1 Introduction
This chapter explores how and why sustainable development (SD) is used by international organizations (IO s) as a strategy for boosting international cooperation on migration, increasing the likelihood of providing global public goods (GPG s). Global public goods and institutional approaches have acknowledged that international governance institutions help to overcome collective action problems (Coleman 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993). Following this argument, we show that IO s deliberately seek to strengthen cooperation on migration by including fragmented issues related to human mobility in other policy areas. This is a strategy for overcoming the absence of a comprehensive international migration regime.
The literature on GPG s demonstrates that the convergence of states’ preferences in a certain policy area is crucial for the provision of such goods and that this eventually leads to more robust forms of global governance (Kok et al., 2011; Olson, 1965). IO s play a key role in the provision of GPG s because they facilitate cooperation among states by increasing access to information and by providing “technical” and more “neutral” expertise (Martin & Simmons, 1998). The expert and “neutral” role played by IO s, in turn, helps to overcome the reluctance to cooperation and finding common interests.
The literature on global migration governance has argued that some types of governance can have public goods characteristics. This means that the existence of common norms, rules, and procedures in certain policy areas can produce non-excludable and non-rivalrous benefits (Betts, 2011; Chand & Markowski, 2018; Hollifield, 2012; Suhrke, 1998). However, there are different classifications of the diverse “types” of migration governance through the public goods theory. We build from Betts (2003), Suhrke (1998), and Thielemann (2013) to argue that refugee protection is a global public good because granting international protection to refugees has benefits for all states, even for those that do not provide this protection. This approach helps us to better understand how and
The implementation of the refugee protection regime results in benefits and costs for states. The costs can reduce the complementarity of states’ interests (Betts, 2011; Chand & Markowski, 2018; Hollifield, 2012; Suhrke 1998). States follow the calculations and measurements of the potential benefits, as well as the costs of providing protection to forcibly displaced persons. Many times, these calculations may result in states’ preferences against international cooperation. In addition to this, the adoption and implementation of international regimes for human mobility have a significant impact on states’ sovereignty, and for this reason, states have historically been reluctant to cooperate and to adopt global-level agreements in this agenda (Betts, 2011; Geiger & Pécoud, 2014). However, by agreeing on a common set of standards, the SDG s establish some basic international norms for human mobility. How and why did states agree on adopting these global-level norms on human mobility? What is the role that IO s have played in this process?
It has been widely acknowledged that in the 2030 SDG Agenda, migration is fragmented and referred to in several areas (Crush, 2019; Guild, 2021; Piper, 2017). This is because, given states’ reluctance to include one goal on migration, IO s have included migration in several SDG s. The primary goal of this strategy is to broaden the opportunities for cooperation in the highly contested area of global governance, where the convergence of preferences is usually low. By shedding light on the role of IO s in including migration in the SDG agenda, we make two main contributions. First, we expand the literature on global migration governance and on the role of IO s by showing how and why these organizations seek to enhance such global governance as a way of strengthening the fragmented global migration regime as a global public good. Second, we contribute to the debates on international cooperation and the SDG s by looking at the migration agenda.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first one, we explain the crucial role played by IO s in the production of GPG s in the area of migration. In Section 2, building from collective action and constructivist theories, we address how the development and provision of GPG s works in highly contested policy areas such as migration. Section 2 begins by explaining the main characteristics of global migration governance, i.e., its fragmentation and overlaps, overlaps and states’ unwillingness to cooperate in the area. In relation to this, Section 2.1 suggests that refugee protection can be seen as
2 The Role of IO s in the Provision of GPG s in Highly Contested Policy Areas
The scholarship on international cooperation identifies the provision of GPG s and the costs and benefits that arise from them as comprising a core element for understanding states’ motivations to engage in international cooperation (see Kaul et al., 1999; Kaul et al., 2003). Collective action failure is more likely to happen in highly contested policy areas. For instance, it is frequently the case that in the area of environmental protection, domestic interests such as economic protectionism prevail, and collective action fails. As we explain below, this is also the case in migration. International cooperation and successful collective action in highly contested areas is more likely to happen when certain domestic and international factors combine. On the domestic side, states may choose to cooperate and seek solutions at the international level when they fail to provide public goods at the national level (Betts, 2009; Caballero Vélez & Pachocka 2021; Kaul et al., 2003). On the international side, IO s can be key agents for the promotion of international cooperation and for achieving successful collective action. IO s, which are actors with a relatively high degree of autonomy and legitimacy in their areas of expertise, manage the agenda, adoption, and provision of GPG s, and states ultimately collaborate with such provision.
In this analysis, we consider that public goods are socially constructed and, consequently, their costs and benefits are perceived by states and constrained by institutions (see Betts, 2009; Roberts, 2017, 2019; March and Olsen, 1989). In other words, the identification of a public good as such is a political decision and its provision at the international level depends on the implementation of rules set by the specific international policy regime in a certain policy area. States are more likely to provide GPG s if the perceived utility gained from the public good is high (Roberts, 2019). Conversely, if states’ perceived utility is low, there probably will be an underprovision of GPG s. The divergent preferences for the provision of a public good may lead to a lack of consensus on a certain
GPG s are goods whose effects go beyond state borders. They provide non-rivalrous and non-excludable benefits to citizens of more than two countries and in more than two different world regions. The costs and benefits produced by GPG s can spill over transnationally and can have effects at the global level (Sandler, 2006). With their “technical” and more “neutral” expertise, IO s are key in “transnationalizing” public goods, particularly in a highly contested area such as migration. One example of this is the set of international security standards for travel documents (passports). After these standards were adopted, IO s assisted many developing countries in complying with the new security measures and, in turn, this assistance resulted in these countries expanding their capacities for issuing travel documents, which ultimately contributed to facilitating human mobility worldwide (see Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010).
The SDG s can be conceptualized as GPG s due to the global reach of their potential benefits (Huck, 2021; Estevaeordal & Goodman, 2017). The SDG s are a set of objectives that, together, provide a policy framework for governance actors to achieve a more sustainable future and cope with global challenges (Huck, 2021). Their wide acceptance by the international community and the key role of IO s in their implementation provides them with legitimacy and a normative dimension. Indeed, some IO s, such as UN specialized agencies with specific expertise, have the role of “custodian” agencies of certain SDG s. In the fields of migration and refugees, these agencies are the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. However, it is also the case for some highly institutionalized IO s with a strong regional reach, such as the European Union (EU), which develops its own sustainable development and migration political agendas and corresponding sectoral policies. In addition, conceptualizing the SDG s as GPG s allows for a better measurement of the impact of the policy framework adopted by IO s (Huck, 2021). As we expand on this concept below, these aspects are crucial in migration and displacement, where disagreements are frequent and collective action is rare.
3 Global Migration Governance and the Production of Public Goods
Governance is both a structure and a process (Börzel, 2016; Levi-Faur, 2012). Governance structures are the formal and informal institutions and the actor
At the global level, there is no international migration regime, no single institutionalized framework that regulates states’ responses to human mobility. This means that states retain a significant degree of autonomy in determining their migration political agendas and corresponding public policies. Global migration governance is characterized by overlapping and fragmented legislation and regimes with different degrees of institutionalization that regulate diverse aspects of migration and different “types” of mobile populations (Hollifield, 2012; Geddes, 2021). The overlapping and fragmented character of global migration governance has powerful effects on individuals’ access to rights and mobility (Mau et al., 2012) because these overlapping norms basically create “categories” of persons who have differential access to mobility rights, as different groups of individuals (Cresswell, 2010). For example, there are different mobility rights for “forced” and “voluntary” migrants, and among these, there are many categories, including students and highly qualified workers, but there are also different mobility rights for family members of non-nationals residing in states other than their native one and at the same time, there are different definitions of family (see Geddes et al., 2020). This fragmentation and overlap, as well as the lack of an all-encompassing “global migration regime,” act as incentives for promoting ad hoc cooperation and preventing states from
There are several explanations for the reluctance to cooperate and to agree on a more comprehensive global migration regime. One of these explanations affirms that states’ interests are non-complementary because most international migrants reside in Global North countries, so the adoption of global standards has a larger effect on a small number of more developed countries (Pécoud, 2021). Other explanations point at nationalist tendencies (Triandafyllidou, 2021) and sovereignty concerns (Newland, 2010) and yet others focus on the reliance of informal workers with low wages in a large sector of the economy (Pécoud, 2021).
For the purposes of this analysis, we assert that the combination of the wide range of states’ interests, ideas. and cost/benefit perceptions about each different “type” of migration results in fragmentation of global migration governance.
3.1 Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good
It has been argued that the (fragmented) global migration governance structures have public goods characteristics (Betts, 2011; Chand & Markowski, 2018; Hollifield, 2012; Suhrke, 1998). Following this argument, some scholars have initiated a heuristic framework based on the innate economic properties of public goods (their publicness or cost-benefit calculus) of the different “types” of migration (see Betts, 2011; Suhrke, 1998; Thielemann, 2018). Betts (2011) identifies the existing global regimes that address different migration “types” and classifies them as specific public goods. These migration types are refugee migration as a public good, irregular and low-skilled migration as a club good, and high-skilled labor migration as a private good.
According to Betts (2011), refugee governance can be seen as a public good, meaning that states can receive non-excludable and non-rivalrous benefits from developing common norms and standards in this area of governance. However, it also means that the free-riding problem may emerge. By irregular and low-skilled migration governance being a “club good,” Betts means that the benefits emerging from collective action are non-rivalrous but can be excludable. For example, high-skilled migration governance has excludable and rivalrous benefits for the states that host high-skilled migrants in their territories because, in this case, states perceive private benefits from high-skilled migration (Betts, 2011).
Another important characteristic of refugee protection as a public good is the free-riding question (Thielemann & Dewan, 2006). If one state relocates refugees to its territory, other states may perceive benefits from that, without contributing to refugee protection. In migration and refugee protection, in particular, non-cooperation and collective action failure are quite frequent because, as stated above, states’ preferences in the area are often divergent. The free-riding problem raises the question of the degree of publicness of refugee protection because the provision of refugee protection by one state may generate excludable benefits for others (see Betts 2003). The degree of publicness is also related to the degree of pureness of refugee protection. “Pure” public goods are unusual because most public goods generate private benefits (Sandler, 1977), so impure public goods partially satisfy one or both of the primary public goods characteristics (non-rivalry and non-excludability). In recent years, scholars have investigated the impure public nature of refugee protection. These investigations conclude with the fact that from granting refugee protection, partial excludable and rivalrous benefits may emanate (see Betts, 2003; Roper & Barria, 2010; Thielemann & El-Enany, 2010). Refugee protection is an impure good because it confers private benefits (Caballero Vélez & Pachocka, 2021, p. 6). This happens because the different “degrees of publicness” generate multiple benefits for different states. For instance, some states that provide humanitarian protection to refugees receive some private benefits, such as international prestige and economic growth. These partial benefits are excludable to the states that grant the status of refugees.
4 Global Migration in the 2030 UN Agenda
Many studies have addressed the relationship between migration and the SDG s, and a large part of this literature has acknowledged the relative “absence” and the marginalization of migration as an SDG (Guild, 2021; Pécoud, 2021; Crush,
The 2030 SDG Agenda emphasizes migrant rights and safeguarding livelihoods. The implementation of the SDG s is a high priority on the international agenda (Guild, 2021). This, together with the fact that other issues on the agenda, especially development, have greater chances of facing less opposition and thus limitations for cooperation and reaching agreement (Guild, 2021, pp. 361–362), which increases the likelihood of countries perceiving a wider set of benefits in the adoption of public goods in the area of development. Development policies can be framed as a form of “managerial” global migration governance. Managerial migration governance (Pécoud, 2021) aims at conciliating diverging interests on migration because the apparently “technical” content of such policies increases its “neutral” appearance, its legitimacy and, finally, the likelihood of it being approved (Brumat, 2020). Together, these factors explain the “linking” of migration to other SDG s and other global governance agendas.
As we show in this chapter, IO s are aware that states’ interests are more likely to converge in the SD agenda rather than the migration agenda (see Guild, 2021; Crush, 2019). As a result, many IO s have actively included migration onto their SD agendas in order to broaden the opportunities for cooperation on migration, as we illustrate in the section below.
4.1.1 The UNHCR
shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.
The crucial role of the UNHCR is reinforced by the fact that the only category/type of international migrants with a binding legal definition are refugees, as defined in Article 1A of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from July 28, 1951 (usually referred to as the 1951 Geneva Convention) (UNGA, 1951), in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees from January 31, 1967 (usually referred to as the 1967 New York Protocol) (UNGA, 1967).
Article 8 of the Statute clearly indicates that the UNHCR should provide protection to refugees falling under its competence. The first two ways in which the UNHCR should do so are particularly relevant because they include “promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments thereto” and “promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection” (UNHCR Statute, Articles 8a–b). So, the UNHCR’s mandate includes a crucial transnational issue: how to protect refugees and ensure appropriate international standards through common legal and policy frameworks for their safe reception in host countries. The implementation of this overarching task within the specific functions of the UNHCR can be carried out in the context of achieving the SDG s. Linking
If we look at refugee migration as a component of the broader category of forced migration (also including displacement caused by natural or human-made disasters) (see IOM, 2019), it should be noted that, in many cases, forced migrations are a large-scale and relatively permanent, long-term phenomenon (Pachocka & Sobczak-Szelc, 2018). As illustrated by recent UNHCR data, these features have intensified in recent years – the total number of people forcibly displaced (internally within the same territory or internationally) as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order increased from 38.54 million in 2011 to 89.32 million in 2021 worldwide (UNHCR, 2022a). In absolute numbers, the most dramatic increase in just one decade was in the number of IDP s (by nearly 31 million), and to a lesser extent in the number of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate (by almost 12 million). Moreover, these numbers are likely to increase significantly by the end of 2022 due to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine caused by the full-scale Russian invasion and aggression against this country since late February.
All this requires a rethinking of forced migration governance within international migration governance, including addressing the needs of migrants and receiving communities and considering the interests and capacities of host countries. Given the reluctance of states to adopt global norms on migration mentioned above, changing the international legal framework in this field (e.g., the 1951 Geneva Convention) to adapt it to the current circumstances seems to be an enormously difficult task. Instead, as seen above, given the perceived utility and legitimacy of development as a global public good, it seems much more feasible to act through the implementation of the SDG s.
The increasing scale, regularity, and persistence of forced migration can be understood as a rapidly and systematically increasing number of forced migrants to a relatively high level on specific migration routes in different regions of the world (e.g., migration from the MENA region to Europe, and specifically to the EU, within the Mediterranean). In light of the increasing numbers of forced migrants in some countries (e.g., Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey or Lebanon), many states, particularly in the Global South, face the challenge of ensuring appropriate and sustainable conditions for their everyday life, often in the medium to long term. In the cases of sudden increases in forced displacement, this raises challenges for their capacities of providing such public goods due to the costs that these states face for receiving and hosting large groups of people who entered the country in a short period of time.
In the New York Declaration, states sought to address migration in general terms, as identified in the SDG s but, due to pressure from the UNHCR and some states, the states finally decided to adopt two separate Compacts: one for Migrants and one for Refugees (Klein Solomon & Sheldon, 2018; Betts, 2018). UNHCR and some governments were concerned about the possible reduction of protection provisions in case that both migration and asylum were addressed together in one global agreement (Klein Solomon & Sheldon, 2018). As Betts (2018) notes, UNHCR followed a strategy of “self-preservation,” as it tried to prevent the international refugee regime based on the 1951 Geneva Convention from being undermined in any form because that would also affect UNHCR’s mandate (Betts, 2018). As a result of these negotiations, the GCM adopts and develops the principles of “safe, orderly and regular” migration of SDG 10.7.
Even if the GCR is not legally binding and does not legally and institutionally restructure the system of international refugee protection, it provides an important framework based on the political will of various stakeholders for a new approach to managing large-scale refugee situations in line with existing international refugee law (see Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2018). The GCR includes four interlinked and interdependent objectives, including easing pressures on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity, the achievement of which will be possible thanks to “the mobilization of political will, a broadened base of support, and arrangements that facilitate more equitable, sustained and predictable contributions among States and other relevant stakeholders” (United Nations, 2018b, p. 4). The Global Compacts are relevant for many reasons, but mainly because they give content to the common framework adopted in SDG 10.7 and because they define common norms and standards and a common framework for implementation for migration and refugee protection. This common framework and standards
Indeed, given the controversies that arose during the negotiation process of the GCR and especially the GCM (see Espinoza et al., 2018), some governments in their national implementation plans avoid mentioning the Global Compacts and instead refer to the SDG s (Kainz et al., 2020). This is because, as mentioned above, the development agenda is perceived as more legitimate and less controversial than the migration and asylum agenda. Recent studies acknowledge that the GCR (and the GCM) has expanded international migration and asylum policy agendas and pushes some countries into acting in some policy areas in which they had not been active previously (Kainz et al., 2020; Triggs & Wall, 2020). One example is Canada, whose refugee and asylum governance structures were already in line with both Compacts. The GCR and GCM implementation process led Canada to evaluate the performance of the existing policies and check what was potentially missing (Kainz et al., 2020).
The fact that the UNHCR is the “custodian” agency of global refugee governance and that the GCR’s underlying legal and normative basis is binding international law (the 1951 Geneva Convention) made its implementation quicker than the GCM (Kainz et al., 2020). Indeed, the UNHCR’s political leadership was key for the adoption and for the implementation of the GCR through its organizational culture of strategic thinking and political entrepreneurship (Betts, 2018).
As a result of both the UNHCR’s role and the GCR’s legitimacy, crucially framed as part of the sustainable development agenda, thousands of pledges were made as part of the GCR implementation, particularly in the areas of burden and responsibility sharing (Triggs & Wall, 2020). Many of these pledges came from countries and other actors who have not traditionally played a relevant role in refugee governance (Triggs & Wall, 2020). Some GCR goals have been prioritized over others by most countries. In practice, the most popular ones are strengthening international cooperation and investing in asylum and
According to the GCR’s mechanism for tracking the implementation of pledges made at the Global Refugee Forum, the total number of pledges was 1,636 at the end of July 2022; 53% of the pledging entities were states, followed by Civil Society Organizations (CSO s) with 24% and IO s at 12%. Among the IO s pledges, those which involved the UNHCR (34% of all entities in this category) prevailed (UNHCR, 2022c). Eight pledges had the status of “fulfilled” and they covered such issues as cooperation and support on restoring refugee family links, FAO/UNHCR cooperation on sustainable agricultural livelihoods for refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR in Eastern and Central Africa, support for refugee children, or strengthening the refugee status determination (RSD) procedure in the Republic of Ecuador. As we can see, these pledges are related to a wide range of issues, from material and/or technical support to legal and policy aspects, including issues dedicated to individual countries and regions, so they effectively link asylum and forced migration to a broad range of other policy areas. This shows the enormous potential of various actors, including IO s, to influence migration governance through the implementation of specific projects in line with the SDG s.
4.1.2 The European Union
Cooperation on asylum and refugees, together with external border control and irregular migration, is the most developed area of EU migration policy (Geddes et al., 2020). Refugee protection is the cornerstone of the EU’s asylum policy. In general, from the legal perspective, three basic components of EU migration policy – three specific/sectoral EU policies – are asylum (international protection) policy, immigration policy, and policy on border checks (border management) (Pachocka & Caballero Vélez, 2022; Caballero Vélez & Pachocka, 2021). They are part of the EU’s area of freedom, security, and justice, which is subject to shared competences between the EU and its member states (Article 4(2)(j) TFEU), which means that both parties “may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area” (Article 2(2) TFEU), in line with the principle of subsidiarity (Pachocka & Caballero Vélez, 2022). The legal basis and general framework for EU asylum policy is rooted in EU primary law: Articles 67(2), 78 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is expanded and detailed by EU secondary law and supplementary sources, such as unilateral acts of law
The process of EU-level harmonization of asylum policy began in the 1990s. The basis of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was defined in 1999 with the twofold objective of harmonizing policies in the short term with the ultimate goal of establishing a common asylum procedure and uniform legal status of international protection throughout the EU. The rationale behind this was that the creation of a common market and a common political space where internal borders were inexistent and required an integrated response to migration (Geddes et al., 2020, pp. 115–118). To do this, the EU developed five policy instruments:
The Dublin regulation, which determines which state is responsible for examining asylum claims
Common standards of reception of asylum seekers, set out in the Reception Conditions Directive
Common procedures for the examination, granting and withdrawal of protection, defined in the Asylum Procedures Directive
Common criteria to qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection, included in the Qualifications Directive
Mechanisms for temporary protection and assistance to respond to sudden and high numbers of arrivals, established in the Temporary Protection Directive (Geddes et al., 2020, pp. 116–117) and used for the first time in 2022 to provide a legal status to forced migrants from Ukraine
Key societal challenges faced by the world today – demography, climate change, security, the global race for talent, and inequality – all have an impact on migration. Policy imperatives such as free movement in the Schengen area, safeguarding fundamental rights, ensuring security, and filling skills gaps, all call for an effective migration policy. The task facing the EU and its member states, while continuing to address urgent needs, is to build a system that manages and normalizes migration for the long term and which is fully grounded in European values and international law. (EC, 2020)
One of the most important aspects of the Pact linked to the UN SDG s is the implementation of the UN GCR. The Pact implicitly refers to “sustainable protection” providing an “end-to-end approach needed to make migration management in Europe fair, efficient and sustainable” (EC, 2020). By including this reference to sustainable protection, the Pact provides a clear case of how the EU implements some elements of the UN SDG s in its legislation. From a public goods perspective, the implementation of sustainable development in asylum policy could help in overcoming the lack of cooperation in the provision of refugee protection. This could be witnessed the case with the temporary relocation scheme of 2015–2017 for asylum seekers from Italy and Greece during the migration and refugee management crisis in the EU (see Pachocka & Caballero Vélez, 2022).
As refugee protection is covered by the scope of the EU asylum policy, which is subject to shared competence under EU law (Article 4 TFEU), as explained above, member state governments include/adopt the European legal framework into national legislation in different ways depending on the type of legal document, e.g., a directive or regulation or other form, to make it coherent across the EU as much as possible.
So far, under current legal and policy settings, this situation renders ineffective provision of refugee protection by the EU, as reflected during the challenges related to the implementation of the relocation scheme in 2015–2017. Consequently, as we assert in this chapter, the implementation of the UN Global Compacts can be seen as an attempt by the EU to overcome divergences on policy costs between the member states.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has shown how and why IO s actively include forced migration on the SDG agenda to broaden the possibilities of increasing international
Future research that explores the roles of other IO s, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whose mandate does not directly include (forced) migrants, could shed further light on the linkage processes and the mechanisms used by IO s to provide GPG s and enhance global migration governance.
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