This book emerged out of many projects, experiences, collaborations, and encouragements.

I first became interested in the subject of American universities in the Middle East while assisting former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad with his memoirs (Khalilzad, 2016). My close colleague during this period was Marin Strmecki, who served as policy coordinator and special advisor on Afghanistan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2003 to 2005. Both Khalilzad and Strmecki were advocates of the American universities in Afghanistan and Iraq and continued, after government service, to be involved in the universities as board members. The seven years I spent working with Khalilzad and Strmecki not only introduced me to the American universities in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also gave me an opportunity to reflect, more generally, on the U.S. role in the greater Middle East. Khalilzad and Strmecki encouraged me to write my own analysis of the universities.

A class I took as a student at Yale Law School on the organization and regulation of higher education provided me with an opportunity to do a deep dive into the topic. Professor Henry Hansmann gave me the credits and flexibility with deadlines I needed to write a detailed paper on the subject. After completing five of the six semesters required for graduation, I took a leave from law school to focus on the paper before graduating in 2014. Professor Hansmann’s feedback on early drafts and his encouragement throughout the process helped me produce a final paper that formed a foundation for this book.

Numerous opportunities over the course of my career acquainted me with individuals who shaped events discussed in this book. In addition to Khalilzad, I assisted several individuals who figured prominently in the war on terrorism with their memoirs. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith were involved with U.S. Middle East policy over several administrations and played critical roles in the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Feith, 2011; Rumsfeld, 2011). I also helped former New York Times reporter Judith Miller, a longtime analyst of the Middle East whose work appears in this book, with her memoirs (Miller, 2015).

My time at the State Department from 2008 to 2009 also introduced me to U.S. officials who played prominent roles in U.S. Middle East policy. My immediate boss at the State Department, acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Trump administration. While in government and then afterwards, I contributed to projects under the leaderships of former Deputy Secretary of Defense and World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz, and Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, who was chairing the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council while I was at the State Department and later went on to serve on the board of the American University of Afghanistan.

These experiences shaped the book in several ways. They provided me with access to source materials, insights, and perspectives that are reflected in the book. They also informed my motivations and goals in writing the book. Working with senior officials underscored to me how often policymakers are forced to make decisions without the benefit of comprehensive histories, pertinent case studies, and well-researched policy guidance. Cognitive biases, wishful thinking, and erroneous assumptions can fill the void, leading to distorted cost-benefit analyses on the risks of intervening in unfamiliar cultures.

To that end, I hope that this book will not only contribute to the academic literature, but will also provide an enduring resource for policymakers who are seeking to navigate dilemmas in the Middle East.

This goal speaks to another motivation behind the project. This book is not an exercise in policy advocacy, but it is guided by an “agenda” of sorts. As my views on foreign policy have evolved, I have come to question whether U.S. policymakers are giving sufficient consideration to non-military means of securing American interests in the Middle East. American universities strike me as a useful case study to explore this topic. Universities by their nature tend to exert influence on long time horizons. In the specific context of the Middle East, American universities enjoy deep roots and an admiration all too absent in other facets of the U.S. presence in the region.

As this book relays, American universities and branch campuses are far from a panacea for U.S. dilemmas in the Middle East. But I hope that this book inspires new perspectives, which, over time, lead to a course correction—one in which the United States finds more sustainable ways of managing its interests in the Middle East, and does so in ways benefiting those on the receiving end of American power.