The (Not so) Strange Rise of Donald J. Trump

In: On the Question of Truth in the Era of Trump
Mike Cole
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In the early hours of the morning on November 9, 2016, the unthinkable became reality—a ruthless, sociopathic, racist, misogynist, disabilist, climate change denying real estate mogul and reality TV star became the first billionaire president of the United States of America. (Cole, 2019, p. 1)

This was my initial response to the election of America’s forty-fifth president. I want to take the opportunity in this Foreword to sketch the political, economic and ideological backdrop to the ascendancy and resilience of Donald J. Trump in order to set the context for the chapters in Faith Agostinone-Wilson’s admirable and much-needed edited collection.

Valerie Scatamburlo-D’Annibale (2019) has provided a useful summary of ongoing analyses of what contributed to the election victory of Trump. I have not addressed all of Scatamburlo-D’Annibale’s contributory factors and have also adapted the order in which she lists them, so that they slot into the purpose, structure, presentation and flow of my own narrative. The statistics in this Foreword, unless otherwise stated, were gathered in May/June 2019.

As Scatamburlo-D’Annibale (2019) puts it, more than two years “after Donald Trump’s ascendancy to the White House, post-mortems of the 2016 American election continue to explore the factors that propelled him to office” (p. 69). Some factors are specific to the actual campaign and election, while others contributed to Trump’s victory, but by their very nature, are more enduring. Here I will restrict my attention to the latter, beginning with what I believe to be supplementary factors and concluding with what I consider to be the primary contributing factor: the crisis in neoliberalism and the rise of right-wing populism.

Some Supplementary Factors

First, Christian Fuchs (2018a) reveals the harmful role that social media plays in facilitating the rise of authoritarianism in the US. In his words, the “age of authoritarian capitalism is the age of social media, big data and fake news” (Fuchs, 2018b, para. 3). Trump has a constantly growing 60.5 million followers on Twitter, 25.4 million on Facebook and 13 million on Instagram. The result, Fuchs (2018b) argues, of the combination of authoritarian capitalism and capitalist “social” media is the decline of the public sphere and democracy. This is all exacerbated by the far-right. The alt-right, in particular, has made massive use of social media to spread its essentially anti-democratic and fascist world views, encompassing rampant antisemitism and other racist tropes, as well as misogyny and disablism (see Cole, 2019, pp. 52–77). The alt-right has also been a prominent street movement. However, it should be pointed out that Antifa has been very successful since Trump’s election in challenging the alt-right, and in curtailing its ability to promote its fascist message (see Cole, 2019, pp. 91–94).

In addition, the mainstream media enabled Trump’s rise by lavishing attention on his every utterance (Pickard, 2016), often conveyed via Twitter, and continues to do so. Trump knows full well how to get the media’s attention and how to manipulate it (Klein, 2018). dana boyd (self-styled lower case), founder and president of Data and Society, a research institute, explains how the manipulation process works. Media manipulators:

  • Create spectacle, using social media to get news media coverage.

  • Frame the spectacle through phrases that drive new audiences to find your frames through search engines.

  • Become a “digital martyr” to help radicalize others (Klein, 2018, para. 7).

Klein (2018) shows how this works with Trump. First, he uses Twitter to create spectacle on social media, deploying “catchy and unusual frames” (“FAKE NEWS! the true Enemy of the People”) that sympathizers can search for to find supporting evidence or fellow loyalists” (para. 26). He then makes use of the media’s aggrieved or simply truth-telling reaction to paint himself as a victim of endless media bias (“90 percent of the coverage of everything this president does is negative”):

The media then reacts in the only way that makes any sense given the situation: We cover Trump’s statements as outrageous and aberrant; we make clear where he’s lied or given succor to violent paranoiacs; we fret over the future of the free press. And then Trump and his loyalists point to our overwhelmingly negative coverage and say, “See? Told you they were the opposition party.” (para. 27)

“Trump, in other words,” Klein (2018) concludes, “manipulates the media using the same tactics as a run-of-the-mill alt-right troll, and for much the same reason” (para. 29). Trump wants to encourage the media to fight him so that he gets more coverage. This, in turn, shows how biased they are against him, thus driving attention “to the things he’s saying, to the conspiracies he’s popularizing, and to himself” (para. 31). “The problem is,” Klein concludes, is that “Donald Trump isn’t your run-of-the-mill troll. He’s the president of the United States of America” (para. 33).

Quoting Kelly Wilz (2016), Scatamburlo-D’Annibale (2019) secondly refers to “deep-rooted misogyny that worked against Hillary Clinton” (p. 70). Fast-forward three years and Trump’s ongoing sexism and misogyny and their societal effects persist unabated (e.g. Cohen, 2018; Cole, 2019, pp. 16–17). At the time of writing, there is developing a major backlash against abortion rights. As Sarah Bates (2019) explains, the United States is “a dangerous place to be a woman” (para. 1). Since Trump’s inauguration, an onslaught of laws has chipped away at abortion rights, with twenty-one states “hostile” or “very hostile” to abortion rights (BBC News, 2019), the plan being to reverse Roe v Wade that made abortion a legal right in 1973 and has been under attack from the right-wing ever since (Bates, 2019). As Bates points out, while abortion attacks did not begin with Trump, it is no surprise that Trump who boasts of sexually assaulting women and who has said that women who have abortions should get “some form of punishment” has overseen these attacks on a women’s right to choose. Hannah Thomas-Peter (2019), US correspondent for Sky News believes that abortion might “become the social issue that defines America’s elections in 2020” (para. 1).

Third, Scatamburlo-D’Annibale (2019, p. 70) refers to the “backlash against Barack Obama, sedimented racism and the demonization of diversity as a public good” (Major, Blodorn & Blascovich, 2016; Shafer, 2017). At this point, we should be reminded that the country that we now know as the United States of America has always been a racist configuration. Racism perhaps began in 1492 when Christopher Columbus, looking for a new trade route to India, landed in the “New World” by mistake. Following his misinterpretation, Indigenous Americans then faced, like enslaved Africans who arrived in the late 1500s, centuries of institutional racism, underpinned by a white supremacist belief system that racialized the great civilisations of the First Nations and of Africa, respectively as “savages” and “negroes.” When Mexico become independent from Spain after the 1821 revolution, Latinx peoples were also subject to colonization, exploitation, racialization and racist oppression. Exploitation racialization and racist oppression has been continuous to the present day (for a comprehensive analysis of the various manifestations of racism in the US from the arrival of Columbus up to the immediate pre-Trump era, see Cole, 2016, pp. 87–133).

Under Trump, racism has plummeted to new depths. In addition to augmenting his hatred and disgust of people who are not white, both verbally and by policy initiatives, Trump’s aim is to appease his white racist supporters, as well as, as we shall see, his fascist followers in the alt-right. Trump’s racism has impacted on a wide constituency, including Muslims, Native Americans, on Black Americans and Latinx Americans (see Cole, 2019, pp. 25–37 for a detailed analysis). Most infamous is Trump’s obsession with “the Wall” and his vicious anti-immigration policies. For example, between December 2018 and May, 2019, five children died in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody (Diaz, 2019) As Norisa Diaz (2019) puts it:

The tragic deaths of the five children underscore the brutality of the prison detention camps and xenophobic anti-immigrant policies celebrated by the Trump administration. At a campaign rally earlier this month in Panama City, Florida, President Donald Trump joked and laughed when one supporter called out that agents should just “shoot” migrants. Life is indeed cheap at the border. (para. 4)

Fourth, there is Scatamburlo-D’Annibale’s (2019) own focus: “how Trump capitalized on the right’s decades-long crusade against ‘political correctness’ (PC)” (p. 70). Throughout his campaign, she reminds us, “Trump derided PC, blaming it for a vast array of perceived social ills while concomitantly deploying anti-PC rhetoric—to inoculate his own racism and sexism from criticism” (p. 70). His supporters celebrated this as “telling it like it is” (p. 70). Trump, she went on, “positioned himself as a culture warrior rather than a politician” and one of his campaign’s distinguishing characteristics was “giving the finger to ‘political correctness in the name of freedom of expression” (Williams, 2016, p. 3, cited in Scatamburlo-D’Annibale’s, 2019, pp. 70–71).

The Crisis in Neoliberalism and Right-Wing Populism

I now turn to what I consider the overriding determinant of Trump’s rise and resilience. As Scatamburlo-D’Annibale (2019) argues, many of the above explanations for the ascendancy of Trump “are, undoubtedly, intertwined and compelling” (p. 70). However, it is her first listed factor that I want to concentrate on here: “the spread of right-wing populism in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis that also culminated in Brexit in Europe” (p. 70; see also: Kagarlitsky, 2017; Tufts & Thomas, 2017). In order to do so, I begin with the crisis in neoliberalism.

There is broad agreement that the neoliberal world order and the free-trade globalization that the United States has pioneered since the end of the Cold War is in crisis. This general acknowledgement incorporates a growing realisation by the ruling class that neoliberalism is not working for capitalists as it should be. As Tom Bramble (2018) puts it:

That neoliberalism in the West is in crisis is widely accepted across the political spectrum and is a topic that features regularly in the leading international press and in discussions at the highest levels of the ruling class and their advisers at forums and institutions such as Davos, the IMF, OECD, World Bank and the World Economic Forum. (para. 1)

However, whereas the ruling class refer to a crisis in the “liberal international order” (e.g. Wolf, 2018), for Marxists (e.g. Davidson, 2013; Plavšić, 2017; Bramble, 2018) the crisis in neoliberalism is a crisis in neoliberal capitalism itself. As Bramble (2018) puts it, “the crisis has multiple elements, political, economic, social and imperial, which arise out of the organic workings of the capitalist system” (para. 2). “The various elements,” he goes on, “are not superimposed on the system from outside but are the contemporary forms that capitalist crisis in the West takes in the early twenty-first century,” a particular feature being the nexus between its economic and political facets. The crisis, he goes on, is indicated by two major developments (para. 2).

Inequality, Popular Discontent, and Distrust of Elites

First, there is popular discontent with the austerity and inequality that neoliberalism has produced. The most visible indicator is wealth inequality, as revealed for example by the Forbes magazine list of the nation’s 400 richest. In 2018, the three men topping the list—Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Microsoft founder Bill Gates, and investor Warren Buffett—held combined fortunes worth more than the total wealth of the poorest half of Americans, while the richest 5 per cent of Americans were shown to own two-thirds of the wealth (Inequality. Org., 2018).

Moreover, as Bernie Sanders (2019) explains, while “Donald Trump tells us the US economy is “absolutely booming,” the “strongest we’ve ever had” and ‘the greatest in the history of America,’” he is right that the economy could not be better for the top 1% and for corporate America in general (para. 1). For average workers, on the other hand, between January 2018 and January 2019, wages were up just $9.11 a week after adjusting for inflation. At the same time, “the price of healthcare, prescription drugs, housing, childcare and a college education continue to go through the roof” (para. 11). Moreover, workers’ tax cuts end in 2025.

The blatant success of neoliberalism to skew the wealth of the world more and more in favor of the super-rich has led to deep skepticism, as has the ongoing relentless pursuit of US imperialism (e.g. Cole, 2017, pp. 141–144). As Graeme Wood (2017) puts it, in reflecting on the way in which modern media gives both popular access to world events and serves to mystify the global processes of capital accumulation, and in the process, alienates the populace, rendering angry people open to right-wing extremism:

The world may be no more complicated now than it was in the past, but exposure to more aspects of it has proved disorienting to many Americans. Far-off wars and economies determine, or seem to determine, the fates o more and more people. Government has grown so complicated and abstract that people have come to doubt its abstractions altogether, and swap them for the comforting, visceral truths of power and identity. (para. 70)

The crisis is the direct result of decades of unbridled neoliberal capitalism, to which masses of people have become estranged, and that has led to seething discontent, rage, and frustration in large part directed at the established political elite. The great recession of 2008–2013, triggered by the 2007/2008 financial crisis, has also had an enduring ideological impact:

Everything that the politicians and economists and bankers had told their populations for two decades about the superiority of free markets turned out to be false. Free markets, it appeared, were responsible instead for the devastation of the world economy. The blatant white-collar crime revealed in the most respectable banks only added to the ideological turmoil. No longer could the ruling class just dismiss critics of the ‘free market’ as throwbacks to an old and superseded order. For the first time, criticisms of the neoliberal order were published on a regular basis in the leading organs of the world’s press. (Bramble, 2018, para. 18)

Resurgence of Nationalism and Asymmetric Imperialism

Second, in addition to popular discontent and distrust of elites, we are witnessing a growing realisation by the ruling class that the neoliberal economic revolution has run its course and that US hegemony is at risk from a new rival, China (Bramble, 2018). This necessitated a resurgence of nationalism and protectionism, and, in the persona of Trump, a phony appeal to white workers. While Hillary Clinton and the rest of her establishment politicians tried to hide their hard-line neoliberal capitalist agenda “under the banner of equality, justice and prosperity for all” (McLaren, 2018, personal correspondence) it was Donald Trump who seized the opportunity to pursue the vote of the dispossessed. He did this by cynically claiming to come to the rescue of the poor white workers in the rust belt, created by the onward march of the fourth industrial revolution: (see the Afterword to this volume), who refused to vote for the establishment figure Clinton and provided a groundswell of support for her populist opponent. For a full analysis of those who voted for Trump, see BBC News (2016). Trump promised to Make America Great Again and to create a decent future for the forgotten white working class by putting the US first. His unexpected victory also emboldened, energized, and served to bring a degree of legitimacy to the fascist alt-right (see Cole, 2019, pp. 47–77).

While Trump retains certain neoliberal policies at home (deregulation, privatization, and permanent tax cuts for the wealthy; those for the working class expire in 2025), his international policies represent a significant shift away from global “free trade” and can be seen as attempting to retreat from the post-Cold War grand strategy of the United States overseeing the international free-trade regime, in favor of economic nationalism. Trump’s nationalism is epitomised by his scrapping of Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. This would have been the largest regional trade accord in history, setting new terms for trade and business investment among the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations (Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore and New Zealand) “a far-flung group with an annual gross domestic product of nearly $28 trillion” representing “roughly 40 percent of global G.D.P. and one-third of world trade” (Granville, 2017, para. 1). As Granville explains,

the agreement, a hallmark of the Obama administration, became a flashpoint in the United States presidential campaign, where it was opposed by the nominees of both major parties as a symbol of failed globalism and the loss of United States jobs overseas. (para. 2)

Rising international tensions, especially between the United States, China, and Russia, fill the daily headlines (Granville, 2017). Smith (2019) refers to “a new period of imperialism,” in which the “unipolar world order based on the dominance of the United States, which has been eroding for some time, has been replaced by an asymmetric multipolar world order” (para. 2).

Trump’s Fascistic Brand of Nationalism

The ruling class historically calls out fascism in times of capitalist crisis, and Trump’s particular brand of nationalism resonates with Michael Mann’s (2004) elucidation of nationalism, one of five fascism-associated key terms drawn from his understanding of its actual existence in six European countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Spain in the post-World War 1 era. Mann makes five observations about fascist nationalism. First, he argues that “fascists had a deep and populist commitment to an ‘organic’ or ‘integral’ nation,” with an “unusually strong sense of its ‘enemies,’” both in other countries and at home (p. 13). Second, fascists had “a very low tolerance of ethnic or cultural diversity, since this would subvert the organic, integral unity of the nation” (p. 13). Third, aggression against “enemies” supposedly threatening this organic unity is the source of fascism’s extremism. Fourth, “race” is an ascribed characteristic, something we are born with and keep until we die. Fifth, fascists have a vision of the rebirth of an ancient nation, adapted to modern times. To this I would add that fascism is against internationalism in all its forms, and, once in power, fascists attempt to centralize authority under a dictatorship and to promote belligerent nationalism, with only one party allowed and all others crushed.

Relating these features to Trump, we can say with confidence that he has a deep and populist commitment to an integral nation and an “unusually strong sense of its enemies” both at home and abroad. This includes “aggression against them.” Trump also has a very low tolerance of ethnic or cultural diversity—seen as a threat to the integral unity of the nation. I also suspect that he believes that “race” is an ascribed characteristic. At home, his multifaceted racist rhetoric and policy agenda is well documented (e.g. Cole, 2019).

Overseas, the combative megalomaniacal Trump fits perfectly into this new period of imperialism. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign affairs means that he will regularly verbally attack, abuse and threaten other nations and their leaders, while also attempting (often simultaneously) to make deals that he feels are in his best interests and those of capitalists operating on US soil. It should be underlined here that, demagogic appeals to labor aside, Trump’s populism is not aimed at benefiting American workers, although, of course, providing jobs boosts his electoral appeal: his program is intended to restore the competitive position of American capital, particularly manufacturing capital, against its rivals (Smith, 2019).

With respect to dictatorship, Trump shows no signs of actually banning other political parties at home, although it should be stressed that he is prepared to shutdown government in an attempt to get his own way, as he did in December, 2018, over Democrats’ opposition to his $5 billion border wall funding request. Moreover, earlier that year (in May 2018), he “joked” about having a longer stint in office than is allotted by the Constitution: “[u]nless they give me an extension for the presidency, which I don’t think the fake news media would be too happy about” (Reese, 2018, para. 2). As Reese points out, “Trump really loves this joke! During [an earlier meeting with donors], Trump commented that China’s president Xi Jingping has been given the title ‘president for life” (para. 4). Trump then added, “I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll want to give that a shot someday” (para. 4). More recently (in May, 2019) he retweeted conservative religious leader Jerry Falwell Jr., who had said the president should have two years added to his first term “as pay back for time stolen by this corrupt failed coup,” a reference to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s lengthy investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election (Corbett, 2019, para. 1).

As Corbett points out:

Trump then went on a tweet storm of his own, arguing that “they have stolen two years of my (our) Presidency.” In a follow up tweet, the president added, “The Witch Hunt is over but we will never forget.” Despite the tremendous success that I have had as President, including perhaps the greatest ECONOMY and most successful first two years of any President in history, they have stolen two years of my (our) Presidency (Collusion Delusion) that we will never be able to get back. (para. 3)

The previous month (April, 2019) he had also “joked” about extending his presidency, after receiving an award at an event for the Wounded Warrior Project, held the same day Mueller’s report was released to the public:

Well, this is really beautiful. This will find a permanent place, at least for six years, in the Oval Office. Is that okay? I was going to joke, General, and say at least for 10 or 14 years, but we would cause bedlam if I said that, so we’ll say six. (Corbett, 2019, paras. 8–9)

That he is indeed serious about a possible dictatorship is further revealed in an interview with Democratic House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi in The New York Times. Pelosi said she didn’t trust Trump to respect the results of the upcoming election if he lost, unless a Democratic candidate won by an overwhelming majority (Corbett, 2019). Finally, Michael Cohen, the president’s former personal lawyer of 10 years, stated to the House oversight committee early 2019 that he worries “there will never be a peaceful transition of power” if Trump loses in 2020 (Corbett, 2019, para. 15).

Despite these and other similarities with classical fascism (see Cole, 2019, pp. 8–24), whether Trump can accurately be described as (neo-) fascist has been the subject of much debate. My own view is that it is factually more appropriate to refer to him as “fascistic,” in that he leans towards fascism, is open to certain fascist ideas, defends fascists on the ground, and is perhaps ready to discuss fascism in private, or adopt one or more fascist policies in public given the right set of political and economic circumstances.

As for the present, if one ideological endeavour dominates the presidency of the fascistic Trump, it is his ongoing attempt to normalise American racism that in turn also serves to enable and empower the far-right, most notably the alt-right. Twitter is now viewed as the platform with the most Nazis on it (apart from perhaps 8chan) (Feldman, 2019) while the use by the alt-right of YouTube is now as important for the video-sharing website as music (Bergen, 2019; Feldman, 2019). During Trump’s state visit to the UK in June, 2019, London Labour May Sadiq Khan described him as the “poster boy of the far-right movement around the world” (Stubley, 2019, para. 1). Later that month, as if to verify Khan’s remark, Trump kicked off the 2020 presidential campaign with a fascistic rally, where the unchallenged leader to the Republican Party “appeared to be bidding for the role of Führer rather than seeking to win a majority of votes in a democratic election” (Martin, 2019, para. 3). Martin describes the event:

In a typically meandering and incoherent presentation, riddled with lies, exaggerations and vicious slanders, Trump vilified immigrants, attacked the media (whose reporters at the rally he denounced repeatedly, prompting catcalls and threats from his supporters), and denounced the Democratic Party, which he described as “radical,” “un-American,” “socialist,” “extreme,” “depraved” and guilty of “the greatest betrayal of the American middle class, and, frankly, American life.” (para. 4)

Martin (2019) goes on, “When he said, at one point, ‘Our Radical Democrat opponents are driven by hatred, prejudice and rage,’ he was clearly engaged in projection” (para. 5). Moreover, he spent much of his speech re-fighting the 2016 election, rehashing attacks on Hillary Clinton and encouraging chants of “lock her up” from the crowd. He concluded with the following assertion, reminiscent of classical fascism: “We are one movement, one people, one family and one glorious nation under God” (para. 6). More generally, the Trump agenda, as witnessed in the chapters of this book, depends on the denial of the existence of “truth” which for Trumpism reads, as Faith Agostinone-Wilson argues in the Introduction, “truth that doesn’t privilege nationalist, white, patriarchal capitalism.”

Trump’s Denial of Climate Change

Trump’s denial of climate change possibly surpasses even fascism in its potential consequences for humankind. Also, on his UK state visit, after denying that he had called Meghan Markle, “nasty”; claiming that the large anti-Trump demonstration, widely reported with media footage and within Trump’s earshot, was “fake news”; and stating that Theresa May was probably a better negotiator than him, he moved on to some earth-shattering (literally) fake news. In an interview with his friend, Piers Morgan on ITV, Trump revealed that he had informed Prince Charles, a passionate advocate of action on climate-change, that the US “right now has among the cleanest climates there are based on all statistics, and it’s even getting better because I agree with that we want the best water, the cleanest water” (Harvey, 2019, para. 1).

Environment correspondent for The Guardian, Fiona Harvey (2019) reminds us of the reality of US damage to the ecosystem, by focusing on eight serious issues. First, despite his claim to Morgan, Trump’s recent actions on water have been an attempt to roll back decades of progress. For example, in December 2019, Trump announced plans to undo or weaken federal rules that protect millions of acres of wetlands and thousands of miles of streams from pesticide run-off (the movement of water and any contaminants across the soil surface) and other pollutants.

Second, there are greenhouse gas emissions, of which the US is the biggest emitter, after China, with Climate Action Tracker (2019) estimating that the US will not meet the carbon reduction targets of 26–28% that were set by Obama below 2005 levels by 2025.

Third, Harvey (2019) notes that, as a result of fracking, the US is one of the world’s biggest gas producers, with about half of its oil coming from this production method. This requires the blasting of dense shale rock with water, sand and chemicals to release the tiny bubbles of fossil fuel trapped inside, and comes at a cost, since the vast water requirements are draining some areas dry. Moreover, pollutants near fracking sites include heavy metals, chemicals that disrupt hormones, and particulates (matter in the form of minute separate particles). The effects range from memory and learning difficulties to behavioural problems. An additional contributor to climate change is leaks of “fugitive” methane.

Fourth, the US fossil fuel industry is seeking new grounds for exploration—among them, the pristine Alaskan wilderness, with drilling in the Alaskan wildlife reserve a key Trump policy.

Fifth, the Trump administration has loosened regulations on fuel efficiency, already less stringent than in many other countries, for cars and vans. It is feared this will increase greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution.

Seventh, we have Trump’s notorious denial of climate change. As a result, according to a YouGov poll in collaboration with The Guardian (Milman & Harvey, 2019), the US has some of the highest rates of climate change denial in the world.

Seventh, and related to this is Trump’s infamous decision to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement of 2015 which, although it doesn’t take effect until after the next presidential election, has emboldened other countries considering withdrawal, notably Brazil, and has increased the influence of the fossil fuel lobbyists.

Finally, Harvey refers to the rolling back of Obama-era measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from power plants that threatens air pollution as coal-fired power stations will be able to spew out toxins once more. I return to the fundamental issue of climate change and the other themes of this Foreword in the Afterword to this book.


  • Collapse
  • Expand
  • Chapter 1 Introduction
  • Chapter 2 Endless Babbling and the Contradictory Nature of Truth in the Rise of Trump
  • Chapter 3 Post-Truth in the Age of Trump
  • Chapter 4 Twitter and Trumpism
  • Chapter 5 The Populist Masquerade of Attributing Trump’s Win to “Economic Anxiety” among White Voters
  • Chapter 6 The Gospel According to White Christian Nationalism
  • Chapter 7 White Stupidification and the Need for Dialectical Thought in the Age of Trump
  • Chapter 8 Conclusion
  • Chapter 9 Afterword: Ecological Catastrophe in the Fourth Industrial Revolution


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