[1.1.1] Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium. Quamvis enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse nec ullum virtutum pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit, iuvat inspicere et circumire bonam conscientam.
[1.1.1] I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of mercy, in order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror, and thus reveal you to yourself as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures. For, though the true profit of virtuous deeds lies in the doing, and there is no fitting reward for the virtues apart from the virtues themselves, still it is a pleasure to subject a good conscience to a round of inspection. (Loeb trans. J.W. Basore, 1928)
This quote makes it tolerably clear that the rhetorical device of holding a mirror in front of a ruler for purposes of praise or instruction, both of which imply constraint, was known to Nero’s adviser Seneca, though hardly any traces of Greek or Roman works which employ this device survive. It was, evidently, one technique among an array of alternatives for giving advice to ancient rulers in order to stress the value of virtuous behaviour over the destructive use of violence. Thus, the specula principum (‘mirrors of princes’) literature, as employed in the medieval period and after, derives from ancient traditions of advice though it also seems the product of evolving conditions and new imperatives. In this paper, my aim is to survey a string of ancient works in different genres written to stress both the value of virtue to ancient rulers and appropriate virtues for good rulers. Even where these works are not addressed to the rulers concerned, or do not employ the device of a mirror by which the ruler can recognise his possession of relevant virtues, they were written for various purposes of praise, instruction, and constraint similar in kind to those sought by the specula
1 Ancient Greece
A range of theoretical justifications for the power of a mortal ruler were available in ancient Greece. Such power might, for instance, be based on principles such as ‘might makes right’ (physical force as sufficient justification), ‘divine election’ (a higher/divine power as decisive), ‘the rule of law’ (implying powers voted by a sovereign legislative body), or ‘hereditary succession’ (based on family descent).1 Homer knew a paternal ideal.2 The crucial contribution of Greek authors, however, was to base ideal rule on ‘moral superiority’, where the important considerations were the superior virtue of the ruler and how this might be maintained. Moral discourse is fundamental to Graeco-Roman literature of various types, but it is particularly clear in political thought about ideal rulers.3 Following the inspirational work of Plato, heavy attention was
Greeks of the Hellenistic Period (323–30 BC) produced a huge amount of literature on rulers, prompted largely by the new phenomenon of absolute monarchy, which came into being in the wake of Alexander the Great’s conquest of the East. After his death in 323 BC, the huge Hellenistic kingdoms of Antigonid Macedon, Seleucid Syria, and Ptolemaic Egypt dominated affairs in the lands affected by Macedonian conquest until the expansion of Rome into the eastern Mediterranean in the second century BC. Alongside the great kings, a range
Philosophical theories of kingship were produced from an early point in the Hellenistic Period. All the major philosophical schools quickly became involved, except for the Cynics, whose extreme views on material possessions, individual ethics, and political power initially disqualified them.8 There has been some debate about whether a Platonic-Stoic ‘canon’ of ‘cardinal’ virtues existed, but it seems preferable to think that a pool of virtues became available for exploitation in changing circumstances.9 In their efforts to claim legitimacy, the kings welcomed philosophers to their courts as advisers, and these philosophers responded appropriately. They wrote treatises Peri Basileias (On Kingship) in great number. These treatises rested on several common ideas. Above all, ideal kingship was ‘rule without accountability’, but this was moderated and justified by the perfect virtue of the king, which was made manifest in the actions of the king towards his subjects. The main virtue of the time was love of humanity (philanthrōpia), in accordance with which the king displayed his love for his subjects. Other fundamental virtues included beneficence (euergesia), justice, self-control, wisdom, foresight, and courage. The king did not need to be a philosopher, but it was understandably held that
2 The Roman Republic
By the time Augustus established his rule at Rome in 27 BC, Roman armies and commanders had been present in the eastern Mediterranean for almost
Roman antipathy to kings and kingship, however, was well known in ancient times, so how could the Romans possibly have internalized Greek political thought dealing with the virtuous king and the decadent tyrant? It might seem to some readers that there were many reasons why they should not have done so, given their historical aversion to the idea of a rex (‘king’), which supposedly began with the foundation of the Republic, and the pose of denial of monarchy instituted by the emperor Augustus, who founded the system of rule conventionally known as the ‘Principate’, in which the emperor is described as princeps inter pares (‘the leader among equals’). The contrast in political terms between Rome and the Hellenistic world is stark.
Questions abound, and on first reading they might seem to paint a pessimistic picture. The kings of early Rome were eventually overthrown. The Roman Republic was dominated by fierce competition between noble families who were constantly on the lookout for a rogue member of their class who might seek overwhelming personal power in the state. Equally, the Empire might not seem very fertile ground for kingship literature because of the attitude adopted by Augustus, the civilis princeps (‘citizen-like leader’). Absolute monarchy was a relevant idea but not in the political and legal environments favoured by Augustus. Philosophical advisers were fine for Greek rulers, but not for Romans, who were simultaneously careful about Greek advisers and averse to being described as kings. Romans used amici (‘friends’) as advisers, rather than Greek philosophers. Furthermore, whereas myriad works On Kingship were produced in the Hellenistic world, there was not much political philosophy or political debate about the form of the state at Rome because, even at times of great friction and civil war, the Romans were broadly in agreement that their res publica (‘commonwealth’, ‘public business’), conceived as a partnership
The truth seems to be that Rome’s outward antipathy represents an ongoing fascination with kingship, so that it should come as no surprise that kingship literature was well known in both Republican and Imperial Rome, where the basic dichotomy between the ‘(good) king’ and the ‘(bad) tyrant’ was constantly employed in (e.g.) political discourse, dramatic performance, and works of history. As a result, Romans of the Republic and Principate were more familiar with relevant Greek works than might be thought from general political conditions and the superficially modest number of surviving works of political theory.
The starting-point must of course be the historical tradition, which indicates that Roman nobles rose against their tyrannical king Tarquinius Superbus (Tarquin the Proud), expelled the ruling Etruscan dynasty in 510 BC, and founded the Roman Republic in 509 BC.14 The evidence for this event is
Subsequently, in the third and (especially) the second centuries BC, Rome expanded into the eastern Mediterranean and encountered the Hellenistic kings, whose aura proved more awesome than the reality of their military
The practice of Republican politics, therefore, meant that nobles were concerned about a ‘tyrant’, who was said to be seeking ‘kingship’ or ‘tyranny’ (regnum), a tendentious charge which in the Middle and Late Republics borrowed from but defied the conventional Greek distinction between the ‘(good) king’ and the ‘(bad) tyrant’. While Romans could attack an opponent as a ‘tyrant’, they could not praise a contemporary as a ‘king’. This produced a problem as Rome experienced a slow growth of autocratic power in the second and first centuries BC, when a succession of nobles achieved positions of
2.1 Cicero
The spotlight inevitably falls on Cicero, who provides much of our written evidence for his lifetime (106–43 BC). Several of his works show deep familiarity with Greek ruler literature. In a speech delivered in 66 BC, the De Imperio Gnaei Pompeii (On the Imperium of Gnaeus Pompeius), also called the Pro Lege Manilia (On Behalf of the Manilian Law), Cicero sought to convince his contemporaries that Pompey the Great should receive an extraordinary imperium (military command) that would effectively see him dominate the eastern Mediterranean and dwarf the rights of other Roman commanders and magistrates in that area. The command was nominally against the dangerous Pontic (Crimean) king, Mithridates VI, but was surely imbued with greater possibilities, since Mithridates had been weakened considerably in previous campaigns. Cicero’s strategy was to demonstrate that Pompey possessed extraordinary personal qualities that made him an ideal candidate for the job (3). The focus on qualities resembles the approach of ruler literature, though the qualities themselves – four above all – were evidently considered fundamental for a Roman general and calculated to appeal to a Roman audience: ‘military knowledge (scientiam rei militaris), courage (uirtutem), authority (auctoritatem), [and] divine fortune (felicitatem)’ (28, cf. 49).
First, Cicero highlights the knowledge Pompey gained through service on his father’s staff during the Social War, and through commands given him in his own right by his father (28). To these opportunities Pompey added hard work (labor), endurance (fortitudo), application (industria), swiftness (celeritas) and deliberation (consilium) (29–35). Second, Cicero places heavy stress
Later, as consul in 63 BC, Cicero uncovered and thwarted the revolutionary plans of Lucius Sergius Catilina, a rogue noble, whose designs involved violent overthrow of the state. When he took a leading role in summarily executing conspirators caught in the city, enemies said that he had acted like a cruel, murderous tyrant for having killed these citizens. Friends, however, honoured him with the title Parens Patriae (‘Parent/Father of the Fatherland’) for having saved citizen lives. This title had probably been around for a long time, but Cicero proceeded to advertise it with unique vigour. It is no understatement to say that he became obsessed from this time with the task of promoting himself, in the face of considerable opposition from political enemies and rivals, as the father of the state for his crucial role in saving Rome from an undeniably serious threat. He was, in the view of his supporters, a saviour rather than a murderer of Roman citizens. The vital point about this ideological battle is that the Parens Patriae, as the opposite of a tyrant, functions like the good king from Greek kingship literature. ‘King’ as an honorific epithet was out of the question at Rome, but ‘Father’ plainly was not. The father analogy, therefore, provided a congenial and distinctive image for individual dominance at Rome. It was employed in Greek kingship works, but never to the same degree. As such, it represents a major adaptation of Greek ideas to Roman models and purposes.24
The way in which Parens Patriae was applied to Cicero by appreciative friends appears to indicate that he was not alone in thinking that autocratic
Some years later, when Cicero had to deal with the dictator Caesar in the years 46 and 45 BC, he showed an extraordinary facility to employ appropriate language and manners in the presence of Rome’s effective monarch. His so-called ‘Caesarian’ speeches – the Pro Marcello (On Behalf of Marcellus), Pro Ligario (On Behalf of Ligarius), and Pro Rege Deiotaro (On Behalf of King Deiotarus) – were delivered on behalf of associates who sought Caesar’s famous clemency in order to resume respected positions. Caesar was cajoled, praised, and honoured in terms that Greeks would have understood, despite the necessary Roman adaptations.
The Pro Marcello thanks Caesar for his extension of clemency (clementia) to Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who had been a fierce opponent of the dictator, had backed Pompey during the civil war, and whose case had been supported by the entire Senate. Cicero himself undertook to plead for Marcellus’ return to Rome. This decision meant a return to public life for Cicero after a long period of absence, which had made his opposition to Caesar’s rule clear. Now his attitude changed fundamentally in response to Caesar’s ‘unbelievable and virtually divine’ decision (Marc. 1). The self-control demonstrated in this act of clementia is more significant than his military conquests and is the quality which sees him ‘most resembling a god’ (8–9). For a start, it is an achievement that ‘is entirely his own’ (11) and, while other monuments will fade, ‘this justice (iustitia) and merciful disposition (lenitas animi) of yours will flourish more with
The speeches Pro Ligario (46 BC) and Pro Rege Deiotaro (45 BC) adopt the same basic strategy, with kingly virtues brought to the fore. In the former speech, Cicero works for the recall of Ligarius, another opponent of Caesar and supporter of Pompey during the civil war. This time he celebrates Caesar’s clementia at regular intervals (6, 10, 15, 19, 30) but commences with a reference to Caesar’s sense of pity (misericordia) (1), and praises in addition the dictator’s generosity (liberalitas) (6, 23), wisdom (sapientia) (6), humanity (humanitas) (13), mildness (lenitas) (15), and goodness (bonitas) (37). In sum, Caesar is a man of humanitas, clementia, and misericordia (29, 37). He resembles a father
The Pro Rege Deiotaro was delivered in favour of another Pompeian, King Deiotarus of Galatia, who had been pardoned by Caesar in 47 BC but was subsequently suspected of treachery. In now-familiar fashion, Caesar’s clemency is given high praise. It distinguishes the dictator ‘from being a tyrant’ (34) and means that there are many ‘who owe their lives to you’ (40). The speech ends poignantly with the words clementiae tuae (43), which underline the point that the forensic circumstances have given special meaning to Caesar’s clementia, though the strategy adopted by Cicero has drawn from the pool of virtues developed in praise of good rulers.31 It seems probable that Cicero was responsible for the sudden appearance and prominence of clementia, which was soon employed in a senatorial decree of 45 BC that proposed the construction of a temple to the Clemency of Caesar (Clementia Caesaris) with statues of Clementia and Caesar clasping hands. The temple was not in fact built, either because Caesar’s murder intervened or because the proposal, although welcome because clementia stood in contrast to the cruelty of Sulla, was nonetheless an explicit signal that Caesar held an autocratic position in respect of his peers and contemporaries: he could treat them like conquered enemies on the battlefield and so it implied servitude. The idea of clementia might not have met with Caesar’s approval, even though Cicero’s repeated appeals to the dictator’s clementia in a forensic setting were largely successful.32 A famous anecdote describes the extraordinary impact of Cicero’s Pro Ligario on a reluctant Caesar (Plut. Cic. 39.6–7): ‘it was manifest that all the emotions of [Caesar’s] soul were stirred; and at last, when the orator touched upon the struggles at Pharsalus, he was so greatly affected that his body shook and he dropped from his hand some of his documents.’
In the wake of Caesar’s assassination on the Ides (15th) of March 44 BC, Cicero reappeared once more at Rome as a political force of independence and fierce patriotism. His famous series of speeches known as Philippicae (the Philippics), delivered against Mark Antony, recalled the angry opposition of the Athenian statesmen Demosthenes to King Philip II of Macedon in the fourth century BC. The Philippics are notable for their relentless attacks on
After Cicero’s murder in 43 BC, the idea of the Parens Patriae became highly controversial. It was used to damn Caesar’s assassins as parricides and to parry claims that he was justly removed for being a tyrant. Livy tells of famous early heroes who were described alternatively as ‘fathers’ and ‘tyrants’. Such terms had been used for generations by the time that Livy sat down to write, in the later decades of the first century BC, but there can be little question that these terms were highly contested during Livy’s formative years, when Rome was wracked by civil war.35 This was also, of course, the formative period of Octavian, who would later become the emperor Augustus. The advent of autocratic power was debated fiercely. On the positive view it was thought that a Parens Patriae could be compatible with traditional ideas about the state, if he was selfless, a saviour, and acknowledged freely by all, rather than selfish, domineering, and in power through violent usurpation. He would be princeps inter pares, rather than an overt rex.
3 The Roman Empire
Augustus avoided the negative associations of monarchy with great skill, even though his power resembled that of an autocrat in certain respects. Aside from traditional attitudes and other controversies of his youth, Caesar’s assassination must have governed his attitude heavily. Augustus knew what could happen to a ruler cast as a ‘tyrant’, and he knew too that the difference between a ‘father’ and a ‘tyrant’ at Rome could be a matter of opinion.
The hallmark of his imperial style was the ritual of recusatio (‘refusal’), whereby he affected a reluctance to accept power until prevailed upon by the unanimous voice of his subjects.36 This ritual helped to produce stability and dispel any thoughts that he was a tyrant. It found its most famous expression in the events of 2 BC, through which Augustus was finally induced to accept the title Pater Patriae (‘Father of the Fatherland’) – the crowning achievement of his reign according to the arrangement of his Res Gestae (Achievements) (see RG 35.1).37 The Res Gestae, therefore, can be looked upon as a definitive statement that he was no tyrant. He was the ideal ruler in Roman terms, with qualities, selflessly applied, which were reminiscent of Greek works on good rulers. In 27 BC the Senate awarded him a clupeus virtutis / clipeus virtutis (‘shield of virtue’), a copy of which survives from Arles. Augustus associates this award closely with the title Pater Patriae in his Res Gestae (34.2, 35.1), as though in combination they indicate remarkable qualities which could eventually be acknowledged in an environment free from the taint of civil war. Augustus says that the shield honoured his virtus (‘courage’), clementia (‘clemency/mercy’), iustitia (‘justice’), and pietas (‘dutifulness’) (RG 34.2), while the Arles copy indicates that in the original decree the fourth virtue was in fact pietas erga parentem (‘dutifulness towards his father’), a form which more easily calls to mind controversies of the civil war. For example, it evokes ideological battles between Octavian and Antony over the question of Caesar’s inheritance, and between Octavian and Sextus Pompey, who advertised the epithet ‘Pius’ (‘Dutiful’) as a sign of his unwavering loyalty to his father Pompey. These are virtues whose appearance owes much to their topicality in the years of civil war which preceded the award of the shield.38 They should also be explained in terms of Roman adaptation of Greek models.
Although no works of political philosophy debated the matter in detail, the concept of libertas (‘liberty/freedom’) was adjusted to fit the new political situation and to conform to the distinction between a fatherly ruler, who works for the freedom of his subjects, and a tyrant, who works to suppress them. The élite of the Late Republic had developed an aristocratic concept of libertas,
The pattern was set whereby the virtues of the paternal emperor trumped the vices of the tyrant. Velleius Paterculus incorporated a miniature panegyric of Tiberius into his history.41 Tacitus, whose narrative of Tiberius’ reign (AD 14–37) is famous for its subtlety and complexity, nevertheless labels the emperor a ‘tyrant’ in a famous passage (Ann. 6.6). Roman coins began to depict numerous virtues, which should be understood as divine powers, not simply as manifestations of internal imperial qualities. As such, they could describe an imperial reign as well as an individual emperor. Carlos Noreña identifies aequitas (‘fairness’), pietas, virtus, liberalitas (‘generosity’), and providentia (‘foresight’) as the virtues most often found on coins from AD 69 to 235.42
3.1 Seneca’s De Clementia (On Clemency, Mercifulness)
Beyond this basic dichotomy of ‘father’ vs. ‘tyrant’, or princeps vs. dominus, the depth of penetration of Greek ruler theory at Rome might still be doubted, given the absence of extended works of political philosophy. From the mid-first
Seneca’s De Clementia (On Clemency) is a notable and enigmatic exception to the general paucity of Roman philosophy on the virtues of good rulers. But how should it be explained? Why does it treat the emperor so openly as an absolute monarch, flying in the face of Augustus’ notion of the emperor as princeps? Was it simply meant for the emperor, or was its cleverness, erudition, depth of thought, and multi-layered deployment of ideas designed for a wider audience? Was it meant to have practical application, or was it a tour de force, a philosophical virtuoso performance, designed to display the erudition and excellence of its author to his contemporaries, and thus enhance his social standing by intellectual means? Even this, of course, would mean that his audience was by no means unaware or uninterested in the topic of the good ruler.
The De Clementia, published in December 55 or slightly thereafter, probably indicates how Seneca wanted Nero to behave, and it is probably a work of advice to that end.43 In the Octavia, for instance, the only surviving Roman historical play, Seneca is brought in as a character who tries to restrain Nero with Stoic advice, and Nero is depicted as a cruel tyrant who is the opposite of the good ruler set forth in the De Clementia.44 In this light, the De Clementia recommends the practice of virtue to Nero at a critical time, just after many suspected he had murdered his stepbrother Britannicus. There were originally three books (Clem. 1.3.1), but only the first (which has affinities with Hellenistic essays On Kingship) and the beginning of the second (a philosophical analysis of virtue) survive. The first book is of prime interest here.
For our purposes, the speech commences strikingly with the words: ‘I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of mercy, in order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror (ut quodam modo speculi uice fungerer), and thus reveal you to yourself as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures’ (1.1.1). The explicit reference to a mirror, by which the emperor might contemplate his virtues, links Seneca’s work with the massive body of political philosophy on the virtues of Hellenistic kings. Yet the dramatic acknowledgement of monarchic power at Rome serves a basic message of constraint. Nero is encouraged to continue behaving as he is at present.46 He is already perfect: ‘no one looks for any model for you to copy except yourself’ (1.1.6). This perfection, of which Seneca is obviously confident, rests first on his innocence (innocentia) (1.1.5), or ‘freedom from guilt’ of civil war, and above all on his clementia, which is described as the essence of humanity (humanitas) (1.3.2). The reference to innocentia seems designed to draw a contrast with the opening of Claudius’ reign.47 Once again, then, while drawing on the tradition of ruler virtues, the treatment is adapted to Roman conditions and stresses relevant Roman virtues.
The image of the ruler as a father continues its prominence in Roman works.48 Seneca evokes this image (1.14, 1.16.2–3) and calls upon Nero to recognise that praise and programme go together. The Senate honoured him with the Pater Patriae title (1.14.2) so that he would employ his absolute power as a gentle father rather than a cruel tyrant. An implicit contrast is drawn throughout with Claudius, Nero’s immediate predecessor, whose relationship with the
3.2 Pliny the Younger’s Panegyricus
About half a century later, the younger Pliny became consul and, on 1 September AD 100, delivered an expanded version of the conventional speech of thanks to the emperor Trajan. This long speech subsequently became so famous for its praise of the ruler that it is commonly held to have initiated the genre known as Latin panegyric and is referred to as Pliny’s Panegyricus. The speeches known as the Panegyrici Latini (Latin Panegyrics) extend in a line of descent from Pliny’s Panegyricus. Despite its innovative aspects, however, this speech owes much to earlier traditions, especially in its emphasis on the virtues of the paternal emperor and its denigration of his tyrannical predecessor, in this case Domitian. In addition, although it is couched in terms of praise rather than advice, so that exaggeration and economy with the truth are naturally prevalent, the element of persuasion or programme accompanies the honorific language.50
The prominence of Trajan’s virtues comes as no surprise. The range of these virtues, the individual virtues chosen for emphasis, and the way they combine to describe a man of unique superiority are, however, quite unprecedented.51 This speech was justifiably looked back upon as a tour de force. Trajan’s adoption by Nerva was contentious and forced upon his predecessor by the need to keep the military on side. Pliny, however, overcomes this uncomfortable fact by emphasizing that Trajan is a man of great experience, as shown by his early career in the military (14–15). Moreover, he possesses many virtues, such as ‘devotion to duty, self-restraint, mildness’ (2.6: pietatem, abstinentiam, mansuetudinem), ‘modesty and moderation’ (3.2: modestiam … moderationemque).
An important theme is that, while Trajan’s virtues elevate him, he remains nonetheless ‘one of us’ (2.4: unum ille se ex nobis), a ruler whose qualities stay those of a citizen, in the tradition of the civilis princeps (‘citizen-like leader’) instituted by Augustus.52 On campaign he behaved like one of his men (10.3, 15.5, 19.3). In general, he regards himself as a private citizen (10.4, 44.1–2, 64.4, 83–4: privatus), has a quality of accessibility (facilitas) (23.2, 47.4), and is humane, personally approachable, affable, and respectful (24.2, 48.1, 49.5, 49.7: humanitas, suavitas, iucunditas, verecundia). Like an ordinary citizen he readily submits to the rule of law (36.4, 64.1, 65.1, 71.3, 71.5). Above all, he shows an extraordinary reluctance to accept monarchic powers and honours, thereby illustrating his fitness to rule (5.5). He has refused, for example, the title Imperator (5.2–5), the title Pater Patriae (21.1), and a third consulship (57.1, 59–60), such is his modesty (5.5, 21.1, 79.4: modestia) and respect for the Senate (1.1, 76.1–6, 90.1, 95.1). The element of persuasion in these sections dealing with the emperor’s attitude to the Senate is very strong.
Pliny repeatedly stresses and develops the image of Trajan as father. Trajan conducts himself towards the citizens ‘as a father towards his children’ (21.4). He acts as the parens publicus (‘public father’) (26.3, 87.1) and his benign protection encourages people to raise children again (27). The vocabulary exploits long-familiar dichotomies: ‘Nowhere should we flatter him as a god and a divinity: we are talking of a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant, a father not a master’ (2.3).53 The theme of divinity is certainly prominent. For example, Trajan was created emperor by the gods (5.1–2). Nerva’s choice of heir was guided by the
3.3 Other Works
There were other contributions to ideas about good rulers from Greek writers adjusting to Roman power. They all demonstrate that writers of the Roman Empire were thoroughly schooled in Greek ruler theory and were adept at applying it to imperial rule through constantly changing circumstances. The degree to which they did this fluctuated considerably.
Philo of Alexandria, a Hellenized Jewish writer of the early first century AD, was well abreast of Hellenistic political philosophy and consequently discussed good rulers in terms of a familiar raft of qualities, such as justice, piety, humanity, and respect for law. He adhered to Plato’s ideal of philosopher-kings and to the view that the king is a living law and the law a just king. His ethical system is close to Stoicism, but for him a truly moral ruler would imitate God.56 Yet he is not systematic in his analyses, does not contemplate the rule of Rome at length, and tends alternately to concentrate on the Jewish people and on all inhabitants of the cosmos, which has ‘but one polity and one law’, the equivalent of Nature’s Logos, based on reason.57
Dio Chrysostom delivered four discourses On Kingship. The first three repeatedly and conventionally stress the mutual benefits of a thoughtful, generous, and hard-working king, while making much of the old contrast between the virtuous king and the non-virtuous tyrant. This was no mean feat for a Cynic, for whom kingship is a moral concept that is opposed to worldly kingship. Yet Dio borrowed from Onescritus, who had facilitated a rapprochement, and his influences are fundamentally Stoic, including support for the role of a
Part of the reason for a lack of adventurous theorising among Greeks of the Imperial period is the simple fact that the Roman Empire seemed unquestionable. In the second century AD, admirers of the emperor Marcus Aurelius could claim that Plato’s ideal of a philosopher-king was finally fulfilled. The theme of the kosmou politēs (‘world citizen’) is prominent in Marcus’ work, as in most traces of Roman Stoicism, since to all Stoics local and national affiliations are far less important than one’s membership in the worldwide community of reason.64 Roman Stoics debated the question of the best regime. The majority understandably preferred monarchy and conceived of the emperor as (ideally) a Stoic sage. There were others, however, such as Thrasea Paetus, who understood the Stoic ideal of self-command to entail republican government and invoked Stoicism in their anti-imperial politics.65
The historian Cassius Dio imagined a ‘debate’ between Agrippa and Maecenas on the merits of democracy (52.2–13) versus monarchy (52.14–40). The idea of such a debate is surely a product of the third century AD rather than the first century BC. It belongs to a time when loyal members of the elite, such as Dio, thought the matter had been well and truly settled, though nonetheless they continued to value the notion of the citizen-like emperor.66 Yet even as the value of the traditional pose of denial of monarchic power gradually waned into nothing with open recognition that the emperor was an absolute
A distinction subsequently developed between (i) the Latin panegyrics, which were rhetorical speeches modelled on Pliny’s masterpiece addressed ‘to a king’ and in direct praise of him, and (ii) philosophical treatises of advice On Kingship, promoting an ideal picture even when addressed to an individual king. Fourth century AD writers, among whom may be numbered Themistius, Julian, Libanius, Claudian, and Synesius, stress this distinction. Some ninety or so virtues were employed by writers of the Panegyrici Latini, a collection of twelve speeches starting with Pliny’s address to Trajan but dating predominantly between AD 289 and 389.67 This mass of virtues might seem like an undisciplined pile at first glance, but in fact their Platonic and Augustan roots often emerge, as in the dominance of virtus, and qualities of military prowess and state security, like fortitudo (‘strength’), victoria (‘victory’), salus (‘safety’), and concordia (‘harmony’) seem fundamental for rulers in uncertain times, while simultaneously permitting the use of additional virtues, along with variation and emphasis for different individuals. The large number of virtues, therefore, permitted nuanced portrayals of different emperors through selection, comparison, emphasis, or omission. Intertextual references would only have increased the layers of nuance and interpretation.68
Kingship theory influenced Christian theology, since it seemed self-evident that the dominance of the Roman Emperor and of the Sun in the sky must reflect the omnipotence of God, and subsequently became an important influence on Byzantine political thought. It was used by Eusebius of Caesarea in his portrayal of Constantine I, the first Christian emperor. Eusebius’ Life of Constantine should be linked with ruler literature, though the text’s precise
The works surveyed here form the foundations on which political works of the specula principum genre were based in the medieval period and beyond. It should be plain that the Romans were deeply familiar with ruler literature from Greek roots, but that they employed it in various genres and contexts for their own changing purposes. One rarely therefore finds a Roman adviser facing the emperor without some carefulness about the open acknowledgement of monarchic power. But the use of ideas derived ultimately from Greek sources tells us much about Roman imperatives and contexts, which are crucial for understanding the virtues that Romans chose to emphasize and propagate. The longevity of the Graeco-Roman tradition of ruler thought based on moral superiority is remarkable. It persisted up to the time of Charles I, who relied (fruitlessly, it can be stressed) on the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, according to which God’s choice overcame any immediate moral questions. This was not just a different tradition but a clear rejection of the tradition that had once produced the fundamental concentration of Greek and Roman writers on the virtues of good rulers.70
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The concept of ‘might makes right’, though not exclusively in relation to a single ruler, is memorably stated by the Athenians to the Melians at Thuc. 5.89.1: ‘The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’ For ‘divine election’, particularly in the Roman world, see J. Rufus Fears, Princeps a Diis Electus: The Divine Election of the Emperor as a Political Concept at Rome (Rome, 1977); with reviews by Peter A. Brunt, in JRS 69 (1979), pp. 168–75 and Simon R.F. Price, in CR 29.2 (1979), pp. 277–9. Brunt (at 174) sees divine right as a product of Christian thought. He argued in a later paper that the power of each new emperor depended on laws passed in the Senate at his accession: ‘The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime’, in CQ 34.2 (1984), pp. 423–44. See now the discussion of Olivier Hekster, Emperors and Ancestors: Roman Rulers and the Constraints of Tradition (Oxford, 2015), esp. 259. The merits of ‘hereditary succession’ were discussed regularly under the Roman Empire. See, for example, the papers in Alisdair G.G. Gibson (ed.) The Julio-Claudian Succession: Reality and Perception of the ‘Augustan Model’ (Leiden/Boston, 2013), esp. Josiah Osgood, ‘Suetonius and the Succession to Augustus’, 19–40, who (at 33) outlines some of the benefits of hereditary succession. Cf. Tom Stevenson, “The Succession Planning of Augustus”, in Antichthon 47 (2013), pp. 118–39.
Hom. Od. 2.47, 2.234, 5.12. Cf. Tom Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor and the Father Analogy in Greek and Roman Thought”, in CQ 42.2 (1992), pp. 421–36 (at 424).
For an excellent introductory discussion, which employs regular and lengthy quotes from ancient sources, see Francis Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, 2 vols. (Washingto, D.C., 1966). Straightforward, succinct, and still valuable as a survey is Thomas A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought, 2nd ed. (London, 1967). Cf. Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”, pp. 433–6.
On Plato’s contribution, especially in the Republic, where he proposes the famous idea of philosopher kings, see Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 143–68; Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), chaps. 10–13; Giovanni R.F. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, 2007). Cf. Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”, pp. 433–6.
Text, translation, and commentary: Donald A. Russell and Nigel G. Wilson (eds.), Menander Rhetor (Oxford, 1981). Cf. Malcolm Heath, Menander: A Rhetor in Context (Oxford, 2004).
Xenophon: Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 169–85; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 142–54 (Gray); Christopher Nadon, Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia (Berkeley, 2001). Isocrates: Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 133–9; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 142–54 (Gray); Evangelos Alexiou, “The Rhetoric of Isocrates’ Evagoras: History, Ethics and Politics”, in Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques, eds. Ch. Bouchet and P. Giovanelli-Jouanna, Collection Études et Recherches sur l’Occident Romain (Lyon, 2015), pp. 47–61. Cf. Susanna Morton Braund, “Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, Seneca, Pliny”, in The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity, ed. M. Whitby (Leiden/Boston/Köln, 1998), pp. 53–76 (at 53–4, 56–8).
For excellent historical overviews, see Frank W. Walbank, The Hellenistic World, rev. ed. (London, 1992); Andrew Erskine (ed.) A Companion to the Hellenistic World (Malden, MA, 2005), chaps. 2–6. Cf. Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 401–14 (Garnsey).
For contributions by Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics, see Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 239–68; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, chaps. 21–22 (Moles, Schofield). The Cynics took some time to become involved, and the subject of ideal kingship was not popular among Epicureans, whose founder, Epicurus, was not primarily a political philosopher. Nevertheless, an Epicurean work by Philodemus (c. 110–c. 40/35 BC), On the Good King According to Homer, has been recovered from the Villa of the Papyri at Pompeii. For an edition of this work, see Tiziano Dorandi, Filodemo: Il buon re secondo Omero (Naples, 1982). For interpretation, see Oswyn Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King according to Homer”, in JRS 55 (1965), pp. 161–82; cf. Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 280–2, who stresses that Philodemus was primarily a literary critic.
On the concept of a Hellenistic ‘canon’ of virtues, see Helen F. North, “Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature”, in The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan, ed. L. Wallach (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 165–83, esp. 174–5. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “The Emperor and his Virtues”, in Historia 30.3 (1981), pp. 298–323, tends to see (at 300–7) a ‘pool’ of virtues; cf. Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, p. 57.
For Hellenistic thought on ideal kingship, see Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy; Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 239–68; Traute Adam, Clementia Principis: der Einfluss hellenistischer Fürstenspiegel auf den Versuch einer rechtlichen Fundierung des Principats durch Seneca (Stuttgart, 1970); Gerhard J.D. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times (Amsterdam, 1975); Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, chap. 23 (Hahm). A Jewish version may be found in the “Letter of Aristeas”, evidently a product of the second century BC, on which see Oswyn Murray, “Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World”, in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers, eds. T. Rajak et al. (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2007), pp. 13–28. Plutarch draws heavily on Hellenistic works in his various treatments of kings and kingship.
On benefactions and ruler cult for the kings as benefactors, founders and/or saviours, see Simon R.F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (Cambridge, 1984), chaps. 1–2; Mary Beard, John A. North, and Simon R.F. Price, Religions of Rome, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 140–9, 208–10; Ittai Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion (Oxford, 2002), chaps. 1–2; Erskine, Companion to the Hellenistic World, chaps. 11, 12, 25.
Much of the debate proceeds from Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship”, in YCS 1 (1928), pp. 58–102, who discussed several pseudo-Pythagorean tracts preserved by Stobaeus. Their date is not certain: Louis Delatte, Les Traités de la royauté d’Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthenidas (Liège, 1942). Diotogenes’ treatise On Kingship described the ideal king as an imitator of God and the embodiment of law: Holger Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Acta Academiae Aboensis (1965), pp. 71–7.
Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.23; Tusc. 2.62. Cf. Plut. Aem. 6.8–10, 28.11; A.E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford, 1967), s.v. ‘Cyropaedia’.
The historical tradition is best conveyed by Livy, Book 1. For supplementary evidence of early kings at Rome, note the survival of names and institutions like the Rex Nemorensis (‘King of Nemi’, inspiration for Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough). The festival called the Regifugium was associated with the expulsion of the kings from Rome, though this interpretation probably misunderstands the sense of ‘the flight of the king’ (Ov. Fast. 2.685–8, Plut. Quaest. Rom. 63 with Rose’s notes; Agnes K. Michels, The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, 1967), pp. 160–5. The Regia (‘Royal House’, ‘Palace’) was the house of the pontifex maximus. Cf. Rex Sacrorum (‘King of Sacred Rites’, Varro, Ling. 6.13, 28; Macrob. Sat. 1.15.9–12, 19; Livy 2.2; 40.42.9; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.74.4) and Interrex (a fill-in magistrate or short-term regent who was named for holding office ‘between kings’).
On the rex at Rome, see Tim J. Cornell, Beginnings of Rome (London/New York, 1995), pp. 141–50, 230–6, 239–41; Andrew W. Lintott, Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999), pp. 28–32; Jacques Poucet, Les Rois de Rome: Tradition et histoire (Bruxelles, 2000).
On the Roman nobility, see Polyb. 6.53.1–54.4; Plin. HN 7.43.139; Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, “Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the Nobilitas”, in Historia 42 (1993), pp. 12–39; Harriet I. Flower, Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture (Oxford, 1996), esp. chap. 6; Lintott, Constitution; Tom Stevenson, Julius Caesar and the Transformation of the Roman Republic (London, 2015), chap. 2.
See J. Roger Dunkle, “The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic”, in TAPA 98 (1967), pp. 151–71, esp. 152, where he points out that words like rex and tyrannus are used interchangeably at Rome, in contrast to Greek practice, and 153, where he states that it ‘was probably through the medium of tragedy that the Romans first became acquainted with the type of the Greek tyrant’; id. “The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography”, in CW 65 (1971), pp. 12–20.
Andrew Erskine, “Hellenistic Monarchy and Roman Political Invective”, in CQ 41.1 (1991), pp. 106–20.
For the influence of men such as Polybius and the Stoic Panaetius, see Polyb. 32.9; Cic. Off. 1–2; Erich Gruen, Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome (Ithaca, 1992), pp. 251–71.
They did not always make a good impression. For example, the sycophancy of Prusias of Bithynia, who addressed the senators as ‘saviour gods’ (Polyb. 30.10.10), went down well with some but was despised by others and was long remembered with revulsion by fellow Greeks.
Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London, 1985).
For Cato the Elder and Cicero rendering megalopsychia into Latin as magnanimitas (‘great-spiritedness’) or magnitudo animi (‘greatness of spirit’), see Ulrich Knoche, Magnitudo Animi. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung eines Römischen Wertgedankens (Leipzig, 1935); Yelena Baraz, “True Greatness of Soul in Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientis”, in Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy, eds. G.D. Williams and K. Volk (Oxford, 2016), pp. 157–71 (at 161).
On this ‘elegant and effective panegyric of Pompey’, see Andrew Lintott, Cicero as Evidence: A Historian’s Companion (Oxford, 2008), pp. 427–30 (quote at 429). Cf. Braund “Praise and Protreptic”, pp. 74–5; Catherine Steel, Cicero: Rhetoric and Empire (Oxford, 2001), esp. pp. 140–54. On Pompey’s felicitas as a personal attribute, rather than a gift of the gods, see Kathryn Welch, “Nimium Felix: Caesar’s Felicitas and Cicero’s Philippics”, in Cicero’s Philippics: History, Rhetoric, and Ideology, eds. T. Stevenson and M. Wilson, Prudentia 37/38 (Auckland, N.Z., 2008), pp. 181–213 (esp. 194).
Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”.
For full discussion and references, see Tom Stevenson, “Readings of Scipio’s Dictatorship in Cicero’s De Re Publica (6.12)”, in CQ 55.1 (2005), pp. 140–52. Cf. Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, chap. 24 (Atkins), esp. pp. 489–98; Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 232–41.
Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, p. 69.
On the Pro Marcello, see Braund, pp. 68–70; Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 313–17.
Robert R. Dyer, “Rhetoric and Intention in Cicero’s Pro Marcello”, in JRS 80 (1990), pp. 17–30.
Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 316–17.
On the Pro Ligario, see Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, p. 70; Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 317–19.
On the Pro Rege Deiotaro, see Braund, p. 70; Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 335–8.
Stefan Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971), pp. 233–43. Braund, p. 171 n. 45, sees Cicero as ‘one of several organs of Caesar’s political self-representation’ but there is no need to think that Caesar sanctioned Cicero’s strategy in the ‘Caesarian’ speeches.
A. Martin Stone, “Greek Ethics and Roman Statesmen: De Officiis and the Philippics”, in Cicero’s Philippics: History, Rhetoric, Ideology, eds. T. Stevenson and M. Wilson, Prudentia 37/38 (Auckland, 2008), pp. 214–39.
For a full discussion, see Tom Stevenson, “Tyrants, Kings, and Fathers in the Philippics”, in Cicero’s Philippics: History, Rhetoric, Ideology, eds. T. Stevenson and M. Wilson, Prudentia 37/38 (Auckland, 2008), pp. 95–113. Cf. Dunkle, “The Greek Tyrant”, pp. 165–6; Lintott, Cicero as Evidence, pp. 374–82.
Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”; Tom Stevenson, “Parens Patriae and Livy’s Camillus”, in Ramus 29.1 (2000), pp. 27–46.
Andrew N. Wallace-Hadrill, “Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King”, in JRS 72 (1982), pp. 32–48.
Alison E. Cooley, Res Gestae Divi Augusti: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 272–6.
Cooley, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, pp. 266–72.
The basic study remains that of Chaïm Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1968); cf. Peter A. Brunt, “Libertas in the Roman Republic”, in The Fall of the Roman Republic and Other Essays (Oxford, 1988), pp. 81–350; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 489–92, 502 (Atkins); Cooley, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, pp. 108–11.
Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”, cf. http://numismatics.org/ocre/results?q=deity_facet:%22Libertas%22.
Vell. Pat. 2.126; cf. A.J. Woodman, Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94–131) (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 234–5.
Carlos F. Noreña, “The Communication of the Emperor’s Virtues”, in JRS 91 (2001), pp. 146–68; Carlos F. Noreña, Imperial Ideals in the Roman West: Representation, Circulation, Power (Cambridge, 2011), esp. pp. 61–100. For a fine treatment of the Republican background to these ‘divine qualities’, see Anna J. Clark, Divine Qualities. Cult and Community in Republican Rome (Oxford, 2007).
On the De Clementia, see Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 311–12; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 535–43 (Griffin); Matthew Roller, Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome (Princeton, 2001), chap. 2; Susanna Braund, Seneca: De Clementia, Edited with Text, Translation, and Commentary (Oxford, 2009); Malcolm Schofield, “Seneca on Monarchy and the Political Life: De Clementia, De Tranquillitate Animi, De Otio”, in eds. S. Bartsch and A. Schiessaro, The Cambridge Companion to Seneca (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 68–81; Peter Stacey, “The Princely Republic”, in JRS 104 (2014), pp. 133–54.
The Octavia was probably composed in the wake of Nero’s assassination, given its knowledge of the details of Nero’s overthrow. Based on events of AD 62, which resulted in the death of Octavia, Nero’s first wife, the play can hardly be by Seneca, who is a character in the drama. It implies knowledge of events that occurred after Seneca’s death and lacks Seneca’s richness of verbal invention and dramatic development. On the Octavia, see Marcus Wilson (ed.) The Tragedy of Nero’s Wife: Studies on the Octavia Praetexta, Prudentia 35.1 (Auckland, 2003); Anthony J. Boyle (ed.) Octavia: Attributed to Seneca, with introduction, translation, and commentary (Oxford, 2008).
Miriam T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976), pp. 133–4, Appendix A, 3; Braund, Seneca: De Clementia, pp. 30–44, 363–4, 378.
Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, p. 72.
Timothy P. Wiseman, “Calpurnius Siculus and the Claudian Civil War”, in JRS 72 (1982), pp. 57–67.
Roller, Constructing Autocracy, chap. 4.
Braund, Seneca: De Clementia, pp. 314–31.
On Pliny’s Panegyricus, see Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 321–2; Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, p. 55; Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 543–5 (Griffin). For the tradition of Latin prose panegyrics, see further below.
It is instructive to compare the speech given to Galba by Tacitus (Hist. 1.15), in which Galba rejects the principle of hereditary succession and chooses Piso as his successor because his virtuous character made him the best man for the role of emperor.
Wallace-Hadrill, “The Emperor and his Virtues”; Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, pp. 61–3.
Stevenson, “The Ideal Benefactor”.
Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, pp. 63–4.
On the contrast with Domitian, and how to read it in context, see Pan. 16.3, 20.4, 33.4, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.5, 52.3, 53.4, 54, 55.7, 62.3, 66.2–3, 72.2, 76; Shadi Bartsch, Actors in the Audience: Theatricality and Doublespeak from Nero to Hadrian (Cambridge, MA/London, 1994), pp. 154–64; Braund, “Praise and Protreptic”, pp. 64–5.
Philo, Moses 2.2–4; Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, p. 299.
Philo, Joseph 29; Sinclair, p. 299; Peder Borden, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for his Time (Leiden/New York, 1997); Adam Kamesar (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge, 2009).
Musonius VIII (Hense): ‘That kings too should study philosophy’. Cf. Sinclair, pp. 312–13; Armand Jagu, Musonius Rufus: Entretiens et fragments, introduction, traduction et commentaire (Hildesheim, 1979); Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 601–3 (Gill).
Rowe and Schofield, pp. 575–83 (Centrone).
Rowe and Schofield, pp. 577–8 (Centrone).
Rowe and Schofield, p. 580, 580 n. 69 (Centrone).
Rowe and Schofield, p. 580 (Centrone).
Sinclair, pp. 312–19; Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250 (Oxford, 1996); Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 603–7 (Gill); Simon Swain (ed.), Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy (Oxford, 2000).
SHA Marc. 27.6–7, cf. Marc. Aur. Med. 9.29. On Marcus’ Meditations, see Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought, pp. 326–7; Richard B. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study (Oxford, 1989); Rowe and Schofield, History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, pp. 611–15 (Gill).
Ronald Syme, Tacitus, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1958), pp. 556–68; Miriam Griffin, Nero: The End of a Dynasty (London, New York, 1984), pp. 165–6, 170–8; Vasily Rudich, Political Dissidence under Nero (London/New York, 1993).
For the view that the ‘debate’ is in fact intended as a showcase of the merits of monarchy, see Paul McKechnie, “Cassius Dio’s Speech of Agrippa: A Realistic Alternative to Imperial Government?”, in G&R 28.2 (1981), pp. 150–5.
For the tradition of Latin prose panegyrics, see Lester K. Born, “The Perfect Prince according to the Latin Panegyrists”, in AJP 55 (1934), pp. 20–35; Sabine MacCormack, “Latin Prose Panegyrics”, in Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II, ed. T.A. Dorey (London/Boston, 1975), pp. 143–205; Robin Seager, “Some Imperial Virtues in the Latin Prose Panegyrics”, in Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar 4th Volume 1983, ed. F. Cairns (Liverpool, 1984), pp. 129–65; Michael Mause, Die Darstellung des Kaisers in der lateinischen Panegyrik (Palingenesia 50) (Stuttgart, 1994); Charles E.V. Nixon and Barbara Saylor Rodgers, In Praise of Later Roman Emperors: The Panegyrici Latini (Berkeley, 1994); Mary Whitby (ed.), The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity (Leiden/Boston/Köln, 1998).
Cf. Catherine Ware, “The Severitas of Constantine: Imperial Virtues in the Panegyrici Latini 7(6) and 6(7)”, in Journal of Late Antiquity 7.1 (2014), pp. 88–90.
Eusebius, Life of Constantine, trans. and comm. A. Cameron and S.G. Hall (Oxford, 1999), pp. 1–9, 34–9.
See Peter A. Brunt, in JRS 69 (1979), pp. 168–75 and Simon R.F. Price, in CR 29.2 (1979), pp. 277–9. Brunt (at 174) describes divine right as a product of Christian thought.