Chapter 3 ASEAN and Timor-Leste: An Analysis of Decision-Making Dynamics

In: The Paradox of ASEAN Centrality: Timor-Leste Betwixt and Between
Authors:
Paulo Castro Seixas
Search for other papers by Paulo Castro Seixas in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
,
Nuno Canas Mendes
Search for other papers by Nuno Canas Mendes in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
, and
Nadine Lobner
Search for other papers by Nadine Lobner in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
Open Access

1 Introduction

Timor-Leste made its first official application for membership of the ASEAN regional grouping in 2011. The application process is still ongoing and remains an unresolved case. There are several (ambivalent) facts and opinions around the admission and the repeatedly prolonged delay. This situation needs to be reviewed by the academic area, which wants to discover the reasons behind this process. Therefore, we have prepared an ordinal, open list with the possible reasons represented by data we collected. International institutionalism, or multilateralism, creates a framework of governance which greatly influences decision-making processes. Firstly, we propose that a second level communication is at stake and, secondly, latent cultural variables in the forefront. These latent variables, which support our text, emerged from in-depth discussions on the data, which highlight details of fieldwork and suggestions from literature.

We intend to pinpoint the elements of the process, for which we use a particular representation aid: flowcharts. Our aim is to provide an overview of the information circulating on this topic, whilst using management and decision-making methodologies to analyze it. We will present each set of opinions and facts on this case (found in our data), with a final flowchart as an aid for representing the political challenge and its mechanisms. Nevertheless, our conclusions cannot be taken as a static answer to the admission process, given the broad mixture of opinions and facts. It rather has to be understood as a contribution to looking at both strengths and weaknesses in the final admission to ASEAN, as well as the specificities of decision-making in a governance context. International organizations such as ASEAN or the EU, for example, are at the root of the transition from government (the pyramidal national paradigm) to governance (a polycentric transnational paradigm) (Hooghe & Marks, 2003).

Various (trans- and international) statements about why Timor-Leste is still not a member of ASEAN are circulating in several discourses. There are obvious inter-relational structures on a global scale regarding the process of admitting Timor-Leste to ASEAN, which means clear involvement and influence from a variety of stakeholders with certain interests in the small country (political, strategic, economic and sociocultural). We intend to pinpoint mechanisms regarding the delay and to detect numerous levels or tiers on which the case of Timor-Leste’s membership of ASEAN is based. This article relies on documents (online media, official reports, newspapers) which present statements from spokespersons of the 10 ASEAN member states, as well as Timor-Leste’s civil society, political leaders, ambassadors and diplomats and lastly, interview content from fieldwork.

There is a general trend considered in online news media, which highlights the readiness of Timor-Leste to join the grouping (Seixas, Mendes & Lobner, 2019). The same trend can be seen in the data we gathered for this article, even though, as mentioned above, the issue of decision-making processes seems to be at stake, revealing the complexities of the governance patterns highlighted by this case. These complexities will be depicted and represented in flowcharts, as management aid and political science research tools. Through this, we achieved a sort of meta-analysis, showing that at least two levels of communication can be found when political decisions are at stake, as well as variables which have not been pinpointed in previous analyses.

Our data uncovered a similar two-step flow in decision-making as it was expressed through the theory of ‘two-step flow communication’ by Lazarsfeld & Henry (1968). The two-step flow theory precisely tackles the dimension of media and opinion makers. As is the case in our analysis, the audience that has to ultimately decide on the final admission is the governments of the current ten ASEAN member states, by consensus, which creates a problem of governance. It comes as no surprise that this audience is influenced by a few opinion makers/leaders of opinions, such as ministers of foreign affairs, their delegates, bureaucrats, etc. Thus, the positions of these delegates are a key element in the final decision. Within this two-step flow model, our data open up latent variables. A latent structure and its variables are considered in structuralism (from Carl Jung and including linguistics, anthropology and psychology) as well as by Foucault, regarding the long history of institutions and decision-making (Foucault, 1969). Recent articles try to tackle latent variables (for instance, emotions) beyond the regular decision-making models (bureaucratic, rational) in order to further elaborate on them (Damasio, 1994; Volz & Hertwig, 2016). However, there are other relevant variables apart from personal latent ones, such as emotions, which have to be taken into account within a new realm of decision-making processes in transnational multilateral platforms. Local Knowledge (LK), as well as institutional and civilizational patterns (Elias, 1978; Geertz, 1983; Fidler, 2001; Linklater, 2003 & 2016) can be expected to occur in such a framework of polycentric governance, as Hooghe and Marks state (2003).

This framework is relevant for enveloping the meta-analysis we have undertaken. We used the meta-analysis in order to propose latent variables to make sense of the decision-making processes which go beyond the explicit available data. Hence, by using flowcharts as representations, we specifically want to tackle their complexities.

Methodologically speaking, we considered it relevant to separate the facts on the admission procedure from the opinions, categorizing these into two sections of the paper. We are tackling both a management technology policy and a research technique, specifically a representation aid or a decision-making support tool. A flowchart is a graphical representation of a problem-solving process, which gives a step-by-step procedure for a particular decision-making process through which the complexities of decision-making come to the fore (Goodin & Tilly, 2006). They gained in relevance in industry (mechanical engineering) in the early 20th century and were also used in the 1940s in the development of computer programs, as well as by Procter and Gamble for management procedures. Furthermore, flowcharts have recently come to be seen as ‘helpful representations of political processes’ in political science research (Goodin & Tilly, 2006, p. 19).

This chapter can be looked at as a form of storytelling in the case of Timor-Leste and ASEAN, for which we use precisely this ‘contextual device’ (flowcharts) in order to make sense of it: “Thus, one important element of getting context right consists of identifying, describing, and explaining the operation of explanatory stories” (Goodin & Tilly, 2006, p. 20). Flowcharts are graphical depictions of certain processes in order to understand top-down decision-making with every possible outcome of events represented. The next sections will present our data and will be followed by a discussion, including flowcharts.

2 Rationalities of the Admission Process

The process of Timor-Leste’s admission to ASEAN is determined by a set of explicit arguments which support the rationality of the decision-making. Our research question is if there may be other latent variables beyond which support unrevealed rationalities. When talking about the existing rationality of the admission procedure, we refer precisely to the official requirements as well as a number of arguments which have been represented in existing documents since 2011 (Seixas, Mendes & Lobner, 2019).

However, we believe that there are other complexities in the forefront of the admission procedure, through which several diverging opinions and factors come into play. Therefore, we will take this variety into account when discussing the decision-making processes in greater detail.

Several sources provide a wide diversity of statements on the case of Timor-Leste, which we will analyze step by step in the following sections. Within this chapter, we will refer to some of the core statements we extracted from our previous online news media analysis for a deeper insight into how the admission procedure is seen by the public. Through this media analysis, we have discovered a common ground in the arguments in favor of the admission procedure. We have concluded that there is a generally held opinion among the public that Timor-Leste is ready to join the grouping, even though there is a certain ambivalence at stake. Therefore, we believe it is relevant to pinpoint this issue from the decision-making perspective.

According to the media, Timor-Leste is meeting all the requirements for ASEAN membership (The Economist, 2016; Strating, 2017; Hananto, 2017; Aquino, 2017; Jacque, 2017; Ortuoste, 2019; etc.). Not only is the small state part of the geographical region of Southeast Asia (as required by the ASEAN Charter), it also shares a cultural heritage, has established embassies in all the ASEAN countries (pursuant to the requirements), built the infrastructure to host ASEAN summits, has a diplomatic presence at general meetings and continues to adapt according to the requirements of the grouping (The Economist, 2016; Kupang, 2017). Delegates and leaders of the country regularly attend internships and trainings with the ASEAN Secretariat, which shows Timor-Leste’s strong commitment to joining the grouping.

Several spokespersons and stakeholders argue that if the regional grouping fails to admit the country, it will show itself as being incapable of solving regional problems (ASEAN CSO Report, 2017). The case of Timor-Leste’s membership of ASEAN is often seen as a unique regional problem and therefore seems barely to be understood in a broader international context. The small nation might appear to some to be an individual (unessential) case, but it must be looked at through its influential connection with several global players in a wider context.

In the next step, we will present the 10 categories which combine the data that we have gathered. We divided the categories into two sections: first, the facts, second, the opinions (also based on facts). Therefore, in the next section we will consider each of these facts and opinions in a precise analysis of the decision-making processes.

2.1 Facts on the Admission Procedure

In this section, we will provide a representation of the first five categories, which look at the facts about the admission procedure. As mentioned above, each category will be represented by a flowchart showing the decision-making process in the procedure for Timor-Leste to gain admittance to ASEAN.

2.1.1 Requirements Met

It is frequently argued (Hooi, 2017; Kupang, 2017; Ortuoste, 2019) that the country’s alleged opponents (such as Singapore and Laos) say that the delays in Timor-Leste’s admission is because of requirements of the ASEAN Charter that have not been met, with the following broad criteria:

  • Location in the recognized geographical region of Southeast Asia

  • Recognition by all ASEAN member states

  • Agreement to be bound by the ASEAN Charter

  • Ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership

The ASEAN Charter covers membership obligations such as: attending ASEAN meetings and summits, participating as an observer at ASEAN meetings, acceding to all the treaties and agreements of ASEAN, preparation and improvement of capacities to meet the requirements of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (and ASEAN’s collective free trade agreements with Dialogue Partners), establishing embassies in all ASEAN members, the contribution of USD 1 million to the ASEAN development fund, the commitment to attend all ASEAN meetings (as well as duties of hosting and chairing ASEAN meetings), participation in regional projects in the different sectors of cooperation and the contribution of an equal share to the annual operating budget of the ASEAN Secretariat (Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017; Siapno, 2014). Even though all of these requirements seem to have been addressed and met by Timor-Leste, the question remains if this process represents ‘effective actions’, or if it is intended to be a formal reply only (Interview PA1, September 2018).

2.1.2 Democracy and Human Rights

Based on this evidence, ASEAN shows a certain indecisiveness when it comes to regional issues (Hooi, 2017; Chin, 2018; Figueiredo, 2018). There seems to be a general intra-ASEAN conflict over its member countries. The regional grouping is facing new challenges, which impose a review of previous membership admissions, according to the obligations of the official charter (Jacque, 2017; ASEAN CSO Report, 2016.; Government of Timor-Leste, 2019). On an intra-ASEAN scale, there are further ongoing mixed responses from the member states regarding the admission of Timor-Leste. Laos and Singapore seem to show the strongest reservations about Timor-Leste’s membership, even though these countries do not make this statement official (ASEAN CSO Report, 2017; Strating, 2017; Thun, 2018). The evidence we have collected shows that the economic instability of Timor-Leste cannot be the only concern of its opponents. Therefore, Timor-Leste’s strong commitment to democracy and adherence to human rights could be seen as a threat to a region which is clearly lacking in the implementation of these concepts and is marked by authoritarian/military regimes, which make the small country an ‘outsider’ within the grouping: “In Southeast Asia, being democratic can lose you friends”. (Talesco, 2016; Interview PA3, September 2018; Hägerdal & Berlie, 2018, p. 102). Our data show even more evidence of such concerns among other member states: within ASEAN, there seems to be a shared mindset that Timor-Leste is not Asian enough, “In Asia, but not Asia” (Zuericher Zeitung, 2008). This may be understood through the extensive foreign influences and cooperation in/with Timor-Leste, such as from Portugal (and therefore the link to Europe/ CPLP), the UN, China, etc. (Interview PA5, September 2018). Furthermore, underlining the argument of Timor-Leste not being Asian enough, Singapore is concerned about the country’s choice of Portuguese as its official language instead of English (which can be considered to be the official ASEAN language) (Interview CS2, October 2018). This leads back to the assumption that Timor-Leste is more closely linked to a European identity rather than being loyal to Southeast Asian values. As our data reveal, the grouping is apprehensive of a possible lack of commitment from Timor-Leste (Interview CS3, October 2018). Therefore, stakeholders emphasize that the Timorese political system is seen by several members of the region as closer to Portuguese/European standards, which leads to a rejection of internal structures/values in the context of the grouping’s member states (when compared to authoritarian political systems such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand) (Thun, 2018). Related to this, human rights, freedom for citizens and following the principles of democracy are just a few of the indicators where Timor-Leste is the forerunner. This leads to the assumption that beyond democracy and human rights, we can consider ‘not being “Asian” enough’ to be a latent variable.

2.1.3 High Freedom Ranking

Curiously, in the 2018 Freedom in the World ranking (Freedom House, 2018), Timor-Leste is in a leading position in comparison with all ASEAN member states. The number of countries designated as Free currently stands at 88, representing 45 percent of the world’s 195 countries and more than 2.9 billion people – or 39 percent of the global population. Timor-Leste’s status improved from Partly Free to Free in 2018 due to fair elections and a peaceful transfer of power which enabled new parties and candidates to enter the political system (Freedom House, 2018).

Table 3.1, ‘Freedom in the World Ranking’ shows all the ASEAN member states, including Timor-Leste, and their current freedom status. This table, which was taken from the Freedom House scores, shows that Timor-Leste is the only country in the region with the freedom status of ‘Free’.

List of categories
Facts on the admission procedure
Table 3.2
Facts on the admission procedure

Regarding the influence of International Organizations and NGOs (and the UN influence in particular) in terms of achieving a certain freedom status, it must be noted that in connection with the decision at the ASEAN Summit to postpone the application process for Timor-Leste to become part of the grouping, Civil Society Organizations in the region challenged the government of Timor-Leste and all ASEAN member states to review previous consultations with Timor-Leste society and prioritize its membership.

We may ask if freedom represents an ASEAN standard. In fact, stronger solidarity among the people of ASEAN beyond nationalities and identities in defense of human rights and equality should be one of the main priorities for the regional grouping (Patel, 2017; Kupang, 2017; ASEAN CSO Report, 2017).

2.1.4 Bilateral Relations with China

The ASEAN border problem must not be disregarded; Timor-Leste’s membership is like a flashpoint between regional forces such as ASEAN and China (Chongkttavorn, 2011; Chin, 2017; Tobin, 2019; Ortuoste, 2019). Various international opinions show that the admittance of Timor-Leste to the regional grouping would strengthen ASEAN by making it a larger counterweight to Chinese dominance, not just in Southeast Asia but in an international context (Chin, 2017; Tobin, 2019; Ortuoste, 2019). Therefore, it is said that if ASEAN does not intensify its political and economic ties with Timor-Leste, China and India will grow in terms of being an economic counter to the potential influence of the grouping itself (Ortuoste, 2019). This is feared by a number of members of ASEAN, which is why several nations (such as Indonesia and Thailand) support the acceptance of the membership with stronger enforcement (Chin, 2017; Sani, 2018). On the subject of Indonesia’s impact regarding this case, it is important to note that the nation is a staunch supporter of statements against the Chinese and Indian forces in the Southeast Asian region, which leads us to a discussion of economic competition. Indonesia’s support for Timor-Leste is seen as self-seeking interest in terms of investment opportunities and security from various perspectives. Financial profits from Timor-Leste’s oil and gas reserves play a crucial role in this discussion (Strating, 2017). Here, a bridge can be built to the discussion of the connection between Timor-Leste and China. China, seen as a potentially dominant non-ASEAN actor in the region, has had a strong presence in the small country in recent years. Also maintaining a strong presence in nations of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) and through its relationship with the Portuguese-speaking community, not least through Macau (and its colonial past), China appears to be aiming to maintain and enhance the economic area, as well as its advantages in Timor-Leste (Tobin, 2019). It is no surprise that there is a long-term interest in economic development and the expansion of the trade market. Another common argument is that China itself staunchly supports Timor-Leste’s development so that it can join ASEAN, deriving from its own interests in the membership (being more present in the ASEAN region). This could make China something of a Trojan horse in the region through Timor-Leste. In order to prevent greater Chinese influence, various spokespersons say that becoming a counterweight to China was one of the main reasons why ASEAN enlarged the grouping with the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) in the 1990s, which we will elaborate further on in later sections (Ortuoste, 2019).

It should be assumed that faced with China’s influence in the Southeast Asia area, ASEAN cannot afford to lose its own impact, dominance and power over the region (Hutt, 2016). Singapore, as one of the biggest opponents to Timor-Leste’s membership (Strating, 2017; Bangkok Post, 2017; Ortuoste, 2019), must be seen as one of the main antagonists, with obvious concerns about the impact of the Chinese force and Singapore’s ties with the United States. At the time of its establishment as a regional organization in 1967, ASEAN received strong support from the United States to become an ally in the fight against communism (Jones, 2012, p. 96; Berlie, 2018, p. 84). Furthermore, regarding the delay of Timor-Leste’s membership due to the bilateral context with China, it is essential to compare this to the case of Myanmar later on. It should be noted that Myanmar gained membership in the 1990s (CLMV); the country was accepted within one week of its first application without the need for any further preparation time/meeting requirements (Hooi, 2017). Following international fears of the rise of communism it can be assumed that the main reason for admitting Myanmar was to maintain pressure on China (Chongkittavorn, 2011; Jones, 2012) and to manage and subdue its influence on Southeast Asia. At that time, China clearly increased its investment in Timor-Leste (development aid was tripled, skyscrapers designed by Chinese architects were financed as gifts to the country, the country’s infrastructure expanded) (Hutt, 2018; Hunt, 2019). As mentioned before, because of Beijing’s diplomatic network in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), various members of ASEAN are concerned about China having the strength and power to influence Timor-Leste’s society and market.

On the contrary, stakeholders say that Timor-Leste could act as a facilitator between China and ASEAN, as an intermediary force in terms of conflict management. In this regard, the various cooperation agreements Timor-Leste has with other organizations on an international scale are also referred to, with the justification that it is necessary to build bridges and to enable progressive dialogue structures (Interview PA2, September 2018).

2.1.5 Poverty and Low Development

According to the United Nations Human Development Report (2018), Timor-Leste is one of the poorest nations worldwide with some of the worst indicators in healthcare, education and human resources and is ranked at 132 (out of 151). Statistics show characteristics such as 50% child malnutrition under the age of 5, 60% of women who have experienced domestic violence and 50% of people in a vulnerable employment situation. Furthermore, the country’s ranking fell from 130 to 132 in two years (2016–2018) (Human Development Report, 2018). Half of the adult population is illiterate, nearly 37% live under the international poverty line (USD 1.25 per day) and food shortages are a daily reality. One of the key challenges faced by Timor-Leste is improving services in the education, public healthcare, nutrition and social protection sectors (Hanion, 2012). Furthermore, it is argued that there is still a lack of infrastructure for connecting communities to markets and that support for economic development to accomplish a non-oil economy is more than necessary. Furthermore, it is argued that overdependence on foreign aid is gradually becoming one of the main challenges (Lotova, 2016; McDonald, 2017, Hooi, 2017; Hunt, 2019). On the contrary, former president Ramos-Horta (2019) said that Timor-Leste had moved well ahead in human development and peacebuilding measures, (National Human Development Report, 2018; Ramos-Horta, 2019). According to this statement, there was robust growth in the economy, the government offered remarkable improvements and transparency, there was backing for an anti-corruption commission and the state offered humanitarian assistance to countries in need. However, ASEAN continues to claim (albeit unofficially) that Timor-Leste does not have the human capacity or economic resources to join. In addition, security issues and its excessive dependence on oil (90%) are considered as reasons for the delay (Strating, 2017; Dupont, 2017). As fieldwork interviews revealed, there is ambivalence in play: Timor-Leste is ready to join the grouping, but there is a great need for regional support (Interview PA5, September 2018; Interview Y2, December 2018). It seems that the latent variable in the forefront is the role of ASEAN itself.

As these five flowcharts (Figs 3.1–5) show, the issue can be simplified as follows: first, all requirements have been met. Second, Timor-Leste is officially an excellent advocate of democracy and human rights. On a second level, the question of whether this applies to the ASEAN standards could be asked. Third, the same situation is at issue with freedom. Fourth, the fact of poverty and low human development in Timor-Leste is an issue. Hence, the second level of this political decision rests on autonomous improvement by the small country or, conversely, regional support. Lastly, in terms of Timor-Leste’s bilateral relations with China, this fact could also be looked at as a double bind: it could be either a problem or an opportunity for ASEAN.

Fulfilled Requirements
Democracy and Human Rights
Figure 3.2
Democracy and Human Rights
High Freedom Ranking
Bilateral Relations with China
Figure 3.4
Bilateral Relations with China
Low development/Poverty

As these data show, facts are not enough. Political decisions are always perspectives on facts, creating a second level of communication. Furthermore, it seems that such decisions are open to becoming double binds. In the following step, we will outline the five opinions which we extracted from our data, each one again ending with a flowchart.

2.2 Opinions on the Admission Procedure

In the following five categories – and their flowcharts – we try to tackle the opinions on the admission procedure which arose from our data. When looking at opinions as such, it is not as simple matter of categorizing them as a ‘yes’ for admission, or a plain ‘no’. Several paths have to be considered, which will be discussed in more detail afterwards. However, to clarify our method, we have included questions in the opinion flowcharts in order to provide the necessary material to later discuss the cases.

2.2.1 Social and Political (in)stability

Timor-Leste officially gained independence in 2002. The small state has been making remarkable progress in terms of democracy and political stability. Regardless of this, there is constant concern about a potential ‘failed state’ among the ASEAN members. There is broad criticism of the lack of political and economic stability within the country (McDonald, 2017). Throughout Timor-Leste’s history of violence and foreign exploitation, and rather new sovereign status, certain stakeholders may fear ASEAN’s growth being dragged down by virtue of this, that the country would pull growth in ASEAN and its current members down. The concerns about the economic issues such as independence from the oil revenue which is bound to stop sooner or later are used on an international scale to criticize the Timorese government. This is broadly seen as justification for the further ongoing delay. ASEAN consistently continues to argue that Timor-Leste does not yet have the necessary capacity to join the grouping. Poverty is still a major problem, unemployment remains high and the quality of education and healthcare is not noticeably improving, as human development reports show (Human Development Report, 2018). Rural areas have so far not (remarkably) been included in the distribution of resources and economically benefiting activities. The development of the domestic economy and investment in the country’s people, according to several statements, must be improved (Guterres, 2019). Some of them outline the need for a policy change within the country to enable faster and more efficient domestic development. Furthermore, the stability of the Timorese leadership is still questioned by various observers. It is argued that with no stable government, there are fewer chances of gaining membership of ASEAN (Guterres, 2019; Strating, 2017). This calls into question the role ASEAN may play in this situation.

Facts on the admission procedure
Table 3.4
Facts on the admission procedure

2.2.2 Economic Burden for ASEAN

Another frequent argument by Timor-Leste’s opponents (Singapore) as to why the admission should be further delayed is that the small country is unable to meet the conditions of the regional grouping in terms of economic stability (Williams, 2015; Lotova, 2016; Maierbrugger, 2017). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, being one of the poorest countries worldwide with a critical past, the opponent’s concerns may be about the possibility of ASEAN being held back in its growth and improvement. Financial aid for ASEAN countries and the share of the investment capacity would have to be reorganized, which is clear from arguments on the possible burden of Timor-Leste’s economy on ASEAN (Haan, 2019). Also, it is said that the country’s government has focused mainly on oil and has expanded this infrastructure in Dili rather than the social, educational and healthcare sectors (Interview Y3, December 2018). Opponents such as Singapore seem to argue that Timor-Leste shows a lack of capacity to host ASEAN meetings and is too dependent on foreign aid (the stability of the country’s government remains in doubt) (Hutt, 2018; Haan, 2019; Hunt, 2019). This leads to the issue of potential profits for ASEAN through the admission of Timor-Leste. As a result of this, Myanmar made the official statement that Timor-Leste has a number of shortcomings which make its membership impossible (because it could overburden ASEAN, according to the data previously outlined). Could ASEAN provide the support Timor-Leste needs for economic improvement?

2.2.3 Singapore as an Opponent?

Singapore is the most strident opponent to Timor-Leste’s membership (Ortuoste, 2019). However, on the other side of the coin, the officially announced fear is described as groundless. Singapore’s concerns seem to encompass the burden for ASEAN in political, financial and social terms (Ortuoste, 2019). The country’s representatives believe that Timor-Leste will hinder ASEAN’s further progress within the economic community, given its financial situation and alleged political instability. Furthermore, the official concerns also include the fear of a divide in ASEAN’s progress in development matters, therefore, seen as an economic burden (Bangkok Post, 2019).

From another perspective, several representatives say that such concerns come exclusively from non-democratic countries and claim that Singapore’s government itself has a lack of democratic structures (Maierbrugger, 2017). Singapore is ASEAN’s wealthiest member, which leads us to the assumption that greed enters the picture when it comes to a possible division of financial resources. The bilateral relationship between Singapore and the United States was described as very strong by Obama at the ASEAN Summit in 2015 (ASEAN CSO Report, 2016). Regarding the strength of these ties, it should be considered that the concerns of Singapore are not just on a regional scale, but on an international one. As mentioned earlier: if Timor-Leste becomes part of ASEAN, there is a high likelihood of Chinese influence in the region, which would constitute a problem in terms of the unofficial (but obvious) weight of authority from the United States as one of the biggest antagonists to China, with further growing bilateral conflict, announced as a possible ‘new cold war’ (Kaplan, 2019). Representatives of Singapore seem to believe that Timor-Leste, after all, is not ready to absorb the challenges and complexities of ASEAN membership (Strating, 2017). This is demonstrated through the argument of a lack of human resources for economic integration and its substantial dependence on oil and gas revenue. Another common argument to justify Singapore’s opinion is the human development index, which shows that 40% of Timor-Leste’s population lives in poverty and healthcare and education indicators are among the worst in the region (as outlined above). Singapore points to careful consideration of support for Timor-Leste’s admission to ASEAN (Bangkok Post, 2017). Another of Singapore’s concerns seems to be the lack of commitment to ASEAN because of the strong ties to other organizations such as the CPLP, which leads back to the connection with China and, therefore, not being ‘Asian enough’ (Thun, 2018; Interview PA4, September 2018). The less grounded arguments include Timor-Leste being geographically seen as too far away from the ASEAN region (Bangkok Post, 2017; Strating, 2017). Nevertheless, it has to be considered that the expansion of the grouping would be a way to strengthen democratic structures and openness among its members.

2.2.4 Australia’s Interests

Australia as one of the largest negotiators with Timor-Leste on an economic scale (regarding its oil and gas revenue) could influence the membership procedure in several ways (Frost, 2013; Strating, 2017; Beetson, 2019). Apart from its strong presence in Timor-Leste throughout its critical past, Australia must be seen as a party that is strongly interested in the country’s resources. Offering help after the independence in 2002 (in terms of language courses, volunteers in various sectors and bilateral, diplomatic dialogues) tends to give the impression of a very genuine act of support (Interview PA6, September 2018). According to this argument, these actions evolved from strategic measures: if Australia generously offered help in rebuilding the country, Timor-Leste might respond with fewer defenses in an agreement on the maritime boundary (Strating, 2017). Therefore, it must be said that these efforts in keeping an Australian presence in Timor-Leste are not primarily out of selfless dedication, but more with an interest in benefiting in terms of the oilfield in the Asia-Pacific region. The negotiations on the Greater Sunshine oilfield officially took place from March 2002 until 2019 and took on wider dimensions and caused more disagreements than were probably expected when the country regained its independence (McDonald, 2017; Strating, 2017; Beetson, 2019).

With the prospect of offering aid in order to reach a rapid agreement in favor of Australia, frustrations grew when Timor-Leste proved to be more persistent in its negotiations than expected. During this time, there was a strong presence of Australian spies in Timor-Leste for gathering internal country information about the procedure of a potential agreement on the pipeline (Interview PA6, September 2018; MacGrath, 2017). This leads us back to the broader interests involved in this case: if Timor-Leste seems to be in a constant conflictual negotiation with Australia, the interests of China and the United States become another dimension of influence. The disputes between China and the United States might be seen in relation to ASEAN and Australia (both as cooperation partners of the United States) (Tobin, 2019; Beetson, 2019). Therefore, admitting Timor-Leste to ASEAN could mean making a statement against Australia and opening the doors for China. Timorese spokespersons, on the other hand, plead for a productive dialogue to build bridges between these regional forces, which could be called a multiple strategic relationship. The need for building bridges and the construction of a stable, diplomatic relationship seems to be in the foreground (Interview PA2, September 2018; Interview PA4, September 2018). Therefore, Timor-Leste’s representatives see the country itself as a potential facilitator between regional organizations (ASEAN, CPLP, and Asia-Pacific-Forum) (Interview PA2, September 2018).

2.2.5 The CLMV as a Paradigm?

Regarding the 2007 ASEAN Charter, Timor-Leste is the first potential member state which has to follow the new rules. This contrasts with the last admission in the 1990s (CLMV) when there were barely any obligations for joining the grouping. Moreover, the admission came about rather quickly, in a timeframe of only a few weeks. Although, there is awareness of following the new rules (three pillars: sociocultural, economic and political), CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) example continuously comes to the fore (Almuttaqi, 2015; Ortuoste, 2019; Myanmar Times, 2017; Pandiyan, 2019). Besides the comparisons which address candidacy procedures in the 1990s and currently, CLMV appear to be seen as a grouping within ASEAN with its own interests, playing a rather important role in the candidacy of Timor-Leste.

In terms of historical comparisons, one of the main assumptions of the swift admission of CLMV in the 1990s has to do with ASEAN’s concerns regarding China’s increasing influence and power in the Southeast Asian region. Therefore, it is said that the frictionless admission took place in order to make it a larger counterweight to China (Tobin, 2019). Looking at more recent tensions around the admission procedure, we can point to the fact that CLMV seem to be concerned about sharing the financial aid of the grouping with a new member that has a number of shortcomings in terms of the country’s budget for economic and social development. Also, some of the concerns voiced indicate fear of ASEAN’s current development status being affected (Southgate, 2015).

Referring once again to the current admission procedure for Timor-Leste, some interviews reveal that the fact that ASEAN, as a regional organization, also has to make adaptions and improvements should not be disregarded. Therefore, we must keep in mind that there cannot (or should not) be a mere superficial comparison with the cases in the 1990s and the former application procedures (Interview Y, October 2018). Thus, it seems that ambivalence is indeed in play.

Regarding the evolution of CLMV within ASEAN, several spokespersons say that these countries were much slower in terms of growth compared to Timor-Leste and that they were given time to develop, which makes the admission procedure unequal (Almuttaqi, 2015). In these discussions, the relationship between Myanmar and Timor-Leste seems to prevail. Looking more closely at this, little diplomatic solidarity has been noticeable between these two countries, following serious criticism of Timor-Leste’s former president Ramos-Horta for being in the forefront against the military leaders of Myanmar (Mizzima, 2015). It has to be noted that one of the main principles of the ASEAN charter refers to regional peace and stability, which Myanmar does not seem to be fulfilling (Kupang, 2017; Jacque, 2017; Medcom, 2019). This leads to mixed messages coming from ASEAN: Myanmar’s unofficial alliance with Singapore’s opinion about the probability of Timor-Leste burdening the economic community in its growth, while Timor-Leste is coompleting all the grouping’s requirements (Hananto, 2017; Medcom, 2019; Ortuoste, 2019; Haan, 2019).

Talking about the contrast between them in terms of political structures, Timor-Leste has consistently shown its commitment to democracy and dialogue; Myanmar, on the other hand, is drifting in a longstanding political and economic crisis, which is consistent with CSO concerns on human rights abuses and non-interference by ASEAN (ASEAN CSO report 2016, 2017).

In light of this, Myanmar currently has an undemocratic status, while Timor-Leste has an official democratic government (Hunt, 2018; The Economist, 2018; Windraskinasih & Afrinasyah, 2018). In strategic matters, the two countries have a great deal in common: they have a lot to offer in terms of natural resources (oil and gas reserves), which greatly increased (among others) their ties with China, as well as its strong presence in those countries (Hutt, 2018).

As the previous five flowcharts (Figs 3.6–10) on opinions reveal, the first one pinpoints Timor-Leste’s social and political instability. Instead of being a simple decision on this issue, there are conditions in the foreground which open up to different outcomes (autonomous improvement vs. regional support). The same occurs with the second case, which is the economic burden the admission of Timor-Leste could imply for the region. Third, regarding Singapore as an opponent, two conditions seem to be at stake: i. Singapore’s geostrategic interests and ii. Timor-Leste’s current situation as a problem. Fourth, in the case of Australia’s interests, its geostrategic position has to be taken into account. Similar to other cases, there seem to be two conditions in the foreground: first, understanding Timor-Leste as ‘being held hostage’ by Australia’s interests, second, as being the middle ground between several players. Lastly, CLMV are seen as a latent variable in terms of ASEAN membership, which also imposes two conditions: when applying the new ASEAN charter, CLMV always come to the forefront as an example of the last admission.

Social and Political Instability
Figure 3.6
Social and Political Instability
Economic Burden for ASEAN
Figure 3.7
Economic Burden for ASEAN
Singapore as an opponent
Figure 3.8
Singapore as an opponent
Australia’s interests
ASEAN Charter 2007

In conclusion, the flowcharts revealed rather clearly the concurrence of other variables for a final outcome. This way, the complexities of decision- making were brought to the foreground, rejecting a linear understanding of the processes at stake. As visible in the sections of the facts, there are always conditions which represent or create different perspectives and problematize decision-making.

3 Final Considerations

Following the above outline of the data in this research, we presented ten flowcharts using five facts and five opinions. Our aim was to elaborate on the complexities of decision-making within a multilateral governance framework, bringing latent variables to the fore. As we have seen throughout the text, beyond the facts presented, there is always a challenging decision at stake. Instead of discussing if Timor-Leste should be admitted to ASEAN or not, we showed that it is clearly a political decision. We tried to understand the difficulties of the decision-making processes, which was the main objective of using flowcharts in order to unravel the complexity behind this case. The outcome of this research line is a meta-analysis, in which a second level of communication (middle ground actors and variables) has to be taken into consideration.

Following this, what can we say from looking at the flowcharts? Can these bring more clarity to the case of Timor-Leste’s membership of ASEAN? Finally, what are the contributions to a better understanding of multilateral governance complexities? As seen throughout the text, the majority of flowcharts, although divided into facts and opinions, represent perspectives on the facts. Therefore, the flowcharts show that a second level of communication is always given. Hence, this process uncovers the relevance of a thorough, in-depth analysis of decision-making, addressing each of the issues both Timor-Leste and ASEAN are facing. We tried to understand the mechanisms involved in each issue and where the decision-making is located in such a stream. This, indeed, has not been an easy task and is open to further discussion. What our data revealed, however, is that decision-making is not a clear, straightforward process in several cases. Hence, we believe that there are latent variables in play within the second level of communication, which bring the complexities of governance within a multilateral international organization to the fore:

  • Effective actions

  • Not Asian enough/ASEAN standards

  • China as a Trojan horse

  • ASEAN way/Timor-Leste as a middle ground

  • Singapore geostrategic interests

  • Regional support/improvement needed

  • CLMV as a paradigm

Besides and beyond the explicit procedures for the acceptance of a new member state in ASEAN, as is the case with Timor-Leste, this middle ground has to be taken into account. Thus, our proposal in this text is that the rationality of the candidacy procedure is made more complex by such a middle ground in the form of a second level of communication.

Therefore, in order to understand the decision-making of governance in multilateral platforms, we propose that a meta-analysis is required, involving both middle ground actors and latent variables, which have been presented throughout the text.

References

Citation Info

  • Collapse
  • Expand