This chapter examines the evolution of U.S. approaches to global economic governance, in particular with respect to international trade policy and multilateralism. We describe herein, an evolution whereby the United States has gone from being a key architect of postwar institutions of international economic policy and the rules-based international trading system to, at this moment, limited executive branch interest in negotiating reciprocal binding trade or economic agreements. Reform of the World Trade Organization (wto) has been identified as necessary, but after years of failed efforts to advance multilateral trade rounds, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the wto has grown, and the United States has blocked appointments to the top dispute settlement arm of the wto, the Appellate Body.
Following the covid-19 pandemic—which revealed both the importance of international trade and significant vulnerabilities in the supply chain—and an increase in geopolitical tensions, U.S. policy appears to have taken a meaningful pause from pursuing trade agreements.2 Current U.S. economic priorities center on covid recovery, competition with China (especially on the technology frontier), support for the clean energy transition, and dealing with a banking crises. In the first two years of the Biden administration, three major pieces of legislation were passed—the chips and Science Act,3 the Inflation Reduction Act,4 and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.5 Some estimates project over $2 trillion in federal spending over the next ten
The president and his cabinet stress the importance of homeshoring, investment nearshoring, and building supply chain resilience with like-minded allies.7 A number of restrictions have been introduced with respect to trade, investment, and technology exchange with China, with more likely.8 There is, in effect, a new formulation of what it means to “get the U.S. house in order,” and it involves more deeply integrating domestic policy and foreign policy and doing so whilst competing with China. In this landscape, in terms of international economic policy initiatives, the Biden administration has advanced the concept of a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (ipef), with novel areas of focus but no reciprocal market access.
The underlying questions that this essay considers include: Do these developments represent a temporary shift in U.S. domestic and foreign economic priorities away from international trade treaties and strategies, or are they indicative of a fundamental paradigm shift away from economic multilateralism and open markets?
We address:
- 1.a brief history of U.S. trade policy, focusing on the underlying rationales that motivated those efforts;
- 2.consideration of factors that have led to the erosion of support away from international trade agreements;
- 3.evaluation of recent U.S. trade policy;
- 4.and consideration of areas of potential future action.
At the end of this essay, we propose several policy approaches that arguably offer scope for useful, albeit incremental, steps in support of advancing governance of the international trading system.
1
Under the U.S. constitution, the regulation of international trade is a congressional power that has been, at times, delegated to the executive branch for specific purposes and requires Congressional oversight and approval. As a result, the advancement of international trade agreements between the United States and its trading partners has required both the exercise of presidential leadership and ultimately a necessary degree of congressional support. For most of the postwar period, international trade has been seen as an essential instrument of economic prosperity, a key feature of foreign policy, and an important means of advancing peace and security. Outstanding treatments of U.S. trade policy are found in the work of Douglas Irwin and I.M. Destler.9 Irwin argues that U.S. trade policy from the establishment of the republic has been aimed at achieving one of three objectives: raising revenues through duties on imports, restricting imports to protect domestic producers, and concluding reciprocity agreements to reduce trade barriers abroad and increase exports. Destler analyzes how trade politics has changed with globalization.
Advancing the economic well-being of the nation has been an important rationale for international trade agreements. As noted above, in the early days of the United States, especially in the absence of national taxing power or a unified nation, international trade (and tariffs) was a major source of revenue. The vision of trade as a driver of growth was advanced by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, the same year as the U.S. Declaration of Independence. Smith argued that in markets open to both domestic and foreign competition, when given the freedom to produce and exchange goods as they pleased (free trade), the individual’s own self-interest would promote prosperity to a greater degree than would government regulations.10 In today’s parlance, commerce was seen as positive sum, not zero sum.
International trade and market openness have proven to be crucial engines of global economic growth. Mainstream economic thinking has advanced that the countries that have achieved large reductions in poverty are generally those that have experienced rapid economic growth, which in turn has been spurred by openness to international trade. This thinking further holds that outward-looking economies are generally better able to gain from trade
Yet the value of expanding international trade is not just about economic efficiency: it has also been recognized as contributing to liberty, security, and the foreign policy objectives of states. In his magisterial work America in the World, Robert Zoellick argues that from the earliest days of independence, Americans have always viewed trade as an expression of liberty. The founders were convinced that new rules of trade could help lead to a changed international system.14
The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each other for wealth and power, or work together for security and mutual advantage … The experience of cooperation in the task of earning a living promotes both the habit and the techniques of common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence on which peace depends.15
To be sure, the United States and the other gatt signatories have always been conscious of the essential character of a sovereign state and its right to consent to any actions that impact domestic policy and the operation of domestic law. From the outset, an important characteristic of the rules of the gatt followed from the premise that the gatt was an instrument of negative rather than positive integration. In other words, countries must agree to tariff reductions or other measures, and only those agreed to (and made effective, in the United States through domestic procedures) would be binding. The gatt and its progeny were not aiming to override domestic law or force convergence of national systems, though in recent agreements, there are some rules that tug in that direction. Instead, the core rules of the gatt require signatories not to discriminate, to engage in transparent practices, and to reduce tariffs and specified barriers to trade.
The expansion of international trade and economic interdependence triggered an expansion of multilateral trade agreements. Between 1947 and 1994, there were eight successive multilateral trade rounds that extended the rule coverage from the gradual reduction of tariffs on goods to more ambitious frameworks that also included new rules governing subsidies, services trade, agriculture, intellectual property, investment, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, binding dispute settlement, and much more. As discussed in greater detail herein, the Uruguay Round, completed in 1994, represents a high water mark of trade liberalization and multilateralism. It was also controversial in the United States, and reaching a conclusion took years longer than anticipated. Fundamental to that expansion of multilateralism was the underlying recognition that in an interdependent world, there are issues that simply cannot be addressed by one country acting on its own and therefore require collective action. Moreover, in an interconnected world, policies in one country can have negative and positive externalities across national
In taking the negotiated agreements forward for congressional passage, numerous U.S. presidents have articulated the narrative that domestic prosperity requires an open trading system and engagement with the world. President William J. Clinton, in his remarks on signing the Uruguay Round Agreements, put it this way: “The end of the cold war imposes more than relief. It gives us a responsibility to finally take advantage of the interconnections that exist in the world today. … We must never run away from the world. We must go into the 21st century convinced that the only way to preserve the American dream is to be involved with the rest of the world.”19
2 The Erosion of Support for International Trade Negotiations and Treaties
The power and pervasiveness of the ideas outlined above have been fundamental to the exercise of American economic leadership. International trade policy is not just about promoting international trade for its own sake but using trade as an instrument of foreign economic policy, expanding agreements and protocols between the United States and its trading partners as tools of diplomacy. However, binding treaties with domestic effects require congressional approval and public support. Today, that support has eroded, and the debates around globalization, international trade, and a host of related issues are polarized. I would like to point to three broad conditions that have contributed to this current state of affairs: changed domestic economic conditions, the China challenge, and multilateralism in paralysis. We look at these in turn:
2.1 Changed Domestic Economic Conditions
The gains from international trade can be enormous, as mainstream economists usually point out, but the effects are diffuse. The pain of dislocations—whether caused by trade or technology—are often localized and enduring. This overall dynamic has occurred in a nation that has seen a steady rise in economic inequality over the past few decades. In the United States, the
My colleague Joseph Stiglitz argues that perhaps “the most invidious aspect of America’s inequality is that of opportunities: in the U.S. a young person’s life prospects depend heavily on the income and education of his parents, even more than in other advanced countries. The American dream is largely a myth.”22 This despair is reflected in surveys of American public attitudes. The majority of U.S. respondents in surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center say that economic conditions are helping people who are wealthy and hurting the poor and middle class. Pew surveys show that seven out of ten Americans also feel that the economic system is unfair and favors the wealthy. However, survey respondents disagree about the sources of these problems and potential solutions.23
While the picture may be unclear to most Americans, in an interconnected world, economic globalization, international trade liberalization, technological change, and China have become part of the narrative as to the forces that
2.2 The China Challenge
A second significant factor has been the rise of China and its economic and geopolitical consequences. In an astonishingly short period of time—less than three decades—China came to be a major hub of global manufacturing and exports and the world’s second largest economy. In the 1990s, when U.S. manufacturing employment contracted, the role of globalization was heavily debated, but many mainstream economists seemed to coalesce around the view that trade did not have significant negative distributional effects or cause rising wage inequality in developed economies. Instead, the expert literature tended to converge around technological advancement as the more significant factor in labor market changes.25 The last decade, however, has seen momentum build behind the idea that the surge in goods trade with China was having a bigger impact than technology on American jobs.26 Several influential studies have revealed that local labor markets exposed to low-income imports from China experienced increased unemployment, especially in manufacturing, and that labor force participation rates remained depressed and unemployment rates “elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commence[d].”27
These analyses have generated extensive economic debate as to the extent to which job losses are properly attributed to Chinese (or other) imports and
Meanwhile, U.S.-China relations have rapidly deteriorated across a host of policy areas. We should recall that commercial relations between the United States and China were once something of a ballast in the broader relationship between the two countries. China’s entry into the wto in 2001 and the reforms that accompanied it were the result of years of intensive bilateral and multilateral negotiations conducted during the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Yet over the past decade, the discourse in Washington has increasingly come to characterize trade with China as heavily disadvantageous for the United States. Official U.S. government documents now characterize China as the most serious strategic competitor faced by the United States.31
2.3 Trade Multilateralism in Paralysis?
A third factor that has contributed to the erosion of support for expanding international trade rules stems from dissatisfaction by governments with the operation of the wto and the progress of treaty-based multilateralism. Especially harsh criticism surfaced during the Trump years, when the prevailing attitude towards the wto might be expressed as: “we tried that, it hasn’t worked, time to take back the reins.”
The Uruguay Round, the last completed multilateral trade negotiation, however ambitious, did not produce a virtuous cycle of ongoing reforms. With 125 participating countries, the Uruguay Round covered areas that had not previously been subject to multilateral rules and were important for international trade flows—such as agriculture, intellectual property, services, and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements—and it created a two-tiered binding dispute settlement system. It strengthened the framework for trade relations, liberalized markets, buttressed and expanded institutional structures, and covered areas previously exempted from gatt rules. The integration of agriculture, which had been a source of intense conflict between trading partners, as well as textiles and clothing, was thought to initiate a process of ongoing reform. Economic benefits were expected to flow to both developed and developing countries. Predictability of policy and security of market access were supposed to contribute to the dynamic economic gains from the Uruguay Round. The novel inclusion of services and intellectual property under the unified international framework of trade regulation was believed at the time to be a major achievement. In brief, it was envisioned that the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements would open up new markets, reduce the scope for trade conflict and unilateralism, and create a working organization and an architecture that would be conducive to further liberalization where barriers remained.32
The Uruguay Round was also expected to usher in a period when big multilateral negotiating rounds would be less necessary, as it had created a robust “built-in agenda” for further negotiations that would maintain trade liberalization moving forward.33 By 1996, some countries were calling for further negotiations to commence.34 Yet it took until November 2001, in the shadow of the tragedy of September 11t and following the failed wto Ministerial in Seattle in 1999, with strong support and advocacy by the United States, for the wto members to launch the Doha Development Agenda (dda). As with the Uruguay Round, the negotiations were launched as a “single undertaking,”
In the United States, the president then had to press Congress to enact the Trade Act of 2002, which re-established the executive’s trade negotiating authority after it had lapsed eight years prior. While seeking congressional support, U.S. officials argued that the administration could be relied upon for pursuing market access and also vigorously enforcing U.S. trade rules. In framing the Doha agenda, U.S. officials stated that “America’s trade policies are connected to our broader economic, political and security aims.”35 President Bush was able to secure this authority for an additional five years with a very narrow margin of 215 to 212 in the House of Representatives and a vote of 64 to 34 in the Senate.36
The United States was a steadfast supporter of advancing the dda.37 Yet, multilateral negotiations proved intractable. Numerous deadlines were missed, and ministerial dialogues faltered repeatedly. By 2015, member countries acknowledged that there was insufficient consensus to keep negotiations going. The failure of the dda inescapably undermined the credibility of the multilateral system.
There is plenty of blame to ascribe to both developed and developing country members. The New York Times summed up the proceedings in an editorial as follows: neither developed economies such as the United States and Europe nor developing countries such as China and India were willing or able to make
While there were many specific issues that caused the negotiations to ultimately fail, I would also highlight an organizational feature of the wto: concluding a multilateral round with the then-147 members by consensus, as required by the rules of the wto, proved exceedingly difficult. For Europe and the United States, many of the “easier” issues had been dealt with in previous rounds; average tariff levels were quite low, and the areas under negotiation were among the most intractable. Yet developing countries were unwilling to liberalize without major concessions from developed countries. Securing a consensus of the 147 members of the wto in order to move ahead required an unattainable combination of diplomacy, coalition building, incentives, and unilateral action.
Powerful constraining undercurrents were at work: the world was still digesting the far-reaching impacts of the Uruguay Round agreements. Put differently, the rule architecture coming out of the Uruguay Round had the positive feature of being more comprehensive than past agreements, but it was tighter and had greater consequences for domestic policy choices than may have generally been understood when it was being negotiated. Moreover, coalition dynamics within the wto changed with the expansion of its membership. Meanwhile, the only part of the wto that kept steadily working was dispute settlement. Over time, the dispute settlement system itself became controversial, especially in the United States.
In hindsight, U.S. dissatisfaction with dispute settlement accelerated quickly. For a number of years after the founding of the wto, the dispute settlement system was characterized as the wto’s “crown jewel.”40 It was actively used by both developed and developing countries. Hundreds of disputes were brought to panels, and still more resolved through consultations in the shadow
U.S. frustration with a series of trade remedy, subsidy, and safeguard cases accumulated, and in 2019, the Trump administration took the extreme step of refusing to appoint new members to the Appellate Body, thereby bringing appellate review to a complete halt. It remains halted to this day. Panels continue to operate, but several cases have been appealed into the void, thereby bringing those disputes to a standstill. Since the beginning of 2022, the system has effectively stopped adopting panel reports.
3 U.S. Trade Policy under the Obama, Trump and Biden Administrations
Multilateralism has long coexisted with bilateral and regional initiatives, and the policy dynamic between these different levels of negotiations has been both competitive and reinforcing. The United States first established an fta with Israel (1985) and then, importantly, with Canada (1988); the latter was utilized to spur interest in the multilateral Uruguay Round. During the Clinton administration, then-Under Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers characterized U.S. government thinking in a succinct assertion that defined well the attitudes of the day: there should be a strong but rebuttable presumption that
This strategic interplay between multilateral, bilateral, and regional predated the Doha Round. The United States started negotiations with a number of countries around ftas as “building blocks” to multilateralism, and later characterized regional agreements as instruments to deepen ties and seek progress where possible. During the Bush administration, the United States stepped up its bilateral fta strategy and negotiated thirteen free trade agreements.43 The Obama administration attempted to advance the Doha agenda, but after narrowly securing trade promotion authority in 2015, it also turned to completing existing ftas and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) agreement.
The tpp, negotiated between twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region (not including China), was the cornerstone of the Obama administration’s economic policy in Asia and represented the largest regional trade deal in history.44 It was aimed at liberalizing trade and binding the United States and like-minded Pacific nations together with sophisticated rules that would help shape trends in the region in the face of growing Chinese influence. Characterized as “open architecture,” meaning that other countries could join if they were willing to meet the commitments, the tpp framework broke new ground in its coverage of data and digital economy, services, and state-owned enterprises. Despite having negotiated what many thought to be the “gold standard” of a trade agreement,45 the Obama administration ultimately did not submit the tpp to Congress before the 2016 election. This decision turned out to be a historic turning point in U.S. trade policy history, the legacy of which still remains very much with us today.
Often when a U.S. president inherits an unpopular trade agreement, there is an effort to make it his own by adding new features thought necessary to correct perceived deficiencies. Instead, the Trump administration quickly pulled out of tpp. However, rather than have the already-concluded tpp die, in a show of exceptional leadership, Japan took the highly unusual step of endorsing the tpp and passing it domestically, which catalyzed its passage among the other ten signatories as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (cptpp).
Interestingly, nafta, in contrast, although maligned by candidate Trump, was renegotiated during the Trump administration rather than abandoned. The heart of the revised agreement, called the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (usmca), actually kept the majority of nafta provisions in place. It included revised sunset provisions causing the agreement to expire in 2036 and required reauthorization every six years. There were also modifications to several areas, perhaps most dramatically the rules of origin pertaining to the automotive sector and the settlement provisions for investor-state disputes. The new digital provisions were akin to those contained in the tpp.
In general, President Trump, whether on the campaign trail or while in office, opposed most international treaties—he pulled out of tpp, the Paris
3.1 Bilateral and Unilateral Measures
Unsurprisingly, then, trade policy under President Trump moved significantly away from trying to strengthen institutions of global economic governance and became more unilateral. It became more confrontational than in any time since the 1980s. President Trump famously tweeted in 2018, in the context of growing tensions with China, that trade wars were “good and easy to win.”48 In several cases, he employed longstanding tools in new ways, such as using Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to attack a variety of intellectual property, investment, and discriminatory trade practices in China or invoking the national security and trade provision of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminum imported from Europe.
The actions directed at China launched a more fundamental shift in U.S. policy towards China. The Trump administration appeared to have concluded early in its tenure that the wto rules were ineffective for dealing with China’s alleged unfair trade practices.49 As a result, bilateral pressure was brought to bear. The U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, inaugurated in August 2017 a domestic 301 action against these perceived unfair Chinese trade practices. A classic trade war followed—the 301 investigation concluded that China was engaging in unfair trade practices; the United States published a list of possible Chinese imports that might be subject to increased tariffs, then imposed tariffs on some portion of those goods and threatened further sanctions; the Chinese government retaliated by imposing tariffs on some U.S. products; further escalation took place on both sides; and eventually they reached a so-called Phase 1 trade agreement. By the end of this period—which ran from 2017 through 2019—Chinese imports amounting to $350 billion were subject to increased tariffs in the United States and approximately $100 billion of U.S. imports into China were covered by increased tariffs. The Phase 1 trade agreement, signed in January 2020, promised $200 billion of additional
What has been the outcome of the U.S.-China trade war? It accelerated a shift in U.S. government policies that has now brought a number of economic policy instruments to bear in a framework that views China as a strategic competitor requiring restrictions on access to U.S. technology and other limitations on investment and commercial activity in the United States and with U.S. allies. Geopolitical developments have caused a further serious deterioration. China’s subsequent pledge of friendship with Russia on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its ongoing support (although not military, as of this writing) has changed U.S.-China relations profoundly. U.S.-China relations are now in their most strained period since normalization.
The U.S.-China trade war does not yet seem to have had many positive economic outcomes for the United States. First, the starting assumption that trade wars are “good and easy to win” proved quite mistaken. Second, the economic impact of the tariff increases was not, as asserted by the Trump administration, more harmful to China than to the United States.51 Extensive economic analysis has shown that the impact of the tariffs has been borne by U.S. consumers in the form of higher prices and that the trade war lowered aggregate real income in both the United States and China, although not by a great magnitude.52 Third, studies suggest that Chinese retaliatory tariffs were particularly targeted to Republican-leaning agricultural counties. The trade war did not pay off well for the Republican party in the 2018 congressional election, “as counties more exposed to the retaliatory tariffs reduced support for Republican candidates.”53 Fourth, studies show that quite apart from the effects of taiffs, policy uncertainty surrounding the trade war spooked the stock market. One study, for example, showed that the market dropped a cumulative 12.9% over a three-day window in the 2018–2019 period.54 By the end of 2020, the trade war
Trade conflict is not unique to tensions between the United States and China. The United States has a history of contentious trade relations with the countries with which it trades most intensively. Yet the tensions with China have characteristics that are systemic in nature. The underlying logic of U.S. actions seems to have been that the multilateral framework of the wto was simply unable to take on the crux of the Chinese economic practices of greatest concern to the United States. The affirmative use of unilateral domestic trade tools was the necessary step forward.58
3.2
As described at the outset, the Biden administration did not come into office with an emphasis on global economic governance reform or enhancement. Instead, it has focused primarily on domestic priorities while strengthening relations with U.S. allies and responding to the security crisis faced in Ukraine. The legislative measures passed on semiconductors, climate and energy transition, and infrastructure have been major priorities and achievements. Each of these major bills has significant implications for U.S. competitiveness and foreign economic policy. U.S. trade policy under the Biden administration has stressed standing up for workers’ rights, promoting sustainable environmental practices, realigning U.S.-China trade relations, and advancing initiatives and frameworks, notably the geopolitically oriented Indo-Pacific Economic Partnership (ipef).59 The administration’s tone and approach on trade with allies has been strikingly more diplomatic than that of the Trump administration. While not lifting any of the Trump tariffs on China, it has stepped up engagement with allies and countries viewed as like-minded.
ipef, negotiated between the United States and thirteen partners, stands as the Biden administration’s most significant trade policy initiative.60 Inaugurated in May 2022, ipef is organized around four pillars: fair and resilient trade (including labor, digital, and other areas), supply chain resilience, infrastructure decarbonization and clean energy, and advancing a fair economy (with a focus on taxation and anti-corruption). U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai has stressed that this is not a traditional trade agreement and will not offer signatories preferential access to the U.S. market. Many analysts see this absence of binding preferential market access features as limiting the likely impact of the agreement and the willingness of negotiating partners to make significant concessions.61 From a U.S. domestic political perspective, however, the lack of preferential access to the U.S. market improves the prospects that
In a speech on the achievements and philosophy of current U.S. trade policy, Ambassador Tai stressed that the Biden administration is ambitious and active. It is developing new mechanisms for building cooperation (such as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council), focusing on practical measures (such as trade facilitation), working on bilateral sectoral issues where possible (such as on critical minerals with Japan and sustainable steel with Europe), and enforcing existing agreements. Drawing once again on the philosophy that has underpinned foreign economic policy since the founding of the United States and that inspired the creation of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Tai concluded that “trade has an undeniable role in promoting freedom and sustaining humanity around the world.”62
Considering these remarks in the context of U.S. trade policy history, what is notable is the absence of emphasis on further trade liberalization abroad or the negotiation of binding agreements, whether regional or bilateral. American participation at the wto is not ignored but it is also not emphasized. There is a discernible philosophical throughline, in that U.S. trade policy actions are situated within the traditional themes of liberty and growth and thus suggestive of continuity. Yet at the same time, the instruments and approaches to advance those interests are the ones that can most readily be advanced through executive branch action without congressional approval. The extent to which presidential leadership and political capital is likely to be invoked remains unclear.
Since Joseph Biden came into office, political and security issues have dominated U.S.-China relations, and high-level interaction between trade officials has been very limited. U.S. policies have prioritized strengthening U.S. domestic capacity in key technology areas, limiting Chinese access to U.S. technology, and increasing domestic resilience through enhanced cooperation with like-minded countries. In these and other ways, when it comes to U.S.-China relations, economics and national security have become deeply intertwined. Senior officials have summarized the Biden administration’s China policy as “de-risking” rather than decoupling U.S.-China economic relations.63
4
This brief review of U.S. multilateralism and trade policy reveals an evolution of approaches that have consistently recognized the importance of trade for economic prosperity but now show limited pursuit of initiatives to expand institutions or rules of global economic governance.
This essay has argued that a combination of factors has contributed to this trend in U.S. policy: public discontent with trade agreements; concerns about job displacement, which is often attributed to imports; the inability of the wto and its members to advance multilateral trade agreements and address organizational infirmities; dissatisfaction with the dispute settlement system; and profound concerns about China in the global trading system and geopolitically. These all reflect a loss of confidence that the existing system is producing appropriate results in terms of its net impact on the U.S. economy.
Few members of Congress are debating the merits of multilateralism or generating ideas about how best to reform the institutions of the international economic system. Recent U.S. administrations, for their part, have not triggered such congressional debate by seeking new negotiating authority or advocating for expanded international trade frameworks. Other domestic, geopolitical and national security priorities dominate the national legislative and policy agenda.
The focus on domestic economic needs, security, the energy transition and competition on the technology frontier with China is driving the adoption of industrial policies that include, in my view, many admirable priorities including advancing U.S. science and competitiveness and the clean energy transition. Implementation and the disbursement of funds are just underway. Will recent legislation induce significant private sector investment in the United States? Will the tax measures and grants lead to major scientific advancement, accelerate ev use and production, or put a meaningful floor on the contraction of U.S. semiconductor capacity? These are among the intended outcomes. It is important to recognize that, these salutary objectives notwithstanding, recent shifts in U.S. policy might be having worrisome unintended consequences that may intensify with time. The “buy national” and other preferential features are producing friction between the United States and its trading partners. In addition, countries around the world are reacting to U.S. legislation and policy by introducing industrial policies of their own. The U.S. government has traditionally been the enforcer of international rules, challenging foreign practices when deemed discriminatory and unfair for U.S. as well as global competition. Depending on how its industrial policies come to be implemented, the United States now runs of risk of becoming, in the words of one analyst,
The environment in which U.S. foreign economic and trade policy is operating is much altered. If one believes, as I do, that maintaining and enhancing the international trading system remains important, we should ask: are there approaches that offer scope for useful, albeit incremental, steps in support of advancing governance of the international trading system? This essay concludes by identifying four areas for consideration:
First, regional policy frameworks are where further experimentation and competitive dynamics are underway. As noted above, even though the United States did not go forward with the tpp, multiple Asian countries did enter into the cptpp. The cptpp has been in effect since 2018 and recently accepted the United Kingdom as a new member.65 China has applied for membership, raising complicated and provocative issues, given the market access commitments expected of members. In Southeast Asia, some 15 countries have agreed to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (rcep). Regional policy frameworks are being established in sectoral areas including around the digital economy. New Zealand, Chile and Singapore have entered into the Digital Economic Partnership (depa), an effort to establish building blocks for the governance of digital trade and cross-border payment flows. Members of asean are now considering whether such regional digital partnership frameworks are in their collective interest. These examples of expanding trade policy frameworks suggest ongoing momentum around regionalism—with or without the participation of the United States.
The Biden administration, for its part, is advancing the ipef. Responses to the concept have been positive. Although only the general contours have been outlined, 13 countries have signed up to be part of the negotiations, which are now vigorously underway. The open question is whether these negotiations will produce meaningful cooperation frameworks that deal with real stresses in the international economic system, such as around supply chains and resiliency, in the absence of market access commitments. Countries also continue
Second, as others have argued in this volume, I too believe it is necessary to preserve the baseline of openness established by existing institutions and rules, including the wto, and to continue to seek the advancement of pragmatic approaches at the wto. There appears to be a growing debate among the wto membership about the value of so-called “joint statement initiatives,” namely methods to allow clusters of countries that agree on a set of priorities to move forward, even in the absence of consensus among all members. Progress of this kind could break a significant impasse that is now facing the wto. A number of voices are calling for more accommodation of “clubs” of various kinds that can be both inside and outside of the wto and applied to non-members on a non-discriminatory basis.67 Plurilateral agreements among coalitions of willing countries represent an avenue for potentially advancing some trade issues.
Third, we should ask ourselves if there are steps possible at the wto to identify and address sources of systemic friction.68 Identifying significant sources of friction could be part of a larger conversation around wto reform. Some of these issues may be addressable case by case; others will likely proceed only if part of a larger overall set of issues. For example, there is growing tension arising from disputes whereby a country invokes the national security exception under article xxi of the gatt. Scholars have put forward ideas around alternative mechanisms that could be created or utilized at the wto to advance transparency and accountability without invoking dispute settlement.69 Rules
Fourth, there is a need to create new forms of regulatory dialogue and consultation in frontier policy areas that currently have no institutional home. In areas including data and the digital economy and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, countries are making different domestic policy choices—whether and how to regulate—with significant cross-border consequences. Harmonious governance approaches are needed. Meaningful engagement on these and other policy areas will not only be important but likely require expertise from the private sector and ngos. As other essays in this volume have argued, more effective collaboration between governments and business executives and ngo participants may offer practical approaches to advance solutions where governments on their own cannot. The future of global economic governance will require experimentation with multi-sector collaboration.
In conclusion, these possibilities for international engagement—be it bilateral, regional, multilateral or new combinations of countries and interests—may differ from and appear more modest than the multilateral trade negotiations of earlier years. Nevertheless, each can contribute to the management of international friction and the ongoing evolution and maintenance of the global trading system. At this moment, that’s the name of the game.
Merit E. Janow is Dean Emerita and Professor of Practice, International Economic Law & Policy, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.
In a recent essay, Alan Wolff argues that trade was essential to addressing covid. Ventilators, for example, need upward of 1500 parts from some 200 suppliers located around the world. Alan Wolff, ‘The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse at the wto’ [2023].
chips and Science Act 2022.
Inflation Reduction Act 2022.
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 2021.
Justin Badlam, ‘The Inflation Reduction Act: Here’s What’s In It’ (McKinsey, October 2022) <
Joseph Biden, ‘State of the Union Address’ [2023].
EU leadership is also calling for a recalibration and de-risking of relations with China. Ursula Von der Leyen, ‘Speech by President Von Der Leyen on EU-China Relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre’ (European Commission, 20 March 2023) <
See Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing over Commerce (University of Chicago Press, 2017); I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics (University of California Press, 2005).
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Penguin, 1986).
Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, India’s Tryst with Destiny (Harper Collins, 2012).
‘Why Open Markets Matter—oecd’ (oecd) <
‘Trade has Been a Powerful Driver of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction’ (World Bank, February 2023) <
Robert B. Zoellick, America in the World (Hachette UK, 2020). After all, Zoellick observes, the U.S. revolution arose out of protests over British controls and taxes on trade. The founders wanted to change the international economic order—to foster the freedom of American states and private parties to trade as they chose. Robert B. Zoellick, ‘2019 Gabriel Silver Lecture—American Trade Policy: An Historical Perspective’ (Columbia sipa, October 2019) <
U.S. Department of State, ‘Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment’ (6 December 1945) 1–2.
Douglas A. Irwin, Genesis of the gatt (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Id.
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, ‘Preamble’ <
William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks on Signing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act’ (8 December 1994) <
‘Income Inequality has been on the Rise since the 1980s, and Continues its Upward Trajectory’ (Peter G. Person Foundation, December 2022) <
Anshu Siripurapu, ‘The U.S. Inequality Debate’ (Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 20 April 2022) <
Miles Corak, ‘Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility’ (2013) 27(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives: 79–102 <
‘70% of Americans say U.S. Economic System Unfairly Favors the Powerful’ (Pew Research Center, 9 January 2020) <
Anthea Roberts and Nicholas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization (Harvard University Press, 2021).
See, e.g., Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson, ‘Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages’ (2001) Handbook of International Trade, 146–185; Ann Harrison, John McLaren, and Margaret McMillan, ‘Recent Perspectives on Trade and Inequality’ (2011) (3)(1) Annu. Rev. Econ. 261–289.
See David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson ‘The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade’ (2016) 8(1) Annu. Rev. Econ. 205–240.
David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States’ (2013) 103(6) American Econ. Rev. 2121–2168.
Xavier Jaravel and Erick Sager, ‘What Are the Price Effects of Trade? Evidence from the U.S. and Implications for Quantitative Trade Models’ (2019) feds 1–110 (finding that Chinese import competition between 2000–2007 had pro-competitive effects on U.S. firms and generated over $202 billion in consumer benefits through lower prices); Liang Bai and Sebastian Stumpner, ‘Estimating U.S. Consumer Gains from Chinese Imports’ (2019) 1(2) American Econ. Rev. 209–224 (arguing that Chinese imports reduced inflation); Galina Hale, ‘How Much Do We Spend On Imports?’ (San Francisco Fed, January 2019) <
Daron Acemoglu, Gary Anderson, David Beede, Catherine Buffington, Eric Childress, Emin Dinlersoz, Lucia Foster, Nathan Goldschlag, John C. Haltiwanger, and Zachary Kroff, ‘Automation and the Workforce: A Firm-Level View from the 2019 Annual Business Survey’ (2022). <
Id.
‘National Security Strategy’ (The White House, October 2022) <
See, e.g., Arvind Subramanian, International Trade Policies (International Monetary Fund, 1994).
There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda, for example around services and the environment, government procurement, dispute settlement, textiles and clothing, and much more. See ‘Understanding the wto—The Uruguay Round’ (World Trade Organization, 1994) <
See
Robert Zoellick. ‘Unleashing the Trade Winds: A Building Block Approach’ (2003) 8(1) Elec. J. of the U.S. Dep’t of State.
The Trade Promotion Authority (tpa) expired in July 2007 but remained in effect for agreements that were already under negotiation until their passage in 2011. President Barack Obama was able to secure a third renewal in June 2015.
In a joint statement, Ambassador Robert Zoellick and U.S. Agriculture Secretary stated: “The United States believes that this great worldwide venture needs to target grand trade goals: to slash agricultural subsidies and tariffs; to eliminate tariffs on industrial and consumer goods; and to vastly expand opportunities for the fast-emerging services trade. U.S. proposals have backed this vision of global openness, growth and development with bold offers, demonstrating concretely what actions the United States will take to open markets if others join with us.” Robert B. Zoellick, ‘Statement on the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations’ (March 31, 2023) <
‘Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round’ (New York Times, 1 January 2016)<
Susan Schwab, ‘After Doha’ (Foreign Affairs, April 2011) <
‘wto Disputes Reach 400 Mark’ (World Trade Organization, 6 November, 2009) <
‘Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the wto Dispute Settlement Body’ (United States Trade Representative) <
C.f., Lawrence Summers. ‘Regionalism and the World Trading System’ (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 1991); see also, James K. Galbraith, ‘The 1994 Council of Economic Advisers Report: A Review’ (1994) 37(3) Challenge 12–16.
‘The Bush Record—Fact Sheet: President Bush Expanded and Enforced Trade Agreements to Open New Markets for American Products’ (The White House, December 2008) <
Members included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. The United States already had bilateral ftas with a number of these countries.
According to Secretary Hilary Clinton, “This tpp sets the gold standard in trade agreements to open free, transparent, fair trade, the kind of environment that has the rule of law and a level playing field.” Ian Kullgren, ‘Yes Clinton Did Call tpp the ‘Gold Standard’’ (Politico, October 2016) <
Emily Stephenson and Amanda Becker, ‘Trump Vows to Reopen, or Toss, nafta Pact with Canada and Mexico’ (Reuters, June 2016) <
Bruce Stokes, ‘Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, See Free Trade Deals as Bad for U.S.’ (Pew Research Center, March 2016) <
Donald J. Trump, Twitter. 2 March 2018. “When a country is losing many billions of dollars on trade with virtually every country it does business with, trade wars are good and easy to win.” <
‘Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 22 March, 2018) <
Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, ‘The Economic Impacts of the U.S.-China Trade War’ (2021) 14(1) Ann. Rev. of Econ. 205–228.
See Mary Amiti, Stephen Redding, and David Weinstein, ‘Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective’ (National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2020).
See Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, ‘The Economic Impacts of the U.S.-China Trade War’ (2021) 14(1) Ann. Rev. of Econ. 205–228. For a comprehensive analysis of the trade war, see Chad P. Bown, ‘The U.S.-China Trade War and Phase One Agreement’ (2021) <
Id. at 208. See also Emily Blanchard, Chad Bown, and Davin Chor, ‘Did Trump’s Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?’ (National Bureau for Economic Research, March 2019).
Mary Amiti, Sang Hoon Kong, and David Weinstein, ‘Trade Protection, Stock-Market Returns, and Welfare’ (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2021).
Id.
Chad P. Bown, ‘China Bought None of the Extra $200 Billion of U.S. Exports in Trump’s Trade Deal’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2022) <
In 2022, about 19% of U.S. agriculture exports went to China (up from 14% in 2017), while China’s import share from the United States fell from 27 to 18 percent of total agricultural imports. See Chad P. Bown and Yilin Wang, ‘China is Becoming Less Dependent on American Farmers, but U.S. Export Dependence on China Remains High’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2023) <
Moreover, the trade tools were soon coupled with new limitations to foreign investment and technology restrictions aimed at curtailing Chinese access to U.S. technology and forcing selective economic disengagement given China’s increasing role as a strategic rival of the United States. See Mark Wu, ‘China’s Rise and the Growing Doubts Over Multilateralism’ in Meredith Crowley, Trade War (Vox EU, 2019). In the same volume, it is argued in essence that “long-term changes in the relative positions of the U.S. and China in the world economy are the deep drivers behind the eruption of the U.S.-China trade conflict.” Crowley summarizes the views in the volume that a global hegemon will underwrite a rules-based system when the benefits of openness vastly exceed the costs but “as the hegemon’s power begins to be challenged by the rise of a major competitor, the advantages of a rules-based system wane relative to the gains that can be achieved through power-based bilateral bargaining.” See also, Aaditya Mattoo and Robert W. Staiger, ‘Trade Wars: What Do They Mean? Why are They Happening Now? What are the Costs?’ (2021) 35(103), Econ. Pol’y 561–584 (noting why the United States moved away from multilateralism).
See ‘ustr Releases President Biden’s 2023 Trade Policy Agenda and 2022 Annual Report’ (United States Trade Representative, March 2023) <
ipef partners include Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Mary Lovely, ‘The Trouble with Trans-Pacific Trade’ (Foreign Affairs, January 2023) <
‘Remarks by Ambassador Katherine Tai at American University Washington College of Law’ (United States Trade Representative, April 2023) <
‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership’ (The White House, 27 April 2023) <
See Adam Posen, ‘Why Current U.S. Industrial Policy is not Just Misguided but Likely to Backfire’ (Foreign Policy, Spring 2023).
‘Britain Becomes First European Member of Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development, April 2023) <
Philippines is reported to have asked the United States to enter into negotiations for an fta. ‘The Philippines calls for fta’ (Inside UStrade.com, 25 April 2023).
Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Preventing the Bad from Getting Worse: The End of the World (Trade Organization) As We Know It?’ (2020) Eur. Int’l Law Rev.
Unlike the Trump administration, the tone of the Biden administration on the future of the wto is diplomatic and engaged. This current U.S. posture contributed to a reasonably successful trade ministerial in 2022. Only recently has the US put forward the broad outlines of a proposal on dispute settlement reform. Comprehensive reform of the wto will surface many intractable issues. It is important to identify areas where reform is needed and those that are creating friction that threatens the very viability or existence of the institution.
A creative proposal has been advanced by Bernard Hoekman, Petros Mavroidis and Douglas Nelson that the wto create a new policy platform for governments to enhance transparency and consider national security-motivated actions with trade impacts. The authors argue that the purpose of such a forum is not to challenge the invocation of national security but to assess such invocations and find an alternative to dispute settlement. See Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Douglas R. Nelson. ‘Geopolitical Competition, Globalization and wto Reform’ (World Economy, February 2023).
‘70% of Americans say U.S. Economic System Unfairly Favors the Powerful’ (Pew Research Center, 9 January 2020).
‘Britain Becomes First European Member of Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development, April 2023).
‘Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 22 March, 2018).
‘Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round’ (New York Times, 1 January 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-trade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html.
‘Income Inequality has been on the Rise since the 1980s, and Continues its Upward Trajectory’ (Peter G. Person Foundation, December 2022).
‘Remarks by Ambassador Katherine Tai at American University Washington College of Law’ (United States Trade Representative, April 2023).
‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership’ (The White House, 27 April 2023).
‘Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the wto Dispute Settlement Body’ (United States Trade Representative) <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/january/statements-united-states-meeting-wto-dispute-settlement-body.
‘The Bush Record—Fact Sheet: President Bush Expanded and Enforced Trade Agreements to Open New Markets for American Products’ (The White House, December 2008).
‘Trade has Been a Powerful Driver of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction’ (World Bank, February 2023) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/brief/trade-has-been-a-powerful-driver-of-economic-development-and-poverty-reduction>.
‘Trust in America: How do Americans View Economic Inequality?’ (Pew Research Center, 5 January 2022).
‘Understanding the wto—The Uruguay Round’ (World Trade Organization, 1994).
‘ustr Releases President Biden’s 2023 Trade Policy Agenda and 2022 Annual Report’ (United States Trade Representative, March 2023).
‘Why Open Markets Matter—oecd’ (oecd ) <https://www.oecd.org/trade/understanding-the-global-trading-system/why-open-markets-matter/>.
‘World Trade Review’ (World Trade Organization, July 2022).
‘wto Disputes Reach 400 Mark’ (World Trade Organization, 6 November, 2009).
Amiti, Mary, Sang Hoon Kong, and David Weinstein, ‘Trade Protection, Stock-Market Returns, and Welfare’ (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2021).
Amiti, Mary, Stephen Redding, and David Weinstein, ‘Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective’ (National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2020).
Autor, David, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson ‘The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade’-2016 8(1) Annu. Rev. Econ.
Autor, David, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States’-2013 103(6) American Econ. Rev.
Badlam, Justin ‘The Inflation Reduction Act: Here’s What’s In It’ (McKinsey, October 2022)<https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it>.
Bai Liang and Sebastian Stumpner, ‘Estimating U.S. Consumer Gains from Chinese Imports’ (2019) 1(2) American Econ. Rev.
Bhagwati Jagdish and Arvind Panagariya, India’s Tryst with Destiny (Harper Collins, 2012).
Biden, Joseph ‘State of the Union Address’ [2023].
Blanchard, Emily, Chad Bown, and Davin Chor, ‘Did Trump’s Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?’ (National Bureau for Economic Research, March 2019).
Bown, Chad and Yilin Wang, ‘China is Becoming Less Dependent on American Farmers, but U.S. Export Dependence on China Remains High’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2023).
Bown, Chad, ‘China Bought None of the Extra 200 Billion of U.S. Exports in Trump’s Trade Deal’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2022).
Bown, Chad, ‘The U.S.-China Trade War and Phase One Agreement’-2021.
Clinton, William, ‘Remarks on Signing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act’ (8 December 1994).
Corak, Miles ‘Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility’ (2013) 27(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Crowley, Meredith Trade War (Vox EU, 2019).
Department U.S. of State, ‘Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment’ (6 December 1945).
Destler, I.M. American Trade Politics (University of California Press, 2005).
Fajgelbaum Pablo and Amit Khandelwal, ‘The Economic Impacts of the U.S.-China Trade War’-2021 14(1) Ann. Rev. of Econ.
Feenstra, Robert and Gordon H. Hanson, ‘Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages’-2001 Handbook of International Trade.
Galbraith, James, ‘The 1994 Council of Economic Advisers Report: A Review’ (1994) 37(3) Challenge.
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, ‘Preamble’ <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_preamble_gatt47.pdf>.
Harrison, Ann, John McLaren, and Margaret McMillan, ‘Recent Perspectives on Trade and Inequality’ – 2011 (3)(1) Annu. Rev. Econ.
Hoekman, Bernard and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Preventing the Bad from Getting Worse: The End of the World (Trade Organization) As We Know It?’ (2020) Eur. Int’l Law Rev.
Hoekman, Bernard, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Douglas R. Nelson. ‘Geopolitical Competition, Globalization and wto Reform’ (World Economy, February 2023).
Inflation Reduction Act 2022.
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 2021.
Irwin, Douglas, Genesis of the gatt (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Irwin, Douglas, Clashing over Commerce (University of Chicago Press, 2017).
Jaravel Xavier and Erick Sager, ‘What Are the Price Effects of Trade? Evidence from the U.S. and Implications for Quantitative Trade Models’ (2019) feds.
Kullgren, Ian ‘Yes Clinton Did Call tpp the ‘Gold Standard’’ (Politico, October 2016).
Lovely, Mary ‘The Trouble with Trans-Pacific Trade’ (Foreign Affairs, January 2023).
Mattoo Aaditya and Robert W. Staiger, ‘Trade Wars: What Do They Mean? Why are They Happening Now? What are the Costs?’-2021 35(103), Econ. Pol’y.
Posen, Adam ‘Why Current U.S. Industrial Policy is not Just Misguided but Likely to Backfire’ (Foreign Policy, Spring 2023).
Roberts, Anthea and Nicholas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization (Harvard University Press, 2021).
Schwab, Susan ‘After Doha’ (Foreign Affairs, April 2011) <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/after-doha.
Siripurapu, Anshu ‘The U.S. Inequality Debate’ (Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 20 April 2022).
Smith, The Adam Wealth of Nations (Penguin, 1986).
Stephenson, Emily and Amanda Becker, ‘Trump Vows to Reopen, or Toss, nafta Pact with Canada and Mexico’ (Reuters, June 2016).
Steverman, Ben ‘America’s Inequality Problem Just Improved for the First Time in a Generation’ (Bloomberg, June 2022) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-06-08/us-income-inequality-fell-during-the-covid-pandemic.
Stokes, Bruce ‘Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, See Free Trade Deals as Bad for U.S.’ (Pew Research Center, March 2016).
Subramanian, Arvind, International Trade Policies (International Monetary Fund, 1994).
Summers, Lawrence ‘Regionalism and the World Trading System’ (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 1991).
Trump, Donald, Twitter. 2 March 2018.
Von Ursula der Leyen, ‘Speech by President Von Der Leyen on EU-China Relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre’ (European Commission, 20 March 2023).
Wolff, Alan, ‘The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse at the wto’ [2023].
Zoellick, Robert, ‘Unleashing the Trade Winds: A Building Block Approach’-2003 8(1) Elec. J. of the U.S. Dep’t of State.
Zoellick, Robert, America in the World (Hachette UK, 2020).
Zoellick, Robert, ‘2019 Gabriel Silver Lecture—American Trade Policy: An Historical Perspective’ (Columbia sipa, October 2019).
Zoellick, Robert, ‘Statement on the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations’ (March 31, 2023).