1 Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had immense negative repercussions for Africa, with rising food, fertiliser, and energy prices contributing to higher living costs in many places across the continent (see Tim Murithi, this Yearbook, chapter 2). The African Union (AU) commissioner for infrastructure and energy, Dr Amani Abou-Zeid, stated in June 2022 that the conflict had created ‘a double crisis’ for Africa. It caused disruptions to global supply chains and further depressed economic growth at a time when African countries were just beginning to recuperate from the social and economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The commissioner emphasised that soaring energy prices and higher costs of transport across Africa had negative knock-on effects for agriculture, industry, trade, tourism, and other economic sectors, while African treasuries faced increasing pressure to finance their budgets and service debts (African Union 2022f). The war in Ukraine also laid bare the extant capacity constraints in Africa’s energy and electricity sectors. AU officials, consequently, reiterated the importance of expediting regional and continental infrastructure programmes and reinforced efforts to solicit infrastructure finance for overcoming Africa’s industrial and transport infrastructure deficits and driving the ‘green’ energy transition. At the same time, European governments and companies turned to Africa in desperation to supplement their energy imports from Russia, thereby investing anew in African fossil fuel infrastructure. Repercussions of the war against Ukraine in Africa reiterate the centrality of infrastructure and its cross-sectoral impacts on the region and, simultaneously, underscore the intensifying geopolitics of infrastructure development on the continent.
This chapter first outlines key developments in AU decision-making and implementation structures in the infrastructure sector. Secondly, it documents AU efforts at ‘greening’ Africa’s infrastructure, focusing particularly on activities and positions at the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 6–20 November 2022) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Relatedly, it also touches on the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA), which was launched on the margins
2 Decision-Making and Implementation
The transition from the first (2017–2021) AU Commission (AUC), led by Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, to the second (instated in February 2021) was marked by continuity at the top decision-making level thanks to Abou-Zeid’s reappointment as the commissioner for infrastructure and energy (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 121–122). Within the Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa, implemented in 2012, the AUC Department of Infrastructure and Energy (DIE) oversees infrastructure policies and coordinates decision-making on infrastructure-related matters for the Council for Infrastructure Development (CID). It is advised by the Infrastructure Advisory Group, which convenes infrastructure experts and high-level officials from relevant bodies at least biannually. The CID, for its part, is composed of top officials from the AUC, the eight officially recognised regional economic communities (RECs), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). It provides programmatic guidelines for the sector, arbitrates and approves programmes and harmonisation measures, and advises the specialised technical committees (STCs) and the AU Executive Council, which in turn is answerable to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (ibid., 129–131).
At the centre of the implementation structure in the infrastructure sector is the AU Development Agency, which emerged from the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (hence its composite acronym AUDA–NEPAD). AUDA–NEPAD coordinates the implementation of projects with key stakeholders, such as the RECs, the AfDB, UNECA, as well as various external development partners and specialised agencies. AUDA–NEPAD also monitors the progress of PIDA, which entered its Priority Action Plan 2 (PAP 2; 2021–2030) in 2021 (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 128–130). Considering AUDA–NEPAD’s central role in the implementation structure of the AU’s infrastructure policies and programme, the appointment of the agency’s new chief executive officer was a
At the highest AU decision-making level, at the 40th Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2–3 February 2022), the AU Executive Council took several decisions related to the infrastructure sector. It adopted the Financing Strategy for PIDA PAP 2 (2021–2030). The PIDA Financing Strategy was developed by the AfDB and validated during the ministerial session of the STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy (STC–TTIIE) in June 2021. With this strategy, the AU hopes to address financial bottlenecks that have severely compromised the progress of many PIDA projects during the PIDA Priority Action Plan 1 (PAP 1) (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 133–136). It foresees strengthening coordination among stakeholders to foster an enabling environment and political support for the preparation of projects, and it aspires to mobilise alternative financing, not least from the private sector, throughout the entire life cycle of projects (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 130). Accordingly, the AU Executive Council, at its meeting in February 2022, ‘urge[d] Members States to increase financial commitment for infrastructure development especially for infrastructure project preparation’ (AU Council 2022a, §20). The AU Executive Council furthermore welcomed the introduction of the PIDA Service Delivery Mechanism Quality Label (PQL). The label is awarded to PIDA projects that excel in adhering to international best practices in infrastructure development (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 130). The AU Executive Council ‘encourage[d] [its] adoption and application across the regions and the infrastructure sub-sectors as Africa’s standard for early-stage appraisal of infrastructure project [sic!]’ (AU Council 2022a, §21). The PIDA steering committee was directed by the AU Executive Council to ‘consider the continuity and/or role of the [PIDA] Task Force going forward’ (ibid., §22). The PIDA task force comprises representatives from the AUC, AUDA–NEPAD, the AfDB, and UNECA.
Another decision by the AU Executive Council that will potentially have decisive effects on future developments in, as well as the governance of, Africa’s information and communications technology (ICT) sector is the council’s request for the AUC to develop a Continental Cybersecurity Strategy (AU Council 2022a, §38[1]ii). It seems appropriate – some would argue overdue – for the AU to take action in this respect, not only because (African) societies are
In the transport sector, the AU Executive Council adopted technical specifications for the African railway network, related norms and standards, and the roadmap towards developing the African common market of railways (AU Council 2022a, §12). Furthermore, the AU Executive Council deliberated on policy and regulatory instruments of the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), a flagship project of Agenda 2063.
3 Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM)
At the 40th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council, the council adopted key performance indicators based on the Yamoussoukro Decision1 of 1999, which constitutes the institutional framework for the liberalisation of air transportation in Africa and contains recommendations on reduction of air transport costs as well as the revised Windhoek Aviation Security and Facilitation Targets (the AU Executive Council urged the ‘remaining Member States’ to join the SAATM) (AU Council 2022a, §7). By 2021, 35 member states, representing 89 per cent of intra-African air traffic, had signed a solemn declaration to operationalise the SAATM (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 124). At the 41st Ordinary Session the AU Executive Council (Lusaka, Zambia, 14–15 July 2022), the council approved the SAATM Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and it ‘request[ed] the AFCAC [African Civil Aviation Commission] in collaboration with the Commission and other key partners to establish the SAATM Dispute Settlement Mechanism Administrative Council and Secretariat hosted by AFCAC and reporting to the YD [Yamoussoukro Decision] Monitoring Body’ (AU Council 2022b, §43[vi]). The policy guidelines for the negotiation of the Air Services Agreement between AU member states and non-African states and regions were also approved (ibid., §45).
At the Accra workshop, the AUC’s acting head of the Transport and Mobility Division, Eric Ntagengerwa, highlighted that the SAATM ‘aspires to establish a single African air transport market with a direct positive influence on the success of Africa’s regional integration agenda through the improvement of transport connectivity between African capitals, facilitating the free movement of people, goods and services, and serving as one of the key enablers for the of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)’ (African Union 2022n). Furthermore, by removing the need for Bilateral Air Service Agreements (BASAs) between countries, the SAATM is expected to improve and facilitate business and commercial traffic between countries, with expected spillover effects for socioeconomic development, job creation, investment, and innovation.
In November 2022, the AFCAC introduced a Pilot Implementation Project (PIP), which incorporates 18 AU member states2 with ‘favourable environments to accelerate the implementation of SAATM’ (African Union 2022n). Participating countries agreed to launch SAATM flights between their territories, and participating airlines signed a strategic partnership framework to reduce costs and increase the size of the available fleets. Overall, according to a study commissioned by the AU, the economies of signatory states are projected to gain $4.2 billion in gross domestic product (GDP), 596,000 new jobs, and a 27 per cent reduction in airfares if the SAATM is fully implemented (cited in Orucho 2022).
4 Continental Power System Master Plan
Another crucial infrastructure governance instrument in the energy subsector that saw some implementation progress in 2022 is the African Single Electricity
Africa has increased overall electricity generation over the past decade, rising from 16,144 megawatts (MW) in 2013 to 31,690 MW in 2021 (AUC and AUDA–NEPAD 2022, 33), and AU member states have increased the number of MW on their national grids. For example, between 2020 and 2021, Senegal added 234.5 MW of electricity to its national grid, while Rwanda and Sierra Leone added 238.4 and 67 MW, respectively (ibid.). During the same period, Egypt and Côte d’Ivoire added 3,140 MW and 275 MW of electricity, respectively (ibid.). Furthermore, work on the Ethiopia–Kenya electricity highway is underway. Various interventions, such as investments in renewable energy projects to support industrial development, explain the increase in electricity generation (ibid.). At the same time, further massive investment in energy infrastructure is deemed vital in order to close the remaining wide energy access gap, as will be discussed in the following section on major developments in the infrastructure policy field in 2022.
5 Major Developments in 2022
The war in Ukraine was a significant concern in AU decision-making circles, including in those concerned with the infrastructure sector. At the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the STC–TTIIE (virtual, 14–16 June 2022), the STC approved a document titled ‘Implications of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis on the African Energy and Infrastructure Sectors’. This contained recommendations
Commission, in collaboration with specialized Pan-African institutions and all relevant stakeholders, to continue monitoring the evolving situation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and its impact on infrastructure and energy sectors and advise Member States on appropriate mitigation measures and intensify the development of data systems on energy consumption and behaviour in the Continent.
AU COUNCIL 2022B, §42
It also requested the AUC and specialised agencies to coordinate the implementation of several recommendations aimed at mitigating the effects of the war against Ukraine. These recommendations included the development of the African Energy Security and Financing Plan, meant to promote intra-African trade and increase African oil production; accelerating the development of regional gas and electricity projects and infrastructure in Africa to support Africa’s energy transition, industrialisation, clean cooking, agriculture, petrochemicals, and export of natural gas to other markets; the integration of the electrification of railways and other sustainable transportation systems into current development plans to reduce the impact of fluctuations in oil and gas prices on transport costs; the creation of interconnected multi-modal logistics zones to facilitate the movement of goods and to reduce transport and distribution, as well as storage and costs; and the acceleration of the implementation of key projects under PIDA PAP 2 and the AfSEM ‘to strengthen intra-Africa interconnectivity and tap into the opportunities for energy trade that the Russia-Ukraine Crisis provides for Africa’ (AU Council 2022b, §43). But it was not only the acute energy crisis caused by the war that made energy a crucial theme in the AU’s infrastructure policy realm in 2022. Throughout the
5.1 Efforts at ‘Greening’ Africa’s Infrastructure
Preparations for COP 27 informed AU policy-making on environmental issues, climate change mitigation, and renewable energy throughout 2022. The AU commissioner for infrastructure and energy, Abou-Zeid, herself an Egyptian national, said in June 2022, ‘Africa should achieve the best possible outcomes from COP 27 dubbed as the “African COP”’ (quoted in African Union 2022g). The 2nd Extraordinary Session of the STC–TTIIE approved a Common African Position on Energy Access and a Just Energy Transition for COP 27. Commissioner Abou-Zeid was cited at the meeting, saying that ‘[t]he world needs to recognize Africa’s unique realities and support its efforts to close the huge energy access gaps without being straight-jacketed into approaches that do not match our circumstances’ (quoted in African Union 2022f). The statement reflects a gradual approach to the transition towards fossil-free energy sources, which is widely supported among African decision-makers. Not only do several African economies remain heavily dependent on the export of fossil fuels, sufficient investments in renewable energy infrastructure to effectively close Africa’s energy access gap have hitherto also failed to appear. Abou-Zeid expressed her concerns that achieving Goal 7 of the UN Agenda 2030, that is to say access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, was at risk if innovative approaches and collaborative efforts failed to materialise (ibid.).
Preparations for COP 27 also informed the agenda of the Bureau of the STC on Communication and Information and Communications Technology (STC–CICT), which held an ordinary session on 22–23 June 2022. The bureau, which serves for two years, convened the ministers of communication or of ICT from Congo (Brazzaville), South Africa, Niger, Rwanda, and Egypt. The session was chaired by Congo and focused on the role of digitalisation in the continent’s recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, the mitigation of adverse impacts of climate change, and the enhancement of energy access and transition. At the ministerial session of the Bureau of the STC–CICT, Commissioner Abou-Zeid stressed that ‘[t]he opportunities that digital agriculture and digital energy present to transition to clean and sustainable energy systems, increased productivity, food security and mitigate the risks stemming from climate change and global warming should clearly be explored and solutions put forward’ (quoted in African Union 2022g). Furthermore, the bureau emphasised the importance of a well-coordinated and common African approach ahead of COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh.
5.2 Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa
Throughout 2022, the AU liaised with international partners to advance (financial) cooperation to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change and leverage investment in green energy sources and technologies on the continent. A joint article by Macky Sall, AU chairperson, and Charles Michel, president of the European Council, published just before the 6th EU–AU Summit (Brussels, Belgium, 17–18 February 2022), emphasised that ‘[t]he EU will provide public and private investment capacity, as well as expertise with the green infrastructure and technologies that are vital to our common fight against climate change and to transforming African economies’ (European Council 2022b). On 9 November 2022, on the margins of COP 27, the Egyptian government, the AU, the AfDB, and the infrastructure investment platform Africa50, in partnership with several global organisations, launched the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA). The collaborating global partners are the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the French Development Agency, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States (US) Trade and Development Agency, the Global Center on Adaptation, the Private Infrastructure Development Group, and the African Sovereign Investors Forum (African Union 2022j). According to the AU, the mission of the AGIA is to raise capital to accelerate Africa’s just and equitable transition to net-zero
The AfDB, in its African Economic Outlook Report (2022), estimated that the cumulative financing needs for Africa to respond appropriately to climate change range between $1.3 and $1.6 trillion, averaging $1.4 trillion in 2020–2030 (AfDB 2022b). Broken down annually, $127.8 billion is needed. However, this is hardly sufficient as adaptation costs are estimated at $259–407 billion. Furthermore, if the international-to-domestic commitment ratio of 2020 remains constant, the adaptation financing gap in Africa from international sources will range between $66 billion and $260 billion in 2020–2030 (ibid.). The AfDB president, Akinwumi Adesina, noted that ‘the needs in Africa are simply enormous. Only by working together and pooling our resources together can we make transformative impacts and set Africa on a clear path to achieving NetZero emissions and to mitigate climate change’ (African Union 2022j).
The AGIA aims to raise $500 million to provide capital for early-stage project development (African Union 2022f). This aligns with calls made at the 7th PIDA Week (Nairobi, Kenya, 28 February–4 March 2022) for prioritising more financing for the early stages of infrastructure development (as discussed below). AGIA funds will assist in creating a pipeline of bankable green infrastructure projects that could generate $10 billion worth of investments (ibid.). The AGIA will prioritise infrastructure developments in energy, transport, water and sanitation, healthcare, and ICT. Another declared focus is linking rural and urban areas through connectivity infrastructure. In addition, large-scale green energy initiatives, such as mega-solar or green hydrogen projects, and smaller venture capital initiatives, like cleantech projects, energy storage, or e-mobility solutions, will also be supported, according to the AU (ibid.).
5.3 Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
[a]s African countries, we need to focus on policies and strategies that will promote and increase domestic resource mobilization, attract private investment and create an environment that attracts the growth of quality infrastructure projects. I, therefore, urge for deeper engagement between PIDA, the private sector, and development partners.
AFRICAN UNION 2022D
Under Agenda 2063, AU members prioritised developing ‘world-class infrastructure [that] crisscrosses Africa’ to stimulate and promote regional integration, trade, and economic transformation (AUC and AUDA–NEPAD 2022, 31). External finance and a diverse range of foreign actors have gotten heavily involved in Africa’s infrastructure development, notably China, which steadily emerged over the 2010s to become Africa’s largest bilateral infrastructure financier (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 137–140). At the same time, African governments and African development finance institutions (DFIs) have also substantially increased their spending on infrastructure (African Union 2022n). Under PIDA PAP 2 (2021–2030) (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 128–130), 69 infrastructure projects were selected by AU member states, representing a collective aggregate capital expenditure of $160 billion (African Union 2022d).
However, Raila Odinga, the former Kenyan prime minister (2008–2013) and, since 2018, the AU high representative for infrastructure development, emphasised in his address at the 7th PIDA Week that Africa’s data on infrastructure remains ‘humbling and disturbing’ as 80 per cent of the continent’s infrastructure projects are failing at the feasibility and business-planning stages (African Union 2022c). Moreover, data on Africa’s performance on global transport and energy indices remained dismal compared to other developing regions such as Asia and South America. Ultimately, Odinga noted, ‘in a nutshell, [that] all our best efforts of recent decades are not good enough’ (ibid.). He stressed the need to learn from the mistakes of PIDA PAP 1 (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 133–136). For PIDA PAP 2 projects to be successful, financing for project scoping, feasibility, designing, and planning should be prioritised. Commissioner Abou-Zeid affirmed that PIDA PAP 2 was carefully developed to address challenges relating to project bankability. She said, ‘Africa has infrastructure
Odinga recommended that the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility at the AfDB, the AU Service Delivery Mechanism, and the specialised agencies for cross-border projects can serve as valuable financing sources for project preparation and implementation (African Union 2022c). Furthermore, he stressed that PIDA PAP 2 needs a financing strategy that prioritises private sector involvement and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Similarly, Commissioner Abou-Zeid appealed to ‘private sector financiers, donors, and partners to invest in … projects that produce a win-win outcome’ (ibid.). AUDA–NEPAD and the AfDB identified five necessary enabling factors for successfully implementing PIDA PAP 2 projects: (1) national ownership over infrastructure projects by African governments and citizens, with regional projects being included into national development plans; (2) regional commitment whereby the RECs should deliberate carefully and include prioritised regional projects in their regional infrastructure master plans; (3) capacity-building for transnational project management to improve the coordination and management of stakeholders involved in large-scale, complex projects; (4) strong advocacy from regional institutions, such as the AUC, AUDA–NEPAD, UNECA, AfDB, and Afrieximbank, which should play a more dominant role in mobilising resources for projects; and (5) enhanced project quality standards to ensure high-quality infrastructure assets and services (ibid.).
5.4 Infrastructures for Industrialisation and Economic Diversification
[t]o achieve the aspirations of the AfCFTA, Africa’s industrialisation and transformation agenda needs to be supported at the highest national, regional, continental, and global levels. Such a focus will be key to accelerate efforts in a selected number of key policy areas – such as energy and road infrastructure, trade facilitation, financial sector development, education development, agro-industrial transformation, green industrialisation and technological innovation and transformation. Advancing the AfCFTA and Africa-Industrialization side-by-side with deliberate efforts to realize the mutually reinforcing interdependences between the two will provide Africa’s critical success pillar and condition for Agenda 2063.
AFRICAN UNION 2022K
African leaders reiterated their determination to ensure that the continent’s industrialisation and economic diversification is financed through secure financial sources. Additionally, emphasis was placed on urgently identifying and addressing impediments to productivity and growth through infrastructural development, energy, access to finance, digitalisation, innovation, and skills development (African Union 2022l). Additionally, in collaboration with development partners, the AU will develop and disseminate among member states an annual African Industrial Development Report based on an African Industrial Development Index, and it will speed up the construction of the African Industrial Observatory (ibid.).
In terms of concrete economic infrastructure for industrialisation, the development of special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial parks (IPs) was among the ten key commitments made at the summit. These facilities are considered to be crucial instruments for ‘economic reforms, promot[ing] quality Foreign direct investments (FDIs), and accelerat[ing] industrialization across the continent’ (African Union 2022l). According to the African Economic Zones Outlook (edition 2021), more than 200 SEZs are operational in Africa, and 73 projects are nearing completion in 47 countries (Africa Economic Zones Organisation 2021, 6). Not only will new SEZs be developed, but support will also be extended to existing SEZs and IPs as a means to overcome existing industrial infrastructure constraints (African Union 2022m). It is envisioned that these facilities will eventually become hubs for regional value chain integration. Furthermore, nearly 150,000 hectares of land have been demarcated to implement economic zones across the continent. And $2.6 billion
Following the African Industrialization Week, the AU and the African Economic Zones Organisation (AEZO) held the 5th AU Symposium on SEZs during the 7th AEZO Annual Meeting (Abuja, Nigeria, 30 November–2 December 2022). The events were convened under the theme ‘African Special Economic Zones: Engine for Resilience and Accelerator for Sustainable Industrial Value Chains Development’. The events coincided with the 30th anniversary of Nigeria’s SEZ scheme and brought together over 400 participants and stakeholders (African Union 2022m). Discussions highlighted cross-cutting issues related to the role of SEZs in accelerating sustainable industrial value chain development (in alignment with Agenda 2063).
6 AU External Partnerships and the Geopolitics of Infrastructure
Infrastructure development has become central to Africa’s external relations, including those of the AU. The latter cooperates with a myriad of external actors on infrastructure programming, financing and project implementation. Besides so-called traditional donors, such as the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan, China has become Africa’s biggest bilateral infrastructure financier (see Yearbook on the African Union 2020, 137–142). Thereby, the AU has taken on the role of an increasingly important supranational ‘broker’ that has institutionalised its cooperation in the infrastructure sector with various external actors. Simultaneously, there has been growing competition between Western actors and China for influence in Africa’s infrastructure sector, which has been tangibly expressed through competing connectivity initiatives, notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the EU’s Global Gateway, and the US-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (see Yearbook on the African Union 2021, 130–135). In 2022, the AU engaged with its external partners on various occasions.
6.1 The Rise of AU–EU Infrastructure Inter-Regionalism
At the 6th EU–AU Summit, heads of state and government as well as government officials from AU and EU member states agreed on a ‘joint vision for a renewed partnership’, which, among several commitments, foresees an
On the margins of COP 27, the AU and the EU announced a cooperation initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa as part of the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package. According to official EU statements, the initiative will streamline existing and new climate change adaptation programmes that are worth over €1 billion and will improve coordination and reinforce policy dialogue on climate adaptation strategies between the EU and AU (European Commission 2022a). At COP 27, during a ministerial side event focusing on the initiative, the executive vice-president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, pledged that the EU would ‘raise further investments for clean, secure and climate resilient infrastructure’ (quoted in European Commission 2022b). He named the ‘Great Green Wall’, the EU–AU transboundary water management initiative, and strategic corridors as examples of cooperation in developing climate-resilient infrastructure (ibid.). However, despite EU commitments to intensify cooperation with the AU and its member states in expediting Africa’s energy transition and mitigating the effects of climate change, Russia’s war against Ukraine lay bare Europe’s, and not least Germany’s, energy vulnerability and, in turn, sparked renewed interest among European firms and governments in African oil and gas deposits (see Browning et al. 2022). According to estimates from the IEA,
6.2 The Geopolitical Race to Build African ICT Infrastructure
At the 11th African Internet Governance Forum (Lilongwe, Malawi, 19–21 July 2022), Commissioner Dr Abou-Zeid emphasised the importance of digital infrastructure and technologies in building resilient and sustainable economies. She stressed the need to ensure that ‘digitalisation is deep-rooted’ in African economies to work towards creating ‘a single digital market for a united Africa’ (African Union 2022h). The forum was held under the theme ‘Digital Inclusion and Trust in Africa’. It prioritised four major thematic areas: affordable and meaningful internet access; cybersecurity, privacy and personal data protection; digital skills and human capacity development; and digital infrastructure (ibid.). In addition, Abou-Zeid underlined ‘the need for Africans to collectively devise ways to keep pace with the increasing demand for digital infrastructure, bridge connectivity gaps, especially the urban-rural disparity and address the gender digital divide and create decent jobs for Africa’s younger population’ (ibid.). She also called on ‘regional and international partners to invest in bankable and impactful projects under [the] Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), which packages regional and continental priorities in the energy, transport and digital sectors’ (ibid.).
In recent years, a growing interest in Africa’s ICT sector and related infrastructure projects is discernible among European and US decision-makers, which is not least a reaction to geopolitical concerns arising from the dominant position Chinese firms have established in the sector. Thus, the development and governance of digital infrastructure has gained increasing importance within AU–EU infrastructural inter-regionalism. Not long after the 6th EU–AU Summit, the Africa–Europe Digital for Development (D4D) Hub Multi-Stakeholder Forum was held on 18 March 2022 under the theme ‘Digital Transformation for Sustainable Development in Africa’. The AUC and the European Commission co-hosted the event to promote exchanges and collaboration with the private sector, enterprises, civil society organisations, and experts in the digital field from both continents (African Union 2022e). The declared aim was to develop an operational digital cooperation plan for Africa’s sustainable development. The AU and EU agree that digital technologies are necessary
These exceptional times have also shown the urgency to invest in secured [sic!] and affordable Africa’s [sic!] digital infrastructure, digital skill [sic!], digital identity, data management and build on Africa’s innovation potential and entrepreneurship. The African Union welcomes the enhanced partnership with the European Union that is based on respect, transparency, equal opportunity, [a] win-win approach and agreed tangible outcome [sic!] and further engagement with African and European stakeholders to accelerate the digital transformation of our continent.
AFRICAN UNION 2022E
WHITE HOUSE 2022
foster an inclusive and resilient African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. This initiative will also seek to empower women and other marginalized people through and within the digital ecosystem. DTA aims to help countries rebuild economies impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and advance U.S. national security, diplomatic, commercial, and development priorities. It will also advance commitments to invest in global infrastructure, including digital connectivity, under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
As this excerpt demonstrates, security concerns are a crucial driver of US efforts to step up cooperation with African partners in the ICT sector, revealing another dimension of the increasing geopoliticisation of infrastructure development in Africa. The Chinese firm Huawei, for instance, is currently estimated to control 70 per cent of African 4G networks and is busy installing 5G infrastructure across the continent (Howell 2022). The market dominance of Chinese firms has not only economic but also potential security and human rights implications. A fortiori, the implementation of the AU Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa, adopted on 9 February 2020, as well as the drafting of a Continental Cybersecurity Strategy, can be expected to be – at least indirectly – affected by intensifying competition among Western actors and China for African ICT infrastructure and service markets. Ultimately, both Western and Chinese actors are setting technological norms in this growing sector by developing the necessary infrastructure and providing ICT-related technology (see Qobo and Mzyece 2023). At the same time, they are ‘exporting’ digital governance norms and standards with potentially far-reaching implications for African societies.
6.3 China’s Continuous Role in Africa’s Infrastructure Sector
While strengthening traditional areas of cooperation such as infrastructure, investment and financing, agriculture, manufacturing and telecommunication, both sides will deepen cooperation in new fields including energy, digital economy, health, marine economy, vocational education, and women and youth development. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) will be encouraged to help Africa realize industrialization and enhance its status in the global industrial and supply chains.
FOCAC 2022
The statement furthermore recalled the Declaration on China-Africa Cooperation on Combating Climate Change, which was introduced at the 8th FOCAC Ministerial Conference (Dakar, Senegal, 29–30 November 2021). It reiterated that it ‘call[s] on the international community not to level down support and input to Africa because of the Ukraine issue, but to actively help African countries address food security, climate change, energy crisis and other global issues’ (FOCAC 2022). This shows that China has been responsive to some of the priorities expressed by the AU in the infrastructure sector, including the leveraging of infrastructure finance, the industrialisation-infrastructure nexus, and climate-resilient and ‘green’ infrastructure.
we need [to] speed up practical cooperation in various fields.… We need to push forward the synergy of the BRI, Global Development Initiative, FOCAC Nine Programs and the AU Agenda 2063 as well as African development agendas, in order to continuously strengthen our creative cooperation in the area of health & disease control, trans-regional infrastructure, energy & climate change, digital economy, food security & loss, trade & investment, etc.
CHINESE MISSION TO THE AU 2022
Ambassador Hu also referred to (geo)political controversies that have arisen over China’s role as Africa’s biggest infrastructure financier (see Yearbook on
7 Outlook
Infrastructure will remain a priority for AU bodies in 2023. The 42nd Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council is expected to be concerned with, among other things, the development of the second ten-year implementation plan for the Agenda 2063. Several of the latter’s flagship projects are in the infrastructure sector, including the African Integrated High-Speed Railway Network, an integrated e-economy, and the SAATM. Hence, deliberations on the next Agenda 2063 implementation plan will set the course for these projects. We can also expect the infrastructure-industrialisation nexus to be further articulated and deliberated on, considering the AU theme for 2023 being ‘Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation’. As discussed in this chapter, the success of the AfCFTA itself is, in official (AU) discourse, often closely associated with the development of regional infrastructure.
As we have elaborated on in this and in previous Yearbooks on the African Union, a myriad of external actors are engaged in Africa’s infrastructure sector, and AU policies and projects are often dependent on cooperation with external partners, not least regarding their financing. The 2nd Dakar Financing Summit for Africa’s Infrastructure Development, scheduled for February 2023, will be an important yardstick for the mobilisation of infrastructure finance for PIDA PAP 2. We can furthermore expect a high-level delegation from the AU to attend the 3rd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, which the Chinese government announced to hold in 2023 (see Wang et al. 2022). The forum will give important indications as to the future of the BRI and, more concretely, as to how the Chinese government intends to foster overseas equity investment in infrastructure, considering that sovereign loan financing has become economically and politically risky in certain countries and regions, including in Africa (see Carmody et al. 2022; van Wieringen and Zajontz forthcoming). In the light of the intensifying geopoliticisation of infrastructure in Africa, as discussed above, infrastructure is also likely to top the agenda in the
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Academic Literature
Bagwandeen, Mandira, Christopher Edyegu, and Oscar M. Otele, 2023. ‘African agency, COVID-19 and debt renegotiations with China’, South African Journal of International Affairs 30 (1): 1–27.
Carmody, Pádraig, Zajontz, Tim and Reboredo, Ricardo 2022. ‘From “debt diplomacy” to donorship? China’s changing role in global development’, Global Political Economy 1 (2): 198–217.
Plane, Patrick 2021. ‘What Factors Drive Transport and Logistics Costs in Africa?’, Journal of African Economies 30 (4): 370–388.
Qobo, Mzukisi and Mjumo Mzyece 2023. ‘Geopolitics, technology wars and global supply chains: Implications for Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs 30 (1): 29–46.
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés et al.2022. ‘The challenge of developing special economic zones in Africa: Evidence and lessons learnt’, Regional Science Policy & Practice 14 (2): 456–481.
van Wieringen, Kjeld and Tim Zajontz (forthcoming). ‘From loan-financed to privatised infrastructure? Tracing China’s turn towards public-private partnerships in Africa’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs.
Zajontz, Tim 2024. ‘Chinese Globalism, African Regionalisms and State Spatial Strategies: The Intricacies of Regionalising Africa’s Railway Renaissance.’ In T. Zajontz et al. (eds.) Africa’s Railway Renaissance: The Role and Impact of China. Abingdon: Routledge.
News Reports
Browning, Noah, Ron Bousso, and Wendell Roelf 2022. ‘Analysis: Ukraine war rekindles Europe’s demand for African oil and gas’, Reuters [London], 22 July. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-war-rekindles-europes-demand-african-oil-gas-2022-07-22/> (accessed: 30 June 2023).
Orucho, Bonface 2022. ‘Open Skies: African nations to pilot single air transport market’, The Independent [London], 1 December. URL: <https://www.independent.co.ug/open-skies-african-nations-to-pilot-single-air-transport-market/> (accessed: 30 June 2023).
Wang, Cong, Bai, Yunyi and Yang, Ruoyu 2022. ‘Xi announces 3rd Belt & Road forum to be held in 2023, calls on Asia-Pacific to up cooperation to new height’, Global Times [Beijing], 18 November. URL: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279916.shtml> (accessed: 30 June 2023).
The Yamoussoukro Decision is a treaty adopted by most AU members states that establishes a framework for the liberalisation of air transport services between African countries, as well as fair competition between airlines. The treaty was signed by 44 African states in 1999 and became binding in 2002.
Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia.
The five power pools are the Central African, East African, Southern African, and West African Power Pools as well as the Maghreb Electricity Committee.