1 Introduction
China is a major player in climate change mitigation. In September 2016, China formally ratified the Paris Agreement.1 Four years later, President Xi Jinping announced China’s plan to further scale up its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, aiming at achieving CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.2 A central element of the plan is reducing China’s heavy reliance on coal power. As a result, China’s use of coal already saw a steady decrease between 2013 and 2018. While coal demand increased in 2019 and 2020, new coal power plants approved in 2021 declined by approximately 58% compared to 2020.3 However, the good progress in energy transition was interrupted by the power outage sprawling over 20 provinces in China in September 2021, which resulted in a U-turn in the policy. Consequently, China reversed its course of action and approved more coal power plants in the last month of 2021 than it did in the previous eleven months combined. This trend continued in 2022, with the coal power capacity approved in the first quarter of 2022 accounting for almost half of the total capacity approved in 2021.
This paper explores the reasons behind China’s policy shift, drawing from insights on the policy-making process in China’s climate change mitigation
The paper also compares the implementation of climate policies with the implementation of trade policies in China, discusses the potential consequences of constitutional and market failures due to “competition among purposes”4 at both the domestic and international levels, and offers more general observations on ways to help developing countries overcome such competition and conflicts.
2 The Evolution of China’s Climate Change Policy: a Brief Account
The development of climate policies in China has been shaped not only by China’s overarching economic development goals and plans, but also by China’s international engagements and commitments. As early as in 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment prompted China to consider environmental issues and develop its first set of environmental legislation.5 However, it was not until the 1990s that China made major progress in advancing its environmental policy and regulatory framework. In 1990, the State Council established the National Coordination Group on Climate Change (ncgcc), which subsequently participated actively in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (unced) in 1992, also known as the Earth Summit.6 This conference developed a blueprint for international cooperation on environmental and development issues and led to the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), the first international treaty on climate change.7 The Convention created the Conference of the Parties (cop) to monitor the implementation of
China’s active engagement in climate policymaking at the international level has progressively enriched its own knowledge about climate change, leading to the gradual elevation of sustainable development and climate policies to a core, strategic national policy in China. In 1998, the ncgcc was relocated to the State Development Planning Commission, the predecessor of the National Development and Reform Commission (ndrc) and the most powerful agency in the central government.11 The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) made a reference to climate change for the first time and emphasized the growth of renewable energy, energy conservation and environmental protection leading to the promulgation or amendments of a range of laws and regulations such as the Renewable Energy Law which took effect in 2006.12 However, during this period the national priority was focused on economic growth, and no specific targets were set for climate actions. Due to the heavy reliance on energy-intensive industries for economic development and industrialization, China became the world’s largest emitter of energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) in 2005.13 The environmental degradation, especially air pollution, intensified public debate over China’s environmental policy and provoked the central government to strengthen climate policy and actions in the next decade.
During the 11th Five-Year Period (2006–2010), the central government set energy efficiency targets, allocated individual targets to provinces, and required
The 12th Five Year Plan (2011–2015) was a landmark in China’s advancement of climate policy leading to a period of remarkable achievements at both domestic and international levels. The Plan set out a clear mandate to transform China’s economic development model with the transition to a green economy and a sustainable development path as one of its priorities.18 It devoted a whole chapter to climate change and set forth specific, binding targets and action plans including reducing carbon intensity and energy consumption, increasing non-fossil energy sources and government support for strategic, green industries and technologies, promoting the restructuring of the coal industry, enhancing the system for monitoring ghg emissions, planning the creation of a carbon trade market, etc.19 More detailed plans were subsequently released in a series of implementation regulations including
As a strong proponent for the Paris Agreement, China submitted its first “nationally determined contributions” (ndcs) to the unfccc in 2015, committing to specific targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions and the increase of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption, amongst other commitments.22 These targets were incorporated in China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020).23 To achieve these targets, the central government rolled out a new set of policy documents to detail the action plans and allocate targets to provinces.24 By the end of this period, CO2 emissions per unit of gdp (i.e. carbon intensity) in China were approximately 48% lower than the 2005 level (or a 40–50% reduction), and the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption was approximately 16% marking “a significant increase of 8.5 percentage points compared with 2005”.25
lower CO2 emissions per unit of gdp by over 65% from the 2005 level, to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25%, to increase the forest stock volume by 6 billion cubic meters from the 2005 level, and to bring its total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1.2 billion kilowatts by 2030.
These commitments and goals are also embedded in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025)28 and are being implemented through a range of policy documents designed to promote climate actions and compliance nationwide during the Plan period in pursuit of the “dual carbon” goals. In May 2021, the central government established a Leading Group on Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality to strengthen and better coordinate national climate policies and actions.29 Through the work of this group, China adopted a “1+N” policy system under which the “1” refers to the Working Guidance for Completely, Accurately and Comprehensively Implementing the New Development Concept and Achieving Carbon Dioxide Peak and Carbon Neutrality (hereinafter Working Guidance 2021),30 the overarching national plan jointly issued by the Central Committee
3 The Coal Energy Transition: a Closer Look
The overview of the evolution of China’s climate policy above shows that climate change has become “an integral part of China’s development vision and strategy” and that China has committed to “more ambitious action to tackle climate change.”32 At the same time, China’s climate action has faced considerable, ongoing challenges. To understand the major drivers of and challenges for China’s climate action, we use as a case study coal energy transition, which is critical to the success of China’s climate policy.
China’s phenomenal economic development and industrialization in past decades has relied heavily on energy-intensive activities leading to massive production and consumption of fossil fuels, especially coal. As the world’s largest coal user, in 2018 China’s electricity and heat generation accounted for approximately 45 percent of all domestic ghg emissions, and its heavy industrial production, particularly in the steel, iron and cement sectors, accounted for approximately 85 percent of industrial CO2 emissions.33 Energy efficiency, renewables and reduction of coal use are therefore essential to the achievement of China’s climate goals on CO2 emissions peaking and carbon neutrality.34 Consequently, China has progressively intensified its climate policy and actions in these areas leading to a significant growth of low-carbon fuel and technologies and reduction of coal use in power and industrial production (especially between 2013–2018).35 Concrete actions taken in the 13th Five-Year
There are notable driving forces behind China’s entrenched commitment to climate actions. This commitment is first and foremost a strategic choice aligned with and supportive of China’s own development goals and political needs. As Chinese leaders become increasingly convinced that the old “growth-at-any-cost model” cannot be sustained,41 energy efficiency, decarbonization and sustainability enter the centrepiece of China’s economic transformation. While economic growth remains a priority, Chinese leaders become increasingly aware of the political risks associated with growing social unrest due to environmental degradation and adverse effects of climate change.42 Thus, there is a strong political will to steer China toward the new
At the same time, China’s climate action faces acute challenges particularly due to the need to accommodate its energy needs and the diverse interest of local governments, industries, state entities and other stakeholders in implementation. Here too, China’s commitment to the reduction of coal production and consumption provides a telling example. While China took an incremental approach to reducing coal use in the past, it deviated from its coal reduction policy in September 2021, when over 20 provinces in China cut power supplies allegedly due to power outages. This in turn led to a massive approval of new coal power plants, with more approvals in the final month of 2021 than in all preceding 11 months combined.48 The effect was also felt in 2022, with coal power capacity approved in the first quarter alone equals to half of the total approved capacity in 2021.49
4 Making Sense of China’s Policy Shift: Gaps in Energy Transition and Governance
So what explains the policy shift in 2021? On the surface, here are a few apparent reasons, such as the rising demand, the insufficient supply from traditional
As noted above, China’s policymaking generally follows a top-down process whereby policies are made by the central leadership without much input from local governments or consultations with other stakeholders. This means that, at the front-end of policy making, China could avoid the tortuous bargaining process required in many other countries which often leads to the need to strike compromises that nobody is happy with, or even paralysis where the decision could not be made. This is reflected in China’s climate policymaking, where the main decision-maker is the central government, or more specifically President Xi himself.
At the domestic level, the seriousness China has attached to climate policies is a reflection of President Xi’s “New Development Concept” (新发展理念). True to the nature of Communism as an ideology, even paramount leaders have come up with new “thoughts”, from Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, to Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”, to Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development”, and finally to “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, where the “New Development Concept” is an important component. This Concept emphasizes “Innovation, Coordination, Green, Openness, Sharing” as a way to shift China’s economic model to one of a high-quality and low-pollution.51 The link between the Concept and China’s carbon goals is explicitly confirmed by the top policy document issued by the central government, i.e., the Working Guidance 2021.52 By shifting the policy in a new direction, the Concept also provides a convenient way to test the loyalty of local officials based on whether they faithfully implement the Concept, which is why the Working Guidance 2021 repeatedly refers to “compacting local responsibilities”53 and “strengthening supervision and assessment”54 under the leadership and coordination
If the raison d’être of “promoting high-level development” still stays true to climate goals at the domestic level, the main rationale for climate responsibility at the international level, i.e. “to foster an image of responsible power”, sounds even more instrumentalist.59 In particular, President Trump’s “irresponsible”60 decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement in 201761 left a vacuum in climate leadership, one which China was eager to fill as a way to “enhance China’s international influence and discourse power”.62 By
While the climate change policymaking power is monopolized by the central government, when it comes to the implementation of such policies, the central government must work together with local governments and other stakeholders such as power plants and downstream user industries. This is where things get tricky, as these players often have different incentives and therefore do not always behave the same way as the central government would prefer.
As noted earlier, after the central government set forth the overarching climate goals, it allocated specific targets to different provinces for local governments to implement. Unlike their counterparts in the West,67 the local governments in China do not have to answer to local constituencies or civil society
4.1 Last-Minute Rush to Meet the Targets
On 12 August 2021, the ndrc issued the notice on the “First half of 2021 Barometer on the completion of energy consumption dual control targets in each region”, which listed in the top warning category 9 provinces for the achievement of energy intensity reduction goals, and 8 provinces for the achievement of total energy consumption control goals.68 The ndrc also made clear that, “from the date of issuance of this notice, for regions where energy consumption intensity has risen instead of fallen, the energy-saving review of “two high” (high energy consumption, high emissions) projects will be suspended in 2021”.69 To make sure that the local governments got the message, the ndrc further issued the “Plan on the improvement of the dual control system for energy consumption intensity and total volume” on 16 September 2021,70 which explicitly stated that the assessment results for the dual control system “will be handed over to the competent department of cadres as an important basis for the comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the leadership team and leading cadres of the Provincial Government”.71
These documents spurred the provinces into quick action, especially those in the top warning category. This is most evident in the two provinces with the biggest industrial outputs, i.e., Guangdong and Jiangsu, which are both listed in the top warning categories for both targets.
4.2 Power Shortages and Incomplete Market Reform
At the same time, it is also interesting to note that the above rationale might not apply to all provinces imposing restrictions on power usages. For example, none of the three provinces in the north-eastern region were in the top warning category (red). Instead, Jilin was in the green category for both targets. For Heilongjiang and Liaoning, their energy consumption and energy intensity reduction achievements were green and yellow respectively. This means that they did not really need to cut power usages to meet the mandatory targets. Rather, they seem to have real power shortage problems, as complicated by factors such as the reduction of wind, solar and hydro power and the national shortage of coal.72
So how could there be power shortages if the market mechanism was working? Aren’t power shortages the best excuse for power plants to gear up their production and generate more power and thus more profits? The answer, it turns out, is that the market transformation is far from complete in China.
China’s power prices have traditionally been set by the government. This is also reflected in China’s wto commitments, which explicitly list prices of both electricity and heating power as one of the goods and services which may be subject to price controls.73 In 2004, in an effort to promote market reform, the government established the coal and electricity price linkage mechanism.74 Under the new system, power prices are supposed to be adjusted upward or downward depending on the coal prices in the preceding period (normally no less than 6 months). Since mid 2016, coal prices rose rapidly and stayed
This strategy seemed to have worked. Right after the nation-wide power shortages, the ndrc issued the “Notice on further deepening market-oriented reform of on-grid electricity price for coal-fired power generation”, which expanded the upper price fluctuations limit from 10% to 20%, while the transaction price of high energy-consuming enterprises was not even subject to the 20% upper limit.81 In May 2022, the central government agreed to provide state-owned coal power plants with a subsidy package totalling 100 billion Yuan, along with 30 billion Yuan of additional capital injection,82 as well as
5 Comparison with China’s Trade Policy Making
As we can see from the above discussions on China’s climate policy implementation, contrary to what might be assumed, it has not been easy to implement the policy despite China being a unitary state with a top-down power structure. This is because China is far from a monolithic entity with only one voice and one course of action. Instead, while the central government may make a policy, it might not be able to force the other actors, such as local governments and state-owned firms, to implement such policy.
This provides an interesting contrast with the implementation of China’s trade policy, where the problems are mainly at the level of central government rather than local government. This is reflected in China’s wto disputes, where most of the cases brought against China are about trade remedy measures (especially subsidies measures) and various import and export restrictions that are introduced and implemented by the central government.
On the other hand, the same problems may be observed even in the trade area when the interests of the local and central governments are not aligned with each other. The best example is the protection of intellectual property (ip) rights, where the central government has for a long time been unable to enforce the ip laws due to local protectionism that results from the lack of incentives from the local government to crack down local ip-infringing firms that provide jobs and economic growth.84 The problem was only solved after the local firms themselves became innovators, and started to pressure local governments to aggressively enforce China’s own ip laws, which is also aligned with the goals of the central government to upgrade China’s position in the value chain.85
Such misalignment of the interests of different levels of government also explains China’s negotiation positions in trade agreements. So far, most of China’s commitments in free trade agreements (ftas) have been on traditional border measures such as tariffs. This is because these issues are mainly
The conundrum China faces in implementing its climate change policies also highlights the importance of implementing more market reforms, which is often fraught with difficulties. Paradoxically, compliance with China’s trade commitments may sometimes further complicates the matter, as the “competition among purposes” between “different bodies of international law”88 might lead to absurd results. Take, for example, China’s export restrictions on rare earth, the subject matter of a high-profile wto dispute in 2012.89 Theoretically speaking, direct environmental protection measures would be more efficient than export restrictions in addressing environment problems. Yet, the lack of effective enforcement by the local governments left China with only one real option: export restrictions implemented by the central government, even though that is not the optimal policy action in theory. After the case was launched in March 2012, it was almost certain that China would lose the case
More specifically, on the relationship between climate change and trade, China has been consistently opposing the use of trade measures for climate purposes. For example, China criticises the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (cbam) as being inconsistent with wto rules and the principles and requirements of the unfccc and the Paris Agreement.93 Similarly, China refused to join the EU-led Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate when it was announced at the World Economic Forum in 2023.94 Instead, the Chinese Minister of Commerce voiced indirect disapproval of the initiative by stressing that “climate change shall be addressed through trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, rather than through trade restrictions and subsidy competition.”95 Again, China’s position partly reflects its concern that, due to the challenges it faces in effectively implementing climate policies domestically, making binding climate-oriented trade policies at the international level could severely undermine China’s policy space.
6
It has been argued that democracies might face limits in tackling climate change due to their tendencies to focus on short-term gains for their constituencies96 and their susceptibility to influences from business interests which oppose environmental policies.97 Instead, to deal with the mounting environmental challenges, authoritarianism “may become not only justifiable, but essential for the survival of humanity”.98 On the other hand, both theories have been challenged. “The limits of democracy in tackling climate change” has been partially debunked by Marina Povitkina’s study which shows that democracies do tend to emit less, and that the limits to the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are mainly due to “the presence of corrupt institutions, which obstruct coercive capacity, extractive capacity of the state, actors’ compliance, and pro-climate policy-making”.99 Similarly, Bruce Gilley notes that, while authoritarian environmentalism might be “more effective in producing policy outputs”,100 such outputs might suffer from lack of coherence, which in turn would lead to more implementation problems compared to democratic governments.101
As a typical authoritarian regime, China’s Constitution is often perceived as lacking the substance required to achieve constitutionalism, due to the lack of judicial oversight over political power, democracy in its political system, amongst other deficiencies.102 Yet, it has also been argued that despite these deficiencies, authoritarian constitutions, like China’s, do serve some standard constitutional functions, such as setting up political mechanisms and practices, facilitating coordination among major institutions, and establishing
At the international level, it has been observed that the rigid “hierarchical structure of China’s policymaking processes”111 “leaves virtually no scope for positions to be significantly adjusted on the spot during international negotiations”,112 which in turn could result in “transnational governance failures”.113 However, our discussion above shows that such “transnational governance failures” could be easily overcome when the top leader decides to make an international commitment. Nonetheless, as we can see from the abrupt policy shift in China in 2021, the much-admired efficiency of “environmental authoritarianism” in making international commitments shall not be confused with the actual implementation of such commitments. When it comes to implementation, the lack of consultation and deliberation from the relevant stakeholders often translate into the lack of understanding of the true significance of such commitments, while the lack of market and political mechanisms to allow “consumers and citizens to freely and fully engage in market-based and political transactions”114 also make it hard for the policies to be carried out as envisaged, leading instead to fits and starts, even crises.
More broadly, China’s experience with climate change and energy transition also highlights the need to not just focus on international cooperation when
- 2.Administration of the Trade Regime
- (A)Uniform Administration
- 1.The provisions of the wto Agreement and this Protocol shall apply to the entire customs territory of China, including border trade regions and minority autonomous areas, Special Economic Zones, open coastal cities, economic and technical development zones and other areas where special regimes for tariffs, taxes and regulations are established (collectively referred to as “special economic areas”).
- 2.China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local regulations, rules and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level (collectively referred to as “laws, regulations and other measures”) pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (“trips”) or the control of foreign exchange.
- 3.China’s local regulations, rules and other measures of local governments at the sub-national level shall conform to the obligations undertaken in the wto Agreement and this Protocol.
- 4.
China shall establish a mechanism under which individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national authorities cases of non-uniform application of the trade regime.
In 2014, China further stepped up the efforts to ensure local compliance with wto rules with the State Council’s “ Notice on Further Strengthening Trade Policy Compliance Work”,118 which is followed by the Ministry of Commerce (mofocm)’s “Implementation Measures for Trade Policy Compliance (Interim)”.119 The two documents give the mofcom wide-ranging power to review the “regulations, normative documents and other policy measures formulated by various departments of the State Council, local people’s governments at various levels and their departments concerning or affecting trade in goods, trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights”120 to ensure their compliance with wto rules including China’s accession commitments.121 The problem, however, is that it is still just desk review of documents and does not cover “specific administrative measures for specific administrative subjects”,122 which means that implementation is not covered. Thus, more would be needed to deal with the gap in implementation of international commitments.
7 Concluding Thoughts
China’s abrupt shift from its policy commitment to the reduction of coal use for its climate goals in 2021 provides a vivid reminder that, while climate issues are global, politics is always local. Politics is not a problem for effective implementation of climate policies in Western countries, where such policies were initially adopted in response to bottom-up demands from various local civil society groups concerned with the negative effects of climate change. However, for countries like China with a top-down decision-making process, the real challenge lies not in the formulation of climate policies but
However, the policy shift should not be seen as China retreating from its climate goals. Rather, it was a temporary deviation and short-term response to one of the worst power shortages in China, which is further complicated by the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on the Chinese economy and the Russia-Ukraine war on global energy prices and supply. Nevertheless, the challenges China faces in balancing climate actions and energy security may well continue to drive China’s incremental approach to controlling coal use and will remain a key concern in China’s pursuit of climate goals.123
In addition, this paper provides some broader insights on understanding the difficulties facing many developing countries. Their reluctance to take climate actions might not necessarily arise from a lack of willingness to undertake commitments at the international level. Rather, it is closely related to gaps in energy transition and governance at the domestic level, including effective tools to translate international commitments into implementation by local governments, and efficient markets to align the interests of different stakeholders in service of the common goal. Thus, a more productive approach to international cooperation on climate issues should involve a more sympathetic understanding of the constraints facing developing countries, and the supply of the necessary tool-box of best practices to help them address such governance deficits. This may also provide a way to help developing countries overcome short-term problems in the implementation of climate policies, which would in turn lead to a brighter future for all mankind.
Henry Gao is Professor of Law at Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University. Email: gaohenry@gmail.com.
Weihuan Zhou is Associate Professor and Co-Director of the China International Business and Economic Law (cibel) Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, unsw Sydney. Email: weihuan.zhou@unsw.edu.au. All websites cited are current as of 25 June 2023.
Brian Spegele, ‘China’s Legislature Ratifies Paris Agreement on Climate Ahead of G-20 Meeting’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2016).
cgtn, ‘Full Text: Xi Jinping’s Speech at General Debate of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’ (cgtn, 23 September 2020).
Yujie Xue, ‘China’s approvals for new coal plants rebound amid renewed focus on energy security after last year’s power crisis: Greenpeace’ (South China Morning Post, 20 July 2022).
Jorge E. Viñuales, The International Law of Energy (Cambridge University Press 2022) 28.
Tianbao Qin and Meng Zhang, ‘Development of China’s Environmental Legislation’, in Eva Sternfeld (eds), Routledge Handbook of Environmental Policy in China (Routledge 2017) 19.
Ye Qi and Tong Wu, ‘The Politics of Climate Change in China’ (2013) 4 wires Climate Change 301, 303. See also United Nations, ‘A new blueprint for international action on the environment’ (United Nations, 1992).
United Nations, ‘What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?’ (United Nations).
See United Nations, ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (United Nations, 9 May 1992) art 7.
United Nations, ‘What is the Kyoto Protocol?’ (United Nations) <
United Nations, ‘The Paris Agreement. What is the Paris Agreement?’ (United Nations).
See above Qi and Wu, ‘The Politics of Climate Change in China’ (n 6) 303.
See David Sandalow and others, ‘Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022’ (Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, 2022) 32; Qin and Zhang (n 5) 21. See also The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划纲要) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 15 March 2001); The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国可再生能源法) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 21 June 2005).
International Energy Agency, ‘An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China’ (iea, September 2021) 22.
See above Sandalow and others (n 12) 33–5.
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘China’s National Plan for Addressing Climate Change’ (中国应对气候变化国家方案) (National Development and Reform Commission, June 2007).
See above Qi and Wu, ‘The Politics of Climate Change in China’ (n 6) 303. See also The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Introduction to the National Coordination Group for Addressing Climate Change’ (China Climate Change Info-Net, 17 July 2006).
See above Sandalow and others (n 12) 34.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 16 March 2011).
For a more detailed discussion of China’s climate policy and goals under the 12th Five Year Plan, see Sam Geall and others, China’s Green Revolution: Energy, Environment and the 12th Five-Year Plan (Chinadialogue 2011).
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Working Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Control in Implementing the 12th Five-Year Plan’ (国务院关于印发“十二五”控制温室气体排放工作方案的通知) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 01 December 2011).
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘The National Plan (2014–2020) for Addressing Climate Change’ (国家发展改革委关于印发国家应对气候变化规划 (2014–2020 年)的通知) (National Development and Reform Commission, 19 September 2014).
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (强化应对气候变化行动—中国国家自主贡献) (National Development and Reform Commission, 30 June 2015).
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要) (Xinhua, 17 March 2016).
National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration, ‘The 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Energy’ (能源发展“十三五”规划) (National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration, 26 December 2016); The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Comprehensive Working Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for Implementing the 13th Five-Year Plan’ (“十三五”节能减排综合工作方案) (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 20 December 2016).
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Full Text: Responding to Climate Change: China’s Policies and Actions’ (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 27 October 2021).
See above cgtn (n 2); Xinhua, ‘Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders Summit on Climate’ (Xinhua, 22 April 2021).
Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions’ (中国落实国家自主贡献成效和新目标新举措) (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, 28 October 2021).
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 the People’s Republic of China’ (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第是十四五个规划和2035年远景目标纲要) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 13 March 2021).
See above Ministry of Ecology and Environment (n 27) 5–6.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy’ (完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念做好碳达峰碳中和工作的意见) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 22 September 2021).
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Action Plan for Reaching Carbon Dioxide Peak before 2030’ (2030年前碳达峰行动方案) (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 24 October 2021).
See above International Energy Agency (n 13) 37.
See above Sandalow and others (n 12) 45; World Bank Group, ‘Country Climate and Development Report: China’ (World Bank Group, October 2022) 26, 45.
See above Sandalow and others (n 12) 14.
Ibid 24–6.
Craig Hart and others, ‘Mapping China’s Climate & Energy Policies’ (Development Technologies International, December 2018) 86–101.
See above The State Council of China (n 31).
Ibid.
See above Ministry of Ecology and Environment (n 27) 2; Isabella Suarez and Xiaojun Wang, ‘Year Review: The Impact of China’s Ban on Overseas Coal Power Plants on Global Climate’ (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, 22 September 2022) 3.
National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration, ‘The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Modern Energy System’ (“十四五”现代能源体系规划) (National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration, 29 January 2022).
Genia Kostka, ‘China’s Local Environmental Politics’ in Eva Sternfeld (eds), Routledge Handbook of Environmental Policy in China (Routledge 2017) 31.
Ibid.
See above International Energy Agency (n 13) 35–6; Lisa Williams, ‘China’s Climate Change Policies: Actors and Drivers’ (Lowy Institute, July 2014) 16.
See above Williams (n 43) 18.
See above Hart and others (n 36) 138.
See above International Energy Agency (n 13) 35.
See above Qi and Wu (n 6) 302.
Xinnan Wang, ‘Provincial Approval on Coal Fired Power Revived after Power Rationing, Local State-Owned Capital Refilled Strongly’ (Greenpeace, 20 July 2022).
Ibid.
David Fishman, ‘Reasons Behind China’s Power Shortage in Q4 2021, Resultant Reform Measures, and the Impact on Power Markets’, (Oxford Energy Forum, March 2022, Issue 131) 13–20.
Xinhua, ‘Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy: Grasp the theory of ‘Five Inevitable Routes’ deeply and thoroughly’ (Xinhua, 14 March 2022).
See above The Central People’s Government (n 30).
Ibid.
Ibid.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Plan for the Institutional Reform of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China’ (国务院机构改革方案) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 17 March 2018).
Wang Yong, ‘Explanations on the Plan for the Institutional Reform of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China’ (关于国务院机构改革方案的说明) (Xinhua, 17 March 2018).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Zhenhua Xie, ‘Persistently Confronting Climate Change and Continuing to Involve, Contribute and Lead the Global Construction of Ecological Civilization: In the Memory of the Ratification of the Paris Agreement’ (China Environment News, 14 December 2020).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Report on the United States Prejudicing Global Environmental Governance’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 19 October 2020).
Timothy Cama and Devin Henry, ‘Trump: We Are Getting out of Paris Climate Deal’ (The Hill, 1 June 2017).
See above The Central People’s Government (n 30).
Leslie Hook and Katrina Manson, ‘US Formally Withdraws from Paris Climate Agreement’ (Financial Times, 4 November 2020).
Xinhua, ‘President Xi Jinping’s Web Conference with the US President Biden’ (Xinhua, 16 November 2021).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Sanction against Pelosi’s Sneaky Visit to Taiwan’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 August 2022).
Xinhua, ‘Facts about Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan’ (Xinhua, 25 August 2022).
Christopher Gore and Pamela Robinson, ‘Local Government Response to Climate Change: Our Last, Best Hope?’ in Henrik Selin and Stacy D VanDeveer (eds), Changing Climates in North American Politics: Institutions, Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance (mit Press 2009).
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the dual-control of energy consumption in each province in the first half of 2021’ (关于印发《 2021 年上半年各地区能耗双控目标完成情况晴雨表》的通知) (National Development and Reform Commission, 17 August 2021).
Ibid.
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Improving the plan of the dual-control of the intensity and quantity of energy consumption’ (关于印发《完善能源消费强度和总量双控制度方案》的通知) (National Development and Reform Commission, 16 September 2021).
Ibid.
Ziwen Jiang, ‘The government officially disclosed the reasons why three provinces in Northeast China were forced power rationing’ (Pengpai News, 27 September 2021).
wto, ‘Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, wt/l/432’ (wto, 23 November 2001) Annex 4.
National Energy Administration, ‘Guidance on establishing the mechanism of coal-electricity price linkage’ (关于建立煤电价格联动机制的意见的通知) (National Energy Administration, 17 August 2011).
National Bureau of Statistic, ‘Coal production increased in rehabilitation, and the industrial layout was optimized in adjustment’ (National Bureau of Statistic, 20 March 2018).
Keqiang Li, ‘2018 Government Work Report’ (2018年政府工作报告) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 05 March 2018).
Keqiang Li, ‘2019 Government Work Report’ (2019年政府工作报告) (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 05 March 2019).
Jinghua Xi, ‘The State Grid Corporation of China lost 17.8 billion yuan for the first time in its main business last year, and its profit hit a seven-year low’ (Jiemian, 16 April 2021).
Xiaoxing Liu, ‘Whether the dual-control policy of energy consumption should be responsible for power rationing?’ (China Environment News, 08 October 2021).
The State Council, ‘The State Council Information Office held a news conference on the economic operation of central enterprises in the first quarter of 2022’ (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 20 April 2022).
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Notice on deepening the marketization reform of the on-grid price generated by coal-fired power’ (关于进一步深化燃煤发电上网电价市场化改革的通知) (National Development and Reform Commission, 11 October 2021).
Zhi Li, ‘Standing Committee of the State Council: Another 50 billion yuan of renewable energy subsidies will be allocated to central power generation enterprises’ (Xinhua, 11 May 2022).
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘2023 New Year Message to Enterprises’ (Zhengfu, 22 January 2023).
Bryan Mercurio, ‘The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property in China since Accession to the wto: Progress and Retreat’ (2012) 1 China Perspectives 23, 23.
Ibid.
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea’ (China fta Network, June 2015) art 16.5; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Singapore’ (China fta Network, 23 October 2008) ch 17, art 4.
See above China-Korea fta (n 86) art 16.9; China-Singapore fta (n 86) ch17, art 7.
See above Viñuales (n 4).
wto, ‘Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, wt/ds431/ab/r’ (wto, 7 August 2014).
wto, ‘Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, wt/ds394/ab/r’ (wto, 30 January 2012).
Xinyu Mei, ‘The Dispute of Rare Earth: Short-Term Response and Radical Measures’ (Securities Times, 16 March 2012).
Shujuan Bi, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions of China’s Rare Earth Industry Accelerated’ (China United Business News, 13 July 2012).
China News, ‘China’s response to the ‘Carbon Tariff’: A contravention of both wto rules and the principles and requirements stipulated by the Paris Agreement’ (China News, 26 July 2021).
European Commission, ‘Trade and Climate: EU and partner countries launch the ‘Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate’’ (European Commission Press Corner, 19 January 2023).
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Wang Shouwen, the negotiator and deputy minister of the Ministry of Commerce, led a delegation to attend the small ministerial meeting hosted by the wto in Davos’ (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 20 January 2023).
Stephen Haggard, ‘Inflation and stabilization’ in Gerald M. Meler (ed), Politics and policy making in developing countries: perspectives on the new political economy (ics Press 1991) 233–49.
Philip Keefer, ‘Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies’ (2007) 51 American Journal of Political Science 804, 804–21.
Mark Beeson, ‘The coming of environmental authoritarianism, Environmental Politics’ (2010) 19 Environmental Politics 276, 289.
Marina Povitkina, ‘The limits of democracy in tackling climate change, Environmental Politics’ (2018) 27 Environmental Politics 411, 425.
Bruce Gilley, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to climate change’ (2012) 21 Environmental Politics 287, 287.
Ibid 297–98.
Stéphanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle, ‘Introduction: Exploring for Constitutionalism in 21st Century China’ in Stéphanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle (eds), Building Constitutionalism in China (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 1–20.
Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, ‘Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes’ in Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2013) 1–18; Ma Ji and Dini Sejko, ‘The Protection of Foreign Investment in China Constitutional Law: An Evolving Constant’ in Ngoc S. Bui, Stuart Hargreaves and Ryan Mitchell (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law in Greater China (Routledge 2023) 286–99.
Xin He, ‘The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China’ in Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2013) 259.
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (Xinhua, 22 March 2018) Preamble and art 26.
See above He (n 104) 245–64.
Xueguang Zhou, ‘The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China’ (2010) 36 Modern China 47, 57.
Ibid 64–6.
Ibid 67–73.
For a recent recap of China’s energy market reforms, see International Monetary Fund, ‘People’s Republic of China: Selected Issues’ (imf Country Reports, 10 February 2023) 51–63.
Mark Beeson, ‘Coming to Terms with the Authoritarian Alternative: The Implications and Motivations of China’s Environmental Policies’ (2018) 5 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 34, 42.
Björn Conrad, ‘China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy”’ (2012) 210 The China Quarterly 435, 443.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Pluralism, Regulatory Competition and Transnational Governance Failures.
Armin Steinbach, Constitutional economics and transnational governance failures.
For the discussion of this concept, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Armin Steinbach, ‘Neo-Liberalism, State-Capitalism and Ordo-Liberalism: “Institutional Economics” and “Constitutional Choices” in Multilevel Trade Regulation’ (2021) 22 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 1.
See above Steinbach (n 114).
See above wto n 73.
The State Council of China, ‘国务院办公厅关于进一步加强贸易政策合规工作的通知’ (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 09 June 2014).
The Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘商务部公告2014年第86号 公布《贸易政策合规工作实施办法（试行）》’ (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 15 December 2014).
Ibid art 2.
See above The State Council of China (n 118) art 2.
Ibid art 1.
Wendong Wei and others, ‘Toward carbon neutrality: Uncovering constraints on critical minerals in the Chinese power system’ (2022) 2 Fundamental Research 367.
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