Chapter 1 Ideal Models and Anti-Models of Kingship in Ancient Greek Literature: Mirror of Princes from Homer to Marcus Aurelius

In: A Critical Companion to the 'Mirrors for Princes' Literature
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John R. Lenz
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1 Introduction

Ancient Greece developed the polis (city-state), composed of and administered by citizens, and an analytical discourse of political philosophy. For all that Greek ideas of freedom and democracy are celebrated, kingship holds a central place in ancient Greek political theory. Thoughts about the virtues of rulers run through all periods of Greek history, literature, and philosophy. From the eighth century B.C. to the second A.D., a variety of works contribute to what we can call a mirror of princes literature. Such works present both positive and negative exemplars and precepts for contemporary and potential future rulers. The discussion will be organized in the following four parts.

Homer and Hesiod (both c. 700 B.C.) present a world in which godlike, just kings maintain order; their criticisms of bad kings serve to inspire good ones. Hesiod addresses aristocratic leaders of his own time, whom he calls kings, as does Homer even when narrating epics of long-past mythical heroes. Their time, we must admit, is still prehistoric, but it exhibits nascent features of the historical city-state. Ancient Greece was never united politically, but populated by hundreds of autonomous city-states. As the polis developed, Greeks believed they had left kings behind, despite anomalous exceptions such as the two kings of Sparta, but in many cities a monarchical tyrant appeared for a time.

In the fifth century B.C., Athens created radical democracy. Foreign kings now threatened the freedom of Greek citizens in Greece and Asia Minor. Thirty-one Greek states allied temporarily to defeat the existential threat of the massive invasion (480–479 B.C.) by the Persian King Xerxes. Athens grew extremely wealthy through its naval empire which attempted to impose democracy throughout the Aegean; its liberality encouraged free debate, and it became the center of literary culture. Classical Greek writing of the fifth century B.C., much of it emanating from democratic Athens, largely rejected kings as foreign, whether in time, as belonging to an outgrown phase of Greek development, or in place, as still found in Persia and other inimical Near Eastern states. A king is now a tyrant and slave-master.

Most influential for later, post-Classical, writings in praise of princes are Greek works of the fourth century B.C. The first explicit works of advice addressed to kings, subsequent to the early poets who had always retained a central role in education, appear then. A surprise turnaround in the attitude to kingship occurs in politically minded philosophical writers associated with Athens. Athens is still governed by a democracy. Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and, somewhat differently, Aristotle all praise kingship and even state that kingship is the best form of government. At times we can see an ad hoc reason for this in their desire to flatter their own (if not always Athens’) foreign royal friends or allies, especially in Xenophon and Isocrates who make Eastern kings into ideal models, and arguably but less so in Plato and Aristotle. But the more general trend has not been given enough scholarly attention. They share a theoretical monarchic reaction on the part of intellectual and perhaps wealthy Athenians to the excesses of democracy. Indeed some of the first talk of “political science” occurs in followers or close successors of Socrates (died 399 B.C.) – we will discuss five – who use the term to refer to an ideal ruler’s knowledge of how to rule, and their own expertise in advising him. It is not enough to call these thinkers conservative. While today seeming theoretical and abstract, they claimed a power to educate true statesmen. Their kings are able to unify a state, end the chaos of democracy, and put an end to the endemic bloody fighting between rich and poor, or oligarchs and democrats, that plagued historical Greek cities. These authors depict ideal kings as virtuous, self-controlled, and benevolent leaders of a harmonious state.

With Alexander the Great of Macedon (336–323 B.C) and earlier his father Philip II, kingship returned to the Greek world. Greece, the Near East and most of the former Persian Empire came to be ruled by Greek kingdoms. Naturally some writers flattered them; intellectuals are often attracted to power. Hellenistic-era (323–30 B.C.) practices exerted a significant influence on Roman political forms and ideology, when in the first century B.C. Rome moved from a republic to a monarchy. Greeks now found themselves the subjects of an external ruling power. When authors of the 1st century B.C. to the 2nd century A.D. wished to flatter or improve their Roman lords, they were able to draw upon models of exemplary rulers found in Homer, histories of Alexander, and Greek philosophy. The wishful thinking is apparent, but this tradition did reach a Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius, who himself wrote a work of advice for rulers and others. We will consider these four thematic periods in chronological order.

2 Homer and Hesiod: The Proper Exercise of Kingship

Kingship is a central theme of the earliest Greek literature, namely four epic poems, the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, and Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days.1 Both the Iliad and the Odyssey open with a crisis of kingship, only to have the king’s authority re-asserted later.2 Homer dramatizes the proper functioning of kingship. Bad behavior by kings only serves to highlight the proper norm. No other form of rule is imagined, although we often see multiple kings or “elders” acting together in a council of kings, even locally, and might call that a type of aristocracy, but one still composed of multiple leaders called “kings”. The most common terms are wanax (“lord”) and basileus (“king”).

By juxtaposing Homer and Hesiod we get a largely consistent picture of the ideology of kings at a time just before the rise of the Greek city-state. The poems date very roughly to c. 700 B.C. Both poets depict bards as close to kings.3 Hesiod admonishes contemporary local lords, who, he complains, had personally wronged him; Homer’s tales of long-ago heroes, who would have lived before c. 1200 B.C. in our terms, presumably conveyed an ideology of leadership to contemporary kings and aristocratic leaders, some of whom claimed descent from mythic heroes. In a possible reflection of Homer’s own audience, bards who appear within the Homeric epics typically perform in royal houses (Od. 1.154, 8.44). At the same time itinerant bards such as Homer reached a wide popular audience, to whom he counselled respect for kings. He buttressed their positions.

Kings deserved their position because they were naturally better, but they also had to maintain their positions by fostering justice and the natural order of the world on which prosperity depends. The word “cosmos” means the ordered universe. Zeus maintains order in the universe and the king does so in his political realm. A king is favored by the gods and often descended from a god. For this reason, kingship is hereditary.4 Descent from divinity is virtually a defining criterion of kingship generally in history. For example, Agamemnon’s scepter, that is, his authority, was given by the gods to his ancestor (Il. 2.100–109). Hesiod states, “kings are from Zeus” (Theogony 96; see also 82). Kings are called “god-descended”, “godlike” or “god-nourished”. People revere or look upon a king “as on a god when he walks in the city”. In battle they are like gods, bulls, or lions.5 A king, or his son, even looks distinctive. One can tell by his appearance that a stranger is an exceptional man “of the race of men who are kings, whom Zeus sustains”.6 All this serves to justify an aristocracy as deserving because naturally better.

Kings must, however, act properly in order to maintain their positions. They earn their great prerogatives by fighting in the forefront (Il. 12.310–21). They must also speak well and give good counsel.7 Achilles was raised “to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds” (Il. 9.443). The Muses attend upon a king “and his words flow sweet from his mouth” (Theog. 81–97), “in winning modesty” (Od. 8.172), with a voice like a god’s (Od. 4.160–1). Kings must deliberate and persuade wisely in counsels of kings, in the agora or public square, and in giving judgement (e.g. Homer, Il. 18.503–8; Hesiod, Theog. 88–90, WD 262–263). By speaking “in due order”, kata kosmon, literally “in accordance with cosmos”, a king maintains the proper order of society, as opposed to those trouble-makers whose speech is disorderly and reckless.8 Mastery of thoughtful language (logos) conveys power and effectiveness in civil discourse, as we will see in later Greek teachings about the liberal arts (discussed below). This notion also underwrites the importance of authors as givers of advice to both rulers and subjects.

Kings are part of the natural order and maintain order (cosmos) by means of justice, just as Zeus does. They take the lead in offering sacrifice to the gods. The first book of the oldest work of Greek literature, Homer’s Iliad, displays the dire consequences of hubristic impiety.9 Kings receive regular gifts from the people, as gods do, but should not unduly fleece them. A good king is a “shepherd of the people”, not a “devourer of his people” or a bribe-taker.10 He is much wealthier than others (Od. 1.392–393), but if he observes justice, his people will flourish. However, Homeric kings were not particularly “benefactors of the multitude” as Aristotle posited.11 Homer, indeed, has only rare glimpses of kings in relation to their subjects; people must be respectful and obedient toward a good king.

Hesiod’s Works and Days contains direct instructions to kings to heed justice for the good of the community. Where justice reigns, cities flourish. Human life in his day is so full of evils that only justice will save this age (WD 174–201). Hesiod in effect calls for a just king to be a savior, since a lengthy exhortation addressed to kings follows immediately upon his doomsaying. “I will now talk to kings … those who give straight judgements … and do not turn aside from justice at all, their city (polis) blooms and the people in it flower … with good things continuously” (WD 202, 225–7, 236); then people have peace and abundance. “O kings, you ponder this justice yourselves”; “keep vigilant about this, kings, and straighten your words, … and put crooked judgements quite out of your minds” (WD 248–9, 263–4). The gods are watching everywhere and Zeus punishes wickedness (WD 7–8, 238–274). A whole city will suffer because of one evil man or corrupt kings (WD 240–1, 260–2).

Hesiod’s admonitions were addressed to kings (so called) and aristocratic leaders in his own time, who also presumably received Homer’s narratives of long-ago heroes with pride in their supposed ancestors, at a time, c. 700 B.C., when features of the Greek polis were just beginning to emerge. Soon, however, the Greek polis developed along other principles and came to leave kings behind.

3 Classical Greece of the 5th Century B.C.: Negative Exemplars of Monarchs

From about the eighth century B.C., the Greeks developed the polis or city-state ruled by citizens, typically by an aristocratic council, sometimes by a larger more democratic body. Kingship gradually declined and became rare. In the Archaic era (700–480 B.C.), a new form of monarch, a tyrant, arose in many Greek cities. A tyrant seized power, rather than inherited it, and established a hereditary dynasty.12 Tyrants brought improvements in administration and benefits for some elements of the population who had previously been excluded, but over time, their rule became oppressive. Eventually, cities such as Corinth and Athens overthrew a ruling tyrannical family; Herodotus, the so-called “father of history” (fifth century B.C.), reports them as hoping never again to allow tyrants, that is, monarchs, to rule in their cities (Hdt. 5.78, 92g). By the Classical period (480–323 B.C.), Greek cities thought they had evolved away from heroic-era kings, had expelled and outgrown tyrants (Thucydides 1.13, 17–18, for both points), or had fought foreign ones (from the mid-sixth to the early fifth centuries B.C.), the main subject of Herodotus’ Histories. Thus, Classical Greek literature tends to marginalize kings as foreign in time or place. Kings take away freedom of cities and citizens. Fifth-century literature reflects the dominance of democratic Athens in political power and literary culture.

Herodotus presents kings as negative exemplars of excessive wealth and power, greed, hybris, overreach, immodesty, and lawless despotism. Fifth-century Athenian tragedy, not considered here, often does the same. Herodotus was not from Athens but was politically favorable to it. In his Histories, Eastern kings are capricious despots, their subjects no better than slaves, metaphorically speaking. Croesus of Lydia (c. 560–546 B.C.) and Xerxes of Persia (486–465) are the worst offenders. They threaten the freedom of Greek cities and of all Greece. Greece had introduced the political idea of freedom. Xerxes thought he could chastise the waters of the Hellespont for not obeying him (Hdt. 7.34–35). He mercilessly punishes a subject who had done him great services, calling him “my slave” (7.39). Implicit in such negative stories about Xerxes are that he lacks Greek values of moderation and modesty, that is, he does not know his limits in relation to the gods and other free human beings, or his own humanity. Later fourth-century writers considered below will, rather than condemn kings, promote the education of rulers along those lines.

At one point during his attempted conquest of Greece, Xerxes incredulously asks an exiled Spartan how the Greeks could ever stand up to the power of his empire. Demaratus’ answer proudly contrasts Greek principles with the Persian system of government: “They are free, yes, but not entirely free; for they have a master, and that master is law, which they fear much more than your subjects fear you”. (Hdt. 7.104) Remarkably, the speaker is a former king of Sparta. Sparta still had two kings descended from Heracles, but they functioned within a polis, subject to the rule of law. This principle of the primacy of laws to the will of one powerful man will, however, come to be reversed in the next century by kingship theorists who desire to train a king to act intelligently and not arbitrarily.

Lessons for bad kings are also conveyed through other stories of the type “the sage against the king”. A sage or a holy man expresses warnings, so obviously truthful to every respectful person, that the king, in his short-sighted pursuit of power and self-interest, rejects – to his own detriment, as the event reveals.13 In Herodotus’ fictional story (logos) of Solon and Croesus, the moderate Athenian politician and sage teaches morality to a king of Lydia in Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.29–34, 86–91). Croesus is overly proud of his enormous wealth; his ancestor Gyges was legendary to Greeks for wealth and “tyranny”.14 Solon has been travelling in search of wisdom15 and, at Sardis, is appalled by the king’s boasting. He warns Croesus of the mutability of human affairs, of human limits and the folly of hybris. Virtue is greater than material possessions. He ranks obscure, modest Greek citizens as happier than Croesus. Eventually, Croesus falls from power. He then learns the lesson of Solon (1.86) and pursues a second career of giving advice to King Cyrus of Persia.16 Here philosophy, or wisdom, triumphs over power. Croesus gains wisdom, but only as an ex-king. The same is true of Oedipus in Sophocles’ tragedies Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus. For fifth-century Greeks, it is best to not have a king. Political intellectuals in the next century hold the opposite view.

4 Philosophical Kings: Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle

Xenophon and Isocrates inaugurated the Classical genre of writing in praise of kings. Fourth-century-B.C. writers use philosophy to justify and improve the rule of kings, not to criticize them as Herodotus had done in defense of political freedom. This section treats Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Paradoxically for citizens of free city-states, Xenophon and Isocrates depict Eastern kings as models. The newfound attraction of kings results partly from their prominence in geopolitics of the Aegean region. Perhaps a stronger motive was dissatisfaction with Athenian democracy.

Kings return to favor and become idealized for several reasons. Xenophon and Isocrates, both Athenians, had connections to Eastern rulers. Xenophon fought in a failed attempt to place Cyrus the Younger (died 401 B.C.) on the throne of Persia. Isocrates was close to Nicocles, king of Salamis on Cyprus, whose father Evagoras had been a significant Athenian ally. The Persians were big players in Greek interstate politics. So was Philip II of Macedon (359–336 B.C.). Isocrates hoped the foreigner Philip would unite Greece. Kings again threatened the autonomy of Greek city-states, who had to negotiate carefully with them. Greek cities felt pressures to combine into larger political units in order to compete. In retrospect we know that the long-term trend was moving away from small city-states and towards kingdoms; from the mid-fourth century B.C. and continuously thereafter up to modern times, foreign kings or emperors dominated Greek city-states, beginning with Macedonian and (in our next section) Roman overlords.

Opposition to Athenian democracy also led to flirtation with monarchs – theoretical or foreign ones, since monarchy was not a political option in Athens. Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle all worked in Athens; none was committed to democracy as practiced there. Xenophon was exiled from Athens and served Sparta. Plato advised a tyrant in Sicily. Aristotle came from Macedon. Conservative Athenians did not like the chaos of democracy. Athenians chose important state officers by annual lot, rather than by merit or any qualification. Radical democracy meant that the poor and untrained had as much say as anyone else. Sparta dealt Athens a major defeat in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), and the negative depiction of the Athenian people’s conduct of affairs at that time by the contemporary Thucydides has tainted the image of democracy ever after.17 Sparta had two kings but that was not the main reason some Athenian oligarchs saw it as an attractive alternative. Xenophon and Plato evince admiration for the stability and success of Sparta, its hierarchical, military organization. Sparta was thought to have avoided the bloody tumultuous stasis, or internal strife between oligarchs and democrats, that plagued the history of Greek city-states. The four writers considered here all admire unity and harmony in a state headed by a wise ruler. An exceptional individual might possess the knowledge and character to achieve this ideal, more than politics-as-usual or even laws could achieve.

A new theoretical force also underpinned the fascination with ideal monarchy. Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato studied with Socrates, and Aristotle with Plato. Socrates repeatedly argues in Plato’s dialogues, and also in Xenophon, that being a statesman is a craft or science (tekhnē) as much as any other. It requires expertise. Not all people are qualified for political office. Knowledge of how to rule is what makes a real king or ruler, Socrates said (Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.9.10). Ruling is a learned, relatively rare, skill, like being a captain of a ship (Xen., Cyropaideia 1.6.21). Authors of advice-treatises impart this knowledge. A true king, even one who has formally qualified by inheritance, can be created by the educated adviser. Both authors and rulers rely on skills of language (as had Homer’s and Hesiod’s kings) and reason (logos means both these things). Their ideal kings are educated in the liberal arts. They also exemplify the philosophical doctrine that the mind should rule the body and the passions.

Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle endowed kings with philosophical virtues. (The Greek word aretē means virtue or excellence.) They are more cultured, more virtuous, and in effect freer, that is free of base desires, than anyone else in the state. So Plato, in praising the way Persians supposedly educated their king to be wise, self-controlled, truthful, and pious, says that the royal student learns to be “a real king, whose first duty is to rule himself” (Plato, Alcibiades 121e–122a).18 Another Socratic, Antisthenes (c. 445–365 B.C.), composed a lost work entitled Cyrus or On Kingship. Evidently it described the Persian king’s ascent to virtue through toil.19 Antisthenes stated that a wise man will be governed by virtue, not by laws (Diogenes Laertius 6. 11). Both Plato and Aristotle also place an ideal king above the laws. We are far from Demaratus’ story of the rule of law (see above). Evidently – this has not been noticed – Socrates’ criticisms of democracy carried monarchic implications in the five followers we have mentioned. Their similarities are often striking. We will consider further Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle in that order.

Xenophon’s Cyropaideia (Education of Cyrus, c. 360s B.C.) may be called historical fiction about Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Empire (died 529 B.C.). Xenophon describes how the king may justify his authority and maintain power. He must above all persuade willing subjects to obey him. Cyrus secures obedience, a key virtue in his men,20 by persuasion, not force: “they followed gladly, because they were intelligent men” (3.3.57). The monarch himself sets an example of obedience, having been trained, along with other noble Persian youths, in self-control (sophrosynē) and obedience to superiors in the service of the commonwealth.21 Character is everything; even in battle, qualities of soul, which in Greek includes the mind, are more important than bodily strength (1.6.13, 3.3.19, 5.4.11). The centrality of intellectual, moral excellence (aretē) underlines the importance of the author of the advice treatise: “to rule men might be a task neither impossible or even difficult, if one should only go about it with knowledge” (epistēmē; 1.1.3). Both Xenophon and Cyrus have such knowledge. The king has mastered his personal desires, although the goal of ruling oneself, as a lesson for the reader, becomes more explicit in other authors such as Isocrates, Plato, and Marcus Aurelius. Xenophon himself is interested in social control by the cultured class; he presents a somewhat utopian ideal of political order founded on such knowledge, with state education for the noble peers who exhibit “the orderly life (eukosmia) of the educated” (1.2.3, 3.3.70). The king also learns from history (1.6.44).

Cyrus, while he qualifies in part by inheritance, in his youth reveals his superior natural character and ability (1.3, 5.1.24–25, as in Herodotus 1.114–115). He possesses in the highest degree the virtues desired in leaders of an ordered state. He is good-looking (Xen., Cyr. 1.2.1, 1.4.28, 3.1.41), commanding, wise, strong, gentle, just, and a fair judge. He is pious, with additional expertise: he even interprets omens (1.6.2, 3.3.34, 8.1.23–25). He displays forethought and endures hardships; he is modest and frugal; he wins friends and affection through being generous, not grasping, and forgiving. He uses his power to do good22 and, of course, to acquire a large empire, but justly. Xenophon’s Cyrus himself likens the benevolent king to a good shepherd (8.2.14). From the character-driven leadership of the king and his peers follow success in war and wealth for Persia (e.g. 4.2.44–46), although, as a benefactor to others, Cyrus does not seek material rewards for himself.23 “By making his own self-control an example, he disposed all to practice that virtue more diligently” (8.1.30). Some scholars hold that Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus is ambiguous because the king must sometimes employ cunning and deceit, and arouse fear in others, for a good end (1.1.5, 6.27–30). But he does so against enemies. He helps friends and harms enemies.24 The king himself presents a ‘mirror’, a “perfect model of virtue” for his subjects (8.1.21); by his example, with kind words and deeds (2.4.10) and as their teacher, he makes his men better.25 Xenophon dramatizes this exemplum in action. “No one had any right to rule who was not better than his subjects” (8.1.37; see also 40). True, Xenophon devotes most attention to Cyrus’ relations with his peers, his troops and allies. Xenophon concludes that the Persian state has declined in his own time because it had not followed the successful example of Cyrus (8.8).

Xenophon wrote other works about monarchs. Hiero26 is a dialogue in which the wise poet Simonides explains to the tyrant of Syracuse how he might become a better and happier ruler. Both Plato and Aristotle also tried to reform tyrants (see below).

Isocrates (436–338 B.C.), an Athenian teacher of civic philosophy and oratory, wrote the first prose works addressed to a specific king for his instruction.27 To Nicocles (cited as Isoc. 2) advises his probable former student who had succeeded his father Evagoras as king of Salamis on Cyprus in 374 B.C. Evagoras (Isoc. 9), written for Nicocles, praises both kings, father and son. A third published Cyprian oration, Nicocles (Isoc. 3), is written in the voice of the good king himself, addressing his subjects on their duties.

Isocrates begins by praising, not the monarch, but the advice-genre and its author (Isoc. 2.1–2). While acknowledging earlier poets and other sages (2.13, 43–4), he claims that by his teaching he helps to form the monarch and others who will imitate him. His words (logoi) impart reason (logos, logismos, e.g. Isoc. 3.46). A good king is one who is wise enough to benefit from instruction; the teacher is the true lawgiver,28 his words and philosophy better gifts than gold or statues (2.1, Isoc. 9.73–77). He offers an education in wisdom. Kings, who are isolated and lack guardrails, need this more than anyone else. Isocrates implies that he makes a monarch legitimate: through instruction, a king becomes a worthy ruler; legal succession is not enough.29 The trappings of royal power, clothing and adornment, are mere external ornaments (2.32); it is his soul that counts. That is a Socratic thought. Nicocles, Isocrates boasts, is the first king to have achieved a philosophical or ‘liberal arts’ education (9.78); his father Evagoras had introduced it (9.50). A king endowed with virtues of character becomes a model for others to emulate, and reasoned words again facilitate this, from adviser to king to subjects.

The ruler must truly be the best man in the state (Isoc. 3.38, 9.81). Evagoras surpassed all in both body and mind (9.23–4, 71). He naturally excels, but is improved by education. The king’s actions flow from his character. He must be gentle, moderate, pious, just, truthful, and generous; he must be wiser than his subjects and ever mindful. Wisdom (phronesis) comes from discipline of the mind, self-control (2.29, 9.45, 80). He must rule himself, continue to train in practice and theory, and know history (2.35). He is wise enough to seek advice (9.44, 53).

The king’s goodness comes before all else, even conventional piety; from goodness, good consequences flow (2.20, 3.47). Both are Socratic sentiments.30 Evagoras was able to build up his city due to his personal qualities (9.47–8). Virtue (aretē) has power to do good. The king owns all property in the state but must earn the right to it through good management (2.21). He acts not from power or greed, but for the benefit of state and subjects. Thus, his word deserves to be law. Now, one exceptional individual is considered to be above the law. As in Xenophon, the ruler serves as a ‘mirror’ for the entire state (2.31): he sets an example for subjects (3.37, 60–64) and other kings to follow. He turns the people towards virtue. Nicocles argues that monarchy is the best form of government, albeit in words that Xenophon places self-servingly in the mouth of the king himself (3.12–13, 17).

Such sentiments could be applied to statesmen of a city-state such as Athens where Isocrates educated future political leaders – he was Plato’s rival – or to Roman senators during the Republic. Cicero praised Isocrates for producing principes, leaders (de Oratore 2.94). The Latin word princeps soon gained added significance when, unknown to Cicero, it came to be applied to the first Roman emperor. To Nicocles (Isoc. 2) became influential in the Renaissance; Erasmus presented his translation to Charles V in 1516.31

Plato (c. 428–347 B.C.) is another conservative Athenian who wrote about ideal kingship and considered kingship to be the best form of government. He buttresses his virtue ethics with a stronger theory of knowledge of the good. Plato holds that a ruler should rule with political knowledge. He calls for a political science (tekhnē) and evidently saw himself and Socrates as pursuing such knowledge and claiming to be the best advisers.32 Enlightened rulers deserve their position because they have the knowledge and wisdom to know, and act for, the good of all; they are trained to rise above self-interest; they deserve to rule others because they rule themselves; he or she governs a unified state. Women may be rulers because while they differ in body they do not differ in what matters, mind or soul. What follows will treat these themes in Plato: his advising of an actual monarch; his theory of ideal kingship and its approximations in the real world; and tyranny as a negative exemplar to illustrate, by contrast, true kingship.

Plato attempted to educate an actual monarch, the tyrant Dionysius II of Syracuse (367–357). His visits to Sicily are described in the autobiographical Letter 7, which might or might not be by Plato.33 The letter expresses his despair at the bad government of “all existing states” and his belief that only from “true philosophy” can rulers hope to gain political wisdom and learn what true justice is (325c–326b). He advised Dionysius to “perfect himself in wisdom and self-control”, to bind the citizens together, and to make others his “friends and partners in the pursuit of virtue” (332d–e). Neither Plato nor this unsuccessful pupil, however, was able to overcome the faction-fighting in the city. Worse, when Plato’s associate in philosophy, Dion, seized power from his uncle Dionysius, he did not do much better. He boasted that he had acquired superior personal virtue in Plato’s Academy; this included self-mastery, mercifulness, justice, goodness, generosity, and moderation – but also, evidently, an unwelcome didactic moralizing, for his anti-democratic arrogance met resistance (Plutarch, Dion 47, 52). For later writers such as Thomas More in Book I of Utopia (1516), this episode paradigmatically illustrates the dilemma of whether an intellectual can be involved in, and improve, real-world politics. Plato thought so, but of course his real influence came from his theories of the ideal ruler. Two works, Statesman (or Politicus; here cited as Polit.) and Republic, largely present a consistent picture.

In Statesman, Plato describes ideal kingship.34 The true king has expert political, or kingly, skill (tekhnē) or knowledge (epistēmē). This is the only correct constitution (Polit. 293c, 303c). Indeed, throughout this work the term “king” is synonymous with “statesman”. The king’s knowledge is not practical but theoretical (259c–d), because his role is one of steering and guiding (260c, 292b, 305d). How does one acquire the “most difficult” knowledge of ruling human beings (292d)? Republic prescribes in great detail the education of the “philosopher-kings” (Plato, Rep. 473c–d, 540d–e). They have been rigorously educated for more than thirty years in music, mathematics, dialectic, and political experience (Rep. Book 7). By age fifty they know the good and therefore desire only it and nothing less; “and once they have seen the good itself, they must use it as their model and put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order” by “serving and fostering” justice (540a, d–e).

A king rules, first, over himself; such a person is the best, most just, and happiest (Rep. 580b–c; see also Alc. and Letter VII, as quoted above). Women may be educated to be rulers since they have the same qualities of mind as males do (Rep. 455e–457c).

The “wise and good man” or woman will govern for the benefit of those she rules (296e). She cares for the state as a doctor cares for a patient. “Wise rulers” must “watch for one great thing, that by always distributing to those in the city what is most just, as judged by the intelligent application of their expertise, they are both able to preserve” and improve the citizens (297a–b; see also 293b, 293d).

The common good is the sole purpose of correct government (Laws 875a–b). The king “weaves” disparate types together into a common life “in agreement and friendship”.35 Evidently Statesman hints at regulating marriage (309–311), given what we know of the Republic’s ruler-imposed eugenics (Rep. 458d–461b). All citizens will agree on “what is fine, just and good” (Polit. 309c). The king has instructed others to educate the citizens in virtue, and has purged the state of bad people (293d, 308b–309a, 310e). He rules willing subjects (276e) — unlike other forms of government such as democracy (Laws 832c), although he knows when to use persuasion or force (296b–e, 293c, 304a–d). “The best thing is not that the laws should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom” (294a); his expertise is “more powerful than the laws”.36 He rules “with virtue and expert knowledge, distributing what is just and right correctly to all” (301d). Because politics normally consists of competing self-interest, every other state is at war with itself (stasis), being divided into two factions, the rich and the poor (422e–423a, 551d). Every state, except the unified state governed by ideal kingship, Plato dubs a “factionality” (Laws 832c).

Plato provided high-minded precepts which a later ruler might use or, indeed, misuse. While to a modern mind he seems unpleasantly to grant license to a single self-styled enlightened individual, his king is no ordinary politician. Modern criticisms of Plato often cannot get beyond our difficulty in conceiving of politicians as not self-interested. Plato’s statesman or stateswoman truly puts the common good above personal interest, and possesses the requisite knowledge to accomplish this. Such an individual would be more godlike than other mortals, “one individual immediately superior in body and mind” (Polit. 301e). Such ideal kingship has rarely if ever existed, although Plato leaves open a small possibility: “it is nowhere to be found at all, except to some small extent” (Laws 875d).37 However, it is most unlikely: not “until philosophers rule as kings … or … kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide” (Rep. 473c–d). Even in his late work Laws, Plato specifies, “if ever by the grace of god some natural genius were born … he would have no need of laws to control him” (875c). Again, kingship theory figures centrally in Greek political science of the polis; idealism was Plato’s legacy.

In the real human world, however (Polit. 273c–274e, 275c), the best constitution is the one that most closely imitates the ideal. A constitutional monarch who rules according to laws constitutes the best of the next six constitutions that Plato calls inferior “imitations” of the only correct one described above (Polit. 301b, 302e, 303b). Nevertheless, the ideal serves as a due measure (283e) by which to judge other governments.

When kings go bad they become tyrants. Plato presents tyranny as an anti-model that reinforces the ideal by means of a warning. Kings can decline in virtue due to the natural deviation of human nature from the divine. Plato dramatizes this with his myth of Atlantis. Kings of the fictional Atlantis, originally descended from the gods, declined over time due to their becoming increasingly dominated by their mortal nature, that is, by their appetites (body) rather than by wisdom (mind). Giving way to “an unjust lust for possessions and power”, they pursued luxury, lost self-control, and failed to maintain order.38 Thus monarchy morphed into its negative type, tyranny (Polit. 302d); a tyrant is lawless (302e) and rules by force (276e). When private interests prevail, the state disintegrates (Laws 714a, 875a–c).39

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) in his philosophy preserves some ideals from his teacher Plato, while also priding himself on a more practical and empirical approach. He came from a Greek city in Macedon, where his father was physician to King Amyntas III, grandfather of Alexander the Great. Aristotle holds that the goal of politics, that is, of living in a state, is sharing together for the purpose of a good life. This is the greatest good.40 Aristotle holds with Plato and others that a good life must take place within a good society, and, conversely, that society exists for the good of everyone in it. This defines a prerequisite of proper kingship.41 A king is benefactor and guardian of social justice. Being above faction, he must protect both the rich and the poor.42 A king must be moderate, behave like an equal, and be supported by and support his friends, in order to set a good example for his subjects. He does not look to his own advantage, but to the common good;43 a tyrant does the opposite and sets a bad example of selfish profit-seeking which others emulate harmfully.

Aristotle states that kingship is the “best and most divine” type of government, being the rule of one man of exceptional virtue; aristocracy, the rule of a few, is comparable in principle.44 He adds, characteristically, to counter dreamy idealism, that virtue must be “equipped” to act.45 A king rules for the benefit of willing subjects.46 Kings, and similarly aristocrats, excel their subjects in merit and ability. Confusingly, however, by the conclusion of Politics kingship is not what Aristotle deems the best constitution.47 This is because as cities developed, many men acquired virtue and it is no longer restricted to one person or a few.48 Thus kingship is, for the most part, no longer viable. Aristotle presents kingship partly as theoretical ideal, partly as historical study, but reverts, like Plato in Statesman, to other law-bound polities (not to be considered here) in the real world where, lacking individual godlike paragons of virtue, governments rely on law and on balancing the interests of different factions. In any case, let us look at his analysis of kingship.

In Politics, Aristotle analyzes five types of lawful, constitutional kingship (3.14–18 1284b35–1288b2). Three have a specific scope: heroic or Homeric kingship (the type discussed above); “barbaric” (a kingship over uncivilized or unfree people, like Herodotus’ Eastern kings); and Spartan (having authority in war and religion, but not absolute because part of a polis oligarchy). Of these, the “barbaric” may recur elsewhere in the world, as may the fourth type, exemplified by the ancient Greek tyrants, which he calls an elective dictatorship (more on this below). The fifth type is unique. It became influential for later European theories of paternal sovereignty. This is pambasileia, absolute kingship with sovereign power over all matters in a state, like the authority of a father over a household. This is justified when one family, or one person, is so “outstanding in virtue” that they or he receive obedience from free and equal peers.49 With this fifth type, Aristotle is often thought to be making a concession to Alexander the Great, his former pupil; in fact, the type recalls the ideal rulers of Xenophon and Plato. It is right to obey someone who “is superior to others in goodness and in the capacity for actually doing the best” (7.3 1325b10–14). This king, theoretically, would not rule according to law (3.13 1284b30–31, 3.16 1287a1–10) and might seem like a god among human beings (3.13 1284a10–11).

However, generally, kingship no longer arises in Aristotle’s time because people are more similar to each other, with no one person standing out.50 If monarchy occurs, it commonly takes the form of tyranny. A tyrant rules over unwilling subjects for his own advantage. In an ironic twist, Aristotle advises tyrants at length on how to preserve their monarchy by becoming good kings (5.11 1313a34–1315b10). Xenophon and Plato had done the same. Aristotle here presents a somewhat cynical mirror of princes: the hitherto flawed ruler should gain a reputation for military virtue, avoid any appearance of arrogance including towards women, be moderate and not extravagant like other tyrants or at least appear to be so, adorn the city, appear to be god-fearing, and the like. A tyrant may thus appear, and might actually become, more kingly and noble, or at least “half-decent”. Thus the worst form of regime might learn to mimic the best.

5 Roman Reception: Philodemus, Historians of Alexander, Marcus Aurelius

With the rules of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon (336–323 B.C.) and the succeeding Hellenistic-era kingdoms (323–30 B.C.), kingship returned to the Greek world and the Greek-ruled Near East. The period reintroduced notions of divine descent of kings and ruler-cult, which exerted a significant influence on Roman political practice and ideology, and it produced a literature addressed to kings. Writers now sit in the vulnerable positions of actual subjects of the rulers they are concerned with. (That was true of Homer and Hesiod, but rare thereafter when kingship might be aspirational.) They write delicately, often indirectly of past kings, with an eye towards receiving protection from a powerful sovereign.

Of this Hellenistic literature,51 most of which has been lost, we may note one of the first and most curious examples. Euhemerus wrote a utopian novel in which he claimed he had discovered, far away, a (fictional) golden column on which were inscribed the deeds of Cronus, Zeus, and others. He ‘learned’ that these were long-ago human beings who because of their great benefactions to people were now worshipped as gods. “Euhemerism” is known as a theory of myth, but equally is this a view of kingship. Euhemerus perhaps wrote while serving King Cassander of Macedon (311–298 B.C.). A good king deserved to be worshipped as a god.

This section will consider the use of Homeric kings and Alexander as models for Roman leaders of the late Republic (1st century B.C.) and of the Empire of the first and second centuries A.D. By the first century B.C., Rome ruled Greece and other Greek-speaking lands in Macedon, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. Once again, Greek writers encourage rulers to elevate and soften their rule by appreciating culture. Elements of the preceding virtue ethics recur, but the teaching seems even less disinterested. Greeks and Hellenized Easterners now write as subjects of absolute imperial overlords. Philodemus used Homer to illustrate precepts addressed to leading Romans; Greek historians presented Alexander as a paradigm for Roman emperors to emulate; and Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote in Greek about ruling oneself (and others) philosophically.

In the first century B.C., the virtues of Homeric kings were held up as models for a Roman leader of the late Republic. The return to Homer was anticipated in part by Aristotle’s praiseworthy treatment, as well as by stories that Alexander wished to be glorified as a Homeric hero and a demigod.52 Philodemus of Gadara, a Greek Epicurean philosopher working in Italy, presented his treatise “On the Good King according to Homer” to, among others, the family of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus.53 Piso was consul in 58 B.C. and father-in-law of Julius Caesar. It was not typical of Epicureans to draw meaning from literary-mythical culture. Philodemus flatters his Roman patron. This work, recovered by archaeology from Piso’s villa in Herculaneum, where Philodemus evidently worked, was unknown until modern times. A Roman princeps is here likened to a king, again.54 He must behave fairly, leniently, politely, temperately, and as a gentle father; he is harsh when necessary. He awes with his beauty, which represents virtue; he should love and be loved by the people rather than instill fear; he should be good at war but not love war. A king should deploy and appreciate good counsel and, of course, have a philosophic adviser like the author.

Roman-era Greek historians whitewashed the image of Alexander, the conqueror of Asia, in order to present him as an ideal model for a Roman ruler. Plutarch, writing c. 110–115 A.D. under Emperor Trajan,55 and Arrian in the second century A.D., who considered himself a second Xenophon, touted Alexander as a royal supporter of Greek culture: alleging, rather implausibly, that he learned ethics and politics from Aristotle; loved learning, reading, and philosophy; slept with Homer’s Iliad under his pillow;56 and while he brutally destroyed the Greek city of Thebes, he reverently preserved the home of the Classical poet Pindar (Arrian 1.9.10).

Writing in their own interests as Greek subjects of a Roman emperor, historians of Alexander emphasize his virtues, sometimes in the face of much evidence to the contrary. Plutarch’s Alexander displays qualities of an ideal king in action: he was extremely generous (e.g. Alex. 39), hardworking and temperate; he exercised self-control and was not overcome by luxury (40–41, 42.6); he judged impartially “at first” (42.2). The Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus (1st or perhaps 2nd century A.D.) eulogizes the king’s continentia (self-control) and clementia (3.12.18–21). Literate Roman emperors were supposed to take the hints and treat their Greek subjects well. Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Plutarch, also wrote several orations on Greek ideals of kingship, one about lessons from Homeric kings applied to Alexander (Or. 2),57 and others more philosophical (Or. 1, et al.).

Of course, not all emperors appreciated the intellectual’s classic appeal to the power of culture. But Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161–180 A.D.) went one better and wrote his own treatise. Meditations is a diary-like collection of his private thoughts derived from his training in Greek philosophy. Although known in popular memory as a “philosopher king”, Marcus says almost nothing about ruling itself; yet in this work he looks in the prince’s mirror and presents himself as embodying some of its ideals. Scoffing at Plato’s ideal state (9.29), he advocates virtues such as modesty, piety, justice, education, and thoughtfulness. These qualities can be applied in everyday practice, by anyone, although the emperor Antoninus Pius, his predecessor and father (by adoption), displayed them in an exemplary way (1.16). Some of Marcus’ other personal admonitions can be applied to a ruler, who rules himself most of all, such as, “be free of passion and yet full of affection” (1.9). When Marcus advises that it is the nature of a king to do good yet to be maligned, that is, to bear ill-will honorably, he is repeating a maxim found in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander and first attested in the fourth-century Socratic Antisthenes.58 Good can exist in a palace (5.16, 8.9; see also 7.36) and our best good is found in a community (5.9). Such counsels echo political precepts of Plato and Aristotle. The image of the self-control of a virtuous, benevolent ruler is perhaps the most important political legacy of this Greek philosophical tradition. Greek theories of kingship, progressing from Homer’s glorification of epic leaders to attempts by intellectuals to educate rulers in virtue, have arguably been more influential throughout history than has Athenian-style democracy.

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1

The translations of Homer used here are those of Richmond Lattimore, Homer, The Iliad (Chicago, 1951) and Homer, The Odyssey (NY, 1967); for Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia, trans. G.W. Most (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), with occasional small modifications. For documentation and argumentation, and historical evidence for kings and councils of kings in early Greece, see John R. Lenz, Kings and the Ideology of Kingship in Early Greece (c. 1200–700 B.C.): Epic, Archaeology and History (diss., Columbia University, 1993). These poems are cited here as Il., Od. (Homer’s) and Theog., WD (Hesiod’s).

2

Achilles challenges Agamemnon in Iliad 1, who, however, regains his authority later (Il. 2.576–580 and 477–484, 12.891–893). Penelope’s suitors in the Odyssey are called local kings (e.g. Od. 1.394–396). They are bad kings who vie to become the next king of Ithaca; this is not an attempted aristocratic takeover.

3

See Lenz, Kings, pp. 248–254 on the audience of Homer and Hesiod. The dating of Homer is necessarily always an uncertain approximation.

4

Lenz, Kings, pp. 233–237. A speaker in the Odyssey states that to become king is Telemachus’ “hereditary right” (Od. i.386–387). Even a hero who seems to acquire kingship by a grant, such as Bellerophon, qualifies on this ground (he was the son of a king, recognized as descended from a god, and son-in-law of a king, Il. 6.191–195). Kings can only come from an eligible ‘class’.

5

Il. 12.312; Od. 4.160–161, 8.173 (quoted), 7.71 (uniquely said of a queen); Hesiod, Theogony 91. Agamemnon is compared to three gods and an outstanding bull (Il. 2.477–483); another fighting king, to a lion (3.23).

6

Od. 4.62–64. Odysseus in appearance is the odd exception (Od. 8.158–177), although not entirely (Il. 3.211). Of the authors considered below, Xenophon, Isocrates, Philodemus, and Plutarch praise the physical attractiveness of kings.

7

Malcolm Schofield, “Euboulia in the Iliad”, in Classical Quarterly 36 (1986), pp. 6–31; Friedrich Solmsen, “The ‘Gift’ of Speech in Homer and Hesiod”, in Transactions of the American Philological Association 85 (1954), pp. 1–15.

8

Il. 2.211–277, Od. 8.166–177. The basest character in Homer, Thersites, speaks “not in due order, quarreling with kings” (Il. 2.214).

9

The Iliad opens with Agamemnon disrespecting a priest and through him Apollo; the god strikes his army with a plague. In defending the Greek seer Calchas who had pointed out the king’s impiety (1.54–91), Achilles speaks to a king’s proper behavior. Oedipus repeats Agamemnon’s mistake in a copycat scene in Sophocles’ fifth-century-B.C. tragedy Oedipus Tyrannus (284–511). A priest, seer, or a sage can speak truth to power.

10

Homer, Il. 1.231; Hesiod, WD 39, 221, 264. The suitors of Penelope in the Odyssey are bad kings because they consume the household of their host.

11

Aristotle says this to explain the creation of the first kings, by, in his view, voluntary agreement of the people and natural progression from the father-led family. Strictly speaking, Aristotle does not say that Homeric kings themselves were benefactors in a material sense, explaining only that they ruled over willing subjects for their subjects’ benefit (Politics 3.14 1285b3–9, 3.15 1286b8–11). What he says later is more telling, that “kingship arose [in the first instance] with a view to providing assistance to the respectable against the people” and also to guard the people from abuses by the rich (5.10 1310b8–10, 1310b40–1311a2).

12

In fact, “tyrant” was not a title and there is some reason to believe that tyrants actually called themselves “kings”, basileis; some claimed descent from legendary kings.

13

See note 9 for such poetic tales. Homer’s epic scene occurs in a dramatic context and, as argued above, a time, that takes kings for granted. Sophocles’ Classical tragedy was produced for an Athenian democratic audience hostile to kings.

14

Archilochus poem 19, ed. M.L. West; Plato, Republic 2 359c–360b.

15

The verb used, philosopheōn (Hdt. 1.30), is perhaps the first secure attestation of a compound word meaning “philosophy”: Vishwa Adluri and John Lenz, “From Politics to Salvation through Philosophy: Herodotus’ Histories and Plato’s Republic”, in Philosophy and Salvation in Greek Religion, ed. V. Adluri (Berlin, 2013), pp. 219, 234–235, 239–241.

16

Richmond Lattimore, “The Wise Adviser in Herodotus”, in Classical Philology 34 (1939), pp. 24–35.

17

Democracy was even a negative word for the founding fathers of the United States.

18

Translated by D.S. Hutchinson in Plato, Complete Works, ed. J.M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997), pp. 557–595. This work is of disputed authorship but was used as an introduction to Plato in antiquity.

19

Diogenes Laertius 6.2, where ponos should be translated “toil”, not “pain” or “suffering”. Antisthenes wrote other works on kingship and politics; see Diogenes Laertius 6.1–19 and the last paragraph below.

20

Obedience: Xen., Cyr. 1.1.3, 2.5, 6.13, 6.21–22, and 6.42; 3.1.28, 3.8, 3.57, 3.59, and 3.70; 4.1.4; 8.1.29.

21

Cyr. 1.2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.13, and 5.1; 3.3.70.

22

Cyr. 1.6.7–8 and 6.24; 5.2.10–11; 8.2.1–13.

23

Cyr. 1.5.13; 3.1.42 and 3.3; 4.2.42 and 2.45; 5.1.1, 1.28, 2.12, 2.20, and 4.32; 8.2.19 and 2.22.

24

Cyr. 1.4.25; 5.2.10, 2.12, and 3.32; 8.1–2.

25

Cyr. 3.3.38, 3.39, 3.49, and 3.53–55; 8.1.39.

26

See Vivienne J. Gray, “Xenophon’s Hiero and the Meeting of the Wise Man and Tyrant in Greek Literature”, in Classical Quarterly 36 (1986), pp. 115–123, and eadem, “Xenophon and Isocrates: 2. Rulership”, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, eds. C. Rowe and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 148–151. In Agesilaus, Xenophon expresses admiration for the king of Sparta whom he had served. Gray, “Xenophon and Isocrates”, pp. 147–148 argues that in Oeconomicus (“household management”) Xenophon attributes to women the qualities of ideal rulers, albeit only in the context of running a household.

27

The three orations are translated in Isocrates, Volume 1, trans. D. Mirhady and Y. Lee Too (Austin, 2000), and in Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library, Volumes 1 and 3.

28

He “sets the political philosopher and teacher on a higher plane than the monarch”: Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 3, trans. G. Highet (NY, 1944), pp. 86, 105; he creates an analogy between the “hegemony of the pedagogue” and that of the leader: Niall Livingstone, “The Voice of Isocrates and the Dissemination of Cultural Power”, in Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning, eds. Y. Lee Too and N. Livingstone (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 268, 279–280.

29

Jaeger, Paideia, vol. 3, p. 96.

30

“Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue come money and all other good things for men, both in private and in public life”, Socrates says in Plato, Apology 30b. Some translate, “… but virtue makes money, and everything else, good”. That seems a forced reading.

31

Livingstone, “The Voice of Isocrates”, p. 263.

32

A private individual may have expert political knowledge and ably advise a king (Plato, Politicus 259a–b, 292e–293a). Perhaps that refers to Plato himself, or to Plato’s Socrates, who claims he is the only one who takes up such knowledge (Plato, Gorgias 521d). Plato also wishes to improve politics by removing false advisers from a state (Polit. 292d; see also 298c).

33

Letter 7 is translated by G.R. Morrow in Plato, Complete Works, pp. 1646–1667; see also p. 1635. Other sources: Plutarch, Dion; Diogenes Laertius 3.18–23. Ancient tradition presents reports, now disputed, that Plato and his students were interested in offering political guidance to city-states; on this, see Malcolm Schofield in The Cambridge History (see note 26), pp. 293–296.

34

Translated by C.J. Rowe in Plato, Complete Works, pp. 294–358. See Charles Griswold, “Politikē Epistēmē in Plato’s Statesman”, in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Vol. III: Plato, eds. J. Anton and A. Preuss (Albany, 1989), pp. 141–167 and Christopher Rowe, “The Politicus and Other Dialogues”, in The Cambridge History (see note 26), pp. 233–257.

35

Plato, Polit. 306a, 308b, 310e–311c.

36

Plato, Polit. 297a; see also 295e–296a, 300c–d. Laws are rigid, too general, and the same for all (Polit. 294b–296a). The six less-than-ideal real-world constitutions of Statesman (mentioned below) are all law-bound.

37

Translated by C. Rowe, “The Politicus”, p. 256.

38

Plato, Critias 120e–121b; Rowe, “The Politicus”, pp. 254–256.

39

By contrast, in Republic, tyranny arises as a perversion of democracy (562a–564a).

40

Aristotle, Politics 1.1 1252a1–7; Nicomachean Ethics 1.2 1094b7–10.

41

Pol. 3.7 1279a28–34.

42

See note 11.

43

Pol. 3.6 1279a17–21 and 28–31, 5.10 1310b34–1311a8; Nic. Eth. 8.10 1160b2–8.

44

Pol. 3.17–18 1288a8–9 and 1288a32–1288b2, 4.2 1289a39–1289b1, 5.10 1310b31–1311a8. Kingship is the best regime: Nic. Eth. 8.10 1160a35–36 and 1160b9; Pol. 4.2 1289a40 (“first and most divine”).

45

Pol. 4.2 1289a32–33, 7.3 1325b10–14.

46

Pol. 3.14 1285b6–9, 3.15 1286b8–11, 4.10 1295a15–16 and 21–22, 5.10 ibid., 5.10–11 1313a18–23.

47

For a discussion, see Rowe, “Aristotelian Constitutions”, pp. 376, 386–387.

48

See below.

49

Pol. 3.13 1284b25–34, 3.14 1285b29–33, 3.17 1288a15–29; see also 3.13 1284a3–11 (a different context).

50

Pol. 3.15 1286b8–22, 5.10 1313a3–9.

51

See David E. Hahm, “Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories”, in The Cambridge History (see note 26), pp. 457–476. For Cynic views, see J. Moles in ibid., pp. 431–432. Herbert J. Rose and Simon Hornblower, “Euhemerus”, in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2012).

52

Some myths about Alexander are that he claimed descent from Heracles and on his mother’s side from Achilles; that he carried a copy of the Iliad given him by Aristotle; that he ran around, and put a wreath on, the supposed tomb of Achilles at Troy; that he emulated Achilles and expressed jealousy that epic poetry had preserved his fame. Plutarch, Alexander 2, 8, 15, 26; Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander 1.11.8 and 12.1, 7.14.4 and 17.8.

53

For Philodemus’ treatise: Oswyn Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King according to Homer”, in Journal of Roman Studies 55 (1965), pp. 161–182 and T. Dorandi (ed.) Filodemo: Il buon re secondo Omero (Naples, 1982).

54

As noted above, Cicero compared Roman Republican principes to Isocrates’ King Nicocles.

55

James R. Hamilton, Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary (Oxford, 1969), p. XXXVII.

56

Plut., Alex. 7–8.

57

Albert B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander (Oxford, 1980), pp. 12–14.

58

Diogenes Laertius 6.3 (Antisthenes), Plut., Alex. 41, Marcus Aurelius 7.36, and also elsewhere. This can be related to a maxim of Socrates’. Socrates said it is better to be a victim of injustice than to commit a wrong; that is, one must be good even if others are not.

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