2.1 Hopes and Failures of the UN

Finally, the case of Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing Russo – Ukrainian War since 2014 could be recalled also. These examples show the very limits of the UN’s effectiveness and role in preventing and settling those conflicts, avoiding the worst-case scenario in the latter. All those cases happened despite the sophisticated institutional structure and procedural mechanisms of the UN, e.g., the General Assembly resolutions, many sittings and talks in the Security Council, a few other discussions at auxiliary bodies of that IO, the wide range of authoritative experts engaged and many conferences/debates on different issues held. Some of them have not been successfully resolved up to now.

Why did it happen? Why, given the recent very pro-Ukrainian resolutions of the General Assembly, did the Russo – Ukrainian War, which started in 2014, move to a more dangerous stage after February 24, 2022? It seems that those cases take place because the UN itself has some principal distortions and loopholes. The organization’s institutes and functions are disproportionately affected by the influence of the great powers. One of the key reasons is the founding consensus of 1945, when five countries were appointed as the permanent members of the Security Council. They agreed to be a core body of the UN. That made this IO a kind of international trust, which is controlled by those principal stakeholders, namely the USA, Great Britain, France, China, and the USSR. Ironically, Russia is a self-proclaimed chief successor of the USSR. These five countries made a consensus that they have a right to be permanent members of the Security Council of the UN, and their exclusive authority, influence, and strength are legally supported and guaranteed by their veto rights. The right of veto has been often applied and used by one or another of these countries in the course of history (Salim, 2021, pp. 8–10). Intriguingly, representatives of Russia have (ab)used that right too many times. For instance, they block any attempts by Security Council members, both permanent and temporary, to discuss and find a way towards a resolution of the Russo – Ukrainian War. It is hardly an acceptable situation when a member of the UN and a permanent member of its Security Council acts as an aggressor under the agreed upon UN charter principles, thus substantially violating international law. Moreover, the same aggressor might simultaneously be able to effectively prevent any restrictive actions from the International Community, the UN, and its Security Council.

2.2 Possible UN Reforms

These cases explain why the UN needs thorough and comprehensive reforms, which should be centered on the role of the Security Council (Binder & Heupel, 2015, pp. 247–248). If an organization is grounded on the principle of all countries’ equality, parity, and respect for any independent state as a member of the UN, the member states must exercise an equal voice and influence. In addition to the drastic division between the small and big countries, and the developed and developing countries, one has to admit evident disparity between the group of permanent member countries and the non-permanent members in the UN Security Council. For instance, Latin America and Africa are not represented in the Security Council with a decisive power or blocking power of a veto. Out of many Asian countries, only China is a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN. This corresponds to neither the economic contribution of countries to the UN budget (it ensures the material grounds for effective functioning and actions of the IO) nor to the countries’ individual contribution to resolving the security, social-economic, educational, and other important problems of human existence. Undeniably, it also makes accessibility of public goods uneven. The author agrees with the following statement: “An expansion of the Security Council or the revoking of veto powers will not […] equip the UN system to fight a ‘soft war.’ It requires new tools and new strategies. The reforms should go beyond cosmetic changes and include all agencies and organisations working with [the] UN” (Thomas & Kumar, 2021, p. 95).

It is incompatible with the logic and spirit of the UN’s mission and legal foundations that its most representative and authoritative body, the General Assembly, lacks the power to make the final decision. It does not control budgetary processes and the functioning of UN agencies, either (Janev, 2020, pp. 121–123). The General Assembly merely issues recommendations that eventually depend on the Security Council for adoption. As the core body of the UN, any move in the Security Council depends on the consensus of the five permanent members. If such a consensus is reached, the global community might expect a positive resolution of any conflict or issue. But if it fails, any one of the five can block, hinder, or even undermine the whole process of policymaking in the UN.

That is why there has been a growing anticipation and need for UN structural reforms, from the 1960s onwards (Ade-Ibijola, 2015). Different projects of reforming the UN were drafted and proposed. Key changes suggest increasing the power of the General Assembly, which is the true representative body of all the member states, and which reflects the position of the global community. The General Assembly should be the real power and ultimate body to resolve any conflict or war and to put in motion the decisive power of the UN, including the right of intervention, economic sanctions, and other measures needed to stop aggression and restore regional or global security.

Another direction of reforms is the composition and power of the Security Council. Some drafts attempt to include the representation of countries like India (Dabhade, 2022, pp. 50–68) Japan, and Germany as new permanent members. From the point of view of demography and the growing importance of India, this was a well-grounded proposal. However, that attempt failed, arousing no enthusiasm from the five principal UN stakeholders (Ade-Ibijola, 2015, pp. 138–139). It might be mentioned there was an attempt to include Japan as a new permanent member of the Security Council. As far as continental Europe is concerned, Germany is a very important stakeholder of the European order and its social and economic development. It is also an influential contributor to regional and global public goods. Yet proposals to increase its role have received the cold shoulder instead of support. Should those motions be realized, it would not resolve the problem of the exclusive privileges of the permanent members of the Security Council. Even if the countries and their representatives had supported the move to make India, Japan, and/or Germany permanent members, it would not have helped to resolve the issue of the permanent members’ veto. Should the veto right be expanded to the new permanent members, it would further complicate the process of making the Security Council more democratic.

Regarding the UN Charter provision, one must accept complications of those motions being realized. This precondition influences the perspective of reforming the whole policymaking process in the UN. The veto right should be totally excluded as an instrument of the so-called “permanent members’ superiority” over the Security Council and consequently the UN in general (Dadashova, 2019, p. 100). Otherwise, the international community could witness the obvious failure of the UN in preventing conflicts and resolving them. There are plenty of conflicts and they require the full attention of the UN (Chesterman, 2014).

UN reforms are inevitable and of crucial importance. They should be carried out as soon as possible. The reform agenda should have a high priority and be considered with no delay. Otherwise, the lack of timely reaction to the global challenges, including pandemics, military threats from Russia, and some alarming moves from China to establish control over Taiwan by military means, could result in a full-fledged global war with all the imaginable and predictable consequences to follow. The UN, as the most important and comprehensive global international organization, needs urgent but well-thought-out reorganization. It’s the right response to the new challenging situation concerning regional and global issues. The reforms should be democratic both in the content and procedures for discussing and resolving conflictual issues. Ultimately, no state can possess privileges instead of equal rights and duties. These are the most urgent direction of changes and reforms in the UN.

3.1 The Origin and Development of the OSCE

First, it is essential to touch upon the origin and evolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The process of its establishment could be observed as early as the 1970s in Détente and the Helsinki Process. The US and the USSR, the leaders of two confronting blocks, mutually recognized the importance of peaceful coexistence and the need for reduced tensions in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space. They tried to find political solutions which would be acceptable to both camps in the framework of the Cold War era and the bipolar system of international relations (Koja et al., 2020, pp. 1–3). In some respects, the new format of Euro-Atlantic interstate dialogue and consultation contributed to the rapprochement between West and East. The OSCE itself was constituted in the early 1990s, soon after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It began a transformation from an important recurrent conference, a platform of political dialogue towards a new IO aimed at much wider cooperation for the engaged countries within a specific organizational and institutional structure (Herman & Wouters, 2017, pp. 7–8). It seemed to be a huge, promising IO, comprising 57 states from North America, Europe, and Central Asia (Костенко & Аметаев, 2021, pp. 48–49). The establishment of the OSCE seeded hopes of a great success and a promising beginning. The prevailing expectation was grounded in the belief that this organization would be able to play an important role in preventing conflicts, promoting cooperation among the engaged countries, and directing socioeconomic development on the three continents towards democracy, economic prosperity, and social stability.

However, after the formative years the OSCE hardly succeeded in those tasks. It did not play an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the scope of the organization’s responsibility (Debuysere, 2019, pp. 250–251). The first litmus test was the context of the post-Yugoslav Wars period, where the OSCE tried its best to be as helpful as possible (Đorđević et al., 2018). Yet until the intervention of NATO, the OSCE was able to perform only a secondary role there (Simonet, 2018, pp. 284–285). It did not find a way to serve as the main platform of making peace, preventing, or managing conflict, and finding solutions for post-conflict regulation (Friesendorf, 2020).

Other conflicts where the OSCE was engaged concerned mainly the post-Soviet space. First, one has to consider the Nagorno-Karabakh case, the oldest open armed conflict in the post-Soviet space, which has been going on until now (with some aggravations in 2015 and 2020) (Guliyev & Gawrich, 2021). The role of the OSCE appeared as weak and indecisive there (Shelest, 2022, p. 14). It is also essential to recall the Moldova and Georgia cases regarding the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia respectfully.Again, the author does not discover proof that the OSCE is the main actor in negotiating the acceptable approach among all the parties concerned with ending these conflicts (Mihr, 2021, pp. 8–11). Certainly, not all parties are equally concerned with productive negotiations in those conflicts. Not every one of them is interested in a fair solution to these conflicts as well. Both in the cases of Georgia and Moldova, the OSCE founded a platform for negotiation, a framework for diplomatic talks, organized different meetings, and sent monitoring missions to the regions. It has made a strenuous effort to elaborate practical recommendations for the conflicted parties for years of those protracted conflicts. Despite those efforts, regional conflicts have been unsolved until now. The position of the OSCE seems to be very low profile with no considerable outcomes achieved.

3.2 Evaluation of the Role of the OSCE

The driving force of the OSCE is a gradual but steady evolution from an international organization, which has been based on the idea of a peaceful coexistence of different, sometimes adversary countries with different economic systems, political regimes, and ideologies. The standards of mutual trust applied to confidence measures and cooperative approaches were advocated and supported by the organization. However, this is not satisfactory to provide peace and strengthen security in Europe and Eurasia. This became clear when the OSCE tried to interfere in the conflict in Ukraine after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of war in Donbas, both launched by Putin’s Russia. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Donbas seemed to be the only IO mission that tried to observe and describe what was happening there in reality (Mihr, 2021, pp. 54–75). Because of the paradoxical situation – the offender, Russia, was an influential member of the OSCE together, with its allies, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan (at that time) – it seemed that the authority and reputation of the OSCE was compromised, resulting in lower efficacy. Not surprisingly, the IO did not achieve considerable results with its monitoring missions in Donbas (Giardullo et al., 2019, pp. 135–137). It did not make the “Minsk process” a road that led to the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The negotiations continued for 8 years with the assumption that they would result in positive results for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and regional security. What happened instead is the opposite of those expectations. Finally, the OSCE mediation and the Minsk process were broken down by the Kremlin with the full-scale intervention in Ukraine and the launch of a new stage of the Russo – Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022. Even the staff of the OSCE SMM has suffered from the actions of the Russian occupational forces in the region under Russia’s attacks, as they were not spared from violence.

In general, despite the very important role the OSCE plays in dialogues involving human rights, media freedom, the development of education, gender equality, monitoring elections, etc., it failed to be an effective international organization, capable of preventing conflict, securing and guaranteeing peace, and making the countries that are the source of revisionism, aggression, or war accountable for their irresponsible and aggressive deeds. Thus, for now the future of the OSCE seems unclear.

3.3 NATO: a Successful Survivor Despite Doubts

Another type of international organization with authority in the Euro-Atlantic space is NATO. From the perspective of its development, NATO is much luckier compared to the OSCE. NATO came into existence as the Western countries’ collective response to the Soviet and communist threat. One must keep in mind that NATO was a kind of international alliance and military block that originated in the Cold War era and was conceived within a bipolar system. Subsequently, NATO served as a counterbalance to the USSR’s global domination claims with the core idea of disseminating the socialist revolution worldwide. NATO played a very important role in the Cold War era. Together with the Warsaw Pact, they were polarized balancers of the very delicate equilibrium of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, as well as their allies at that time. A turning point for NATO came after the collapse of the Communist Bloc, when Central Europe was undergoing a series of “velvet” revolutions, which liberated the region from communist regimes (Oztig, 2020, p. 2). When the USSR collapsed as well, the discussion about NATO’s mission and the sense of its very existence reached its momentum.

The debates revolve around the key issue: Are there rational reasons for keeping up NATO’s existence anymore? (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 344–345). The assumption that those reasons are no longer valid has been swept away with the stormy waves of the Yugoslavian crisis (Ejdus & Kovačević, 2019). Soon after this, any remaining doubts were quashed by open regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Finally, they were destroyed by the September 11th terrorist attacks against the USA and others in some European states at the very beginning of the new millennium. These threats proved that proposals to dismiss NATO are premature and rather dangerous, both for the member states of the alliance as well as for the security system of the Euro-Atlantic area (Spohr & Hamilton, 2019, pp. 3–7).

From that moment on, NATO evolved from a military block to a political alliance with new functions and competences. The alliance has undertaken a lot of effort to cooperate with former rivals and foes, for example, establishing the Partnership for Peace program. Despite some positive steps in the early 1990s, NATO enlargement to the east of Europe was soon perceived by the Kremlin as a direct threat to Russia’s national interests, security, and defense concerns (Kucharski, 2019, p. 2).

However, it is worth underlining that the new NATO member states from Central and Eastern Europe joined the Euro-Atlantic alliance of their own political will and with clear arguments in favor of such a choice. They feel insecure because of the threat of restoring Russia’s power, its pretense to dominate. The Kremlin claims of being an undisputed regional leader obsessed with the idea of regaining the status of a superpower once again by any means induce growing fear in the region. The history of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as the experiences of many Central European countries, made them aware of the threat of Russian occupation and rule. These facts make NATO enlargement not an expansionist move but rather a fully justified reaction of the alliance toward growing revisionism, expansionism, and aggressive policy of Russia (Binnendijk & Priebe, 2019, pp. 1–2, 31–32).

Debates originated because of NATO attempts to go out of the natural geographical area of its responsibility. They concern not only NATO operations and missions to Yugoslavia, especially to Kosovo (Krivokapić, 2019). They also cover NATO missions to Libya. Operations against piracy also took place on the Indian Ocean near Somalia, and the long-standing mission of the alliance to Afghanistan. The Libyan mission was rather a failure after the dismissal and death of Qaddafi (Staack, 2018, pp. 11–12). NATO’s operation against piracy (Operation Ocean Shield) involved a coalition of partners and can be evaluated as more or less effective and timely.

The most distanced NATO mission from the natural geographic area of its responsibility was its mission to Afghanistan. Obviously, despite all the efforts (Berdal, 2019), human lives, money, and other resources invested, that mission was a complete failure. One can speculate that the NATO mission to Afghanistan enforced the cooperation of member states, making it more animated and effective. The mechanism evoked because of that mission promoted solidarity and closer cooperation between NATO countries (Johnston, 2019, p. 12).

Comparing the benefits of membership for allied states, NATO is an overtly beneficial IO and military-political alliance for them. One example is the case of Turkey – Greece relations. It is evident that because of their NATO membership, both countries have (to this point) avoided engaging in a direct confrontation. Their interrelations remain tense, due to their disagreement on Cyprus and their dispute over territorial claims to some islands between them. Relations between Turkey and Greece today are closer to hostility rather than true partnership. Still, being loyal members of NATO, both countries understand their responsibilities and appreciate the benefits they receive from their membership in the alliance. Being responsible and loyal members of NATO is important to them both (despite some recent criticisms of the behavior of Turkey) (Goren, 2018).

Regarding the positions of new alliance members, especially from the former Soviet countries and the whole socialist bloc, these countries (such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) significantly benefit from NATO membership. Otherwise, they would likely fall prey to Russian expansionism very quickly (Veebel & Ploom, 2019, pp. 5–7). Recent NATO activities regarding the Russo – Ukrainian War show that, as an international organization, the alliance supports Ukraine. NATO membership has also urged some hesitant countries to be more active in their backing of Ukraine. The uneasy but still meaningful consensus of NATO countries helps it to be on guard and more effective (Klein et al., 2019).

NATO acknowledges that Russia is a direct threat, with China as a second challenge. These realities mean the NATO reinforcement of vision on global security and threats originated as a reaction to other countries. The most dangerous one is Russia (Connable et al., 2020). Still, the rise of China as a geopolitical actor may not be a direct threat (Nye, 2017), but rather a challenge for NATO solidarity and efficiency in the short term and for the foreseeable future.

NATO has witnessed some internal tensions. Old problems with the USA’s centrality and tricky avoidance of military expenditure growth by other European members (Koivula, 2021, pp. 145–147) led to the progressive weakness of those countries’ defensive capabilities, including the highly developed ones like France and Germany.

Regarding the Russian political threat and the growing military pressure presently approaching the eastern and southern borders of NATO, the alliance has to be more active and consolidated. It needs to move forward with reform of the organization and attract new members.

It would be reasonable to recall here the lesson of NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008 (Staack, 2018, p. 7), where the leaders of France and Germany (Olech, 2019, p. 4) – Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, respectively – blocked the appeal of Georgia and Ukraine to enter NATO and to set up instead an action plan to eventually give them NATO membership. They argued that they did not want to see Georgia and Ukraine as new NATO members because they did not want to irritate Vladimir Putin, the leader of Russia. What followed that public statement? Russia’s invasion of Georgia started the same year. Russia, for the first time in its modern history, openly used its military forces against an independent state, which was Russia’s partner not only in the UN and in the OSCE, but also in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Georgia quit the organization in 2009). This example also presents an unwise solution against the necessity of fortifying NATO solidarity. To some extent, this was the move that inspired some to suspect these leaders of pro-Russian feelings or, even worse, of being disposed to defending Russia’s interests for unclear reasons rather than the national interests of their own countries.

After the new stage of the Russo – Ukrainian War in 2022, NATO must reconsider its strategy regarding Russia and new prospective members from the former USSR. It is very positive that NATO promptly reacted to the appeal for membership from Finland and Sweden. This was a right and timely move which makes NATO stronger. Both countries, with their long histories of neutrality, will be protected by the alliance’s collective force when their applications are accepted. NATO solidarity has in any case been confirmed. The new members could join soon, despite reservations expressed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey (another NATO member) against the membership of these two countries because of their political backing of Turkish dissidents (Kurds, etc.). Notwithstanding that diplomatic turmoil, NATO found a way for a principal solution and both countries were accepted as new members unanimously. The only problem that remains is the ratification of the protocols by all the NATO member states, although hopes exist that the necessary steps can be completed without delay.

Regarding the conditions of the ongoing Russo – Ukrainian War, some priorities of NATO are visible, namely the containment and clear-cut repulsion of Russian aggression, revisionism, and retro-imperial policy. NATO needs to elaborate a new affirmative strategy and implement it as soon as possible. It should be a new efficient policy, enhancing its military and administrative capacity to act faster and stronger and to be as united as ever, securing their borders against existing and potentially emerging threats.

5.1 The EU as a Global Actor: Its Strengths and Weaknesses

The Lisbon Treaty brought about important and beneficial legal institutional changes, thus enhancing the very capacity of the EU to act in a more consolidated way and be united in the face of various tasks of international policy and politics. The intergovernmental mechanism of decision-making prevails in the CFSP, and it limits the ability of the EU to advance as an important international player and an influential geopolitical actor. Simultaneously, it poses an obstacle and hampers setting up proactive strategies by the EU regarding global issues like the North/South division, the common efforts in fighting poverty, overcoming the post-colonial burden, etc. Those issues, intrinsically related to public goods, were recognized by the EU as a part of joint responsibility of the member states and the Union in general. In addition, the problems of uncontrolled, illegal migration affected the EU policy and relations with its neighbors (Sójka & Klasa, 2021, pp. 1611–1614), especially Northern African and Asian countries. The EU demonstrates often that it is concerned with resolving those issues. Looking at the process of their resolution, one can agree that the EU plays a very important global role and should be recognized as a principal contributor to the solution for crucial global problems such as poverty, lack of resources and support for the developing countries, the fight against organized crime, and so forth (Petkov & Krastev, 2018). The EU’s reaction to climate change also earned praise for its active stance as the most devoted advocate of the concerted efforts of the international community.

However, while dealing with some hard military and security threats, the EU is less successful. Sometimes it has failed to find an appropriate solution and adequate compromise among the member states. For instance, wars in former Yugoslavia seemed to be a certain failure of Brussels regarding the breakdown of that country. The key reason is in the different positions of the member states in search of a better way to resolve those conflicts. The decisive role was given away by the EU in favor of the USA and some other international organizations, while it was primarily the EU whose member states (including Italy, Austria, and Germany) were the most affected by the consequences of those conflicts. They had to deal with flows of refugees, criminals, and other complications at the time and after the Yugoslav Wars. The EU did not face those challenges successfully.

Some other attempts at making the EU more consolidated regarding security issues appear to have finally failed. The EU hesitates a lot at times when discussing the USA’s leadership in the areas of responsibility of the two important international organizations: NATO and the EU in Europe. Finally, the discussions have been closed with a compromise. Overlapping membership in organizations as well as the different concerns and visions of the European security and global agenda of conflict prevention contributed to a certain kind of redistribution of powers and competencies among NATO and the EU. So far, NATO remains the most important contributor to the hard security issues, but the EU concentrates mainly on the soft security agenda, including fighting against terrorism (Efrat et al., 2021), the illegal trade of weaponry, the prevention and resolution of regional and subregional conflicts, etc. (Bartnik, 2021, pp. 11–16). That compromise was reached at the end of the 1990s. It serves as a vantage point for drafting and implementing other attempts to make the EU a true global actor.

In the end, it makes sense to touch upon the problems of the EU aiming to reform itself. The debates are also framed with the most difficult dilemma: the choice in favor of its further enlargement or preference to solidify cohesion inside the EU. Both options are related to the EU prospect to be stronger and expansive in its activities. The failure of the constitutional process in the EU undermined the capacity of the Union to transform the integrational community into a more effective and well managed one. The proverbial characteristic of the EU as “an economic giant and political dwarf” reflects a widespread reaction to that paradox. The EU is acquiring more prominence, importance, and influence as an economic power. Still, it remains incompatible, less visible and prominent as a global political power. That situation raises a legitimate question about its governability, especially on security issues (Sperling & Webber, 2019).

A series of consecutive crises that affected the EU and the member states in recent decades was a test to the EU’s powerfulness and proactive policy (Kinnvall et al., 2018, pp. 249–250). The economic crisis in 2008, the refugee crisis in 2011, the Ukrainian crisis since 2014, and Brexit after that. Optimistically, these challenges did not signify the end of the EU, of the European integration process, nor of the political union perspective. However, they have uncovered too many loopholes and weaknesses in the organization up to now (Kalniete & Pildegovičs, 2021, pp. 23–25).

5.2 The Eastern Partnership as a Test for the EU Actors

The very complicated nature of the European Union as a unique combination of an international organization, a confederation, and a federation, but not a state per se, makes the analysis of the EU’s capacity to be a geopolitical actor a very difficult task. The external environment for the EU is growing more complicated. Since 2014, the EU has faced growing tensions with Russia. To its own surprise, it also discovered Russia’s foreign policy on the eve of the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Russia’s perception of the Eastern Partnership, inaugurated in Prague in 2008 as a new program of the EU, made the Union optimistic before that time. EaP corresponds not only to the Union’s vision on the Eastern European dimension of the EU’s foreign and security policy. It also answers the appeals of European countries of the post-Soviet region (Crombois, 2019, pp. 90–91). This initiative was modest as to goal setting and limited with incentives and resources attained (Latoszek & Kłos, 2016). It did not correspond fully with the initial, much more ambitious ideals of the EaP initiators, Sweden and Poland (Latoszek & Kłos, 2016), which framed the program as a kind of new open window of opportunities for aspiring countries who looked at the EU as a strategic partner, the most important ally and the closest neighbor. Three countries announced at that time that they were looking for future EU membership (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, in chronological order).

The Eastern Partnership did not threaten Russia’s security. Nonetheless, the Kremlin reacted as though it perceived these steps as a competition and an unacceptable challenge for Russia. Moscow initiated a full-fledged operation of threatening these countries with growing economic pressure, political intimidation, and, finally, open military attack. Before the Vilnius summit of 2013, it was expected that Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova would likely sign association agreements with the EU. However, drawbacks to this prospect emerged quickly. First, Armenia deserted the camp of the pro-European countries of the Eastern Partnership in favor of the Customs Union (nowadays, the Euro-Asian Union, led by Russia). Next, Ukraine faced the attempt of the government of President Viktor Yanukovych to block the European integration course of the country, withdrawing the obligation to sign the Association Agreement. Finally, only Georgia and Moldova signed the Agreement in 2013. All of this meant that it was a turning point for the geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet region (Kruglashov, 2020). Later on, the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, the war in Donbas, and the current so-called Ukrainian crisis have made Russia and the EU no longer strategic partners, as they had officially declared themselves years before. Instead, they are increasingly competitors in the geopolitical arena, full of suspicions and distrust. From February 24, 2022, onwards, almost nobody in the EU treats Russia as a reliable partner or even as a partner at all. Russia is now a principal challenger to the European order, European law, and the European value system. On the one hand, the EU is helping Ukraine in sustaining its statehood and defending its sovereignty in the face of the Russian aggression. This position and actions of the EU are very important and should be appreciated. On the other hand, the latest events of 2022 have illustrated major systemic problems in the EU. For example, the problem of the very slow policymaking process and the deficit of its internal cohesion (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018, pp. 136–138).

Furthermore, a group of so-called “Putin friends” remain a true obstacle to recognizing what the Russian regime in fact is, and what authoritarianism and neototalitarianism in Russia, Belarus, and some other post-Soviet countries means for the EU countries.

Under these circumstances, today the EU must reconsider its strategies and policymaking procedures to reinforce institutional capacity and the role of a united Europe in the region and worldwide vis-à-vis external and internal security challenges (Sperlea, 2019). Without this introspection, the EU will face many more serious and tragic moments in its development. At present, this process has become more apparent in the EU reforms and changes of policymaking procedures. It is a positive development that by supporting Ukraine and Moldova as the frontline states of Russian aggression, the EU tries to rethink its foundations, safeguard its values, and enhance the cooperation mechanisms between the member states.

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine applied for EU candidate status, which two of them were granted on 23 June, 2023, with the prospect of future membership. Certainly, this political solution has been colored with a lot of reservations and discussions. Still, it is very important that the EU recognizes both countries as their prospective members. That decision opens a new stage of their relations with the EU and ensures another vision of the EU regarding the Eastern European flank and the dimension of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Hopefully, the tough lessons learned in 2008, 2014, and especially in 2022 will be very carefully analyzed by the EU and the member states’ leaders. The EU must be much more engaged in the resolution of existing and predictable conflicts, stimulating the member states’ preparedness toward any aggressive action. It also has to strengthen the ability of the EU to be proactive and to guarantee all member states due protection in the sense of common security. Together they must be vigorous promoters of peace deals in the agenda of cooperation, prevention, and resolution of conflicts. Their responsibility in Europe and worldwide will grow substantially because all currents of global politics are of an urgent character. They should not be left unattended and postponed for further hesitation and political procrastination.