ὁ δὲ τῆς Πολιάδος Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ τῆς Βουλαίας Θέμιδος (Hom. Od. 2.69) “ἥ τ ’ἀνδρῶν ἀγορὰς ἠμὲν λύει ἠδὲ καθίζει ”προφήτης ,ἑνὶ χρώμενος ὀργάνῳ τῷ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν πλάττων καὶ συναρμόττων ,τὰ δ ’ἀντιστατοῦντα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ὥσπερ ὄζους τινὰς ἐν ξύλῳ καὶ διπλόας ἐν σιδήρῳ μαλάσσων καὶ καταλεαίνων ,κοσμεῖ τὴν πόλιν .
The spokesman for Athena Polias and Themis of Counsel, “who summons and dismisses men’s assemblies,” sets his city in order with one tool only at his disposition—the word: with this he shapes and joins, and softens or smooths down the obstacles to his work—the knots in the wood, as it were, or the flaws in the iron. (Praec. ger. reip. 802B–C)1
In this way, Plutarch, in the Political Precepts (Praecepta gerendae reipublicae), emphasizes the importance of rhetorical ability for politicians active in the Greek cities of the Roman empire.2 A few lines earlier (801D–E), he had already pointed out that even the Homeric kings, who were able to overshadow the masses with all their splendor, still wanted to be “speakers of words” (Il. 9.443) and did not neglect the charm of speech or “the assemblies where men become preeminent” (Il. 9.441). On the contrary, these kings often relied on persuasion to soften the stubbornness and forcefulness of the demos (
From the range of the rhetorical tools deployed in these paragraphs (i.e. quotations, direct addresses, metaphors and paradigms), it is evident that Plutarch regarded the ability to speak persuasively as essential for a successful career in civic politics and that he wanted to impress this conviction upon his readers as well. Despite the importance Plutarch attaches to speech, his instructions, which cover four chapters and should suffice for any competent person to draw further conclusions about the preparation and use of speech (804C), have received relatively little attention.3 This ties in with the general tendency among scholars to focus on the ways in which local, Greek politics had changed due to the impact of Roman rule.4 Yet, the Political Precepts also shows that, regardless of the limits set by the Roman authorities, local politics continued in much the same vein as it had before the incorporation of the Greek cities into the Roman empire. What stands out from Plutarch’s advice, among other things, is the prominent place reserved for the city’s demos.5 Together with the evidence from inscriptions and other first- and second-century CE authors, this has led several scholars to stress the importance of popular political participation in the imperial period.6 With this ongoing tradition of people politics in mind, it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at Plutarch’s advice on demegoric speech.
In this respect, it is important to realize, however, that the Political Precepts is a prescriptive text that is firmly rooted in Plutarch’s philosophical ideas; it describes how politicians ought to behave, not how they normally did. Whereas Plutarch’s account of the Greek city under Roman rule is often valued for its realism, his portrayal of the civic statesman has been labelled idealistic, unrealistic and quaintly ambitious.7 The politician of the Political Precepts has been described as the counterpart to Plato’s ideal state: an idealized figure, a model of impeccable virtue, that could never have existed in reality.8 Yet, even though scholarship has rightly stressed the importance of Plutarch’s philosophical agenda and his desire to shape rather than to describe political realities, it is important to note as well that Plutarch took great care to distinguish his own methods from those of other philosophers who merely encouraged people to engage in politics but failed to show them how (cf. Praec. ger. reip. 798A–C). What Plutarch promises his readers in the preface are practically oriented instructions (
In this chapter, I will examine Plutarch’s advice on political speech and compare it to Dio of Prusa’s assembly speeches (Or. 40, 43–48, 51). The aim of this comparison is, firstly, to better understand Plutarch’s instructions on rhetoric and, secondly, to see if and how these instructions hold up against political practice as evidenced in Dio’s orations. While the Political Precepts is prescriptive and aimed at an elite political in-crowd, Dio’s speeches are—or at least purport to be—examples of political oratory in action and were designed to persuade the city’s demos gathered in the theatre. By comparing these radically different perspectives, I intend to add to our understanding of these texts and the ways in which Dio and Plutarch responded to, and engaged in, a Greek tradition of people politics that continued to shape the political world they shared.
1 Plutarch on the Politician’s Style of Speech
Plutarch’s first remarks about political speech are concerned with style (
Ὁ μέντοι λόγος ἔστω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ μήτε νεαρὸς καὶ θεατρικός ,ὥσπερ πανηγυρίζοντος καὶ στεφανηπλοκοῦντος ἐξ ἁπαλῶν καὶ ἀνθηρῶν ὀνομάτων ,μήτ ’αὖ πάλιν ,ὡς ὁ Πυθέας τὸν Δημοσθένους ἔλεγεν ,ἐλλυχνίων ὄζων καὶ σοφιστικῆς περιεργίας ,ἐνθυμήμασι πικροῖς καὶ περιόδοις πρὸς κανόνα καὶ διαβήτην ἀπηκριβωμένος· …ἐπιφαινέσθω μὴ δεινότης μηδὲ πανουργία ,μηδ ’εἰς ἔπαινον αὐτοῦ τιθέσθω τὸ ‘ἑκτικῶς ’ἢ ‘τεχνικῶς ’ἢ ‘διαιρετικῶς ’ …
A politician’s style of speech must not be extravagant or theatrical, as though he was orating at a festival and weaving a garland of soft flowery words. Nor on the other hand, must it “smell of the lamp” (as Pytheas said of Demosthenes’ style) or of sophistic elaboration, all sharp epigrams and periods measured out by rule and dividers … there should be no ingenious tricks about it, one shouldn’t be able to applaud it by saying “What facility!” “What skill!” “What organization!”
What a politician should avoid, first of all, is an extravagant and theatrical style that is more appropriate for epideictic occasions where the aim would be to honor a specific person or speak in praise of a certain object or theme. The word
There seems to be more to Plutarch’s advice, however, than mere consideration for the performance context of demegoric speech. For Classical Athens, scholars have drawn attention to the ideological tensions produced by a system where the mass of ordinary citizens had to make political decisions after listening to the debate in the assembly that was often dominated by elite orators.12 Before Plutarch, Aristotle already argued that an orator should compose his speech without it being noticeable, because speaking artificially (
Plutarch was not the only Greek author writing in imperial times to echo the concerns that arose in the context of the Classical, Athenian democracy. In The Art of Political Speech, an anonymous rhetorician from around 200 CE argues, for example, that “[a] style that is artless and seemingly improvised also creates persuasion” (
2 Dio of Prusa’s Assembly Speeches
At several points, Dio of Prusa’s assembly speeches indicate that popular suspicion of clever and well-prepared speakers was still very much alive in the imperial period. A first passage comes from the Oration 46 that was pronounced during a local grain shortage. In this speech, Dio vigorously defends himself against rumors that he was either unwilling to supply money for the purchase of grain or even deliberately withholding grain from the market in order to drive up its price.16 He answers these allegations by using a tactic advised in contemporary stasis-theory when the issue turns on the existence of the facts: he argues that he does not have the capacity (
εἰμὶ δὲ αὐτὸς οὔτε ὑπέρδεινος εἰπεῖν οὔτε ἴσως ἁπάντων ὕστατος ἐν τῷ λέγειν .ἔστιν οὖν ὅντινα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐλύπησα ,πρᾶγμα ἐπαγαγών τινι τῶν ἀπραγμόνων ἢ κατασκευάσας ἐπήρειαν ;ἢ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐποίησα κινδυνεῦσαί τινα ,ὡς Καίσαρι προσηκούσης ,ἢ ἐν συνηγορίᾳ προύδωκα ;
Nor am I either over-clever as a speaker or, if I may say so, poorest of all in that art. Well then, is there any one whom I have injured by my words, by causing trouble for any one who loves peace and quiet or by contriving some outrage against him? Or have I placed anyone in jeopardy touching his estate, pretending that it belongs to Caesar, or have I as advocate played false to any one?18
Dio’s rhetorical questions invite the audience to consider whether he has ever abused his rhetorical abilities by attacking others in public or through illegitimate lawsuits. Although he could not deny his rhetorical talents, Dio takes care to stress that he is not over-clever as a speaker and that he has never used his abilities to make a profit at the cost of his fellow citizens. The style of the passage supports its content. The kind of rhetorical questions Dio employs here are characteristic of what Hermogenes would call Indignance (
In the Oration 43, Dio similarly turns to the use of rhetoric in establishing his character, this time to prove that he was not colluding with a bad governor: “nor do I make myself a nuisance to anyone in the market-place—for I am no orator—nor have I defended anyone in court, save one luckless fellow alone …; but I have spoken in no other case at law, so that I am in no respect offensive to any one” (Or. 43.6–7:
3 The Importance of Ethical Speech
Let us return to the Political Precepts and consider what kind of style the politician’s speech should exhibit (Praec. ger. reip. 802E–803A):
ἀλλ ’ὥσπερ οἱ μουσικοὶ τὴν θίξιν ἀξιοῦσι τῶν χορδῶν ἠθικὴν καταφαίνεσθαι μὴ κρουστικήν ,οὕτως τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ πολιτευομένου καὶ συμβουλεύοντος καὶ ἄρχοντος …,ἀλλ ’ἤθους ἀπλάστου καὶ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ παρρησίας πατρικῆς καὶ προνοίας καὶ συνέσεως κηδομένης ὁ λόγος ἔστω μεστός ,ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ τὸ κεχαρισμένον ἔχων καὶ ἀγωγὸν ἔκ τε σεμνῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ νοημάτων ἰδίων καὶ πιθανῶν .
Music critics expect the touch on the strings to show sensibility, not mere mechanical skill. The same principle applies to the speech of the politician who gives advice or holds office: … the speech should be overflowing with sincerity, true high-mindedness, a father’s frankness, forethought and caring intelligence. Its nobility of content should be given the charm and attractiveness of dignified language and individual and convincing thoughts.
Contrary to what we may expect after reading about what styles are to be avoided, Plutarch does not actually give his readers stylistic advice. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of ethos. The ethical qualities he lists are by no means randomly chosen. We should note that Plutarch’s advice follows the Aristotelian triad for ethical persuasion (Rh. 1378a6–16). A speaker should present himself as capable or intelligent, as a good person, and as someone who wishes the best for his audience. For a politician, “forethought” (
4 Timing, Preparation and Improvisation
The emphasis Plutarch places on unaffected character and avoiding a style that “smells of the lamp” should not be taken to mean that politicians were to go into the assembly unprepared: “Try, if possible, to address the people with a well-considered speech, meaningful and without slips” (Praec. ger. reip. 803F:
Plutarch does not specify how his readers should prepare their speech. It may be interesting therefore to see what Dio has to say about preparing a political speech in a letter to an unknown politician (Oration 18). At several points in the text, he specifically identifies the local council and assembly as places where his advice could be put into practice (18.14, 18.17). At the end of the letter, Dio argues that it is best not to prepare your speeches in writing but rather to dictate them to a secretary (18.18). The reason for this is that “the one who utters his thoughts aloud is more nearly in the mood of a man addressing an audience than is one who writes” (
From Plutarch’s Political Precepts, it appears that speaking in the assembly could be highly agonistic and unpredictable affair. This image is confirmed by Dio’s speeches. Time and again, the orator had to defend his conduct and policies against his critics. It seems, moreover, that in addressing the assembly he had to deal not only with the arguments and counterarguments of his opponents but also with the interruptions of his audience. At several points, Dio calls upon the audience not to laugh him down or not to make a tumult again (Or. 43.3:
“
ἡμεῖς ἄρα τὰ αὑτῶν ἀπολέσωμεν ;”οὐθείς φησιν· ἀλλ ’εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσίν ἐστι χρήματα δημόσια ,καὶ ταῦτα ἔχουσιν ἔνιοι ,τινὲς μὲν δι ’ἄγνοιαν ,τινὲς δὲ ἄλλως· καὶ δεῖ προνοεῖν καὶ σῴζειν ,οὐ μέντοι μετὰ ἔχθρας οὐδὲ μετὰ διαφορᾶς .
“Shall we, then, lose what belongs to us?” “Nobody says that.” “But you should know that in all the cities public funds are held by a few persons, some through a mistake and some otherwise and although it is necessary to recover them, this should be done without hatred or division.”
These and similar passages have been read as traces of the clamor that pervaded the assembly meetings where Dio’s speeches had been performed.23 Such interruptions, however, never disrupt the orator’s line of argument; on the contrary, they often allow him to make his point more forcefully. Our extant texts should, therefore, probably not be regarded as the (reworked) transcripts of assembly meetings but as Dio’s personal preparations, perhaps those taken down by his secretary.24 I would suggest that the air of spontaneity conveyed by the assembly speeches has more to do with the rules that governed political speech and Dio’s stylistic mastery than with their performance context. The expressions of amazement and doubt, the sudden confessions of forgetfulness, the rhetorical asides, the indignant rhetorical questions and the prayers and exclamations to the gods that can be found in these speeches all belonged to the standard repertoire of the trained orator. They are recommended by Hermogenes as stylistic devices that produce Sincerity, the style that carefully avoids all appearance of polish and preparation and portrays the speaker as someone who is speaking more or less extemporaneously (Id. 2.7.1–2.8.19 Patillon). By turning to these devices, the politician could make his speeches appear full of unaffected character and present himself as a capable, sincere and benevolent advisor while avoiding the “smell of the lamp.”
Conclusion
In this chapter, I hope to have shown that it can be a rewarding exercise to read Plutarch’s advice on political speech against Dio’s assembly speeches. While the Political Precepts draws our attention to the aims and motives behind the politician’s rhetoric, Dio’s speeches help us to imagine how Plutarch’s instructions could be applied to real-life politics. Keeping Plutarch’s advice in mind when reading Dio’s works helps us to look past the overt message of his speeches and focus on the methods he employs to convince his popular audience and achieve his political agenda. This, in turn, leads to a better understanding of the conventions that governed assembly politics in the Roman period. With regard to the Political Precepts, the short comparison presented above suggests that Plutarch’s advice, or at least his instructions on demegoric rhetoric, responded to the concrete demands of political life in the Roman period. What we have here, are indeed praecepta, practically oriented instructions that could be applied in real-life politics. It is by bringing Plutarch into dialogue with his contemporaries that we gain access to the political world they shared. In doing so, we also gain a better understanding of Plutarch as an author who intended to shape the political behavior and practices of his time.
The Greek text cited in this chapter is from the Teubner edition of K. Hubert, M. Pohlenz & H. Drexler (eds.), Plutarchi Moralia. Vol. 5.1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1960). Transl. by D.A. Russell, Plutarch. Selected Essays and Dialogues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), slightly adapted.
In a later passage, Plutarch adds that politicians who were unskilled at public speaking should align themselves with more eloquent colleagues (Praec. ger. reip. 819C).
For some exceptions, see L. Van der Stockt, “Education and Public Speech: Plutarch on Aesthetics and Ethics,” in: E. Calderón et al. (eds.), Koinòs lógos: Homenaje al profesor José García López (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2006) 1037–1046; C. Cooper, “The Moral Interplay Between Plutarch’s Political Precepts and Life of Demosthenes,” in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: Moralia Themes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the Moralia (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2008) 77–80.
H. Halfmann, “Die Selbstverwaltung der kaiserzeitlichen Polis in Plutarchs Schrift Praecepta gerendae rei publicae,” Chiron 32 (2002) 83–96; M. Trapp, “Statesmanship in a Minor Key?” in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works. Vol. 1: Plutarch’s Statesman and His Aftermath: Political, Philosophical, and Literary Aspects (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004) 189–190; G. Roskam, “A Great and Sacred Thing? Plutarch’s Attempt to Revaluate the Political Office,” in A. Pérez Jiménez & F.B. Titchener (eds.), Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works: Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2005) 399, 408; K.M. Trego, “Do As I Say and As I Do: Lessons on the Use of History for the Civic Statesman in Plutarch’s Praecepta,” CW 109.3 (2016) 379.
T. Oppeneer, “Plutarch’s Political Precepts: Popular Politics in the Greek City under Rome,” in A. Filippini et al. (eds.), Ancient Cities III. Grecia e Roma. Aspetti della vita sociale, politica e culturale (Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, forthcoming).
A. Zuiderhoek, “On the Political Sociology of the Imperial Greek City,” GRBS 48.4 (2008) 417–445; A. Heller, “La cité grecque d’époque impériale: vers une société d’ordres?,” Annales (HSS) 64.2 (2009) 341–373; H.-L. Fernoux, Le Demos et la Cité: communautés et assemblées populaires en Asie Mineure à l’époque impériale (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2011); T. Oppeneer, “Assembly Politics and the Rhetoric of Honour in Chariton, Dio of Prusa and John Chrysostom,” Historia 67.2 (2018) 223–243; T. Oppeneer, “Grain Crisis at Prusa. Persuading the People in the Imperial Period,” Mnemosyne 73.6 (2020) 975–998.
M. Beck, “Plutarch on the Statesman’s Independence of Action,” in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works. Vol. 1: Plutarch’s Statesman and His Aftermath: Political, Philosophical, and Literary Aspects (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004) 105–114; P. Desideri, “Greek Poleis and the Roman Empire: Nature and Features of Political Virtues in an Autocratic System,” in G. Roskam & L. Van der Stockt (eds.), Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011) 83.
S.-T. Teodorsson, “The Education of Rulers in Theory (Mor.) and Practice (Vitae),” in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: Moralia Themes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the Moralia (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2008) 341–342.
On the distinction between
It has been argued that Plutarch here argues against the excesses of Asianism and Atticism. See Van der Stockt, “Education and Public Speech,” 1039, with further references.
Transl. G.A. Kennedy (ed.), Aristotle: On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
See esp. J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
Transl. N. Livingstone, Athens: The City as University (London: Routledge, 2016) 74.
Ober, Mass and Elite, 165–177; J. Hesk, Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 202–241.
Transl. M.R. Dilts & G.A. Kennedy (eds.), Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire: Introduction, Text, and Translation of the Arts of Rhetoric Attributed to Anonymous Seguerianus and to Apsines of Gadara (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
For a more detailed analysis, see Oppeneer, “Grain Crisis at Prusa,” 975–998.
See e.g. Hermog. Stat. 3.7.1–3.9.8 Patillon.
The Greek text edition and English translation of Dio’s Orations 43, 46, 48 here and below, are by H.L. Crosby.
T. Whitmarsh, Ancient Greek Literature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 97, describing a similar rhetorical move by Demosthenes.
Van der Stockt, “Education and Public Speech,” 1039.
On an unaffected manner as part of the sincere style, see Hermog. Id. 2.7.1 Patillon. Cf. also Anon. Seg. 94 Patillon: “The ethos and pathos of the speaker also create persuasiveness; the ethos, he [i.e. the rhetorician Alexander] says, if it should seem unaffected (
The Greek text edition and English translation by J.W. Cohoon.
For Or. 47, see M. Cuvigny, Dion de Pruse: Discours Bithyniens (Discours 38–51) (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1994) 135. Cf. C. Bost-Pouderon, Dion Chrysostome. Trois discours aux villes: Orr. 33–35 (Salerno: Helios, 2006) 48.
For more arguments in support of this view, see T. Bekker-Nielsen’s review of C. Bost-Pouderon, Trois discours aux villes: