1 Introduction

Ever since the late African philosopher, Odera Oruka, put forward his concept of philosophic sagacity as an authentic African philosophy (Oruka 1983, 1990), widespread discussion on this position has given it such authority that it is proposed as one of the most reliable sources of African knowledges (Mosima 2016). Perhaps owing to the influence of Paul Radin (1927) and his gender-restrictive reference to “man” in the discovery of African knowledges, Oruka and his followers, save for one female sage, Peris Njuhi Muthoni, seem to have excluded women from the category of sages (Presbey 2021: 2).

Thus, despite the possible existence of many female powerhouses of wisdom in Africa, and despite the global push for equal opportunities and recognition for women, the sage philosophy project is still predominantly chauvinistic. Though some recent works in African philosophy are interrogating the marginalization of women in African intellectual history (Chimakonam 2018; Matolino 2018) and the possibility of feminizing epistemologies in African gender studies (Amadiume 2005; Marcano 2010; Oyewùmí 2011), the generation, documentation and analysis of a corpus on female sages has yet to gain serious academic attention. A few works have expressed the possibility of an inclusive sagacity project that involves female sages in knowledge production and ideation (Mosima 2018; Presbey 2000, 2012, 2018, 2021). However, a fundamental shortcoming in these works is the lack of empirical data on the life and times, influences and reflective corpus of ideas and wisdom creditable to such female sages. Thus, the female sage is still significantly marginalized in a predominantly male-dominated space of indigenous knowledges.

The project on which this paper is based sets out to explore the nature and value of feminine wisdom in an agenda-setting manner, seeking to investigate the possibility of women sages, the nature and content of the form of knowledge they produce and the value of such knowledges to contemporary Africa and the world at large. The research also unpacks the multiple ways of knowledge production, characterization, transmission and recognition through heuristic investigation of the epistemic agency of female sages, until now ignored in the documentation of indigenous knowledges. Since ideas, knowledges and wisdom are purveyors of civilization and societal development, reconfiguring the scales of indigenous knowledges and wisdom through female agency is pivotal in holistically deploying indigenous knowledges, practices and wisdom to expand Africa’s epistemic space.

The research is significant because, by investigating women’s epistemic powers and feminine wisdom, it counterbalances the privileged masculinity accorded to the epistemic enterprise and promises to provide another perspective to the male-dominated production, management and dissemination system of indigenous knowledges in Africa. In this way, this chapter contributes to the literature on feminism, gender studies and related fields. Drawing insight from Pius Mosima’s (2016–2018) critical postmodernist analysis of philosophic sagacity, this chapter maintains that Oruka’s sage philosophy project is founded on a hegemonic Western ratio socially situated in a patriarchal cultural setting. As a result, it does not accommodate female epistemic agents as candidates for philosophic sagacity.

Oruka’s Sage Philosophy Project leaves open gaps in the articulation of what wisdom entails and who is wise. Although he insisted that being a philosopher and being wise were mutually exclusive, he made ratiocination (as abstract reasoning) a condition for philosophic sagacity. Furthermore, notwithstanding his submission on candidates for philosophic sagacity, there seems to have been a deliberate exclusion of female agency in the entire project as Presbey rightly observed (Presbey 2012: 117). A gender-sensitive reading of the mechanics of the project reveals that “all named student assistants are male (Oruka 1991: Acknowledgements). Of 12 sages whose interviews are quoted at length in the book Sage Philosophy (1991), only one is a woman. In an earlier part of the book, where Odera Oruka gives brief excerpts of interviews with eight sages, all these are also men (Oruka 1991: 37–40). Nine sages asked about equality of the sexes were all men (Presbey 2012: 117). We wonder if this seemingly embarrassing oversights are not premeditated or rooted in the masculinist mindset to pave way for a position that both panders to the philosophical tradition of a colonial knowledge system and entrenches a patriarchal epistemic order.

In spite of the oversights, we agree with Oruka not only that philosophy should be sought in sagacity but also that what sagacity entails should not be dictated in advance. We hold that the concept of women as sages is rooted in the idea that women have a unique and valuable perspective on the world that has been historically overlooked and undervalued, albeit by agencies of patriarchy and colonial heritage. What informs this position is our assumption that since wisdom pertains to practical understanding of quotidian dealings, sagacious knowledge “is not esoteric, for it is within everyone’s reach; nor does it require a special skill or talent (Kekes 1983: 280). Furthermore, in view of the fact that phronesis, a Greek term which translates as “practical understanding” or “prudence in everyday dealings”, is a veritable correlate of wisdom, this paper argues that female sages indeed exist in contemporary African societies.

In furthering the reflection for this chapter, two assumptions foreground our conceptualization of knowledge. One is the philosophy of difference, a fundamental principle of which is the engagement with marginal issues in mainstream philosophical traditions, examination of constitutive exclusions and appraisal of deviations from the hegemonic norm in philosophical scholarship (Imafidon 2020). The other assumption contemplates the ontogenesis of knowledge from the postmodern theorizing in Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome epistemological model, which envisions theories and research works that allow for multiple, non-hierarchical entry and exit points in data representation and interpretation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 6–10). It also adopts the neo-African epistemic temperament of insurgent and resurgent decolonization (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018, 2021). Methodologically, it adopts an African phenomenological approach (Olivier, Lamola and Sands 2023), which studies the phenomena of African lived experiences by letting the expressions of these women’s lived experiences be “seen” in the way they are.

In light of these assumptions, knowledges cannot be conceptualized in advance because knowledge can take any form in so far as it is an individual’s description of a reality experienced or witnessed, a proposition of an idea emanating from one’s interiority, or an expression of an embedded feeling or culturally transmitted mentality. By decentring the canons of philosophic knowledge that arise from colonial intellectual heritage, namely the thinking that knowledge could be acquired only through rational inquiry from the colonial library, this chapter calls for unthinking the ways in which Africa has been constructed and represented in the past, and creating new ways of knowing Africa from the inside out (Okeregbe 2018; Hountondji 2009). In this way, it not only “shows that studying knowledge and forms of knowing implies exploring forms of unknowing and ignorance” (Hoeyer and Winthereik 2022: 217) but also that thinking shifts with new experiences, new encounters and new awakenings. Thus, this chapter resonates with the theme “thinking as moving”, by translocating the context of female epistemic agency from the imperial citadel of the colonial academe to the self-created sphere of ownness of the African woman.

This work contributes to feminism, gender studies and related fields by challenging female epistemic marginalization, creating a space for women’s voices to be heard and valued in the creation of knowledge. By centring the experiences and perspectives of women, and by availing space for women to express their thoughts about their experiences in all their rawness and modest authenticity, this chapter aims to create a more inclusive and just epistemic regime.

2 Field Trip Findings

Adopting a similar (not necessarily identical) research approach to the one used by Oruka in carrying out his Sage Philosophy Project, we purposively made the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria our research area. These zones are the North West, North Central, North East, South West, South South and South East. We thereafter randomly selected communities in each of these six geopolitical zones from which female sages could be identified. We further built on this mapping process by carrying out surveys and interviews in these locations with the aim of identifying female sages across certain age brackets. Importantly, the choice of the six geopolitical zones in modern day Nigeria was to discover and advance the multiplicity and relationality of knowledges among female sages, knowing that these zones may not be culturally homogenous. We restricted the age bracket (to 50 and 80) to ensure that respondents had not been influenced by formal school education, among other influences. This transethnic cultural survey, which formed the primary method of data gathering, was necessary to provide content to the research, even as it expressed the multiple nature of knowledge.

For even distribution, nine to 12 randomly selected respondents from each of the six geopolitical zones were interviewed. A provincial state was also randomly selected from a geopolitical zone, and three communities were isolated in that provincial state for the study. In each of these three communities, three to four respondents were interviewed. In all, 66 potential female sages were interviewed individually, using open ended questions for critical conversation. They reflected multiplicity and diversity in terms of the sampled local government areas (LGA s), religious orientation, age grade, educational status, professions and roles in the community. Although the respondents were chosen based on community recommendations, their availability and their interest in participating in the project, the team experienced serious resistance from some members of the communities and some of the identified potential female sages, who expressed concerns about exploitation.¹ Since knowledge production presupposes some relationship between the researcher and the researched, the notion of positionality (namely, indicators of contexts and relational locations such as nationality, race, class, education, epistemological perspectives and philosophical orientations) is a consideration in the value accorded the knowledge produced (Anyidoho 2008: 28). Often, there is the misunderstanding (emanating from past anthropological research works) that field research borders on extractivism, and thus researchers are seen as harvesters of encrypted knowledge of some cults or secret societies. Because our research project interviewed mainly elderly women, there was the tendency to think that way too. However, when we explained our motivations for the project, the respondents became favourably disposed towards it.

Given the political situation in certain parts of the country, the women had to be constantly reassured that this project was purely academic in nature and would not be used for political purposes. In one provincial state, the political tension in some communities was so intense that we were asked to remove our facemasks while moving around, to avoid drawing attention. This was shortly after the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown, and the ban had been lifted in some states on the wearing of facemasks. Apparently, like other areas far from the state capital, this town paid little heed to wearing a mask. Thus, our masked appearance gave us away as “outsiders”.

The administration of the consent procedures before the interview sessions, difficult as it was in some instances, allayed concerns and fears over exploitation, and the prima facie lack of trust in “strangers” seeking indigenous knowledge from the “natives”. Besides, when they realized that we were seeking women’s perspectives on being and existence for academic and educational purposes, some connection was established. For the fieldwork, the principal investigator worked with a female research assistant, and both were accompanied by two pre-established field assistants (one of whom had to be female) who also acted as translators in some cases. The gender balance created an auspicious environment for interviews of this nature to run smoothly. Largely, the respondents spoke in their native language, but in communities where language posed a barrier in communication, the researchers relied on the translators. After a series of focus group discussions, the number of sages was pruned to nine.

3 Criteria for Sagacity

By referring to “some sages” Oruka meant sages whose intellectual activities did not qualify as philosophic sagacity. Sages in this category appear in the works of Sodipo and Barry Hallen (Hallen and Sodipo 1986), and include Ogotemmeli, Marcel Griaule’s interlocutor (Griaule 1975). According to Oruka, their activities qualified as culture philosophy at best (Oruka 1991: 52). Culture philosophy, according to Oruka, indicates the underlying ideas and beliefs of a culture seen in one totalizing repertoire as its mythos or folk wisdom. Familiarity with a culture philosophy or folk wisdom presupposes allegiance to that culture. On the other hand, philosophic sagacity is the outcome of the re-evaluation of culture philosophy, a critical assessment of communal beliefs. In the words of Oruka, “using the power of reason rather than celebrated beliefs of the communal consensus and explanation, the sage philosopher produces a system within a system, an order within an order” (Oruka 1991: 52). In other words, whereas culture philosophy, which is philosophy of the first order, absolutizes and glorifies the truth claims of a culture, philosophic sagacity is a second-order scion sprouted from the first order, through the rigours of ratiocinative scrutiny or open-minded, rational scepticism. In carrying out his epistemic quest, the sage philosopher acts as an individual, for it seems that only as an individual would the sage be able to transcend communal philosophizing.

Pius Mosima, who has extensively and productively engaged with Oruka and his philosophic sagacity, explains why Oruka was fascinated with the individual as the quintessential philosopher. He asserts that this rests on Oruka’s thinking that “in a modern context, the individual is the subject, the author. He is the one who produces books, articles, and pamphlets” (Mosima 2016: 115). Moreover, being a specialist, the individual as a philosopher “has a superior position to educate, instil moral values or enlighten the reader, who is not held in high regard”. All this is because the individual philosopher is supposed to have “privileged access to truth, reason, and scientific knowledge” (ibid.).

4 The Reality of Women as Sages

Given the criteria put forward by Oruka, are there female philosophic sages in Nigeria? To ascertain whether or not our respondents were candidates for philosophic sagacity, we posed some ontological questions to them, such as whether God existed, and considered their responses.

Gladys Okpoagu was a 77-year-old widow who was educated up to Standard Five. A Christian and trader by profession, Madam Gladys, at the time of this interview, had just relinquished her position as Woman Chairlady of the Umuduru Akwakuma/Okporo community in Orlu, Imo State. Barring the infelicities associated with conducting interviews with an interpreter, these were her responses.

5 Female Sages as Non-candidates for Orukan Philosophic Sagacity

From the Orukan standpoint, given that these women fulfilled other conditions for being sages, the question remains whether the postulations they made or the sage views expressed were philosophic in the sense of being critical. Did these female sages think or know that they were sages? Were they deliberate, conscious philosophic sages? As Oruka and his team asserted that to be critical as a philosophic sage demands that the sage in question subjects communal consensus, prevalent worldviews and established positions to ratiocinative scrutiny. Oruka also seemed to suggest, by his emphasis on this demonstration of critical individuality, that the operative virtue of the philosopher sage is the ability to be continually critical.

If the above is the case, since the women who responded to the questions seemed devoid of perceptible criticality by Oruka’s standards it follows that they do not qualify as philosophic sages in the Orukan sense. Many of them neither problematized their treatment of questions raised nor engaged the interlocutors in the polemical manner popularized by the analytic tradition, for which many anglophone philosophical traditions are known. This position should not go unquestioned because it calls for critical engagement with the Orukan criteria for sagacity in their axiological underpinning and methodological stance.

6 Analysis: Patriarchal Forces in Female Knowledge Production

Generally, female sages within the age brackets interviewed tended to adhere to the dictates of their traditional cultures when expressing views about self, nature and society, notwithstanding their religious affiliations as Christians, Muslims and Orisa adherents. Though such views may be critical of folk wisdom, they expressed them with a subtlety and caution that would not upset the epistemic balance of their respective Indigenous cultures. However, it is worth considering that this ability to maintain such epistemic integrity, though suggestive of the level of practical wisdom that these sages possessed, subsists on patriarchy.

The prevalence of patriarchy reveals certain modes of relationality between the activities of these sages and the cultural environment from which their philosophic or sagacious postulations emanate. As used here, modes of relationality refers to the various forms, qualities and outcomes of relating. It entails both the presence and absence of relating (Spies and Seesemann 2016: 136) as well as the overall philosophical underpinning of relationality (Powell 2013). The epistemic modes of relationality, among other things, concern the axiology and politics of knowledge production as well as the structures, historicities and the social networks associated with it. In analyzing the statements of the female sages, we identify the following modes of relationality: control, suppression and acquiescence.

7 Deviation from the Orukan Sense

In her reaction to this criticism, Presbey (2017), who suggests that Oruka intended by action and later works that sage philosophy be a future-oriented and continuous self-evaluating project, agrees that it was misleading of Mosima to review Oruka’s sagacious philosophy in this light. According to her, Oruka, in a continuous evaluation of his project, engaged in interviews with “sages on a variety of topics like natural family planning”, while paying careful attention to “concepts of home, family relations, burial practices, and religious beliefs and practices” (Presbey 2017: 89). The point is that Oruka himself, in expanding his idea of sagacity, did not restrict the activity of the sages to the scrutiny of abstract thought, he also accommodated postulations on existential conditions and practical mundane living as subjects for sage philosophy. Wisdom, therefore, entails not only the capacity for critical evaluation of concepts or ratiocinative inquiry but also profound articulation of living experiences. If this is the case, then it deviates from Oruka’s original position that merely tends to create an alter Socrates out of the philosophic sages.

8 Towards “Feminine Wisdom”

In the light of this revised Orukan position, we can speak of another kind of sagacity, one that need not be entrapped by pre-established male-dominated canons. Although the responses of our sages might seem pedestrian in the original Orukan sense or to any essentialist philosophical tendency, on careful and discerning analysis they express a peculiar kind of sagaciousness about being and nature. They are open to some sense of sagacity that may be “feminine” on the basis of being different. This difference is evident in the knowledge production universe, where women are subjected to both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice on the basis of their ontological relegation as intellectually weak and inscrutable on account of their gender (Eyo and Obioha 2022: 145; Fricker 2007: 1). These experiences of epistemic injustice tend to engender a broader outlook on existence which appears different, if not strange, to a male-dominated order, thus opening up new insights into sagacious reasoning. Indeed, women have the capacity to contemplate some mystery about their being in a way that eludes masculine rationality.

Furthermore, in a postmodernist world characterized by multiform narratives and multiperspectival existential standpoints, it is scholarly inelegant to impose non-negotiated standards and methodologies as canons of what philosophy is and how to go about African philosophy following the form of philosophic sagacity. Whereas for the older generation, sagacity is contemplated in the context of suppression, acquiescence and control of female epistemic agency, knowledge production for the educated, Westernized younger generation includes protests and counternarratives through forceful constructive dialogue and negotiated management of epistemic spaces. This is why Oluwole’s submission on the extrarational nature of African philosophy is instructive in appreciating feminine wisdom. In one of her proverbial submissions, Oluwole avers: “Bi a ba non gongo ogbon si nkan, ti ko ba to o, ki a fi were die ti ese” (If reason is stretched to its limit, then folly becomes inevitable) (Oluwole 1997b: 39).

The “little madness” implied by the proverb is suggestive of the manifold nature of sagacious activities. Feminine wisdom, or the epistemic activity of female sages, may come in any form in so far as the agencies deployed lead to new ways of knowing or viewing African experiences. For instance, while the sages’ submissions on the origin and cause of being lack the rigorous explication of concepts found in textbooks, their recourse to self-affirmation is noteworthy. By providing grounds for the existence of God based on their expression of interior experiences as mothers or child-bearers, their position complements other forms of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. Furthermore, the reality of consensual knowledge production in this age of globalization abhors any purist or totalizing conception of an African philosophical position.

9 Conclusion

By using sage philosophy as an example to highlight the dominance of patriarchal forces in female knowledge production, this paper encourages a movement towards female sagacious philosophizing. It is a call for female academic philosophers to interrogate whatever toxic masculinities hamper female epistemic agencies. However, we are aware of, and hamstrung by, the fact that there is a gender imbalance in the discourse on philosophic sagacity. Considering Presbey’s review of the work on marginalization of African women in philosophical discourse, which questions the preponderance of male contributors who decry the absence of African women in academic philosophy, it seems highly disturbing that projects like this have not been taken over by female academic philosophers. That women have not been the ones responding to the Oruka challenge is as baffling as it is discomforting to us male researchers. Doesn’t this salvaging mission also suggest the prevalence of patriarchal regimes in academics?