judgement of 1 March 1979, Mitbestimmungsgesetz, BverfGE 50, 290, recital 123 ff.
Ibid., recital 123: “keine unmittelbare Festlegung und Gewährleistung einer bestimmten Wirtschaftsordnung”.
Ibid.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 12.
BverfG, Judgement of 6 December 2016, Atomausstieg, BverfGE 143, 246, recital 214 ff.
In particular C. F. Ophüls, « Grundzüge europäischer Wirtschaftsverfassung », Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 1962, vol. 124, pp. 136–181 ; E-.J. Mestmäcker, « Offene Märkte im System unverfälschten Wettbewerbs in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft », in H. Coing, H. Kronstein and E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.), Wirtschaftsordnung und Rechtsordnung. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Franz Böhm, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1965, pp. 345–391; W. von Simson, « Die Marktwirtschaft als Verfassungsprinzip in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften », in: Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg/Br. (ed.), Zur Einheit der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften, Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1967, pp. 55–68; J. Scherer, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der EWG, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1970; U. Everling, « Eigentumsordnung und Wirtschaftsordnung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft », in F. Baur, J. Esser, F. Kübler and E. Steindorff (eds.), Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen. Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser, Tübingen, Mohr, 1974, pp. 379–401; M. Zuleeg, « Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften », in Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration (ed.), Wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitische Ordnungsprobleme der EG, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1978, pp. 73–100; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 280 ff.; T. Oppermann, « Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung nach der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte », in P.-C. Müller-Graff and M. Zuleeg (eds.), Staat und Wirtschaft in der EG. Kolloquium für Bodo Börner, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, pp. 53–71; C. Joerges, « Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die Renaissance der regulativen Politik », Working Paper eui law, n° 1991/15; J. Basedow, Von der deutschen zur europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung, Tübingen, Mohr, 1992; A. Hatje, « Wirtschaftsverfassung », in A. von Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Heidelberg, Springer, 2003, pp. 683–745; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Die Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Herausforderung grenzüberschreitender Unternehmensübernahmen », in E.-J. Mestmäcker, W. Möschel and M. Nettesheim (eds.), Verfassung und Politik im Prozess der europäischen Integration, Baden-Baden, Nomos 2008, pp. 195–222; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Das verschleierte Antlitz der Lissabonner Wirtschaftsverfassung », Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009, vol. 173, pp. 443–453; C. Joerges, « Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise », Der Staat, 2012, vol. 51, n°3, pp. 357–385; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Europäisches Binnenmarkt- und Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht », in P.-C. Müller-Graff (ed.), Europäisches Binnenmarkt- und Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht, Enzyklopädie Europarecht, vol. 4, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2021, § 1 (pp. 61 ff.).
Today Article 26, par. 2 tfeu.
Supra footnote 58. Ed.: regarding the effects in terms of ‘competition between jurisdiction’, see also infra in this volume, the contributions in Section 6 on Global Governance and New (Economic) Constitutionalism, esp. M.M. Mohamed Salah, « La mise en concurrence internationale des ordres juridiques nationaux », and T. Biscahie & S. Gill, « Three Dialectics of Global Governance and the Future of New Constitutionalism ».
Today Article 345 tfeu.
U. Everling, « Eigentumsordnung und Wirtschaftsordnung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft », op. cit., pp. 379 ff.; G. Burghardt, Die Eigentumsordnungen in den Mitgliedstaaten und der EWG-Vertrag. Zur Auslegung des Art. 222 EWG-Vertrag, Hamburg, Appel, 1969.
D. W. Rahmsdorf, Ordnungspolitischer Dissens und europäische Integration, Kehl, Verlag Engel, 1982; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Ordnungspolitische Divergenzen und wettbewerbliche Lauterkeit in der Verfassung des Gemeinsamen Marktes », in H. Jahrrreiß, B. Börner and K. Stern (eds.), Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit. Festschrift für Karl Carstens, Cologne/Berlin/Bonn/Munich, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1985, pp. 209–230; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., p. 65.
K. W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 32 ff. and pp. 36 ff.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Privatrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht », in P.-C. Müller-Graff and M. Zuleeg (eds.), Staat und Wirtschaft in der EG. Kolloquium für Bodo Börne, op. cit., pp. 17–52, esp. pp. 27 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Extending Private Party Autonomy Across Borders », in S. Grundmann, W. Kerber and S. Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 2001, pp. 133–150.
E-.J. Mestmäcker, « Offene Märkte im System unverfälschten Wettbewerbs in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft », op. cit., pp. 354 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 280 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, Binnenmarktziel und Rechtsordnung – Binnenmarktrecht, Bergisch Gladbach/Cologne, Eul/O. Schmidt, 1989, pp. 30 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Die wettbewerbverfasste Marktwirtschaft als gemeineuropäisches Verfassungsprinzip? », Zeitschrift Europarecht, 1997, pp. 433–457.
E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006, p. 288 and pp. 290 ff.; S. Okruch, « Die Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung zwischen Input- und Output-Legitimation. Ein verfassungsökonomisches Impromptu » in C. Stumpf F. Kainer and C. Baldus (eds.), Privatrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Verfassungsrecht – Privatinitiative und Gemeinwohlhorizonte in der europäischen Integration. Festschrift für Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, pp. 1000–1005. Ed. : see also supra in this volume, F. Marty, « Évolution des politiques de concurrence en droit de l’UE : de la Wettbewerbsordnung ordolibérale à la More Economic Approach néolibérale ? », and C. Mongouachon, « Les difficultés d’une interprétation ordolibérale de la constitution micro-économique de l’Union européenne ».
ecj, Judgment of 3 October 2000, Échirolles, Case C-9/99, ecli:eu:c:2000:532, recital 25.
E.g. P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Soziale Marktwirtschaft als neuer Primärrechtsbegriff der Europäischen Union », in P.-C. Müller-Graff, S. Schmahl and V. Skouris (eds.), Europäisches Recht zwischen Bewhärung und Wandel. Festschrift für Dieter H. Scheuing, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, S. 600–623; C. Stumpf, « Das Recht der sozialen Marktwirtschaft im Binnenmarkt », in P.-C. Müller-Graff (ed.), Europäisches Binnenmarkt- und Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht, op. cit., p.1471 ff.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 320 ff.
R. Streinz, « Art.23 GG par. 54 et seqq. », in M. Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar, 6th éd., Munich, C.H. Beck, 2012, pp. 939.
For France, see H. Gaudin (ed.), La constitution européenne de la France, Paris, Dalloz, 2017.
W. Möschel, « Der Einfluß der europäischen auf die deutsche Rechtsordnung », in M. Lieb, U. Noack and H. P. Westermann (eds.), Festschrift für Wolfgang Zöllner, Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1999, pp. 395–410.
W. Möschel, Rechtsordnung zwischen Plan und Markt, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
See P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Europäisches Binnenmarkt- und Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht », op. cit., pp. 68 ff.
E.g., Articles 6, 16, 20 cfr; Articles 2, 12, 14 Basic Law.
Article 101 tfeu; § 1 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. I S. 2).
Article 102 tfeu; § 19 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. i s. 2).
Article 2, par. 3 Council Regulation (ec) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, oj 2004 L 24/1; § 36 par. 1 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. I S. 2).
Article 107 tfeu.
E.g. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/ec, oj 2014 L 94/65; § 97 et seqq. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021, bgbl. I S.2).
Article 106, par. 1 tfeu.
E.g., Article 36 and 114, par. 3 tfeu.
Leading decision: ecj, Judgment of 20 February 1979, Cassis de Dijon, Case 128/78, ecli:eu:c:1979:42.
Article 39, par. 1 lit. d tfeu.
Article 194, par. 1 tfeu; § 1 par 1 Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) (7 July 2005; bgbl. I S. 1970, 3621).
Article 39, par. 1 lit. b tfeu.
Article 91 tfeu.
Article 3, par. 3 subsection 1 s. 1 teu; § 1 Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft (8 June 1967; bgbl. I S. 582).
Article 119, par. 3 tfeu; § 1 Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft (8 June 1967; bgbl. I S. 582).
Like for example in ecj, Judgment of 20 February 1979 (Cassis de Dijon), loc. cit., in the interpretation of the necessity for accepting obstacles (caused by a specific national rule on consumer protection in marketing fruit liquors) to the free movement of goods (today’s Article 34 tfeu) and, by that, to border-crossing competition in the common market.
P.-C. Müller-Graff, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im Marktrecht, op. cit., pp. 341 ff.; P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Die wettbewerbverfasste Marktwirtschaft als gemeineuropäisches Verfassungsprinzip? », op. cit., pp. 443 ff.
W. Möschel, Rechtsordnung zwischen Plan und Markt, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
ecj, Judgment of 20 February 1979, Cassis de Dijon, loc. cit. Choice of alternative options for the consumer on the market; Personal responsibility of the consumer based on precise labeling. On this legal principle of personal responsibility in the market see P.-C. Müller-Graff, « Das der Selbstverantwortung im heutigen Privatrecht – Europarechtliche Grundlagen », in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), Das Prinzip der Selbstverantwortung, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2011, pp. 139–158, esp. pp. 150 ff.
Such as, e.g., recently § 19a Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. I S. 2).
Such as the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, oj 2010 L 102/1. The analogous application of such block exemption regulations of the EU within the scope of German antitrust law is ordered by § 2 par. 2 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (18 January 2021; bgbl. I S. 2).
Such as the Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, oj 2014 L 187/1.
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